Nomad Community and Nomad Enterprise ("Nomad") allocations are vulnerable to privilege escalation within a namespace through unredacted workload identity tokens. This vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-12678, is fixed in Nomad Community Edition 1.9.4 and Nomad Enterprise 1.9.4, 1.8.8, and 1.7.16.

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.

Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.

User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.

Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.

Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.

Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.

GHSA-hr68-hvgv-xxqf: Hashicorp Nomad Incorrect Privilege Assignment vulnerability

Cyberattacks against OT/ICS engineering workstations are widely underestimated, according to researchers who discovered malware designed to shut down Siemens workstation engineering processes.

Source: Constantine Johnny via Alamy Stock Photo

NEWS BRIEF

Operational technology (OT) and Industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly exposed to compromise through engineering workstations. A new malware developed to kill stations running Siemens systems joins a growing list of botnets and worms working to infiltrate industrial networks through these on-premises, Internet-connected attack vectors.

Forescout researchers reported the discovery of the Siemens malware, which they called "Chaya\_003." But that's hardly an isolated case. The researchers also found two Mitsubishi engineering workstations compromised by the Ramnit worm, they explained in a new report.

"Malware in OT/ICS is more common than you think — and engineering workstations connected to the Internet are targets," the Forescout team warned.

Researchers from SANS said engineering workstation compromise accounts for more than 20% of OT cybersecurity incidents, the report noted. Botnets targeting OT systems, which the report said includes Aisuru, Kaiten, and Gafgyt, rely on Internet-connected devices to infiltrate networks.

Engineering workstations make excellent targets for cyberattack because they are on-premises stations running traditional operating systems as well as specialized software tools provided by vendors such as the Siemens TIA portal or Mitsubishi GX Works, the Forescout team wrote.

To defend against these campaigns, OT/ICS network operators should ensure engineering workstations are protected and that there is adequate network segmentation, and implement an ongoing threat monitoring program.

The report acknowledges malware developed specifically for OT environments is relatively rare compared with efforts put behind enterprise compromises, "but there’s little room to sleep easily if you’re a security operator in OT or manage industrial control system security," the researchers added.

**About the Author**

Dark Reading

Becky Bracken is a veteran multimedia journalist covering cybersecurity for Dark Reading.

OT/ICS Engineering Workstations Face Barrage of Fresh Malware

Fortinet has patched CVE-2023-34990 in its Wireless LAN Manager (FortiWLM), which combined with CVE-2023-48782 could allow for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) and the ability to read all log files.

Source: Konstantin Nechaev via Alamy Stock Photo

NEWS BRIEF

Fortinet has finally patched a critical security vulnerability in its Wireless LAN Manager (FortiWLM) that could allow unauthenticated sensitive information disclosure. And, when chained with another issue, it could lead to remote code execution (RCE), a researcher warned.

The bug (CVE-2023-34990, CVSS 9.6) was first disclosed in March, when it was described as an "unauthenticated limited file read vulnerability" without a CVE.

"This issue results from the lack of input validation on request parameters allowing an attacker to traverse directories and read any log file on the system," Horizon3.ai security researcher Zach Hanley, who reported the bug to Fortinet, noted in March. He has confirmed to Dark Reading that the bug patched this week is the same issue.

He added, "Luckily for an attacker, the FortiWLM has very verbose logs — and logs the session ID of all authenticated users. Abusing the above arbitrary log file read, an attacker can now obtain the session ID of a user and login and also abuse authenticated endpoints."

NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD) has noted that the flaw can also be used to "execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted Web requests" — thanks to the access it provides to those authenticated endpoints.

The bug affects FortiWLM versions 8.6.0 through 8.6.5 (fixed in 8.6.6 or above) and versions 8.5.0 through 8.5.4 (fixed in 8.5.5 or above).

**Combining Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Achieve RCE**

Hanley back in March flagged a potential exploit chain as well: When CVE-2023-34990 is combined with an authenticated command-injection bug that Fortinet patched last year (CVE-2023-48782, CVSS 8.8), it becomes another recipe for RCE.

