Government ministries keep falling victim to relatively standard-fare cyber-espionage attacks, like this latest campaign with hazy Chinese links.

Source: Mint Images Limited via Alamy Stock Photo

A Chinese-language advanced persistent threat (APT) has been spying on government ministries across the eastern hemisphere.

The first signs of it date back to late August of last year. Back then, the as-yet-unidentified group began to use a modified version of Gh0st RAT, nicknamed "SugarGh0st RAT," to spy on targets in South Korea, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uzbekistan. Since then, Cisco Talos revealed in a new blog post, the group now called "SneakyChef" has been cooking up new campaigns across more countries.

Based on its lure documents, likely targets for the campaign have included:

*   Ministries of foreign affairs from Angola, India, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Turkmenistan
    
*   The ministries of agriculture and forestry, and fisheries and marine resources in Angola
    
*   The Saudi Arabian embassy in Abu Dhabi
    

Talos has not attributed SneakyChef to any particular government itself. They did note, however, the Chinese language preferences present in its code, its use of SugarGh0st RAT — particularly, though not exclusively popular among Chinese threat actors — and the similar profile of its targets.

**Sneaky Chef's Latest Servings**

Where early campaigns utilized malicious RAR files embedded in LNK files for initial infection, now SneakyChef prefers self-extracting RARs (SFX RAR). The shift offers some modest benefits.

"RAR files just got official support in Windows 11, so for anything prior to Windows 11, you need to have extra software to be able to extract the file," explains Nick Biasani, Cisco Talos' head of outreach. "A self-extracting RAR file eliminates the need for extra software, so it probably increases the likelihood of infection."

Among the goodies SFX RAR drops: a decoy document, a dynamic link library (DLL) loader, some encrypted malware — either SugarGh0st RAT or SneakyChef's newest tool, SpiceRAT — and a malicious Visual Basic (VB) script for establishing persistence.

The decoys are legitimate, scanned documents relating in some way to the targeted ministry or embassy. They'll describe some kind of government business, most often an upcoming meeting or conference. Notably, Talos was unable to find any of the documents used in recent campaigns on the open web. (This might indicate they were themselves obtained via espionage.)

When it comes to government cyberespionage, "What we commonly see is that this would be the 'first wave.' This actor is not typically highly sophisticated, they're more aiming to send a lot of lures and get a lot of people infected so they can get initial footholds and start gathering data," Biasani says. Then, when they need access to a specific, extra-secured government body. "That's when you start seeing the more sophisticated elements of these attacks play out."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

'SneakyChef' APT Slices Up Foreign Affairs With SugarGh0st

PRESS RELEASE

DALLAS and TOKYO, June 18, 2024— VicOne, an automotive cybersecurity solutions leader, today announced that its xNexus and xZETA solutions are available in AWS Marketplace, a digital catalog with thousands of software listings from independent software vendors that make it easy to find, test, buy, and deploy software that runs on Amazon Web Services (AWS). xNexus is a next-generation vehicle security operations center (VSOC) platform and xZETA is an automotive vulnerability and software bill of materials (SBOM) management system. These safeguard the automotive software supply chain with unique zero-day threat intelligence, providing accurate, contextualized, and actionable insights for risk assessment.

AWS customers will now have access to VicOne’s solutions directly within AWS Marketplace. VicOne provides AWS customers with the ability to streamline the purchase and management of xNexus and xZETA within their AWS Marketplace account. 

“In various ways, our listing in AWS Marketplace is another of our efforts to help automotive manufacturers to securely put in place all of the many high-quality solutions they need across a globally scoped software supply chain for SDVs (software-defined vehicles),” said Max Cheng, chief executive officer of VicOne. “By accessing VicOne solutions, customers, MSSPs (managed security service providers) and other partners can more efficiently and simply offer our products to protect the automotive software supply chain against zero-day vulnerabilities and cyberattacks.” 

xNexus integrates with VicOne’s in-vehicle VSOC sensor, leveraging a unique large language modeling (LLM) approach to provide customized reporting to support VSOC teams. xNexus provides VSOC teams with actionable and contextualized attack paths based on different stakeholders’ needs. The capabilities delivered by VicOne’s next-gen VSOC platform accelerate threat investigations, enable confident response to attacks, and effectively reduce the burden of chasing false alarms. 

xZETA is an automotive vulnerability and SBOM management system that scans vehicle software to identify zero-day, undisclosed, known, and customer-discovered vulnerabilities, along with CWE, malware, and advanced persistent threats. Through xZETA’s patent-pending VicOne Vulnerability Impact Rating (VVIR) technology, external and internal insights are integrated to prioritize high-risk vulnerabilities. This enables swift identification of high-risk issues and formulation of corresponding strategies. Information feeds back into Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) results to ensure alignment with ISO/SAE 21434 processes and maintain continuous monitoring.

