#git

Mattermost versions 10.2.x <= 10.2.0, 9.11.x <= 9.11.5, 10.0.x <= 10.0.3, 10.1.x <= 10.1.3 fail to properly handle posts with attachments containing fields that cannot be cast to a String, which allows an attacker to cause the webapp to crash via creating and sending such a post to a channel.

### Impact If SVG or JPEGXL thumbnailers are enabled (they are disabled by default), a user may upload a file which claims to be either of these types and request a thumbnail to invoke a different decoder in ImageMagick. In some ImageMagick installations, this includes the capability to run Ghostscript to decode the image/file. If MP4 thumbnailers are enabled (also disabled by default), the same issue as above may occur with the ffmpeg installation instead. MMR uses a number of other decoders for all other file types when preparing thumbnails. Theoretical issues are possible with these decoders, however in testing they were not possible to exploit. ### Patches This is fixed in [MMR v1.3.8](https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8). MMR now inspects the mimetype of media prior to thumbnailing, and picks a thumbnailer based on those results instead of relying on user-supplied values. This may lead to fewer thumbnails when obscure file shapes are used. This also...

### Impact Matrix Media Repo (MMR) is vulnerable to server-side request forgery, serving content from a private network it can access, under certain conditions. ### Patches This is fixed in [MMR v1.3.8](https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8). ### Workarounds Restricting which hosts MMR is allowed to contact via (local) firewall rules or a transparent proxy. ### References https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery https://learn.snyk.io/lesson/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/ https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/preventing_server_side_request_forgery_in_golang

### Impact MMR makes requests to other servers as part of normal operation, and these resource owners can return large amounts of JSON back to MMR for parsing. In parsing, MMR can consume large amounts of memory and exhaust available memory. ### Patches This is fixed in [MMR v1.3.8](https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8). ### Workarounds Forward proxies can be configured to block requests to unsafe hosts. Alternatively, MMR processes can be configured with memory limits and auto-restart. Running multiple MMR processes concurrently can help ensure a restart does not overly impact users.

A flaw was found in the HAL Console in the Wildfly component, which does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output used as a web page that is served to other users. The attacker must be authenticated as a user that belongs to management groups “SuperUser”, “Admin”, or “Maintainer”. ### Impact Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the management console. ### Patches Fixed in [HAL 3.7.7.Final](https://github.com/hal/console/releases/tag/v3.7.7) ### Workarounds No workaround available ### References - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-23366 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2337619

### Impact MMR before version 1.3.5 allows, by design, unauthenticated remote participants to trigger a download and caching of remote media from a remote homeserver to the local media repository. Such content then also becomes available for download from the local homeserver in an unauthenticated way. The implication is that unauthenticated remote adversaries can use this functionality to plant problematic content into the media repository. ### Patches MMR 1.3.5 introduces a partial mitigation in the form of new endpoints which require authentication for media downloads. The unauthenticated endpoints will be frozen in a future release, closing the attack vector. ### Workarounds Though extremely limited, server operators can use more strict rate limits based on IP address. ### References https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3916

XSS on the parameters:`/addhost` -> param: community of Librenms versions 24.10.1 ([https://github.com/librenms/librenms](https://github.com/librenms/librenms)) allows remote attackers to inject malicious scripts. When a user views or interacts with the page displaying the data, the malicious script executes immediately, leading to potential unauthorized actions or data exposure. **Proof of Concept:** 1. Navigate to the /addhost path. 2. Fill in all required fields. 3. In the Community field, enter the following payload: `"><img src=a onerror="alert(1)">`.  4. Submit the form to save changes. 5 The script will execute when the error alert "No reply with community + payload" appears.  **Impact:** Execution of Malicious Code

# StoredXSS-LibreNMS-MiscSection **Description:** Stored XSS on the parameter: `ajax_form.php` -> param: state Request: ```http POST /ajax_form.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <your_host> X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest X-CSRF-TOKEN: <your_XSRF_token> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Cookie: <your_cookie> type=override-config&device_id=1&attrib=override_icmp_disable&state="><img%20src%20onerror="alert(1)"> ``` of Librenms version 24.10.1 ([https://github.com/librenms/librenms](https://github.com/librenms/librenms)) allows remote attackers to inject malicious scripts. When a user views or interacts with the page displaying the data, the malicious script executes immediately, leading to potential unauthorized actions or data exposure. The vulnerability in the line: ```php $attrib_val = get_dev_attrib($device, $name); ``` within the `dynamic_override_config` function arises because the value of `$attrib_val is` retrieved from untrusted data without any sanitiz...