This second issue allows an attacker who has used CVE-2023-34990 to gain access to an authenticated endpoint to, from there, inject a crafted malicious string in a request to the /ems/cgi-bin/ezrf\_switches.cgi endpoint that will be executed with root privileges.

"Combining both the unauthenticated arbitrary log file read and this authenticated command injection, an unauthenticated attacker can obtain remote code execution in the context of root," Hanley explained. "This endpoint is accessible for both low privilege users and admins."

Admins should patch the Fortinet appliances ASAP, given the vendor's status as a most-favored cyberattack target.

**About the Author**

Tara Seals has 20+ years of experience as a journalist, analyst and editor in the cybersecurity, communications and technology space. Prior to Dark Reading, Tara was Editor in Chief at Threatpost, and prior to that, the North American news lead for Infosecurity Magazine. She also spent 13 years working for Informa (formerly Virgo Publishing), as executive editor and editor-in-chief at publications focused on both the service provider and the enterprise arenas. A Texas native, she holds a B.A. from Columbia University, lives in Western Massachusetts with her family and is on a never-ending quest for good Mexican food in the Northeast.

Fortinet Addresses Unpatched Critical RCE Vector

In the last newsletter of the year, Thorsten recalls his tech-savvy gift to his family and how we can all incorporate cybersecurity protections this holiday season.

Thursday, December 19, 2024 14:02

Welcome to the final Threat Source newsletter of 2024. 

Watching "Die Hard" during the Christmas season has become a widely recognized tradition for many, despite ongoing debates about its classification as a Christmas movie. I know it isn't everyone's cup of tea. Whether you like the movie or not, let me share a story about what didn't quite go as planned in my family last year.  

When  some celebrities had their social media accounts compromised, I saw it as the perfect opportunity to introduce my family to the world of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for their online accounts. Our home IT setup is diverse— With Linux, Macs, Windows; Androids, iOS, we needed something cross-platform. Also, we needed a user-friendly solution as we have both standard users and IT experts (never underestimate your users). From my professional standpoint, I decided to go “all in” with hardware tokens - they work cross platform and "survive" one or the other OS installs from scratch. Providing two for each person was mandatory in case one got lost, which had happened to me already. So it wasn't a cheap exercise. In my defense, this was before the side-channel attack EUCLEAK was discovered, which has since expanded to affect more products as noted in the first release. 

In the spirit of John McClane : “Now I know what a TV dinner feels like.” 

The kids found the gift "boring" and almost a year later, the adoption rate is still only 30%. Fortunately, my wife had the foresight to prepare real presents for the family, saving Christmas Eve from being a "bad guys win" scenario. (Only John Thor can drive somebody that crazy.) 

I share this anecdote not to discourage you, but to help you avoid making the same mistake and risking your celebrations. Unless everyone gathered around the Christmas tree is an infosec professional, it might not be the time to go "Yippee-ki-yay Mr Falcon" with tech gifts.  

However, spending time with loved ones is a great opportunity to discuss the trends and importance of cybersecurity. We've been highlighting compromised credentials for a long time, as seen in our previous posts \[here\], \[here\], \[here\] and \[here\]. For the fourth consecutive time in over a year, the most observed means of gaining initial access was the use of valid accounts, making it clear identity-based attacks are becoming more prevalent, and wont be gone anytime soon. 

 Advocate for the use of a password managers—there are paid versions with family plans on one end, and excellent open-source alternatives on the other. Avoid storing credentials in browsers, as they can be extracted by info-stealers. Consider using passkeys where possible. According to the fido alliance, more than 20% of the world's top 100 websites support passkeys already. If passkeys are not yet enabled for one of your services? Any MFA is better than none. Even using "just" TOTP in a software container is a significant improvement over just a password. 

But it's not just about enabling MFA. As Martin wrote last week, we need to close the gap by communicating and understanding the the threat landscape. When it comes to stolen credentials, share resources like https://haveibeenpwned.com/ or https://sec.hpi.de/ilc/?lang=en with your loved ones so they can check if their email has been part of a breach.   