Services will be available in Japan as soon as it is ready.

To learn more about the VicOne solutions available in AWS Marketplace, please visit here.

About VicOne

With a vision to secure the vehicles of tomorrow, VicOne delivers a broad portfolio of cybersecurity software and services for the automotive industry. Purpose-built to address the rigorous needs of automotive manufacturers and suppliers, VicOne solutions are designed to secure and scale with the specialized demands of the modern vehicle. As a Trend Micro subsidiary, VicOne is powered by a solid foundation in cybersecurity drawn from Trend Micro’s 30+ years in the industry, delivering unparalleled automotive protection and deep security insights that enable our customers to build secure as well as smart vehicles. For more information, visit vicone.com.

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Experts aren’t unanimous about whether the AI-powered search startup’s practices could expose it to legal claims ranging from infringement to defamation—but some say plaintiffs would have strong cases.

Earlier this week, WIRED published a story about the AI-powered search startup Perplexity, which Forbes has accused of plagiarism. In it, my colleague Dhruv Mehrotra and I reported that the company was surreptitiously scraping, using crawlers to visit and download parts of websites from which developers had tried to block it, in violation of its own publicly stated policy of honoring the Robots Exclusion Protocol.

Our findings, as well as those of the developer Robb Knight, identified a specific IP address almost certainly linked to Perplexity and not listed in its public IP range, which we observed scraping test sites in apparent response to prompts given to the company’s public-facing chatbot. According to server logs, that same IP visited properties belonging to Condé Nast, the media company that owns WIRED, at least 822 times in the past three months—likely a significant undercount, because the company retains only a small portion of its records.

We also reported that the chatbot was bullshitting, in the technical sense. In one experiment, it generated text about a girl following a trail of mushrooms when asked to summarize the content of a website that its agent did not, according to server logs, attempt to access.

Perplexity and its CEO, Aravind Srinivas, did not substantively dispute the specifics of WIRED’s reporting. “The questions from WIRED reflect a deep and fundamental misunderstanding of how Perplexity and the Internet work,” Srinivas said in a statement. Backed by Jeff Bezos’ family office and by Nvidia, among others, Perplexity has said it is worth a billion dollars based on its most recent fundraising round, and The Information reported last month that it was in talks for a new round that would value it at $3 billion. (Bezos did not reply to an email; Nvidia declined to comment.)

After we published the story, I prompted three leading chatbots to tell me about the story. OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Anthropic’s Claude generated text offering hypotheses about the story’s subject but noted that they had no access to the article. The Perplexity chatbot produced a six-paragraph, 287-word text closely summarizing the conclusions of the story and the evidence used to reach them. (According to WIRED's server logs, the same bot observed in our and Knight’s findings, which is almost certainly linked to Perplexity but is not in its publicly listed IP range, attempted to access the article the day it was published, but was met with a 404 response. The company doesn't retain all its traffic logs, so this is not necessarily a complete picture of the bot's activity, or that of other Perplexity agents.) The original story is linked at the top of the generated text, and a small gray circle links out to the original following each of the last five paragraphs. The last third of the fifth paragraph exactly reproduces a sentence from the original: “Instead, it invented a story about a young girl named Amelia who follows a trail of glowing mushrooms in a magical forest called Whisper Woods.”

This struck me and my colleagues as plagiarism. It certainly appears to satisfy the criteria set out by Poynter Institute—including, perhaps most stringently, the seven-to-10 word test, which proposes that it’s “hard to incidentally replicate seven consecutive words that appear in another author’s work.” (Kelly McBride, a Poynter SVP who has described this test as being useful in identifying plagiarism, did not reply to an email.)

“If one of my students turned in a story like this, I would take them before the academic dishonesty committee for plagiarism,” said John Schwartz, professor of practice at the University of Texas at Austin’s journalism school, after reading the original story and the summary. “I find this just too close. When I was reading the Perplexity version, I just thought, there’s an echo in here.”

Perplexity and Srinivas, the company’s CEO, did not respond to a detailed request for comment in which they were presented with the criticisms experts made of the company for this story.

Bill Grueskin, professor of professional practice at Columbia Journalism School, wrote in an email that the summary looked to be “pretty much ok” for a chatbot identified as such, but that it was hard to say because he hadn’t had time to read the original WIRED story. “Quoting a sentence verbatim without quote marks is bad, of course,” he wrote. “I'd be pretty mortified if a news org ran an AI summary like this without disclosing the source—or worse, pretending it came from a human.” (Perplexity, of course, isn’t claiming this material came from a human.)

