#git

### Summary The latest version of lobe-chat(by now v0.141.2) has an unauthorized ssrf vulnerability. An attacker can construct malicious requests to cause SSRF without logging in, attack intranet services, and leak sensitive information. ### Details * visit https://chat-preview.lobehub.com/settings/agent * you can attack all internal services by /api/proxy and get the echo in http response :)    ### PoC ```http POST /api/proxy HTTP/2 Host: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cookie: LOBE_LOCALE=zh-CN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined; _ga=GA1.1.86608329.1711346216; _ga_63LP1TV70T=GS1.1.1711346215.1.1.1711346846.0.0.0 Content-Length: 23 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Google Chrome";v=...

Dell has notified some customers about a data breach reported to include 49 million records.

By Waqas Dell has announced a data breach, while a hacker using the alias Menelik is selling 49 million Dell customer data on the notorious Breach Forums. This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Dell Discloses Data Breach As Hacker Sells 49 Million Customer Data

### Overview Path Traversal vulnerability via File Uploads in Genie ### Impact Any Genie OSS users running their own instance and relying on the filesystem to store file attachments submitted to the Genie application may be impacted. Using this technique, it is possible to write a file with any user-specified filename and file contents to any location on the file system that the Java process has write access - potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE). Genie users who do not store these attachments locally on the underlying file system are not vulnerable to this issue. ### Description Genie's API accepts a multipart/form-data file upload which can be saved to a location on disk. However, it takes a user-supplied filename as part of the request and uses this as the filename when writing the file to disk. Since this filename is user-controlled, it is possible for a malicious actor to manipulate the filename in order to break out of the default attachment storage path and p...

### Impact A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in Next.js Server Actions by security researchers at Assetnote. If the `Host` header is modified, and the below conditions are also met, an attacker may be able to make requests that appear to be originating from the Next.js application server itself. #### Prerequisites * Next.js (`<14.1.1`) is running in a self-hosted* manner. * The Next.js application makes use of Server Actions. * The Server Action performs a redirect to a relative path which starts with a `/`. \* Many hosting providers (including Vercel) route requests based on the Host header, so we do not believe that this vulnerability affects any Next.js applications where routing is done in this manner. ### Patches This vulnerability was patched in [#62561](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/pull/62561) and fixed in Next.js `14.1.1`. ### Workarounds There are no official workarounds for this vulnerability. We recommend upgrading to Next.js `14.1.1...

### Impact Inconsistent interpretation of a crafted HTTP request meant that requests are treated as both a single request, and two separate requests by Next.js, leading to desynchronized responses. This led to a response queue poisoning vulnerability in the affected Next.js versions. For a request to be exploitable, the affected route also had to be making use of the [rewrites](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/next-config-js/rewrites) feature in Next.js. ### Patches The vulnerability is resolved in Next.js `13.5.1` and newer. This includes Next.js `14.x`. ### Workarounds There are no official workarounds for this vulnerability. We recommend that you upgrade to a safe version. ### References https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/advanced/response-queue-poisoning

RIOT versions 2024.01 and below suffers from multiple buffer overflows, ineffective size checks, and out-of-bounds memory access vulnerabilities.

The Security Explorations team has come up with two attack scenarios that make it possible to extract private ECC keys used by a PlayReady client (Windows SW DRM scenario) for the communication with a license server and identity purposes. Proof of concept included.

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5686-1 - Nick Galloway discovered an integer overflow in dav1d, a fast and small AV1 video stream decoder which could result in memory corruption.

**Important: Exploiting this vulnerability requires the attacker to have access to your Frigate instance, which means they could also just delete all of your recordings or perform any other action. If you have configured authentication in front of Frigate via a reverse proxy, then this vulnerability is not exploitable without first getting around your authentication method. For many obvious reasons in addition to this one, please don't expose your Frigate instance publicly without any kind of authentication.** ## Summary When uploading a file or retrieving the filename, a user may intentionally use a large Unicode filename which would lead to a application-level denial of service. This is due to no limitation set on the length of the filename and the costy use of the Unicode normalization with the form NFKD under the hood of `secure_filename()`. I idenfied multiple vulnerable paths on [blakeblackshear/frigate](https://www.github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/) repository. In all of th...