In the case of pig butchering scams, it’s not really anything that can be solved by a cybersecurity solution or sold in a package.

Thursday, March 21, 2024 14:00

Whether you want to call them “catfishing,” “pig butchering” or just good ‘old-fashioned “social engineering,” romance scams have been around forever.  

I was first introduced to them through the MTV show “Catfish,” but recently they seem to be making headlines as the term “pig butchering” enters the public lexicon. John Oliver recently covered it on “Last Week Tonight,” which means everyone my age with an HBO account heard about it a few weeks ago. And one of my favorite podcasts going, “Search Engine,” just covered it in an episode. 

The concept of “pig butchering” scams generally follows the same chain of events: 

*   An unknown phone number texts or messages a target with a generally harmless message, usually asking for a random name disguised as an “Oops, wrong number!” text. 
*   When the target responds, the actor tries to strike up a conversation with a friendly demeanor. 
*   If the conversation persists, they usually evolve into “love bombing,” including compliments, friendly advice, ego-boosting, and saying flattering things about any photos the target has sent. 
*   Sometimes, the relationship may turn romantic. 
*   The scammer eventually “butchers” the “pig” that has been “fattened up” to that point, scamming them into handing over money, usually in the form of a phony cryptocurrency app, or just straight up asking for the target to send the scammer money somehow. 

There are a few twists and turns along the way based on the exact scammer, but that’s generally how it works. What I think is important to remember is that this specific method of separating users from their money is not actually new.  

The FBI seems to release a renewed warning about romance scams every Valentine’s Day when people are more likely to fall for a stranger online wanting to make a real connection and then eventually asking for money. I even found a podcast from the FBI in 2015 in which they warned that scammers “promise love, romance, to entice their victims online,” estimating that romance-related scams cost consumers $82 million in the last half of 2014.  

The main difference that I can tell between “pig butchering” and past romance scams is the sheer scale. Many actors running these operations are relying on human trafficking and sometimes literal imprisonment, forcing these people against their will to send these mass blocks of messages to a variety of targets indiscriminately. Oftentimes in these groups, scammers who are less “successful” in luring victims can be verbally and physically harassed and punished. That is, of course, a horrible human toll that these operations are taking, but they also extend far beyond the world of cybersecurity. 

In the case of pig butchering scams, it’s not really anything that can be solved by a cybersecurity solution or sold in a package. Instead, it relies on user education and the involvement of law enforcement agencies and international governments to ensure these farms can’t operate in the shows. The founders who run them are brought to justice. 

It’s never a bad thing that users become more educated on these scams, because of that, but I also feel it’s important to remember that romance-related scams, and really any social engineering built on a personal “relationship,” has been around for years, and “pig butchering” is not something new that just started popping up. 

These types of scams are ones that our culture has kind of just accepted as part of daily life at this point (who doesn’t get surprised when they get a call about their “car’s extended warranty?), and now the infrastructure to support these scams is taking a larger human toll than ever. 

**The one big thing **

Talos has yet another round of research into the Turla APT, and now we’re able to see the entire kill chain this actor uses, including the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) utilized to steal valuable information from their victims and propagate through their infected enterprises. Before deploying TinyTurla-NG, Turla will attempt to configure anti-virus software exclusions to evade detection of their backdoor. Once exclsions have been set up, TTNG is written to the disk, and persistence is established by creating a malicious service. 

**Why do I care? **

Turla, and this recently discovered TinyTurlaNG tool that Talos has been writing about, is an international threat that’s been around for years, so it’s always important for the entire security community to know what they’re up to. Most recently, Turla used these tactics to target Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and steal sensitive data.  

**So now what? **

During Talos’ research into TinyTurla-NG, we’ve released several new rounds of detection content for Cisco Secure products. Read our past two blog posts on this actor for more.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**The Biden administration issued a renewed warning to public water systems and operators this week,** saying state-sponsored actors could carry out cyber attacks soon, citing ongoing threats from Iran and China. The White House and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency sent a letter to every U.S. governor this week warning them that cyber attacks could disrupt access to clean drinking water and “impose significant costs on affected communities.” The letter also points to the U.S. Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s list of known exploited vulnerabilities catalog, asking the managers of public water systems to ensure their systems are patched against these vulnerabilities. The EPA pointed to Volt Typhoon, a recently discovered Chinese APT that has reportedly been hiding on critical infrastructure networks for an extended period. A meeting among federal government leaders from the EPA and other related agencies is scheduled for March 21 to discuss threats to public water systems and how they can strengthen their cybersecurity posture. (Bloomberg, The Verge) 

**UnitedHealth says it's still recovering from a cyber attack that’s halted crucial payments to health care providers across the U.S.,** but has started releasing some of those funds this week, and expects its payment processing software to be back online soon. The cyber attack, first disclosed in February, targeted Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of United, that handles payment processing and pharmaceutical orders for hospital chains and doctors offices. UnitedHealth’s CEO said in a statement this week that the company has paid $2 billion to affected providers who spent nearly a month unable to obtain those funds or needing to switch to a paper billing system. A recently published survey from the American Hospital Association found that 94 percent of hospitals that responded experienced financial disruptions from the Change Healthcare attack, and costs at one point were hitting $1 million in revenue per day. (ABC News, CNBC) 

**Nevada’s state court system is currently weighing a case that could undo end-to-end encryption across the U.S.** The state’s Attorney General is currently suing Meta, the creators of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, asking the company to remove end-to-end encryption for minors on the platform, with the promise of being able to catch and charge users who abuse the platform to lure minors. However, privacy advocates are concerned that any rulings against Meta and its encryption policies could have larger ripple effects, and embolden others to challenge encryption in other states. Nevada is arguing that Meta’s Messenger a “preferred method” for individuals targeting Nevada children for illicit activities. Privacy experts are in favor of end-to-end encryption because it safeguards messages during transmission and makes it more difficult for other parties to intercept and read them — including law enforcement agencies. (Tech Policy Press, Bloomberg Law) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   The LockBit story: Why the ransomware affiliate model can turn takedowns into disruptions 
*   Cisco Closes $28B Splunk Deal: 5 Big AI, Security And Partner Things To Know 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #176: Why no one should be relying on passive security in 2024 
*   Dissecting a complex vulnerability and achieving arbitrary code execution in Ichitaro Word 
*   Netgear wireless router open to code execution after buffer overflow vulnerability 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**Botconf** **(April 23 - 26)** 

_Nice, Côte d'Azur, France_

> _This presentation from Chetan Raghuprasad details the Supershell C2 framework. Threat actors are using this framework massively and creating botnets with the Supershell implants._

**CARO Workshop 2024** **(May 1 - 3)** 

_Arlington, Virginia_

> Over the past year, we’ve observed a substantial uptick in attacks by YoroTrooper, a relatively nascent espionage-oriented threat actor operating against the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) since at least 2022. Asheer Malhotra's presentation at CARO 2024 will provide an overview of their various campaigns detailing the commodity and custom-built malware employed by the actor, their discovery and evolution in tactics. He will present a timeline of successful intrusions carried out by YoroTrooper targeting high-value individuals associated with CIS government agencies over the last two years.