Perhaps luckily for Perplexity and its backers, this is a literal academic debate. Plagiarism is a concept pertaining to professional ethics, important in contexts like journalism and academia where being able to identify the source of information is of fundamental importance but of no legal significance in itself. If a rival studio releases a film containing a reasonable chunk of footage from _Inside Out 2_, Disney would sue not for plagiarism but for copyright infringement; similarly, a letter Forbes reportedly sent Perplexity threatening legal action is said to mention “willful infringement” of Forbes’ copyrights. Here, legal experts say, Perplexity is on somewhat safer ground—probably.

“In terms of the copyright, this is a tough call,” says James Grimmelmann, professor of digital and information law at Cornell University. On one hand, he argues, the summary is reporting facts, which cannot be copyrighted; but on the other, it does partially duplicate the original and summarize the details found in it. “It’s not a slam dunk copyright case, but it’s not trivial, either. It’s not frivolous.”

Grimmelmann sees a host of potential issues for Perplexity, among them consumer protection, unfair advertising, or deceptive trade practices claims he believes could be made against a company that says it respects the Robots Exclusion Protocol but doesn’t follow it. (The standard is voluntary but widely adhered to.) He also thinks it could be vulnerable to a claim of misappropriation of hot news, in which a publisher argues that a competitor summarizing its material before it’s had a chance to commercially benefit from it, or in a way that undermines its value to paying subscribers, is infringing on its copyright. Perplexity’s evident ability to circumvent paywalls “is a bad fact for them,” he says, as is the fact that its system is automated.

Grimmelmann also says that Perplexity may be forfeiting the protection of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This is the law that, among other things, protects search engines like Google from liability for defamation when they link to defamatory content because they are services passing on information from other content providers; as he sees it, Perplexity is similarly shielded as long as it accurately summarizes material. (Whether AI-generated material enjoys 230 protection at all is a matter of debate.)

“They’d only get in trouble if they summarized the story incorrectly and made it defamatory when it wasn’t before. That’s something that they actually would be at legal risk for, especially if they don’t credit the original source clearly enough and people can’t easily go to that source to check,” he says. “If Perplexity’s edits are what make the story defamatory, 230 doesn’t cover that, under a bunch of case law interpreting it.”

In one case WIRED observed, Perplexity’s chatbot did falsely claim, albeit while prominently linking to the original source, that WIRED had reported that a specific police officer in California had committed a crime. (“We have been very upfront that answers will not be accurate 100% of the time and may hallucinate,” Srinivas said in response to questions for the story we ran earlier this week, “but a core aspect of our mission is to continue improving on accuracy and the user experience.”)

“If you want to be formal,” says Grimmelmann, “I think this is a set of claims that would get past a motion to dismiss on a bunch of theories. Not saying it will win in the end, but if the facts bear out what Forbes and WIRED, the police officer—a bunch of possible plaintiffs—allege, they are the kinds of things that, if proven and other facts were bad for Perplexity, could lead to liability.”

Not all experts agree with Grimmelmann. Pam Samuelson, professor of law and information at UC Berkeley, writes in an email that copyright infringement is “about use of another’s expression in a way that undercuts the author’s ability to get appropriate remuneration for the value of the unauthorized use. One sentence verbatim is probably not infringement.”

Bhamati Viswanathan, a faculty fellow at New England Law, says she’s skeptical the summary passes a threshold of substantial similarity usually necessary for a successful infringement claim, though she doesn’t think that’s the end of the matter. “It certainly should not pass the sniff test,” she wrote in an email. “I would argue that it should be enough to get your case past the motion to dismiss threshold—particularly given all the signs you had of actual stuff being copied.”

In all, though, she argues that focusing on the narrow technical merits of such claims may not be the right way to think about things, as tech companies can adjust their practices to honor the letter of dated copyright laws while still grossly violating their purpose. She believes an entirely new legal framework may be necessary to correct for market distortions and promote the underlying aims of US intellectual property law, among them to allow people to financially benefit from original creative work like journalism so that they’ll be incentivized to produce it—with, in theory, benefits to society.

“There are, in my opinion, strong arguments to support the intuition that generative AI is predicated upon large scale copyright infringement,” she writes. “The opening ante question is, where do we go from there? And the greater question in the long run is, how do we ensure that creators and creative economies survive? Ironically, AI is teaching us that creativity is more valuable and in demand than ever. But even as we recognize this, we see the potential for undermining, and ultimately eviscerating, the ecosystems that enable creators to make a living from their work. That’s the conundrum we need to solve—not eventually, but now.”

Perplexity Plagiarized Our Story About How Perplexity Is a Bullshit Machine

A cybercriminals is giving 1 million data records from the Ticketmaster breach away for free, saying that Ticketmaster refused to pay

The cybercriminal acting under the name “Sp1d3r” gave away the first 1 million records that are part of the data set that they claimed to have stolen from Ticketmaster/Live Nation. The files were released without a price, for free.