If you decide not to bother your friends & famliy (though I strongly believe Mbappe, Sweeny and Odenkirk would have preferred a more secure account) with Account/Password Hygiene, there are some more work related recommendations in Hazel’s “How are attackers trying to bypass MFA” 

Whichever is your idea of Christmas, then, like Argyle said, "I gotta be here for New Year's!"  

We look forward to seeing you in 2025!   

**The one big thing**

At the time of writing, our Vulnerability Research Team Disclosed 207 Vulnerabilities, and had another 93 reported to the respective Vendor in 2024.  Di you know  Talos has a team which investigates software and operating system vulnerabilities in order to discover them before malicious threat actors do? Every day, they try to find vulnerabilities that have not yet been discovered, and then work to provide a fix for those before a zero-day threat could ever be executed. 

**Why do I care? **

We see threat actors exploiting known vulnerabilities constantly. Sometimes those CVEs are Years old.  

**So now what? **

Maybe you want to check for some CVEs or conduct a network security assessments.   
You can our team’s reports,roundups,spotlights and deep dives on our blog. 

**Top security headlines of the week **

 Blackhat Europe 2024 took place Dec 9-12 in London, UK. Loaded with a lot of interesting Sessions, my favorites are “Vulnerabilities in the eSIM download protocol” and “Over the Air: Compromise of Modern Volkswagen Group Vehicles” both showing how far an attack surface can possibly extend.  

Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) says it blocked communication between appr. 30.000 Android IoT Devices which were sold with BadBox malware preinstalled, and their command and control (C2) infrastructure by sinkholing DNS queries (Bleeping Computer)  

Law enforcement agencies worldwide disrupted a holiday tradition for cybercriminals: launching Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Booter and stresser websites were taken down, administrators were arrested and over 300 users were identified for planned operational activities. (Europool) 

The Willow chip is not capable of breaking modern cryptography,” Google’s director of quantum tells The Verge.

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   The evolution and abuse of proxy networks 
*   Microsoft Patch Tuesday for December 2024 contains four critical vulnerabilities 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

  Cisco Live EMEA (February 9-14, 2025) 

Amsterdam, Netherlands 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA256:**873ee789a177e59e7f82d3030896b1efdebe468c2dfa02e41ef94978aadf006f   
**MD5:** d86808f6e519b5ce79b83b99dfb9294d    
**VirusTotal:**  
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/873ee789a177e59e7f82d3030896b1efdebe468c2dfa02e41ef94978aadf006f   
**Typical Filename:** n/a   
**Claimed Product:** n/a    
**Detection Name:** Win32.Trojan-Stealer.Petef.FPSKK8  

**SHA256:**9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507   
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**VirusTotal:**  
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** n/a    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Bitmin-9847045-0 

 **SHA 256:**  
7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5    
**MD5:** ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86    
**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5   
**Typical Filename:** endpoint.query    
**Claimed Product:** Endpoint-Collector    
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent  

 **SHA256:**47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca   
**MD5:** 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde   
**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca   
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe   
**Claimed Product:** n/a    
**Detection Name:** Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos 

 **SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5:**  
7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376    
**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91   
**Typical Filename:** IMG001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** Trojan/Win32.CoinMiner.R174018

Welcome to the party, pal!

Applications serving static resources through the functional web frameworks WebMvc.fn or WebFlux.fn are vulnerable to path traversal attacks. An attacker can craft malicious HTTP requests and obtain any file on the file system that is also accessible to the process in which the Spring application is running.

GHSA-g5vr-rgqm-vf78: Spring Framework Path Traversal vulnerability

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in SaxEventRecorder by QOS.CH logback version 1.5.12 on the Java platform, allows an attacker to forge requests by compromising logback configuration files in XML.
 
The attacks involves the modification of DOCTYPE declaration in  XML configuration files.

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-6v67-2wr5-gvf4: QOS.CH logback-core Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability

A newly discovered vulnerability, CVE-2024-53677, in the aging Apache framework is going to cause major headaches for IT teams, since patching isn't enough to fix it.

Source: ZUMA Press, Inc. via Alamy Stock Photo

A critical, stubborn new vulnerability in Apache Struts 2 may be under active exploitation already, and fixing it isn't as simple as downloading a patch.