**RSA** **(May 6 - 9)** 

_San Francisco, California_    

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 0e2263d4f239a5c39960ffa6b6b688faa7fc3075e130fe0d4599d5b95ef20647   
**MD5:** bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790   
**Typical Filename:** bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790.vir   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::1201 

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll |  
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:** 7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5   
**MD5:** ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86   
**Typical Filename:** endpoint.query   
**Claimed Product:** Endpoint-Collector   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** e38c53aedf49017c47725e4912fc7560e1c8ece2633c05057b22fd4a8ed28eb3   
**MD5:** c16df0bfc6fda86dbfa8948a566d32c1   
**Typical Filename:** CEPlus.docm   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Doc.Downloader.Pwshell::mash.sr.sbx.vioc

“Pig butchering” is an evolution of a social engineering tactic we’ve seen for years

There are a few reasons why we’re so ready to jump to the “it’s a cyber attack!”

Thursday, March 14, 2024 14:00

Some of my Webex rooms recently have been blowing up with memes about blaming Canada or wild speculation that a state-sponsored actor is carrying out some sort of major campaign.  

After a widespread outage of cellular service with AT&T and other carriers a few weeks ago, people were sure it was some sort of coordinated attack to disrupt Americans’ services that largely power our day-to-day lives. The outage lasted about 11 hours, and after the fact, the company announced they’d give customers a whopping $5 credit to make up for the issue. The Federal Communications Commission also announced last week that it was launching a formal investigation into the outage, requesting more information about the exact cause and how many users were affected.  

About two weeks later, the same kinds of messages and questions to our team came flooding in when Meta experienced an outage across many of its platforms, most notably Facebook, Instagram and Threads. Though this only lasted a few hours, any time Americans can’t access their Instagram feeds, it’s going to make headlines. 

In both cases, consumers immediately wanted to start pointing fingers — Which actor was behind these? Why is there so little information about this outage? Is this China getting revenge for talk of forcing a TikTok sale? What’s the broader conspiracy behind this? The outages also quickly opened the door for some of the world’s chief spreaders of misinformation and fake news to start spreading conspiracy theories. 

The problem is, not every technical issue can or needs to be explained away by a cyber attack. That’s not to undersell the danger that state-sponsored APTs pose currently, or the fact that they \*could\* one day cause a disruption like this. But jumping to that conclusion every time Down Detector pops off is only going to spread fear/FUD and help these outlets for disinformation reach a larger audience.  

It creates a “boy who cried wolf” situation for when a major cyber attack actually does happen, and the average consumer is forced to make an immediate update to some piece of software or hardware. 

There are a few reasons why we’re so ready to jump to the “it’s a cyber attack!” conclusion. One is that Hollywood has been “glamorizing” the idea of a major cyber attack or major disruption for years now. Movies and TV shows like Netflix’s “Leave the World Behind” have dramatized what a major cyber attack or internet outage may look like, and how quickly it could lead to the unraveling of civilization. Because of our current doomscrolling culture, the second something even looks like it could be a cyber event, we’re ready to declare the end of our economy and society. 

It’s also sexier when it’s a cyber attack. AT&T says its outage was caused by a technical error that occurred when it was trying to upgrade its network’s capacity, explicitly stating it was not caused by any sort of disruption campaign or cyber attack. Meta simply chalked their outage up to a “technical issue.”  

None of these things make for good headlines. But sometimes, the simplest explanation is the most obvious one — we’ve all pressed a wrong button here or there, and stuff breaks on the internet all the time for all sorts of reasons. But “Users logged out of Instagram after Meta employee hits ‘enter’ too soon” isn’t as eye-catching as “Are Instagram and Facebook down because of a cyber attack?” 

Could these multi-billion-dollar corporations be lying? Sure, but I also find it hard enough to believe that the truth would not have made it out to consumers by now if these outages weren’t simple technical issues, nor would AT&T feel compelled to reimburse customers for something that could be totally out of their control. 

And if you ever get logged out of Facebook or Instagram, maybe you’re just better off being offline for a few hours anyway than immediately assuming Mahershala Ali is going to be knocking on your vacation home’s door in any minute.   

**The one big thing **

We want to keep reminding users to update and upgrade their network infrastructure. Aging devices like switches and routers that are used across the globe are a consistently vulnerable surface for adversaries to gain an initial foothold onto targeted networks. Talos recently highlighted the three most common post-compromise attacks that adversaries carry out after compromising these types of vulnerable devices, including modifying the device’s firmware and downgrading the firmware to remove older patches and open the door to new exploitable vulnerabilities. Nick Biasini from Talos Outreach also spoke about this issue for an article in NetworkWorld.  

**Why do I care? **

As Hazel Burton puts it in the blog post linked above: “Adversaries, particularly APTs, are capitalizing on this scenario to conduct hidden post-compromise activities once they have gained initial access to the network. The goal here is to give themselves a greater foothold, conceal their activities, and hunt for data and intelligence that can assist them with their espionage and/or disruptive goals. Think of it like a burglar breaking into a house via the water pipes. They’re not using “traditional” methods such as breaking down doors or windows (the noisy smash-and-grab approach) — they’re using an unusual route, because no one ever thinks their house will be broken into via the water pipes. Their goal is to remain stealthy on the inside while they take their time to find the most valuable artefacts.” 

**So now what? **

If you are using network infrastructure that is end of life, out of support, and now has vulnerabilities that cannot be patched, now really is the time to replace those devices. Using networking equipment that has been built with secure-by-design principles such as running secure boot, alongside having a robust configuration and patch management approach, is key to combatting these types of threats. Ensure that these devices are being watched very carefully for any configuration changes and patch them promptly whenever new vulnerabilities are discovered.   

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Security researchers have found a new vulnerability affecting chips made by nearly all major CPU makers dubbed “GhostRace.”** The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-2193, requires an adversary to win a race condition and to have physical or privileged access to the targeted machine. However, it could allow a malicious user to steal potentially sensitive information from memory like passwords and encryption keys. "The vulnerability affects many CPU architectures, including those made by Intel, AMD, Arm and IBM. It also affected some hypervisor vendors and the Linux operating system. AMD released an advisory this week that informed customers that they should follow previous defense guidance for other security flaws like Spectre that have affected CPUs in the past. “Our analysis shows all the other common write-side synchronization primitives in the Linux kernel are ultimately implemented through a conditional branch and are therefore vulnerable to speculative race conditions,” VU Amsterdam said in its blog post disclosing GhostRace. (SecurityWeek, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 