When Malwarebytes Labs first learned about this data breach, it happened to be the first major event that was shared on the resurrected BreachForums, and someone acting under the handle “ShinyHunters” offered the full details (name, address, email, phone) of 560 million customers for sale.

The same data set was offered for sale in an almost identical post on another forum by someone using the handle “SpidermanData.” This could be the same person or a member of the ShinyHunters group.

Following this event, Malwarebytes Labs advised readers on how to respond and stay safe. Importantly, even when a breach isn’t a “breach”—in that immediate moment when the details have yet to be confirmed and a breach subject is readying its public statements—the very news of the suspected breach can be used by advantageous cybercriminals as a phishing lure.

Later, Ticketmaster confirmed the data breach.

Bleeping Computer spoke to ShinyHunters who said they already had interested buyers. Now, Sp1d3r, who was seen posting earlier about Advance Auto Parts customer data and Truist Bank data, has released 1 million Ticketmaster related data records for free.

Post by Sp1d3r

In a post on BreachForums, Sp1d3r said:

> “Ticketmaster will not respond to request to buy data from us.
> 
> They care not for the privacy of 680 million customers, so give you the first 1 million users free.”

The cybercriminals that are active on those forums will jump at the occasion and undoubtedly try to monetize those records. This likely means that innocent users that are included in the first million released records could receive a heavy volume of spam and phishing emails in the coming days.

**Protecting yourself after a data breach**

There are some actions you can take if you are, or suspect you may have been, the victim of a data breach.

*   **Check the vendor’s advice.** Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice they offer.
*   **Change your password.** You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
*   **Enable two-factor authentication (2FA).** If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop or phone as your second factor. Some forms of two-factor authentication (2FA) can be phished just as easily as a password. 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
*   **Watch out for fake vendors.** The thieves may contact you posing as the vendor. Check the vendor website to see if they are contacting victims, and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
*   **Take your time.** Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
*   **Consider not storing your card details**. It’s definitely more convenient to get sites to remember your card details for you, but we highly recommend not storing that information on websites.
*   **Set up identity monitoring.** Identity monitoring alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online, and helps you recover after.

**Check your exposure**

While matters are still unclear how much information was involved, it’s likely you’ve had other personal information exposed online in previous data breaches. You can check what personal information of yours has been exposed with our Digital Footprint portal. Just enter your email address (it’s best to submit the one you most frequently use) to our free Digital Footprint scan and we’ll give you a report.

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identit**y

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

 First million breached Ticketmaster records released for free 

The new remote access trojan (RAT) dubbed SpiceRAT was used by the threat actor SneakyChef in a recent campaign targeting government agencies in EMEA and Asia.

*   Cisco Talos discovered a new remote access trojan (RAT) dubbed SpiceRAT, used by the threat actor SneakyChef in a recent campaign targeting government agencies in EMEA and Asia. 
*   We observed that SneakyChef launched a phishing campaign, sending emails delivering SugarGh0st and SpiceRAT with the same email address. 
*   We identified two infection chains used to deliver SpiceRAT utilizing LNK and HTA files as the initial attack vectors. 

_Cisco Talos would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation._ 

**SneakyChef delivered SpiceRAT to target Angola government with lures from Turkmenistan news agency **

Talos recently revealed SneakyChef’s continuing campaign targeting government agencies across several countries in EMEA and Asia, delivering the SugarGh0st malware (read the corresponding research here). However, we found a new malware we dubbed “SpiceRAT” was also delivered in this campaign.  

SneakyChef is using a name "ala de Emissão do Edifício B Mutamba" and the email address “dtti.edb@\[redated\]” to send several phishing emails with at least 28 different RAR file attachments to deliver either SugarGh0st or SpiceRAT. 

One of the decoy PDFs that we analysed in this campaign was dropped by a RAR archive, delivered as an attachment in the emails likely targeted Angolan government agencies. The decoy PDF contained lures from the Turkmenistan state-owned news media “ТУРКМЕНСКАЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСКАЯ СЛУЖБА” (Neytralnyy Turkmenistan), indicating that the actor has likely downloaded the PDF from their official website. We also found that a similar decoy PDF from the same news agency was dropped by the RAR archive that delivered the SugarGh0st malware in this campaign, highlighting that SneakyChef has SugarGh0st RAT and SpiceRAT payloads in their arsenal.   

__Decoy PDF samples of SugarGh0st and SpiceRAT attacks.__

**Two infection chains **

Talos discovered two infection chains employed by SneakyChef to deploy SpiceRAT. Both infection chains involved multiple stages launched by an HTA or LNK file.  

**LNK-based infection chain  **

The LNK-based infection chain begins with a malicious RAR file that contains a Windows shortcut file (LNK) and a hidden folder. This folder contains multiple components, including a malicious executable launcher, a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL loader, an encrypted SpiceRAT masquerading as a legitimate help file (.HLP) and a decoy PDF. The table below shows an example of the components of this attack chain and the description. 

