#kubernetes

Non-human identities—also known as machine or workload identities—are becoming increasingly critical as organizations adopt cloud-native ecosystems and advanced AI workflows. For workloads spanning multiple cloud platforms, adhering to zero trust principles becomes challenging as they cross identity domains. A unified identity framework provides consistency in automating identity issuance and enforcing access control policies across diverse environments. SPIFFE/SPIRE, an open source identity issuance framework, enables organizations to implement centralized, scalable identity management on

In hybrid and multicloud environments, proper management of sensitive data-like secrets, credentials and certificates is critical to maintaining a robust security posture across Kubernetes clusters. While Kubernetes provides a Kube-native way to manage secrets, it’s generally understood that Kubernetes secrets are not particularly secret: they are base64 encoded and are accessible to cluster administrators. Additionally, anyone with privileges to create a pod in a specific namespace can access the secrets for that namespace. While at-rest protection can be provided by encrypting sensitive da

Cloud-native applications offer scalable, automated workflows, intelligent data processing, and seamless deployments. However, many organizations still struggle to…

Security leaders must address both internal and external risks, ranging from sophisticated cyberattacks to insider threats. At the same time, they must also adhere to an ever-growing list of regulations, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU Cyber Resilience Acts (CRA) and industry-specific mandates like Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). Balancing these concerns requires a strategic approach that integrates security and compliance without compromising operational efficiency.External threatsCybercr

Microsoft has warned that using pre-made templates, such as out-of-the-box Helm charts, during Kubernetes deployments could open the door to misconfigurations and leak valuable data. "While these 'plug-and-play' options greatly simplify the setup process, they often prioritize ease of use over security," Michael Katchinskiy and Yossi Weizman from the Microsoft Defender for Cloud Research team

Security policies like [`allowed-gadgets`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/restricting-gadgets), [`disallow-pulling`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/disallow-pulling), [`verify-image`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/verify-assets#verify-image-based-gadgets) can be bypassed by a malicious client. ### Impact Users running `ig` in daemon mode or IG on Kubernetes that rely on any of the features mentioned above are vulnerable to this issue. In order to exploit this, the client needs access to the server, like the correct TLS certificates on the `ig daemon` case or access to the cluster in the Kubernetes case. ### Patches The issue has been fixed in v0.40.0 ### Workarounds There is not known workaround to fix it.

Software supply chain security has become more relevant in the last decade as more and more organizations consume, develop and deploy containerized workloads. Software is inherently complex so an analogy concerning an area of life that we can all relate to should help. Here's a conversation about cooking lasagna!“Do you need any help?”“No, it's fine. I have done this a thousand times, thanks.”“That meat packaging is unusual. It’s just a thin plastic bag. Where did you get that?”“It was a bargain. A young chap knocked the door earlier and said he was selling meat. He had a coole

### Impact This issue allows an attacker who has compromised either the Elastic service or the extender plugin to cause denial of service of the scheduler. This is a privilege escalation, because Volcano users may run their Elastic service and extender plugins in separate pods or nodes from the scheduler. In the Kubernetes security model, node isolation is a security boundary, and as such an attacker is able to cross that boundary in Volcano's case if they have compromised either the vulnerable services or the pod/node in which they are deployed. The scheduler will become unavailable to other users and workloads in the cluster. The scheduler will either crash with an unrecoverable OOM panic or freeze while consuming excessive amounts of memory. ### Workarounds No

### Summary Due to a missing error propagation in function `GetNamespaceSelectorsFromNamespaceLister` in `pkg/utils/engine/labels.go` it may happen that policy rules using namespace selector(s) in their `match` statements are mistakenly not applied during admission review request processing. As a consequence, security-critical mutations and validations are bypassed, potentially allowing attackers with K8s API access to perform malicious operations. ### Details As a policy engine Kyverno is a critical component ensuring the security of Kubernetes clusters by apply security-relevant policy rules in the Kubernetes admission control process. We encountered a case where Kyverno did not apply policy rules which should have been applied. This happened in both the mutation and the validation phase of admission control. Effectively Kyverno handled the admission review requests as if those policy rules did not exist. Consequently, the Kube API request was accepted without applying securit...

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Steve where by default it was using an insecure option that did not validate the certificate presented by the remote server while performing a TLS connection. This could allow the execution of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack against services using Steve. For example, Rancher relies on Steve as a dependency for its user interface (UI) to proxy requests to Kubernetes clusters. Users who have the permission to create a service in Rancher’s local cluster can take over Rancher’s UI and display their own UI to gather sensitive information. This is only possible when the setting `ui-offline-preferred` is manually set to `remote` (by default Rancher sets it to `dynamic`). This enables further attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS), or tampering the UI to collect passwords from other users etc. Please consult the associated [MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) for further infor...