**Health care providers are still reeling from a cyber attack on Change Healthcare**, a subsidiary of the United HealthGroup Inc. insurance provider. First Health Advisory, a digital health risk assurance firm, recently estimated that health care providers are losing an estimated $100 million daily as they still cannot process payments from insurance providers. Change first disclosed the suspected ransomware attack in late February, and on March 5, the U.S. government announced a plan to provide relief payments for providers who are facing financial shortfalls due to the outage. Many doctors' offices and care clinics are facing late rent payments and unpaid invoices. The attack has also limited some patients’ ability to obtain pre-authorization for certain services and surgeries, and others have not been able to refill their prescriptions at hospitals. U.S. Congress is also asking the CEO of United HealthGroup to appear before a committee to answer questions about the hack. (CBS News, Bloomberg) 

**The U.S. has placed formal sanctions against two individuals and five entities associated with the Intellexa Consortium,** responsible for developing and distributing the Predator spyware. Talos has previously reported on Intellexa’s tools, and how their spyware is silently loaded onto targeted devices. This is the first time the Treasury Department has sanctioned a spyware organization and announced it publicly. The sanctions include five vendors who work with Intellexa to sell the spyware, all of whom are spread across Europe. Intellexa itself is based in Greece. Predator and other spyware developed by private parties are often used to target high-risk individuals to track their communication and movement, including politicians, journalists, activists and political dissidents. Under the sanctions, anyone in the U.S. is forbidden from doing business with Intellexa or the associated companies and individuals. The Biden administration has long pushed for additional action against spyware makers, including Israel-based NSO Group, which distributes the Pegasus spyware. (Voice of America, Axios) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Threat actors leverage document publishing sites for ongoing credential and session token theft 
*   Heather Couk is here to keep your spirits up during a cyber emergency, even if it takes the “Rocky” music 
*   Another Patch Tuesday with no zero-days, only two critical vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #175: What's new about GhostSec's ransomware-as-a-service model 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**Botconf** **(April 23 - 26)** 

_Nice, Côte d'Azur, France_

> _This presentation from Chetan Raghuprasad details the Supershell C2 framework. Threat actors are using this framework massively and creating botnets with the Supershell implants._

**CARO Workshop 2024** **(May 1 - 3)** 

_Arlington, Virginia_

> Over the past year, we’ve observed a substantial uptick in attacks by YoroTrooper, a relatively nascent espionage-oriented threat actor operating against the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) since at least 2022. Asheer Malhotra's presentation at CARO 2024 will provide an overview of their various campaigns detailing the commodity and custom-built malware employed by the actor, their discovery and evolution in tactics. He will present a timeline of successful intrusions carried out by YoroTrooper targeting high-value individuals associated with CIS government agencies over the last two years.

**RSA** **(May 6 - 9)** 

_San Francisco, California_   

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:** 24283c2eda68c559f85db7bf7ccfe3f81e2c7dfc98a304b2056f1a7c053594fe   
**MD5:** 49ae44d48c8ff0ee1b23a310cb2ecf5a   
**Typical Filename:** nYzVlQyRnQmDcXk   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd 

**SHA 256:** e38c53aedf49017c47725e4912fc7560e1c8ece2633c05057b22fd4a8ed28eb3   
**MD5:** c16df0bfc6fda86dbfa8948a566d32c1   
**Typical Filename:** CEPlus.docm   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Doc.Downloader.Pwshell::mash.sr.sbx.vioc 

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934   
**MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c   
**Typical Filename:** Wextract   
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

Not everything has to be a massive, global cyber attack

By Deeba Ahmed
Mikhail Vasiliev, a Russian-Canadian citizen faces four years in a Canadian prison and is likely to be extradited to the US after completing his sentence.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: LockBit Affiliate Sentenced to 4 Years in Canada, Faces Extradition

Mikhail Vasiliev was also fined $860,000 for his involvement in the LockBit gang’s attacks. This case highlights the international effort to combat cybercrime and the severe consequences awaiting perpetrators.

A Russian-Canadian citizen, Mikhail Vasiliev, has been sentenced to nearly four years in prison for his involvement in the notorious **LockBit ransomware operation**. Vasiliev will also pay $860,000 in restitution to his Canadian victims.

Vasiliev’s lawyer reportedly argued that he turned to cybercrime due to financial difficulties during the **COVID-19 pandemic**.  However, Justice Michelle Fuerst rejected this justification, calling Vasiliev a _Cyber Terrorist_ whose actions were motivated by _greed_ and his crimes were “_far from_ _victimless crimes_.”

Investigations revealed Vasiliev’s role as a key member of the LockBit ransomware gang, involved in a significant number of cyberattacks with ransom demands ranging between €5m-€70 million. Vasiliev took responsibility for his actions, as confirmed by his lawyer Louis Strezos.

Vasiliev, 34, was arrested in October 2022 from his residence in Bradford, Ontario where he had moved from Moscow 20 years ago. He pleaded guilty in February 2024 to stealing victims’ computer data and using it for extortion.

Moreover, according to Canadian media **reports**, he admitted targeting at least three Canadian organizations, encrypting their data, and seeking ransom payments between 2021-2022, making $100 million in ransom demands for the gang from around 1,000 cyberattacks on victims in the U.S. and globally,

Vasiliev primarily targeted businesses in Saskatchewan, Montreal, and Newfoundland. His attacks likely caused significant disruptions and financial losses to the targeted businesses.

In November 2022, the US Department of Justice announced separate charges for his involvement in LockBit attacks. Vasiliev is set to be extradited to the U.S. for facing these additional charges

**LockBit, active since 2020**, operates under a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model, where affiliates exploit intrusions and deploy ransomware in exchange for some percentage of ransom payment.

In 2023, the gang gained significant profits from targeting companies like Boeing and Allen & Overy and exploited the **Citrix bleed security flaw** tracked as CVE-2023-4966 (CVSS score: 9.4).

LockBit’s infrastructure was **dismantled** by the law enforcement authorities in February 2024 as part of Operation Cronos with the seizure of 34 servers and 200 cryptocurrency accounts. Just a week after its seizure, LockBit **reemerged** with new leak sites, but RaaS is unlikely to recover. It claimed Operation Cronos was successful due to its negligence in updating PHP settings.

So far, Authorities have arrested six suspects in connection to LockBit, including Vasiliev, Ruslan Magomedovich Astamirov who was arrested **in June 2023**, two Russian nationals Artur Sungatov and Ivan Kondratyev, alias Bassterlord, and two others **arrested** in Ukraine and Poland.

Vasiliev’s potential extradition is a sign of growing international cooperation in combating cybercrime and serves as a warning to other gangs involved in such activities.

1.  Ragnar Locker Ransomware Dismantled, Key Suspect Arrested
2.  Alcasec Hacker, aka “Robin Hood of Spanish Hackers,” Arrested
3.  Operator of Proxy Botnet ‘IPStorm’ Arrested, Pleads Guilty in US
4.  LockBit ransomware blames victim for DDoS attack on its website
5.  Multimillion-Dollar Vishing Scam Busted: Czech-Ukrainian Gang Arrested

LockBit Affiliate Sentenced to 4 Years in Canada, Faces Extradition

By Waqas
Some reports suggest that LockBit ransomware gang is behing the EquiLend data breach.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: EquiLend Employee Data Breached After January Ransomware Attack

EquiLend, a financial technology firm, experienced a data breach following a January ransomware attack – EquiLend is offering credit monitoring and identity theft protection to affected individuals.

