#windows

An issue was discovered in the 3CX Phone System Management Console prior to version 18 Update 3 FINAL. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse improperly secured access to arbitrary files on the server, leading to cleartext credential disclosure. Afterwards, the authenticated attacker is able to upload a file that overwrites a 3CX service binary, leading to Remote Code Execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows installations. Versions prior to version 18, Hotfix 1 Build 18.0.3.461 March 2022, are prone to an additional unauthenticated file system access to C:\Windows\System32.

An issue was discovered in the 3CX Phone System Management Console prior to version 18 Update 3 FINAL. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse improperly secured access to arbitrary files on the server, leading to cleartext credential disclosure. Afterwards, the authenticated attacker is able to upload a file that overwrites a 3CX service binary, leading to Remote Code Execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows installations. Versions prior to version 18, Hotfix 1 Build 18.0.3.461 March 2022, are prone to an additional unauthenticated file system access to C:\Windows\System32.

CTBLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Cerber ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

LockerGoga ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. Four processes are created. For instance, there is "imtvknqq9737.exe" running under AppData\Local\Temp, the process name is "imtvknqq" plus an appended random number. Our exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective, you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual ma...

Cryptowall ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

SQL Injection vulnerability in admin/group_list.php in piwigo v2.9.5, via the group parameter to delete.

SQL Injection vulnerability in cat_move.php in piwigo v2.9.5, via the selection parameter to move_categories.

SQL Injection vulnerability in admin/user_perm.php in piwigo v2.9.5, via the cat_false parameter to admin.php?page=user_perm.