Struts 2 is an open source framework for building Java applications. Though long past its prime, Struts 2 remains common in older legacy systems across industries. In fact, its prevalence combined with its agedness is what makes its newly discovered vulnerability — CVE-2024-53677, CVSS 9.5 — so tricky. As its components have withered, and newer technologies and security practices have moved on, fixing any newly arising issues like this can require more than just a standard patch. 

"The risk lies in the fact that older applications are less likely to be integrated with a modern CI/CD pipeline," explains Chris Wysopal, chief security evangelist at Veracode. "As a result, updating the Struts 2 library, building and deploying a new version of a vulnerable application requires more manual effort and takes significantly longer. This significant effort will result in a longer window of vulnerability, during which attackers may exploit and take advantage of this weakness."

Wysopal assesses, "It is likely that we will see the exploitation of this vulnerability for weeks, as organizations find and fix all instances of Struts 2 usage."

Related:Delinea Joins CVE Numbering Authority Program

**RCE Bug in Apache Struts 2**

This same time last year, nearly to the day, a Struts 2 vulnerability with a "critical" 9.8 score in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) was disclosed to the public. CVE-2023-50164 resulted from attackers' ability to manipulate file upload parameters, opening the door to path traversal. Under certain conditions an attacker could upload a specially crafted malicious script in order to achieve remote code execution (RCE) on a server.

CVE-2024-53677 is CVE-2023-50164 regen. It, too, lies in Struts 2's File Upload Interceptor component, responsible for handling file uploads, and enables RCE via path traversal. In a blog post, Johannes Ullrich of the SANS Institute speculated that an inadequate patch for CVE-2023-50164 led to this latest déjà vu.

He also observed active exploitation attempts from one IP address, which utilized a public proof-of-concept (PoC). The attacker played with the vulnerability by uploading "a one-liner script that is supposed to return 'Apache Struts.' Next, the attacker attempts to find the uploaded script. The exploit attempt is very close to the original PoC. Since then, a slightly improved exploit has been uploaded to the same GitHub repository," he wrote.

Related:Does Desktop AI Come With a Side of Risk?

Typically in situations such as this, organizations are advised to apply patches as soon as possible. In the case of CVE-2024-53677, the story isn't quite as simple.

Organizations do need to upgrade to the latest version of Struts, 6.7.0 — or, at least, 6.4.0, released in the wake of CVE-2023-50164, which deprecated the File Upload Interceptor at issue. The fix isn't backward compatible, however, Apache noted in its security bulletin. IT teams will need to migrate to the newfangled Action File Upload Interceptor, and adjust how their existing applications handle file uploads by diligently rewriting their code to make use of it.

"It's not a simple version bump," warns Saeed Abbasi, manager of vulnerability research at Qualys. "It requires code rewrites, configuration adjustments, and can break existing logic and dependencies. In complex environments, removing all traces of the legacy interceptor poses significant challenges due to intricate plug-in chains and layered frameworks. This complexity is further compounded by the need for extensive regression testing."

**The Potential Scope of Impact for CVE-2024-53677**

The national centers for cybersecurity in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Singapore, and the UK have all released urgent security warnings regarding CVE-2024-53677. That this issue has attracted so much attention may not be obvious at first, since Struts 2 is so rarely used by developers today. It does, however, live on in legacy systems worldwide.

Related:Citizen Development Moves Too Fast for Its Own Good

In the 2000s, Struts 2 was king among Java Web frameworks. By 2007 it was receiving nearly 350,000 downloads per month. Its webpage received millions of monthly visits; even its newsletter had thousands of subscribers. Today, Wysopal says, "It no longer has mainstream appeal and is rarely chosen for new projects. Its presence is more an artifact of historical adoption rather than active popularity."

"Its 'kingdom' is confined to those stable, older applications in conservative industries — particularly finance, insurance, government, and large-scale manufacturing or logistics — often in organizations and regions that are regulated and less likely to modernize," he says. Case in point: a Struts 2 vulnerability was at the heart of the infamous 2017 Equifax breach.

Just how common is Struts 2 in legacy systems in 2024? Abbasi reports that within the first 24 hours following the disclosure of CVE-2024-53677, Qualys "observed tens of thousands of vulnerable instances, reflecting the breadth and urgency of the challenge."