Financial technology firm EquiLend recently disclosed a data breach reportedly originating from a January ransomware attack. The attack, which according to Bloomberg’s report, is attributed to the LockBit ransomware group, compromised the personal information of EquiLend employees.

The claim that LockBit ransomware is involved in the incident is concerning for businesses, as the group, despite its shutdown, has not only resurfaced but is already targeting new victims.

****Breach Details Emerge****

EquiLend initially reported a “technical issue” on January 24th, leading to service disruptions. The company later confirmed a ransomware attack but provided limited details. Recent notifications to affected individuals and authorities reveal the extent of the data breach.

****Employee Information Exposed****

According to the notification sent by the company to impacted customers, the attack compromised sensitive employee data, including names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and internal payroll information. EquiLend assures it has no evidence of this information being misused but is offering two years of complimentary credit monitoring and identity theft protection services to affected individuals.

****Ransomware Attack Scope Unclear****

While client-facing services were restored by February 5th, the full impact of the attack remains unclear. Speculation suggests EquiLend may have negotiated with the attackers, but the company has not confirmed any ransom payment.

It’s worth noting that at the time of writing, LockBit’s dark web leak site showed no mention of EquiLend. This could indicate that negotiations have occurred, or the group has yet to list EquiLend on their website.

****EquiLend Responds****

EquiLend is working with cybersecurity experts to investigate the incident and prevent future occurrences. The company emphasizes its commitment to data security and is urging affected individuals to remain vigilant and monitor their financial statements for suspicious activity.

****Experts Weigh In****

For insights, we reached out to Tamara Kirchleitner, Senior Intelligence Operations Analyst at Centripetal. “In the wake of this cyberattack, it’s a stark reminder of the relentless threat fintech firms face. Offering affected employees free identity theft protection is commendable, yet many companies remain reactive,” Tamara said.

“This incident underscores the need for proactive cybersecurity measures. Implementing robust protocols is imperative in today’s digital landscape. Businesses must embrace advanced technologies to safeguard their systems and customer data. It’s time for a paradigm shift towards anticipatory cybersecurity,” she warned.

****Importance of Cybersecurity****

This incident highlights the growing threat of ransomware attacks and the importance of strong cybersecurity measures. Financial institutions like EquiLend handle sensitive data, making them prime targets for cybercriminals.

EquiLend’s data breach should be a wakeup for organizations to prioritize data security investments and implement strong safeguards against cyberattacks.

1.  **FIN8 Resurfaces with New Sardonic Backdoor**
2.  **Hive Ransomware Resurfaces as Hunters International**
3.  **FBI Disrupts Chinese State-Backed Volt Typhoon’s KV Botnet**
4.  **Mirai botnet resurfaces with MooBot variant to target D-Link devices**
5.  **Nasty Mamba ransomware that encrypts entire hard drive resurfaces**

EquiLend Employee Data Breached After January Ransomware Attack

By Deeba Ahmed
Patch Now! One-Day Vulnerabilities Exploited by Magnet Goblin to Deliver Linux Malware!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Magnet Goblin Hackers Using Ivanti Flaws to Deploy Linux Malware

Hackers exploit unpatched Ivanti vulnerabilities to deploy malware on Linux systems. Magnet Goblin targets businesses using outdated software. Patch immediately and implement strong security measures to protect against these attacks.

Cybersecurity researchers at Check Point are warning of a malicious campaign targeting one-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti and other security software products, potentially impacting a wide range of organizations.

The culprit behind this campaign is a financially motivated hacker group known as Magnet Goblin. This group has been active since January 2022 and specializes in leveraging newly disclosed vulnerabilities, targeting public-facing servers and edge devices.

According to Check Point’s research, Magnet Goblin is using one-day security vulnerabilities to breach edge devices and public-facing services and deploy custom malware on Linux systems. For your information, after zero-day vulnerabilities are disclosed publicly and patches are released, they are referred to as one-day vulnerabilities.

The attackers exploit unpatched servers like Ivanti Connect Secure VPN, Magento, Qlik Sense, and possibly Apache ActiveMQ to deploy a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) called Nerbian RAT, first documented by Proofpoint in 2022. It also utilized Nerbian RAT’s simplified variant, MiniNerbian, which allows arbitrary command execution from a C2 server. 

“NerbianRAT and MiniNerbian… these tools have operated under the radar as they mostly reside on edge devices. This is part of an ongoing trend for threat actors to target areas which until now have been left unprotected,” researchers noted.

NerbianRAT is downloaded from compromised systems with critical Ivanti Connect Secure flaws. While researching, CheckPoint discovered a 1-day vulnerability infection that led to the download of the NerbianRAT Linux variant.

The variant was used to execute various malicious activities on compromised systems, including modifying connection intervals, work time settings, and updating configuration variables.

Magnet Goblin leveraged CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21888, and CVE-2024-21893 in Ivanti VPNs, CVE-2022-24086 in Magento, and CVE-2023-41265, CVE-2023-41266, and CVE-2023-48365 in Qlik Sense.

They used a JavaScript credential stealer called Warpwire and the open-source tunnelling tool Ligolo to exploit these vulnerabilities. Warpwire stealer is linked to mass Ivanti vulnerability exploitation and was used in a 2022 Magento server attack. In addition, they used remote monitoring tools ScreenConnect and AnyDesk, targeting Qlik Sense and Apache ActiveMQ.

It is worth noting that Ivanti issued a public advisory in January for CVE-2024-21887, a command injection vulnerability, urging users to patch their systems against wild exploitations. However, Check Point found that Magnet Goblin exploitations occurred within a day of patch issuance, targeting systems not yet patched with available fixed updates.

Compromised Magento servers used in Magnet Goblin campaigns (Screenshot: Checkpoint)

John Gallagher, Vice President of Viakoo Labs at Viakoo commented on the findings stating, “It’s clear that Magnet Goblin is taking the easy route; using recently disclosed vulnerabilities to exploit poorly defended systems. With many edge and IoT devices and applications there is a lag time between when a vulnerability is disclosed and when a patch is available…and then another lag time between when the patch is released and when it is implemented.”

“Often the teams managing edge and IoT systems are outside of IT and may have different priorities or sense of urgency when it comes to patching. One can expect that one-day threats will be a major security issue, as the speed of AI can accelerate these specific types of threats. Until the speed of delivery by threat actors is matched by the speed of response by defenders this will be an ongoing security risk.”

Organisations of all sizes relying on Ivanti software for endpoint management and security are at potential risk. This includes companies in various sectors that utilize Ivanti to safeguard their critical infrastructure.

Therefore, patching Ivanti software is necessary to prevent exploitation along with increased monitoring, and adopting a layered security approach, including implementing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to strengthen the overall security of the network and devices.