File Name 

Description 

2024-01-17.pdf.lnk 

Malicious shortcut file  

LaunchWlnApp.exe 

Windows EXE to open decoy PDF and run a legitimate EXE 

dxcap.exe 

Benign executable to side-load the malicious DLL 

ssMUIDLL.dll 

Malicious DLL loader 

CGMIMP32.HLP 

Encrypted SpiceRAT

Microsoftpdf.pdf 

Decoy PDF  

When the victim extracts the RAR file, it drops the LNK and a hidden folder on their machine. After a victim opens the shortcut file, which masqueraded as a PDF document, it executes an embedded command to run the malicious launcher executable from the dropped hidden folder.  

__Sample LNK file that starts the malicious launcher EXE.__

This malicious launcher executable is a 32-bit binary compiled on Jan. 2, 2024. When launched by the shortcut file, it reads the victim machine’s environment variable, the execution path of the legitimate executable and the path of the decoy PDF document and runs them using the API ShellExecuteW.  

__Sample function that starts the legitimate EXE and opens the decoy document.__

The legitimate file is one of the components of SpiceRAT infection, which will sideload the malicious DLL loader to decrypt and launch the SpiceRAT payload.  

**HTA-based infection chain **

The HTA-based infection chain also begins with a RAR archive delivered with the email. The RAR file contains a malicious HTA file. When the victim runs the malicious HTA file, the embedded malicious Visual Basic script executes and drops the embedded base64-encoded downloader binary into the victim’s user profile temporary folder, disguised as a text file named “Microsoft.txt.” 

After dropping the malicious downloader executable, the HTA file executes another function, which drops and executes a Windows batch file in the victim’s user profile temporary folder, named “Microsoft.bat.”  

The malicious batch file performs the following operations on the victim’s machine: 

*   The certutil command decodes the base64-encoded binary data from “Microsoft.txt” and saves it as “Microsoft.exe” in the victim’s user profile temporary folder.  

certutil -decode %temp%\\\\Microsoft.txt %temp%\\\\Microsoft.exe

*   It creates a Windows scheduled task that runs the malicious downloader every five minutes, supressing any warnings that it triggers when the same task name existed.  

schtasks /create /tn MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineClSAN /tr %temp%\\\\Microsoft.exe /sc minute -mo 5 /F 

*   The batch script creates another Windows task named “MicrosoftDeviceSync” to run a downloaded legitimate executable “ChromeDriver.exe” every 10 minutes.  

schtasks /create /tn MicrosoftDeviceSync /tr C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Chrome\\\\ChromeDirver.exe /sc minute -mo 10 /F 

*   After establishing persistence with the Windows scheduled task, the batch script runs three other commands to erase the infection markers. This includes deleting the Windows task named MicrosoftDefenderUpdateTaskMachineClSAN and removing the encoded downloader “Microsoft.txt,” the malicious HTA file, and any other contents unpacked from the RAR file attachment.  

schtasks /delete /f /tn MicrosoftDefenderUpdateTaskMachineClSAN 

del /f /q %temp%\\\\Microsoft.txt %temp%\\\\Microsoft.hta 

del %0 

The malicious downloader is a 32-bit executable compiled on March 5, 2024. After running on the victim’s machine through the Windows task MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineClSAN, it downloads a malicious archive file “chromeupdate.zip” from an attacker-controlled server through a hardcoded URL and unpacks its contents into the folder at “C:\\ProgramData\\Chrome”. The unpacked files are the components of SpiceRAT.  

__A sample function of the malicious downloader.__

**Analysis of SpiceRAT **

Both infection chains eventually drop the SpiceRAT files into victim machines. The SpiceRAT files include four main components: a legitimate executable file, a malicious DLL loader, an encrypted payload and the downloaded plugins.  

**The loader components of SpiceRAT ****Legitimate executable **

The threat actor is using a legitimate executable (named “RunHelp.exe”) as a launcher to sideload the malicious DLL loader file (ssMUIDLL.dll). This legitimate executable is a Samsung RunHelp application signed with the certificate of "Samsung Electronics CO., LTD.” In some instances, it has been observed masquerading as “dxcap.exe,” a DirectX diagnostic included with Visual Studio, and “ChromeDriver.exe,” an executable that Selenium WebDriver uses to control the Google Chrome web browser. 

__File properties and digital signature details of the legitimate executable.__

The legitimate Samsung helper application typically loads a DLL called “ssMUIDLL.dll.” In this attack, the threat actor abuses the application by sideloading a malicious DLL loader that is masquerading as the legitimate DLL and executes its exported function GetFulllangFileNamew2. 