To his view, "The persistence of Struts 2 in critical systems, long after more secure frameworks have emerged, illustrates the ongoing struggle enterprises face with technical debt. Many organizations run versions of Struts past their end-of-life, without proper planning which compounds the impact of new vulnerabilities. Enterprises need solid attack surface management, along with lifecycle management strategies, ensuring that critical frameworks are regularly updated, and deprecated components are swiftly phased out."

**About the Author**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

Orgs Scramble to Fix Actively Exploited Bug in Apache Struts 2

Modern identity verification (IDV) approaches aim to connect digital credentials and real-world identity without sacrificing usability.

Source: Carlos Castilla via Alamy Stock Photo

Just about everyone is familiar with the annoying process of becoming locked out of an account and needing to reset a password. Whether it's forgetting a log-in after months of disuse or being forced to prove your identity to regain access, the experience can be frustrating, time-consuming, and — ironically — less secure than the original authentication process.

"People lose their credentials all the time. Resetting passwords is manual and often less secure than the regular process," says Bruce Schneier, who recently joined the advisory board of Nametag, which focuses on challenges such as artificial intelligence (AI) manipulated documents and remote user verification. The need for robust identity verification (IDV) solutions has become one of the most pressing challenges for organizations today, he says.

One of the biggest security challenges enterprises have to deal with is to reliably verify who someone is, especially in a digital world. Attackers are increasingly exploiting weak identity systems to steal credentials, impersonate users, and gain access to sensitive data. Recent advances in cyber threats, including AI-driven deepfakes and credential theft, have outpaced many legacy verification methods.

"Identification answers, 'Who are you?' Authentication says, 'Prove it,' and authorization tells us, 'What can you do?'" Schneier says, noting that identity verification sits at the intersection of people, technology, and trust.

While authentication systems like two-factor verification can confirm credentials, they often fail to answer the bigger question of identity. For example, traditional systems, such as passwords, scanned documents, or biometric authenticators, can be vulnerable to fraud and tampering. Schneier notes that early fingerprint scanners could be fooled with "gummy finger replicas," and face recognition systems could be tricked with simple photographs. 

These weaknesses underscore the more pervasive challenge of bridging what Schneier calls the "keyboard-to-chair" gap — ensuring that the physical person matches their digital credentials. These days, adversaries are adopting increasingly sophisticated techniques to steal credentials so that their activities look like they are being performed by legitimate users.

Deepfake technology has introduced a new layer of concern, where AI-generated images or videos can mimic biometric data convincingly. The result is a growing risk landscape where IDV failures fuel financial fraud, ransomware attacks, and nation-state cyber-espionage.

Beyond the security risks, weak identity verification comes with significant costs for organizations. Credential loss and resets remain one of the largest IT burdens for businesses, consuming time and resources. Onboarding new users poses similar challenges, especially for enterprises needing to verify employees, customers, or partners at scale. Inefficient IDV systems result in delays, poor user experience, and a reliance on insecure methods, like manually uploading identification documents.

Any solution to identity verification must address these emerging threats head-on, Schneier says.

"This will be an arms race between attackers and defenders," he adds.

**What Makes Modern IDV Different?**

IDV companies like Nametag are focused on balancing robust security, scalability, and usability while keeping pace with the increasingly sophisticated tools used by threat actors, Schneir says. Modern solutions incorporate multiple layers of verification to address emerging threats. For example, Nametag's Deepfake Defense technology detects and blocks AI-generated identity documents and advanced injection attacks — both of which have become critical pain points as deepfakes and synthetic media evolve.

Traditional methods also typically require users to manually upload identification documents, creating friction and vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. Requiring users to download additional apps or software to verify their identity is a common deterrent to adoption, Schneier says.

In addition to thwarting sophisticated attacks, modern IDV systems can streamline practical use cases for enterprises, including automating credential recovery processes, onboarding new employees or customers, and verifying users for sensitive transactions or account access.

“This to me solves a corporate pain problem — and that's the cost of regenerating people's credentials when they lose them or onboarding new users," Schneier says. "It's better, faster, and more secure.”