1.  New Linux Malware Alert: ‘Spinning YARN’ Hits Docker
2.  Linux Malware “Migo” Exploits Redis for Cryptojacking
3.  Bifrost RAT Targets Linux Devices, Mimics VMware Domain
4.  Crypto Stealing PyPI Malware Hits Both Windows and Linux Users
5.  Mirai-based NoaBot Botnet Targeting Linux Systems with Cryptominer

Magnet Goblin Hackers Using Ivanti Flaws to Deploy Linux Malware

It’s important to be vigilant about tax-related scams any time these deadlines roll around, regardless of what country you’re in, but it’s not like you need to be particularly more skeptical in March and April.

Thursday, March 7, 2024 14:00

It’s that time of the year when not only do you have to be worried about filing your federal taxes in the U.S., you must also be on the lookout for a whole manner of tax-related scams.  

These are something that pop up every year through email, texts, phone calls and even physical mail — phony promises to get your tax return back faster, file your taxes “easy and free” or maximizing your possible return. Usually, the bad actors behind these are either looking to steal your money or personal information.  

One scam from last year’s tax season could have cost consumers up to $5,000 in penalties for trying to claim a fraudulent tax credit.  

And it turns out this isn’t just a problem in the U.S., either. We published new research last week into a trojan malware that’s been infecting victims in Mexico with tax-related spam emails and other social engineering tactics.  

Many countries across the world all have tax filing deadlines around the same time — Japan’s is just around the corner on March 15, in the U.S. it’s April 15, and several countries (Brazil, Canada, Chile, etc.) all share an April 30 filing deadline. So, adversaries all over the globe are going to be leveraging tax-related topics in their spam emails and social engineering campaigns in the coming weeks, trying to steal money, infect devices with malware, or steal critical personal information. 

It’s important to remember that this isn’t “peak spam season” or anything, though, and it’s not the time to spread FUD that, “Oh, your inboxes are going to be flooded with spam!” 

As I’ve written and talked about before, there isn’t more spam during tax season, it’s just different. Think about the confirmation bias that pops up when you buy a new car, and then suddenly you start seeing that car everywhere else on the road when you didn’t notice it as much before.  

Talos’ telemetry indicates that spam hasn’t increased during tax filing season in the U.S. for many years, and attackers’ tactics largely stay the same: Try to create a convincing offer, document, or link, and try to convince the target to engage with that social engineering in some form.  

It’s important to be vigilant about tax-related scams any time these deadlines roll around, regardless of what country you’re in, but it’s not like you need to be particularly more skeptical in March and April than any other time of the year. As soon as the tax filing deadline comes and goes, attackers will just start looking for the next hot topic to include in their phishing emails — presidential primaries, summer vacation deals or fake Amazon gift cards. 

If you want to hear more about this, listen to the episode of Talos Takes on this topic from last year below. 

**The one big thing **

An APT known as GhostSec has increased its ransomware activities over the past year and is now conducting “double extortion” ransomware attacks with fellow group Stormous. GhostSec and Stormous have also launched a new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) program STMX\_GhostLocker and are actively recruiting new affiliates or members.  

**Why do I care? **

Talos observed the GhostSec and Stormous ransomware groups operating together to conduct several double extortion attacks using the GhostLocker and StormousX ransomware programs against the victims in Cuba, Argentina, Poland, China, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Vietnam, Thailand and more nations, according to our assessment of the disclosure messages posted by the group in their Telegram channels and Stormous ransomware data leak site. This shows that the groups’ activities are not going to be contained just in one region or industry. RaaS has been a popular business model for many ransomware groups recently, which opens the door to other actors to use GhostSec’s tools by just paying them money.  

**So now what? **

Talos has released new IOCs to provide defenders with new ways to block these ransomware actors. One of the implants GhostSec specifically relies on injects an admin bypass and hacking tool targeting the WordPress content management system. Any WordPress users should make sure their login credentials are up-to-date and strong and check their site to ensure there aren’t any illegitimate plugins or processes running on their site.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**A fake ransomware gang calling itself “Mogilevich” admitted that they made up a claim that it had hacked video game developer Epic and stolen personal information and game source code.** A leak page from the group claimed to have 200GB of data stolen from the company available for sale to other threat actors, or they would return the stolen information to Epic in exchange for a ransom payment. The group claimed it had "email, passwords, full name, payment information, source code and many other data." Epic immediately came forward sand said it had not detected any evidence of a hack or data breach. A few days after the claims went public, representatives from Mogilevich later came forward and called themselves “professional fraudsters” and they never hacked Epic’s network. Epic is known for the popular online platform and game “Fortnite.” The fraudsters also admitted that they had sold fake ransomware infrastructure to other would-be actors who wanted to carry out attacks themselves, including tricking one buyer out of $85,000. (Eurogamer, Cyber Daily) 

**A popular series of white-label security cameras are littered with an array of security vulnerabilities that could allow adversaries to collect images from their cameras without users knowing.** The cameras are manufactured by the same company, but sold under the labels of Eken and Tuck on popular websites like Amazon, Walmart, Sears and Temu. The doorbells also do not have a visible ID issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that’s normally required by the agency, which technically makes them illegal to distribute in the U.S., though many of them were still for sale as of late February. The vulnerabilities affect more than 10 different products, which are all controlled by the same app that’s available on the Android app store. All an adversary would need to do to exploit the vulnerabilities and spy on the camera would be to acquire the serial number — no notification is sent to the doorbell’s owner when there’s a new pairing, and the adversary doesn’t even need an account username or password. Retailers that list the cameras for sale did not respond to a request for comment from Consumer Reports, the outlet that performed the research. (Consumer Reports, TechCrunch) 

**Payment systems across the U.S. health care system are offline, with many doctors having to switch to paper billing,** after a massive data breach at Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of the UnitedHealth insurance company. Change Healthcare first disclosed the breach on Feb. 21 after adversaries disrupted operations for the company, which processes 15 billion health care-related transactions every year. Now the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is urging health care systems and doctors who use Change to start developing alternatives, as they are unsure when systems will be back online. Change Healthcare is a system that connects doctors, hospitals and other health care providers with insurance companies to pay for medical care and authorize assorted services for patients. The follow-on effects have also been difficult on providers, who are now being faced with rent and other bills that they can’t pay because they still haven’t been paid by insurance companies. (USA Today, The New York Times) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? ** **Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**Botconf** **(April 23 - 26)** 

_Nice, Côte d'Azur, France_

> _This presentation from Chetan Raghuprasad details the Supershell C2 framework. Threat actors are using this framework massively and creating botnets with the Supershell implants._

**CARO Workshop 2024** **(May 1 - 3)** 

_Arlington, Virginia_

> Over the past year, we’ve observed a substantial uptick in attacks by YoroTrooper, a relatively nascent espionage-oriented threat actor operating against the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) since at least 2022. Asheer Malhotra's presentation at CARO 2024 will provide an overview of their various campaigns detailing the commodity and custom-built malware employed by the actor, their discovery and evolution in tactics. He will present a timeline of successful intrusions carried out by YoroTrooper targeting high-value individuals associated with CIS government agencies over the last two years.