__Sample function that side-loads the malicious DLL.__

**Malicious DLL loader **

The malicious loader is a 32-bit DLL compiled on Jan. 2, 2024. When its exported function GetFullLangFileNameW2() is run, it copies the downloaded legitimate executable into the folder "C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\data\\” as “dxcap.exe” along with the malicious DLL “ssMUIDLL.dll” and the encrypted SpiceRAT payload “CGMIMP32.HLP.”  

__A sample function copies the SpiceRAT components.__

It executes the schtasks command to create a Windows task named “Microsoft Update,” configured to run “dxcap.exe” every two minutes. This technique establishes persistence at multiple locations on the victim's machine to maintain resilience.    

schtasks  -CreAte -sC minute -mo 2 -tn "Microsoft Update" -tr "C:\\Users\\<User>\\AppData\\Local\\data\\dxcap.exe" 

__A sample function that creates Windows task.__

Then the loader DLL takes the snapshot of the running processes in the victim machine and checks if the legitimate executable that sideloads this malicious DLL is being debugged by querying its process information using “NtQueryInformationProcess.” 

The loader DLL executes another function that loads the encrypted file “CGMIMP32.HLP,” which is masquerading as a legitimate Windows help file into memory and decrypts it using the RC4 encryption algorithm. In one of the samples, we found that the DLL used a key phrase “{11AADC32-A303-41DC-BF82-A28332F36A2E}” for decrypting SpiceRAT in memory. After decryption, the loader DLL injects and runs the SpiceRAT from memory to its parent process “dxcap.exe.”  

__A sample function that decrypts the SpiceRAT in memory.__

**The SpiceRAT payloads **

Talos discovered that SneakyChef has employed SpiceRAT and its plugin as the payloads in this campaign. With the capability to download and run executable binaries and arbitrary commands, SpiceRAT significantly increases the attack surface on the victim’s network, paving the way for further attacks.  

SpiceRAT is a 32-bit Windows executable with three malicious export functions GetFullLangFileNameW2, WinHttpPostShare and WinHttpFreeShareFree. Initially, it executes the GetFullLangFileNameW2 function, creating a mutex as an infection marker on the victim machine. The mutex name is hardcoded in the RAT binary. We spotted two different mutex names among the SpiceRAT samples that we analyzed: 

*   {00866F68-6C46-4ABD-A8D6-2246FE482F99}  
*   {00861111-3333-4ABD-GGGG-2246FE482F99} 

After the Mutex is created, the RAT collects reconnaissance data from the victim’s machine, including the operating system’s version number, hostname, username, IP address and the system’s network card hardware address (MAC address). The reconnaissance data is then encrypted and stored in the machine’s memory. 

__A sample function that encrypts the reconnaissance data in memory.__

During runtime, the RAT loads the WININET.dll file and imports the addresses of its functions to prepare for C2 communication.  

__A sample function that loads the APIs of WININET.dll.__

Once the function addresses of WININET.dll are imported, the RAT executes the WinHttpPostShare function to communicate with the C2. It connects to the C2 server with a hardcoded URL in the binary and through the HTTP POST method.  

 

 

Then, it attempts to read and send the encrypted stream of reconnaissance data and user credentials from memory to the C2 server. The C2 server responds with an encrypted message enclosed with HTML tags in the format “<HTML><encrypted Response> </HTML>”. The RAT decrypts the response and writes them into the memory stream.  

We discovered that the C2 server sends an encrypted stream of binary to the RAT. The RAT decrypts the binary stream into a DLL file in the memory and executes its exported functions. The decrypted DLL functions as a plugin to the SpiceRAT.  

 __Sample function of SpiceRAT executing the export functions of plugin.__ 

**SpiceRAT plugin enables further attacks  **

SpiceRAT plugin is a 32-bit dynamic link library compiled on March 28, 2023. The plugin has an original filename “Moudle.dll” and has two export functions: Download and RunPE. 

The Download function of the plugin appears to access decrypted response data from the C2 server stored in the victim’s memory and writes them into a file on disk, likely as commanded by the C2.  

__The downloader function of SpiceRAT plugin.__

The RunPE function appears to execute arbitrary commands or binaries that were likely sent from C2 using the WinExec API.  

__A sample function to run a PE file.__ 

**C2 communications **

SneakyChef’s infrastructure includes the malware’s download and command and control (C2) servers. In one attack, the threat actor hosted a malicious ZIP archive on the server 45\[.\]144\[.\]31\[.\]57 and hardcoded the following URL in a malicious downloader executable.  

http://45[.]144[.]31[.]57:80/S1VRB0HpMXR79eStog35igWKVTsdbx/chromeupdate.zipservers

We observed that the threat actor used IP addresses and domain names to connect to the C2 servers in different samples of SpiceRAT in this campaign. Our research uncovered various C2 URLs hardcoded in SpiceRAT samples.  