**About the Author**

Contributing Writer, Dark Reading

Joan Goodchild is a veteran journalist, editor, and writer who has been covering security for more than a decade. She has written for several publications and previously served as editor-in-chief for CSO Online.

Bridging the 'Keyboard-to-Chair' Gap With Identity Verification

Non-human identities authenticate machine-to-machine communication. The big challenge now is to secure their elements and processes — before attackers can intercept.

Source: Poptika via Shutterstock

When industrial automation giant Schneider Electric revealed last month that ransomware gang Hellcat stole 40GB of sensitive data, the attackers acknowledged using exposed credentials to breach Schneider's Jira server. 

Once inside the company's project management system, attackers used the miniOrange REST API, a widely used authentication plug-in, to exfiltrate 400,000 rows of data, including 75,000 email addresses, employee names, and customer records. 

What this and dozens of other incidents have in common is that the attackers exploited vulnerabilities in non-human identities (NHIs). Unlike human identities used for authentication by individuals via identity and access management (IAM) credentials, NHIs, also known as machine identities or service accounts, are used by applications, services, and Internet of Things (IoT) installations for authenticating machine-to-machine communications. 

Predictably, investors are funding startups with products that govern and mitigate NHI risk, while more established companies are adding such capabilities, either internally or via acquisition. 

Astrix Security, a prominent startup that says it created the term NHI, earlier this month raised $45 million in Series B funding led by Menlo Ventures and artificial intelligence (AI) platform provider Anthropic, bringing its total funding to $85 million since its founding in 2021.

"A year ago, the term NHI did not exist, and now everyone is talking about them," says Astrix co-founder and CEO Alon Jackson.

Astrix describes its platform as a suite of identity security posture management (ISPM) tools, including non-human identity threat detection and response, NHI life cycle management, auto-remediation, and secrets scanning. 

**Where NHIs Are Vulnerable**

Typical NHIs include API keys, bots, OAuth tokens, database credentials, certificates, and secrets. As organizations have accelerated use of cloud-native applications, IoT infrastructure, and, most notably, AI-based automation during the past two years, NHIs have become a more alarming threat.

Unlike IAM and privilege access management (PAM), few organizations centrally manage NHIs, and there's greater likelihood that they have excessive permissions without expiration dates.

"There are numerous issues with NHIs, including unencrypted credentials, having a full inventory of NHI accounts, inactive accounts, and lack of account ownership," explained Omdia senior analyst Don Tait in a November report.  

Many CISOs are just learning the implications of NHIs. A recent Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) survey of over 800 security and IT professionals found that 24% plan to invest in NHI security during the next six months, and 36% will do so within a year.

More than half of those surveyed believe they may have experienced an incident related to NHIs. 

Astrix is not the only company with NHI discovery and remediation tools attracting investors. Among those that raised Series A funding in 2024 include Aembit ($25 million), Entro Security ($18 million), and Oasis Security ($35 million), which recently discovered the MFA bypass flaw Microsoft Azure. 

The most prominent bet on protecting NHIs was placed in May when CyberArk paid $1.54 billion to acquire machine identity management provider Venafi.

"As NHI continues to evolve, so are the notable vendors in this space," says Christopher Steffen, VP of research at Enterprise Management Associates (EMA). 

Meanwhile, AppSec providers are adding NHI protection capabilities to their offerings. GitGuardian, known for detecting and remediating leaked secrets in GitHub and other source code repositories, recently launched GitGuardian NHI Governance. GitGuardian officials describe it as an addition to its existing platform that will provide visibility and control of NHI life cycles and their associated secrets. 

GitGuardian's initial release will integrate with five key secrets management platforms: HashiCorp Vault, CyberArk Conjur, AWS Secrets Manager, Google Cloud Secrets Manager, and Azure Key Vault.

**Role of NHI Security **

Failure to adequately rotate credentials, overprivileged accounts or identities, and insufficient monitoring and logging are among the common causes of incidents involving compromised NHIs, the CSA report indicates.