**RSA** **(May 6 - 9)** 

_San Francisco, California_  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5**: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934   
**MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c   
**Typical Filename:** Wextract   
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** 9ef2e8714e85dcd116b709894b43babb4a0872225ae7363152013b7fd1bc95bc   
**MD5:** 4813fa6d610e180b097eae0ce636d2aa   
**Typical Filename:** xmrig.exe   
**Claimed Product:** XMRig   
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.70491190 

**SHA 256:** a75004c0bf61a2300258d99660552d88bf4e1fe6edab188aad5ac207babcf421   
**MD5:** c44f8ef0bbaeee256bfb62561c2a17db   
**Typical Filename:** ggzokjcqkgcbqiaxoohw.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Symmi:GenMalicious-tpd

You’re going to start seeing more tax-related spam, but remember, that doesn’t actually mean there’s more spam

We discuss three of the most common post-compromise tactics that Talos has observed in our threat telemetry and Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) engagements. These include modifying the device’s firmware, uploading customized/weaponized firmware, and bypassing security measures.

Thursday, March 7, 2024 10:00

We’ve been discussing networking devices quite a lot recently and how Advanced Persistent Threat actors (APTs) are using highly sophisticated tactics to target aging infrastructure for espionage purposes. Some of these attacks are also likely prepositioning the APTs for future disruptive or destructive attacks. 

Talos has also observed several ransomware groups gaining initial access to networking devices to extort their victims. We wrote about these attacks in our 2023 Year in Review report. 

The mechanisms and methodology behind these two groups are drastically different, but no less concerning. This is partly because networking devices offer a great deal of access to an attacker. If you can compromise a router, you are highly likely to have a point of ingress into that network.  

These attacks are largely being carried out on aging network infrastructure; devices that have long since gone end-of-life, and/or have critical unpatched vulnerabilities sitting on them. Many of these older devices weren’t designed with security in mind. Traditionally, network infrastructure has sat outside of security’s ecosystem, and this makes monitoring network access attempts increasingly difficult. 

Adversaries, particularly APTs, are capitalizing on this scenario to conduct hidden post-compromise activities once they have gained initial access to the network. The goal here is to give themselves a greater foothold, conceal their activities, and hunt for data and intelligence that can assist them with their espionage and/or disruptive goals. 

Think of it like a burglar breaking into a house via the water pipes. They’re not using “traditional” methods such as breaking down doors or windows (the noisy smash-and-grab approach) — they’re using an unusual route, because no one ever thinks their house will be broken into via the water pipes. Their goal is to remain stealthy on the inside while they take their time to find the most valuable artefacts (credit to my colleague Martin Lee for that analogy). 

In this blog, we explore how we got here, and the different approaches of APTs vs ransomware actors. We also discuss three of the most common post-compromise tactics that Talos has observed in our threat telemetry and Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) engagements. These include modifying the device’s firmware, uploading customized/weaponized firmware, and bypassing security measures. 

**How we got here**

There is a rich history of threat actors targeting network infrastructure — the most notorious example being VPNFilter in 2018. The attack was staged, but potential disaster was averted when the attacker’s command and control (C2) infrastructure was seized by the FBI, preventing the attacker from issuing the final command to take over the devices. 

At the time, we spoke about how VPNFilter was the “wakeup call that alerted the cybersecurity community to a new kind of state-sponsored threat — a vast network of compromised devices across the globe that could stow away secrets, hide the origins of attacks and shut down networks.” 

The techniques used in VPNFilter gives us plenty of clues as to possible current threat actor motivations. In the attack, the modular design of the malware allowed for many things to take place post compromise – one module even allowed the malware to create a giant Tor network of the 500,000 compromised devices.  

A recent attack which may have been inspired by this was the KV Botnet (Lumen released a blog about this in December 2023). The botnet was used to compromise devices including small and home office (SOHO) routers and firewalls and then chain them together, “to form a covert data transfer network supporting various Chinese state-sponsored actors including Volt Typhoon.”  

The Beers with Talos team recently spoke about the KV Botnet and Volt Typhoon, a group widely reported by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Microsoft and other organizations to be a PRC-based state actor. They have been known to conduct long-term espionage activities and strategic operations that are potentially positioning them for future destructive/disruptive attacks. Listen to the episode below:

In 2019, we saw another type of modular malware that was designed to target network infrastructure: “Cyclops Blink.” This was dubbed the “Son of VPNFilter” because of the similarities to that campaign.

The Cyclops Blink malware was designed to run on Linux systems, specifically for 32-bit PowerPC architecture. It could be used in a variety of ways, including reconnaissance and espionage activity. It leveraged modules to facilitate various activities such as establishment of C2, file upload/download and data extraction capabilities.  

In 2022, Talos wrote about how we had detected compromised MikroTik routers inside of Ukraine being leveraged to conduct brute force attacks on devices protected by multi-factor authentication. This continued the pattern we have seen since our investigation into VPNFilter involving actors using MikroTik routers. 

APTs and cyber criminals have different goals for attacking network infrastructure. APTs want to go in with stealth and hide for espionage purposes. Criminal groups use edge devices to an end for ransomware purposes. 

For more insights into the status of attacks on network infrastructure, here is Talos’ Matt Olney and Nick Biasini talking about what Talos has observed over the past 18 months: 

**Post compromise tactics and techniques**

Compromising the network for persistent access and intelligence capture is a multi-step process and requires a lot of work and expertise in targeted technologies which is why we typically only see the most sophisticated threat actors carry out these attacks.  

Below are some techniques that Talos has observed post compromise on out-of-date networking equipment, in order to maintain persistent access. We initially discussed these in our threat advisory in April, as well as our 2023 Year in Review, but due to the sophisticated nature of these attacks and the continued exploitation, we wanted to dive deeper into some of these tactics: 

**1) Modifying the firmware**

Talos has observed APTs modifying network device firmware on older devices to add certain pieces of functionality, which will allow them to gain a greater foothold on the network. This could be adding implants or modifying the way the device captures information.  

An example of this is the recent exploitation of Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface. One attack included the deployment of an implant we called “BadCandy” which consisted of a configuration file (“cisco\_service.conf”). The configuration file defined the new web server endpoint (URI path) used to interact with the implant. That endpoint receives certain parameters that allowed the actor to execute arbitrary commands at the system or IOS level.  

Another example is from September 2023, when CISA wrote about how BlackTech was observed modifying firmware to allow the installation of a modified bootloader which helps it to bypass certain security features (while creating a backdoor to the device). 

Detecting the modification of firmware is extremely difficult for defenders. Occasionally, there may be something in the logs to imply an upgrade and reboot, but turning off logging is usually one of the first steps attackers take once they are inside a network. 

This again highlights the need for organizations to sunset aging network infrastructure that isn’t secure by design, or, at the very least, increasing cybersecurity due diligence on older equipment such as configuration management. Performing configuration comparisons on firmware may help to highlight when it has been altered by an adversary.  

**2) Uploading customized/weaponized firmware**

If threat actors cannot modify the existing firmware, or they need additional levels of access that they don’t currently have, adversaries can upload customized or old firmware they know have working exploits against it (in effect, reverting to an older version of the firmware).  