*   hxxp\[://\]94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4/homepage/index.aspx 
*   hxxp\[://\]stock\[.\]adobe-service\[.\]net/homepage/index.aspx 
*   hxxp\[://\]app\[.\]turkmensk\[.\]org\[/\]homepage\[/\]index.aspx 

One of the C2 servers, 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4, was found to be running Windows Server 2016 and hosted on the M247 network, which is frequently abused by APT groups. Passive DNS resolution data indicate that the IP address 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4 resolved to the domain app\[.\]turkmensk\[.\]org and we found another SpiceRAT sample in the wild that communicated with this domain.  

Further analysis of the C2 server 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4 uncovered a unique C2 communication pattern of SpiceRAT. The SpiceRAT initially sends the encrypted reconnaissance data to the C2 URL through the HTTP POST method. The C2 server then responds with an encrypted message embedded in the HTML tags.   

We observed that the SpiceRAT and its C2 servers use a three-byte prefix for their first three requests and responses, as shown in the table below. 

C2 server response prefix 

Our analysis suggests that the second request that SpiceRAT sends likely contains the encrypted stream of the victim’s machine user credentials. We found that for the third request that SpiceRAT sends from the victim machine, the C2 server responds with an encrypted stream of the SpiceRAT’s plugin binary. SpiceRAT then decrypts and injects the plugin DLL reflectively.  

Once the plugin is downloaded and implanted on the victim’s machine, SpiceRAT sends another request with the prefix “wG.” The C2 server responds with an unencrypted message “<HTML>D\_OK<HTML>”, likely to get a confirmation of successful payload download.  

**TTPs overlap with other malware campaigns  **

Talos assesses with medium confidence that the actor SneakyChef, using SpiceRAT and SugarGh0st RAT is a Chinese-speaking actor based of the language observed in the artifacts and overlapping TTPs with other malware campaigns.  

In this campaign, we saw that SpiceRAT leverages the sideloading technique, utilizing a legitimate loader alongside a malicious loader and the encrypted payload. Although sideloading is a widely adopted tactic, technique and procedure (TTP), the choice to use the Samsung helper application to sideload the malicious DLL masquerading “ssMUIDLL.dll” file is particularly notable. This method has been previously observed in the PlugX and SPIVY RAT campaigns. 

**Coverage **

 Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SID for this threat is 63538. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRAT-10031450-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATPlugin-10031560-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATLauncher-10031652-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATLauncherEXE-10032013-0 

**Indicators of Compromise **

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.

Unveiling SpiceRAT: SneakyChef's latest tool targeting EMEA and Asia

Cisco Talos recently discovered an ongoing campaign from SneakyChef, a newly discovered threat actor using SugarGh0st malware, as early as August 2023.

Friday, June 21, 2024 08:00

*   Cisco Talos recently discovered an ongoing campaign from SneakyChef, a newly discovered threat actor using SugarGh0st malware, as early as August 2023.  
*   In the newly discovered campaign, we observed a wider scope of targets spread across countries in EMEA and Asia, compared with previous observations that mainly targeted South Korea and Uzbekistan.   
*   SneakyChef uses lures that are scanned documents of government agencies, most of which are related to various countries’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs or embassies. 
*   Beside the two infection chains disclosed by Talos in November, we discovered an additional infection chain using SFX RAR files to deliver SugarGh0st.  
*   The language used in the SFX sample in this campaign reinforces our previous assertion that the actor is Chinese speaking.   

_Cisco Talos would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation._ 

**SneakyChef actor profile **

In early August 2023, Talos discovered a campaign using the SugarGh0st RAT to target users in Uzbekistan and South Korea. We continued to observe new activities using the same malware to target users in a wider geographical location. Therefore, we created an actor profile for the group and dubbed them “SneakyChef.” 

Talos assesses with medium confidence that SneakyChef operators are likely Chinese-speaking based on their language preferences, the usage of the variants of Gh0st RAT — a popular malware among various Chinese-speaking actors — and the specific targets, which includes the Ministry of Foreign affairs of various countries and other government entities. Talos also discovered another RAT dubbed “SpiceRAT” used in the campaign. Read the corresponding research here.

**Targets across EMEA and Asia **

Talos assess with low confidence that the following government agencies are the potential targets in this campaign based on the contents of the decoy documents: 

*   Ministry of Foreign affairs of Angola 
*   Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Angola  
*   Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Angola 
*   Ministry of Foreign affairs of Turkmenistan 
*   Ministry of Foreign affairs of Kazakhstan 
*   Ministry of Foreign affairs of India 
*   Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Abu Dhabi 
*   Ministry of Foreign affairs of Latvia  

Most of the decoy documents we found in this campaign are scanned documents of government agencies, which do not appear to be available on the internet. During our research, we observed and analyzed various decoy documents with government-and research conference-themed lures in this campaign. We are sharing a few samples of the decoy documents accordingly. 

