#java

### Summary Usage of the `Butterfly.prototype.parseJSON` or `getJSON` functions on an attacker-controlled crafted input string allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server. Since Butterfly JavaScript code has access to Java classes, it can run arbitrary programs. ### Details The `parseJSON` function (edu/mit/simile/butterfly/Butterfly.js:64) works by calling `eval`, an approach that goes back to the original library by Crockford, before JSON was part of the ECMAScript language. It uses a regular expression to remove strings from the input, then checks that there are no unexpected characters in the non-string remainder. However, the regex is imperfect, as was [discovered earlier by Mike Samuel](https://dev.to/mikesamuel/2008-silently-securing-jsonparse-5cbb); specifically, the "cleaner" can be tricked into treating part of the input as a string that the "evaluator" does not, because of a difference in interpretation regarding the [the Unicode zero-width jo...

### Summary The Butterfly framework uses the `java.net.URL` class to refer to (what are expected to be) local resource files, like images or templates. This works: "opening a connection" to these URLs opens the local file. However, if a `file:/` URL is directly given where a relative path (resource name) is expected, this is also accepted in some code paths; the app then fetches the file, from a remote machine if indicated, and uses it as if it was a trusted part of the app's codebase. This leads to multiple weaknesses and potential weaknesses: * An attacker that has network access to the application could use it to gain access to files, either on the the server's filesystem (path traversal) or shared by nearby machines (server-side request forgery with e.g. SMB). * An attacker that can lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL belonging to the app could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript to be loaded in the victim's browser (cross-site scripting). * If an app is written ...

### Summary The built-in "Something went wrong!" error page includes the exception message and exception traceback without escaping HTML tags, enabling injection into the page if an attacker can reliably produce an error with an attacker-influenced message. It appears that the only way to reach this code in OpenRefine itself is for an attacker to somehow convince a victim to import a malicious file, as in GHSA-m88m-crr9-jvqq, which may be difficult. However, out-of-tree extensions may add their own calls to `respondWithErrorPage`. ### Details The `Command.respondWithErrorPage` (through `HttpUtilities.respondWithErrorPage`) function renders the Velocity template `error.vt`, which contains the `$message` and `$stack` variables, which are included in the response as-is: https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/blob/master/main/webapp/modules/core/error.vt#L52-L53 However, the message can contain HTML tags, which would then be interpreted by the browser. A mitigation would be to esc...

### Summary The `export-rows` command can be used in such a way that it reflects part of the request verbatim, with a Content-Type header also taken from the request. An attacker could lead a user to a malicious page that submits a form POST that contains embedded JavaScript code. This code would then be included in the response, along with an attacker-controlled `Content-Type` header, and so potentially executed in the victim's browser as if it was part of OpenRefine. The attacker must know a valid project ID of a project that contains at least one row. ### Details The malicious form sets `contentType` to `text/html` (ExportRowsCommand.java line 101) and `preview` to `true` (line 107). This combination causes the browser to treat what OpenRefine thinks of as an export preview as a regular webpage. It would be safer if the `export-rows` command did not allow overriding the Content-Type header at all, instead relying on the exporter to provide the correct Content-Type. It could a...

### Summary The `/extension/gdata/authorized` endpoint includes the `state` GET parameter verbatim in a `<script>` tag in the output, so without escaping. An attacker could lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL containing JavaScript code, which would then cause that code to be executed in the victim's browser as if it was part of OpenRefine. ### Details The `state` GET parameter is read from: * extensions/gdata/module/MOD-INF/controller.js:105 It is used (as `$state`) in: * extensions/gdata/module/authorized.vt:43 There is no check that the state has the expected format (base64-encoded JSON with values like "openrefine123..." and "cb123..."), or that the page was indeed opened as part of the authorization flow. ### PoC Navigate to: http://localhost:3333/extension/gdata/authorized?state=%22,alert(1),%22&error= An alert box pops up. The gdata extension needs to be present. No other configuration is needed; specifically, it is not required to have a client ID or client...

North Korean hackers from Lazarus Group exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome to target cryptocurrency investors with…

ABB Cylon Aspect version 3.08.02 suffers from an authenticated arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. Input passed through the logFile GET parameter via the logYumLookup.php script is not properly verified before being used to download log files. This can be exploited to disclose the contents of arbitrary and sensitive files via directory traversal attacks.

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a security flaw impacting Amazon Web Services (AWS) Cloud Development Kit (CDK) that could have resulted in an account takeover under specific circumstances. "The impact of this issue could, in certain scenarios, allow an attacker to gain administrative access to a target AWS account, resulting in a full account takeover," Aqua said in a report shared

The North Korean threat actor known as Lazarus Group has been attributed to the zero-day exploitation of a now-patched security flaw in Google Chrome to seize control of infected devices. Cybersecurity vendor Kaspersky said it discovered a novel attack chain in May 2024 that targeted the personal computer of an unnamed Russian national with the Manuscrypt backdoor. This entails triggering the

The Snyk gradle plugin is vulnerable to Code Injection when scanning an untrusted Gradle project. The vulnerability can be triggered if Snyk test is run inside the untrusted project due to the improper handling of the current working directory name. Snyk recommends only scanning trusted projects.