Once the weaponized firmware has been uploaded, they reboot the device, and then exploit the vulnerability that is now unpatched. This now provides the threat actor with a box that can be modified with additional functionality, to exfiltrate data, for example. 

Again, as with the modification of firmware tactic, it’s important to check your network environment for unauthorized changes. These types of devices need to be watched very closely, as threat actors will want to try and prevent system administrators from seeing the activity by turning off logging. If you’re looking at your logs and it looks like someone has actually turned off logging, that is a huge red flag that your network has been infiltrated and potentially compromised. 

**3) Bypassing or removing security measures**

Talos has also seen threat actors take measures to remove anything blocking their access to fulfil their goals. If for example they want to exfiltrate data, but there’s an access control list (ACL) that blocks the actor from being able to access the host, they may modify the ACL or remove it from the interface. Or they may install operating software that knows to not apply ACLs against certain actor IP addresses, regardless of the configuration. 

Other security measures that APTs will attempt to subvert include disabling remote logging, adding user accounts with escalated privileges, and reconfiguring SNMP community strings. SNMP is often overlooked, so we recommend having good, complex community strings and upgrading to SNMPv3 where possible. Ensure that your management of SNMP is only permitted to be done from the inside and not from the outside.  

The BadCandy campaign is a good example of how an actor can remove certain security measures. The adversary was able to create miniature servers (virtualized computers) inside of compromised systems which created a base of operations for them. This allowed the threat actors to intercept and redirect traffic, as well as add and disable user accounts. This meant that even if the organization were to reboot the device and erase the active memory, the adversary would still have persistent accounts – effectively a consistent back door.  

**Additional campaign objectives**

In our original threat advisory, we also posted a non-exhaustive list of the type of activities Talos has observed threat actors take on network infrastructure devices. The point behind this is that threat actors are taking the type of steps that someone who wants to understand (and control) your environment.  

Examples we have observed include threat actors performing a “show config,” “show interface,” “show route,” “show arp table” and a “show CDP neighbor.” All these actions give the attackers a picture of a router’s perspective of the network, and an understanding of what foothold they have. Other campaign objectives include: 

*   Creation of hub-and-spoke VPNs designed to allow the siphoning of targeted traffic from network segments of interest through the VPN. 
*   The capture of network traffic for future retrieval, frequently limited to specific IPs or protocols. 
*   The use of infrastructure devices to deliver attacks or maintain C2 in various campaigns. 

> Read more about campaign objectives 

**Recommendations**

The first thing to say when it comes to recommendations is that if you are using network infrastructure that is end of life, out of support, and now has vulnerabilities that cannot be patched, now really is the time to replace those devices.  

To combat the threat of aging network infrastructure as a target, Cisco became a founding member of the Network Resilience Coalition. Along with other vendors in this space and key governmental partners, the group is focussed on threat research and recommendations for defenders. The initial report from the Network Resilience Coalition was published at the end of January 2024 and contains a broad set of recommendations for both consumers of networking devices and product vendors. 

Earlier this month, Cisco’s Head of Trust Office Matt Fussa wrote about how organizations should view these recommendations, and the overall threat that end-of-life network infrastructure poses on a national security level.  

The report from the Network Resilience Coalition contains an in depth set of recommendations for network infrastructure defense. Here is a brief summary: 

Key recommendations from the report for network product vendors include: 

*   Align software development practices with the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF). 
*   Provide clear and concise details on product “end-of-life,” including specific date ranges and details on what support levels to expect for each. 
*   Separate critical security fixes for customers and not bundle those patches with new product features or functionality changes. 
*   Get involved in the OpenEoX effort in OASIS, a cross-industry effort to standardize how end-of-life information is communicated and provide it in a machine-readable format. 

Purchasers of network products should: 

*   Favor vendors that are aligned with the SSDF, provide you with clear end-of-life information, and provide you with separate critical security fixes. 
*   Increase cybersecurity diligence (vulnerability scanning, configuration management) on older products that are outside of their support period. 
*   Periodically ensure that product configuration is aligned with vendor recommendations, with increasing frequency as products age, and ensure implementation of timely updates and patches. 

As the report says, “These recommendations, if broadly implemented, would lead to a more secure and resilient global network infrastructure and help better protect the critical infrastructure that people rely on for their livelihood and well-being.”  

From a Talos perspective, we are keen to re-emphasize this point and help our customers transition from equipment that has become end-of-life. Using networking equipment that has been built with secure-by-design principles such as running secure boot, alongside having a robust configuration and patch management approach, is key to combatting these types of threats. Ensure that these devices are being watched very carefully for any configuration changes and patch them promptly whenever new vulnerabilities are discovered. 

Proactive threat hunting is also one of the ways that organizations can root out visibility gaps and hints of incursion. Look for things like VPN tunnels, or persistent connections that you don't recognise. This is the type of thing that will be left in an attack of this nature.  

And finally, the definition of post compromise means that the attacker had gained some form of credentials to get them to the place where they could then launch the exploit and get deeper access to the device.  

Our recommendations are to select complex passwords and community strings, use SNMPv3 or subsequent versions, utilize MFA where possible, and require encryption when configuring and monitoring devices. Finally, we recommend locking down and aggressively monitoring credential systems like TACACS+ and any jump hosts. 

**Additional resources**

State-sponsored campaigns target global network infrastructure (Talos blog)  

Network Resilience: Accelerating Efforts to Protect Critical Infrastructure (Cisco blog) 

Network Resilience Coalition: Full report 

Securing Network Infrastructure Devices (CISA) 

The VPN Filter catastrophe that wasn’t 

Cisco Trust Center: Network Resilience

The 3 most common post-compromise tactics on network infrastructure

By Deeba Ahmed
Another day, another Linux malware!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: New Linux Malware Alert: ‘Spinning YARN’ Hits Docker, Other Key Apps

Linux Users Beware: “Spinning YARN” Malware Campaign Targets Misconfigured Servers Running on Apache Hadoop YARN, Docker, Confluence and Redis.

Cado Security Labs has discovered an emerging Linux malware campaign dubbed Spinning Yarn targeting misconfigured servers running Apache Hadoop YARN, Docker, Confluence, and Redis web-facing services. 

The emergence of the new Linux malware shouldn’t come as a surprise, given the recent surge in threats targeting Linux devices and servers. Just a couple of days ago, an old Linux malware known as Bifrost RAT resurfaced with a new variant that mimics VMware domains.

According to Cado Security’s research research shared with Hackread.com ahead of publication on Wednesday, Spinning Yarn is a malicious campaign that exploits weaknesses in popular Linux software used by businesses across various sectors. 

These services are crucial components in organizations’ IT infrastructure. Docker is critical for developing, deploying, and managing containerized applications. Apache Hadoop allows distributed processing of large datasets. Redis, a widely used in-memory data store, helps in caching real-time applications, and Confluence allows collaboration and knowledge management.

