#js

Red Hat Insights has expanded its recommendation capabilities to security software by integrating with CrowdStrike, a security provider which provides protection across endpoints and cloud workloads, identity and data. Insights Advisor provides Red Hat administrators proactive recommendations and early warnings for their Red Hat systems based on decades of operational expertise from Red Hat and select independent software vendor (ISV) partners. Through a new integration between Insights and the lightweight CrowdStrike Falcon® agent, organizations can have greater confidence that their Red Hat

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5802-1 - Security issues were discovered in Chromium which could result in the execution of arbitrary code, denial of service, or information disclosure.

IBM Security Verify Access versions prior to 10.0.8 suffer from authentication bypass, reuse of private keys, local privilege escalation, weak settings, outdated libraries, missing password, hardcoded secrets, remote code execution, missing authentication, null pointer dereference, and lack of privilege separation vulnerabilities.

IBM Security Verify Access Appliance suffers from multiple insecure transit vulnerabilities, hardcoded passwords, and uninitialized variables. ibmsecurity versions prior to 2024.4.5 are affected.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-8425-03 - Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform release 4.15.37 is now available with updates to packages and images that fix several bugs and add enhancements. Issues addressed include denial of service and traversal vulnerabilities.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-8318-03 - Logging for Red Hat OpenShift - 5.6.25.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-7323-03 - Logging for Red Hat OpenShift - 5.6.24.

This week was a total digital dumpster fire! Hackers were like, "Let's cause some chaos!" and went after everything from our browsers to those fancy cameras that zoom and spin. (You know, the ones they use in spy movies? 🕵️‍♀️) We're talking password-stealing bots, sneaky extensions that spy on you, and even cloud-hacking ninjas! 🥷 It's enough to make you want to chuck your phone in the ocean.

### Summary By default `oak` does not allow transferring of hidden files with `Context.send` API. However, this can be bypassed by encoding `/` as its URL encoded form `%2F`. ### Details 1.) Oak uses [decodeComponent](https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/3896fe568b25ac0b4c5afbf822ff8344c3d1712a/send.ts#L182C10-L182C25) which seems to be unexpected. This is also the reason why it is not possible to access a file that contains URL encoded characters unless the client URL encodes it first. 2.) The function [isHidden](https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/3896fe568b25ac0b4c5afbf822ff8344c3d1712a/send.ts#L117-L125) is flawed since it only checks if the first subpath is hidden, allowing secrets to be read from `subdir/.env`. ### PoC ```ts // server.ts import { Application } from "jsr:@oak/[email protected]"; const app = new Application(); app.use(async (context, next) => { try { await context.send({ root: './root', hidden: false, // default }); } catch { await ...

Ping Identity PingIDM versions 7.0.0 through 7.5.0 enabled an attacker with read access to the User collection, to abuse API query filters in order to obtain managed and/or internal user's passwords in either plaintext or encrypted variants, based on configuration. The API clearly prevents the password in either plaintext or encrypted to be retrieved by any other means, as this field is set as protected under the User object. However, by injecting a malicious query filter, using password as the field to be filtered, an attacker can perform a blind brute-force on any victim's user password details (encrypted object or plaintext string).