"To claim their identity, machines authenticate via secrets like API keys, OAuth tokens, database credentials, usernames and passwords, and certificates," noted GitGuardian product manager Soudanya Ain in a blog post. "They've become the number one vector for a successful attack, frequently overlooked."

Besides the Schneider incident, the NHI Management Group counts over 40 breaches tied to compromised non-human identity credentials during the past two years, including:

*   Microsoft's Midnight Blizzard, which enabled the attackers to access and breach a legacy test OAuth application with elevated privileges.
    
*   The Snowflake breach, which compromised its various customers, including Santander Bank and Ticketmaster.
    
*   Last summer's GitHub extortion attacks by threat actors who used malicious OAuth apps to breach trusted third-party integrations.
    
*   A breach by an attacker who stole secrets, including authentication tokens from the popular Hugging Face open source repository of APIs and other resources for developers who build AI models. 
    

Next year, the risk from compromised NHIs is expected to grow, as is their proportion to human identities, as AI automates more business processes. Omdia's Tait noted industry estimates of the current ratio of NHIs to human identities is 50:1.

"That figure is only likely to increase going forward," he wrote. 

"We do expect NHI growth is going to accelerate further," added Maxine Holt, senior director of Omdia's cybersecurity practice, speaking during a December webinar presented by Dark Reading.

Holt warned that ungoverned NHIs will further raise the threat landscape.

"These identities do require management to ensure secure communication between different services and to prevent unauthorized access and facilitate accountability," she said. "Of course, we need the audit trail there as well. We believe that it's really important to recognize non-human identities as a vital link in the cyber threat chain."

According to the CSA survey, 69% said they are concerned about NHIs as a threat vector, while 38% reported that their organizations have low or no visibility to third parties connected by OAuth apps. Only 20% have a formal process for revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them. 

"There's definitely that trend toward understanding NHI security better and addressing them," said John Yeoh, CSA's global VP of research, at a public meeting in September. "We only expect the NHI field to explode and get out further."

**Blending NHIs and Human Identities **

The current crop of NHI platforms is designed for machine identities, not human credentials, managed by IAM and PAM systems from Microsoft, Okta, Ping Identity, JumpCloud, CyberArk, BeyondTrust, and OneLogin.

Astrix's Jackson says its new round of funding will, in part, go toward expanding integration with human identities.

"Our customers are asking for a 360-degree view of the human and the non-human identities," Jackson says. "But we will be keeping our edge on the NHI space. This is not just posture management and not just anomaly detection, but it's creating the connections in a secure manner."

GitGuardian, which deals with application security and platform engineering teams, has a similar ambition of providing links from its secrets vaults to IAM platforms.

"That's the plan," says Pierre Le Clézio, the company's lead product manager. "But not yet. We are starting with the secret managers and that ecosystem, and then we will have the IAM systems."

**Anticipate M&A Activity **

As NHI security continues to evolve, so will the notable providers, EMA's Steffen says.

"It seems very likely that larger technology players are going to jump into this space," he says. "Many already have complementary offerings, like Wiz and Palo Alto Networks, and are jumping into NHI — either through acquisition or developing their own solution."

Steffen also anticipates that identity providers like Ping and Okta will delve into NHI.

"They already have the infrastructure and the means to enhance NHI for most enterprises, as well as they already lead the market in identity solutions."

Omdia's Holt also anticipates M&A activity.

"The evolving threat landscape really does necessitate a shift toward comprehensive products and solutions that take on both human and non-human identities," she said. "But the market is still developing. A lot of the players are startups. We expect to see more of a move towards platform support and more acquisitions during 2025 for managing non-human identities."

**About the Author**

Contributing Writer

Jeffrey Schwartz is a journalist who has covered information security and all forms of business and enterprise IT, including client computing, data center and cloud infrastructure, and application development for more than 30 years. Jeff is a regular contributor to Channel Futures. Previously, he was editor-in-chief of Redmond magazine and contributed to its sister titles Redmond Channel Partner, Application Development Trends, and Virtualization Review. Earlier, he held editorial roles with CommunicationsWeek, InternetWeek, and VARBusiness. Jeff is based in the New York City suburb of Long Island.