By compromising these applications, attackers can gain unauthorized access to systems, steal sensitive data, disrupt operations, or deploy ransomware, posing a significant threat to servers and critical infrastructure.

In Spinning Yarn, threat actors have used several unique payloads, including four Golang binaries that automate the discovery and infection of hosts and let them exploit code. They use Confluence to exploit common misconfigurations and vulnerabilities, launching Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks and infecting new hosts.

The attackers exploit CVE-2022-26134, an n-day vulnerability in Confluence, and deploy a container for the Docker compromise. The vulnerability has been exploited since 2022, including by Mirai malware variant V3G4 against IoT devices for DDoS attacks

Further probing revealed a series of shell scripts and standard Linux attack techniques used to deliver a cryptocurrency miner, spawn a reverse shell, and enable persistent access to compromised hosts. They also deploy an instance of the Platypus open-source reverse shell utility to maintain access.

In an attempt to evade detection, multiple user-mode rootkits are deployed. Researchers observed that the shell script payloads employed in this campaign share similarities with those used in previous cloud attacks.

In their blog post, Cado Security Labs detailed initial access activity on a docker Engine API honeypot on this IP address: 47966971. The attacker spawned a new container using Alpine Linux and created a bind mount for the underlying server’s root directory. This technique is common in Docker attacks, allowing attackers to write files to the host and execute a job for the Cron scheduler eventually achieving RCE.

In this campaign, the attacker wrote an executable and registered a Cron job to execute base64-encoded shell commands. Such extensive attack on Linux applications demonstrates attackers’ growing sophistication in targeting web-facing services in cloud environments, keeping abreast of vulnerabilities.

To mitigate the risks from campaigns like Spinning Yarn, regularly update software, enable strong passwords, educate employees on cybersecurity best practices, segment your network to limit potential damage, and deploy security solutions like endpoint security solutions and firewalls to detect and prevent malware infections. This will help protect against known vulnerabilities and ensure a secure environment.

1.  New Linux Malware “Migo” Exploits Redis for Cryptojacking
2.  Free Download Manager Site Pushed Linux Password Stealer
3.  Malicious Ads Infiltrate Bing AI Chatbot in Malvertising Attack
4.  Hamas Hackers Hit Israelis with New BiBi-Linux Wiper Malware
5.  Mirai-based NoaBot Botnet Hits Linux Systems with Cryptominer

New Linux Malware Alert: ‘Spinning YARN’ Hits Docker, Other Key Apps

By Deeba Ahmed
Leaked Military Audio Raises Stakes in Russia-Ukraine Conflict.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Russian Operatives Expose German Military Webex Conversations

In the recording, four senior Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) officers are discussing the hypothetical export of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, and how to attack Russian infrastructure through them.

Russian spies leaked a 38-minute audio file of German military officials discussing Taurus cruise missile deliveries to Ukraine, raising questions about the military’s information security practices, as reported by Russian state broadcaster RT.

The German Defence Ministry has accused Russia of launching an “information war” following the publication of the recording of a meeting of senior German military officials, calling the incident an act of eavesdropping and a “hybrid disinformation attack” by Russia-backed spies.

Reportedly, the spies could record the conversation by joining a Webex conference. The conversation reveals plans for the shipment of advanced weaponry to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine and a possible military strike on Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula currently under Russian control. 

It is worth noting that Kyiv wants Germany’s Taurus missiles, long-range missiles from France and Britain, and Ukrainian soldier training amid the ongoing war in Ukraine since the country is facing soldiers and ammunition shortages. The transcript of the conversation, which took place on 19 February, was published by RT on 1st March. 

In the recording, four senior Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) officers are discussing the hypothetical export of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, and how to attack Russian infrastructure through them.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz refuses to send such long-range cruise missiles, causing splintering within the country’s governing coalition. The recording, shared on social media, revealed that the German Air Force’s chief, Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz **expressed** concern about direct connections with the Ukrainian armed forces. 

Russian officials also discussed potential targets for Taurus missiles donated to Ukraine, the training time for local personnel, and the possibility of using the missiles to destroy the Kerch bridge linking Crimea to Russia.

They also discussed preparations for a meeting with MP Boris Pistorius to send around 10-20 Taurus missiles from Germany’s 600-strong stockpile to counter Russia’s air defences and destroy the Kerch connection. They also discussed transporting data for Taurus programming from German airbases into Ukraine.

As per DW, the Defence Ministry has confirmed the recording’s authenticity and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz referred to it as a “very serious matter.” German Social Democrats MP Pistorius criticized the leaked audio, stating it was suspiciously published just before opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral. 

Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service is investigating the leaked audio, which comes just days after Scholz inferred that British and French staff are helping calibrate missile targets for Ukrainians.

1.  Microsoft Executives’ Emails Breached by Russia Hackers
2.  Russian Hackers Hit Mail Servers in Europe for Military Intel
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By Waqas
Bifrost RAT, also known as Bifrose, was originally identified two decades ago in 2004.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: New Bifrost RAT Variant Targets Linux Devices, Mimics VMware Domain

The latest version of Bifrost RAT employs sophisticated techniques including typosquatting, to avoid detection and complicate efforts to trace its origins.

Cybersecurity experts at Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 have uncovered a new cybersecurity threat: a new variant of the Bifrost RAT (also known as Bifrose) targeting Linux systems. This variant, utilizing a tricky domain named download.vmfare(.)com, is designed to evade detection and compromise targeted systems.

The malicious domain bears a not-so-easy-to-distinguish resemblance to a legitimate VMware domain, with the only difference being the substitution of the letter “F” for the “W” in the domain: VM**w**are becomes VM**f**are. For your information, VMware is a leading provider of virtualization and cloud computing software and services.

This type of attack is called a **typosquatting attack** in which malicious actors register domain names similar to popular ones, relying on users making typing errors to visit their sites, often for phishing or malware distribution purposes. For example, “**It’s Google.com, not ɢoogle.com**.”

VirusTotal score for the malicious domain (screenshot: Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42)

Bifrost, a remote access Trojan (RAT) dating back to 2004, is notorious for its ability to hide within systems, inject malicious code into legitimate processes, and establish covert communication channels with external servers. This allows attackers to steal sensitive data with ease.

The latest version of Bifrost, as detailed by researchers in their technical **blog post**, employs sophisticated techniques to avoid detection and complicate efforts to trace its origins. By encrypting collected data using RC4 encryption, and the aforementioned domain with a deceptive name, the malware makes it challenging for security experts to thwart its activities.

Additionally, the malware’s recent deployment on a server hosting an ARM version hints at an expansion of its targets.

Analysis of the malware’s code reveals intricate manoeuvres to establish connections and gather data, showcasing its advanced capabilities in evading detection. Palo Alto Networks detected over 100 instances of Bifrost activity in recent months, signalling a critical need for enhanced security measures.

To safeguard against Bifrost attacks, Unit 42 researchers recommend a multi-faceted approach including regular system updates, strong access controls, deployment of endpoint security solutions, and vigilant monitoring of network activity.

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