Headline
Ewon Cosy+ Password Disclosure
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance in industrial environments. The credentials used for the basic authentication against the web interface of Cosy+ are stored in the cookie “credentials” after a successful login. An attacker with access to a victim’s browser is able to retrieve the administrative password of Cosy+.
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Advisory ID: SYSS-2024-017
Product: Ewon Cosy+
Manufacturer: HMS Industrial Networks AB
Affected Version(s): Firmware Versions: < 21.2s10 and < 22.1s3
Tested Version(s): Firmware Version: 21.2s7
Vulnerability Type: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie (CWE-315)
Risk Level: Low
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2024-03-27
Solution Date: 2024-07-18
Public Disclosure: 2024-08-11
CVE Reference: CVE-2024-33892
Author of Advisory: Moritz Abrell, SySS GmbH
Overview:
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance
in industrial environments.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):
"The Ewon Cosy+ gateway establishes a secure VPN connection between
the machine (PLC, HMI, or other devices) and the remote engineer.
The connection happens through Talk2m, a highly secured industrial
cloud service. The Ewon Cosy+ makes industrial remote access easy
and secure like never before!"
Due to cleartext storage of the password in a cookie, an attacker with
appropriate access is able to retrieve the plaintext administrative
password.
Vulnerability Details:
The credentials used for the basic authentication against the web
interface of Cosy+ are stored in the cookie “credentials” after a
successful login.
An attacker with access to a victim’s browser is able to retrieve the
administrative password of Cosy+.
In addition, the cookie is not secured (no HttpOnly, Secure or
SameSite attribute is set). Thus, the credentials could also be extracted
in combination with cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
Note: During the responsible disclosure process, SySS GmbH became aware of
CVE-2015-7928[8], which describes an issue with password autocomplete
in Ewon devices. Since this function contains the problematic cookie,
this CVE may already describe the insecure cookie. SySS GmbH would therefore
like to credit the reporter of CVE-2015-7928, Karn Ganeshen.
Proof of Concept (PoC):
1. "credentials" cookie value: YWRtOlN1cDNyUzNjcjN0IyM=
2. Decoded credentials:
#> echo -n "YWRtOlN1cDNyUzNjcjN0IyM=" | base64 -d
adm:Sup3rS3cr3t##
Bonus: accessing the cookie from JavaScript code:
<script>alert("Credentials can be access via JavaScript" + document.cookie)</script>
Solution:
According to the manufacturer note[4], the vulnerability was fixed
with the firmware versions 21.2s10 and 22.1s3.
Disclosure Timeline:
2024-03-26: Vulnerability discovered
2024-03-27: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2024-04-02: Inquiry about the status
2024-04-05: Manufacturer acknowlegded the vulnerability and started the
analysis
2024-04-10: Two more vulnerabilities reported to the manufacturer
(SYSS-2024-032 and SYSS-2024-033)
2024-04-11: Manufacturer acknowlegded the vulnerabilities and asked for
a publication date for all findings
2024-04-12: Proposed dates for a discussion about publication
2024-04-15: Manufacturer sent a technical overview of planned remediation
actions and details about the planned timeline
2024-04-15: Acknowlegded the remediation actions and asked the manufacturer
to assign a CVE ID
2024-04-30: CVE ID CVE-2024-33893[5] assigned by the manufacturer
2024-05-31: Manufacturer informed that the fix is in completion stage and
asked if the blog post[6] can be reviewed by HMS
2024-06-04: Proposed dates to review the blog post draft
2024-06-21: Inquiry about the status
2024-06-21: Received an out-of-office auto reply
2024-07-01: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-04: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-12: Inquiry about the status and letting the manufacturer know that
the vulnerability will be published within a talk at DEF CON[7]
in August
2024-07-12: Manufacturer responded that the fix is planned by the end of
July; manufacturer asked again for reviewing the blog post
draft
2024-07-12: Again confirmed reviewing the blog post is possible and asking
for the sending of details
2024-07-17: Blog post provided to HMS
2024-07-18: Fixed firmware versions 21.2s10 and 22.1s3 released by HMS
2024-07-23: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-23: Manufacturer reviewed the blog post and confirmed that a
fix is provided
2024-07-29: Discussion with HMS about the blog post and final publication
actions
2024-08-11: Vulnerability disclosed at DEF CON[7]
2024-08-11: Blog post published[6]
References:
[1] Ewon Cosy+ product website
https://www.hms-networks.com/p/ec71330-00ma-ewon-cosy-ethernet
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2024-017
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-017.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] Manufacturer note
https://hmsnetworks.blob.core.windows.net/nlw/docs/default-source/products/cybersecurity/security-advisory/hms-security-advisory-2024-07-29-001–ewon-several-cosy–vulnerabilities.pdf
[5] CVE-2024-33892
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-33892
[6] Blog post
https://blog.syss.com/posts/hacking-a-secure-industrial-remote-access-gateway/
[7] DEF CON talk
https://defcon.org/html/defcon-32/dc-32-speakers.html#54521
[8] CVE-2015-7928
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-7928
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Abrell of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail:[email protected]
Public Key:https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Abrell.asc
Key Fingerprint: 2927 7EB6 1A20 0679 79E9 87E6 AE0C 9BF8 F134 8B53
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
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