Vendors Chase Potential of Non-Human Identity Management

Seemingly innocent "white pages," including an elaborate Star Wars-themed site, are bypassing Google's malvertising filters, showing up high in search results to lure users to second-stage phishing sites.

Source: Bits And Splits via Shtterstock

Threat actors appear to have found yet another innovative use case for artificial intelligence in malicious campaigns: to create decoy ads for fooling malvertising-detection engines on the Google Ads platform.

The scam involves attackers buying Google Search ads and using AI to create ad pages with unique content and absolutely nothing malicious about them. The goal is to use these decoy ads to then lure visitors to phishing sites for stealing credentials and other sensitive data.

With malvertising, threat actors create malicious ads that are rigged to surface high up in search engine results when people search for a particular product or service. The ads often spoof popular and trusted brands and involve webpages and content that are replicas of the originals but serve instead to redirect users to phishing pages or download an attacker's malware of choice on systems of users who interact with the malicious ads.

While many malvertisement campaigns are targeted at consumers, there have been several recently focused on corporate users as well. One example is a campaign that sought to distribute the Lobshot backdoor on corporate systems, and another that phished employees at Lowe's.

**A Steady, Post-Macro Increase in Malvertising**

"We are seeing more and more cases of fake content produced for deception purposes," researchers at Malwarebytes said in a report on the campaign this week. These so called "white pages," as they are being referred to in the criminal underground, serve as legitimate-looking decoys, or front-end webpages that hide malicious content and activities behind them, according to Malwarebytes.

Related:Manufacturers Lose Azure Creds to HubSpot Phishing Attack

"The content is unique and sometimes funny if you are a real human, but unfortunately a computer analyzing the code would likely give it a green check," Malwarebytes security researcher Jerome Segura wrote. White pages, incidentally, are in contrast to "black pages," which are the actual malicious landing pages containing harmful content or malware.

The use of AI to plant decoy content on Google Ads adds a new wrinkle to malvertising scams, which have seen a remarkable surge in volume recently. Malwarebytes has pinned the increase to Microsoft's decision in 2022 to block macros in Word, Excel, and PowerPoint files downloaded from the Internet — a top malware vector for threat actors. That decision forced attackers to look for other malware distribution vectors, one of which happens to be malvertising, according to Malwarebytes.

Though Google and operators of other major online ad distribution networks have been battling against the scourge — and have gotten better at quickly identifying and removing malvertising content — bad actors have consistently managed to remain a step ahead. A Malwarebytes study found Amazon to be the most spoofed brand in malvertising campaigns, followed by Rufus, Weebly, NotePad++, and TradingView.

Related:CISA Directs Federal Agencies to Secure Cloud Environments

**Spoofing Brands With AI-Generated Content**

In its report, Malwarebytes provided two examples of AI-generated decoy ads it spotted recently on Google Ads. One of the decoy ads targeted users searching the Internet for the Securitas OneID mobile app, and the other targeted users of the Parsec remote desktop app, which is popular among gamers.

The Securitas OneID scam involved an entirely AI-generated website, complete with AI-generated images of supposed executives of the company.

"When Google tries to validate the ad, they will see this cloaked page with pretty unique content and there is absolutely nothing malicious within it," Segura wrote.

With the Parsec ad, the threat actors used some creative license of their own to generate a heavily Star Wars\-influenced website, replete with references to the parsec astronomical measurement unit. The artwork for the website even included several AI-generated Star Wars-themed posters, which while impressive, would likely have suggested to users that the site had nothing to do with the legitimate Parsec app.

Related:Azure Data Factory Bugs Expose Cloud Infrastructure

"Ironically, it is quite straightforward for a real human to identify much of the cloaked content as just fake fluff. Sometimes, things just don’t add up and are simply comical," Segura wrote. Even so, as a cloaking mechanism for a malvertising campaign," he added, "the website would have passed Google's validation checks.

**About the Author**

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year career at Computerworld, Jai also covered a variety of other technology topics, including big data, Hadoop, Internet of Things, e-voting, and data analytics. Prior to Computerworld, Jai covered technology issues for The Economic Times in Bangalore, India. Jai has a Master's degree in Statistics and lives in Naperville, Ill.

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