#auth

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Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a `ThirdPartyBlock` request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it: - the public key of the previous block (used in the signature) - the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions) A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair. Consider the following example (nominal case) - Authority `A` emits the following token: `check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}` - The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority `B` - Third-party `B` generates the following third-party block `thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}` - The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third ...

### Impact An open redirect vulnerability exist in MobSF authentication view. PoC 1. Go to http://127.0.0.1:8000/login/?next=//afine.com in a web browser. 2. Enter credentials and press "Sign In". 3. You will be redirected to [afine.com](http://afine.com/) Users who are not using authentication are not impacted. ### Patches Update to MobSF v4.0.5 ### Workarounds Disable Authentication ### References Fix: https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/fdaad81314f393d324c1ede79627e9d47986c8c8 ### Reporter Marcin Węgłowski

### Impact It is possible for an attacker to craft malicious Urls that certain functions in IdentityServer will incorrectly treat as local and trusted. If such a Url is returned as a redirect, some browsers will follow it to a third-party, untrusted site. ### Affected Methods - In the `DefaultIdentityServerInteractionService`, the `GetAuthorizationContextAsync` method may return non-null and the `IsValidReturnUrl` method may return true for malicious Urls, indicating incorrectly that they can be safely redirected to. _UI code calling these two methods is the most commonly used code path that will expose the vulnerability. The default UI templates rely on this behavior in the Login, Challenge, and Consent pages. Customized user interface code might also rely on this behavior. The following uncommonly used APIs are also vulnerable:_ - The `ServerUrlExtensions.GetIdentityServerRelativeUrl`, `ReturnUrlParser.ParseAsync` and `OidcReturnUrlParser.ParseAsync` methods may incorrectly re...

Malicious actors could potentially exploit this vulnerability if they gain physical access to a user's device.

The sustained cyberattack, likely made worse by a mitigation snafu, disrupted several Azure cloud services for nearly eight hours on July 30.

Two US senators accuse carmakers of deceptive language and shifty practices in sharing and resale of driver data.

### Impact Tokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request. Due to implementation issues in biscuit-java, third party block support in published versions is inoperating. Nevertheless, to synchronize with other implementations, we publish this advisory and the related fix. ### Description Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a `ThirdPartyBlock` request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it: the public key of the previous block (used in the signature) the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions) A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair. Consider the following example (nominal case) * Authority A emits the following token: `check if thirdparty("b")...

### Impact The file upload widget is vulnerable to XSS payloads in filenames. Access permission to upload files is required. As such, in most cases only authenticated editors and administrators will have the required permission. It is not persistent, i.e. the payload is only executed during the upload. In effect, an attacker will have to trick an editor/administrator into uploading a strangely named file. The fix ensures XSS is escaped. ### Patches See "Patched versions". Commit: https://github.com/ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui/commit/7a9f991b200fa5a03d49cd07f50577c8bc90a30b ### Workarounds None. ### References - https://developers.ibexa.co/security-advisories/ibexa-sa-2024-004-dom-based-xss-in-file-upload - https://github.com/ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui/commit/7a9f991b200fa5a03d49cd07f50577c8bc90a30b - https://github.com/ibexa/admin-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-qm44-wjm2-pr59 ### Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported to Ibexa by Alec Romano: https://github.com/4rd...