**Lures targeting Southern African countries **

The threat actor has used decoy documents impersonating the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Angola. The lure content in one of the sample documents appeared to be a circular from the Angolan Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources about a debt conciliation meeting between the ministry authority and a financial advisory company.  

Another document contained information about a legal decree concerning state or public assets and their disposal. This document appealed to anyone interested in legal affairs and public heritage regimes and was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MIREX, a centralized institution in Luanda. 

 

 

**Lures targeting Central Asian countries **

The decoy documents used in the attacks likely targeting countries in Central Asia were either impersonating the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan. One of the lures is related to a meeting organized with the Turkmenistan embassy in Argentina and the heads of transportation and infrastructure of the Italian Republic. Another document was a report of planned events and the government-issued list of priorities to be addressed in the year 2024 that includes a formal proclamation-signing event between the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan. 

 

 

**Lures targeting Middle Eastern countries **

A decoy document we observed in the attack likely targeting Middle Eastern countries was an official circular regarding the declaration of an official holiday for the Founding Day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  

**Lures targeting Southern Asian countries **

We found another sample that was likely used to target the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has decoy documents, including an Indian passport application form, along with a copy of an Aadhar card, a document that serves as proof of identity in India.  

 

 

One of the decoy Word documents we observed contained lures related to India-U.S. relations, including a list of events involving interactions between India’s prime minister and the U.S. president. 

**Lures targeting European countries **

A decoy document found in a sample likely targeting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia was a circular impersonating the Embassy of Lithuania. It contained a lure document regarding an announcement of an ambassador’s absence and their replacement. 

**Other targets **

Along with the government-themed decoy document samples we analyzed, we observed a few other samples from these campaigns. These included decoys such as an application form to register for a conference run by the Universal Research Cluster (URC) and a research paper abstract of the ICCSE international conference. We also saw a few other decoys related to other conference invitations and details, including those for the Political Science and International Relations conference.   

 

 

Recently, Proofpoint researchers reported a SugarGh0st campaign targeting an organization in the U.S. involved in artificial intelligence across academia, the private technology sector, and government services, highlighting the wider adoption of SugarGh0st RAT in targeting various business verticals. 

**Threat actor continues to leverage old and new C2 domains **

After Talos’ initial disclosure of SugarGh0st campaign in November 2023, we are attributing the past attacks to the newly named threat actor SneakyChef. Despite our disclosure, SneakyChef continued to use the C2 domain we mentioned and deployed the new samples in the following months after our blog post. Most of the samples observed in this campaign communicate with the C2 domain account\[.\]drive-google-com\[.\]tk, consistent with their previous campaign. Based on Talos’ Umbrella records, resolutions to the C2 domain were still observed until mid-May.  

DNS requests for the SugarGh0st C2 domain. 

Talos also observed the new domain account\[.\]gommask\[.\]online, reported by Proofpoint as being used by SugarGh0st. The domain was created in March 2024, and queries were observed through April 21.  

**Infection chain abuse SFX RAR as the initial attack vector **

With Talos’ first reporting of the SugarGh0st campaign in November, we disclosed two infection chains that utilized a malicious RAR with an LNK file, likely delivered via phishing email. In the newly observed campaign, in addition to the old infection chains, we discovered a different technique from a few malicious RAR samples.  

The threat actor is using an SFX RAR as the initial vector in this attack. When a victim runs the executable, the SFX script executes to drop a decoy document, DLL loader, encrypted SugarGh0st, and a malicious VB script into the victim’s user profile temporary folder and executes the malicious VB script.  

The malicious VB script establishes persistence by writing the command to the registry key UserInitMprLogonScript which executes when a user belonging to either a local workgroup or domain logs into the system. 

HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript 

regsvr32.exe /s %temp%\\update.dll 

When a user logs into the system, the command runs and launches the loader DLL “update.dll” using regsvr32.exe. The loader reads the encrypted SugarGg0st RAT “authz.lib”, decrypts it and injects it into a process. This technique is same as that of the SugarGh0st campaign disclosed by the Kazakhstan government in February. 

**Coverage **

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SID for this threat is 62647. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014937-0 

Win.Tool.DynamicWrapperX-10014938-0 

Txt.Loader.SugarGh0st\_Bat-10014939-0 

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014940-0 

Lnk.Dropper.SugarGh0stRAT-10014941-0 

Js.Trojan.SugarGh0stRAT-10014942-1 

Win.Loader.Ramnit-10014943-1 

Win.Backdoor.SugarGh0stRAT-10014944-0 

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0st-10030525-0 

Win.Trojan.SugarGh0st-10030526-0 

**Orbital Queries **

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries related to this threat, please follow the links: 

*   SugarGh0st RAT file detected 
*   SugarGh0st RAT Registry key  

**Indicators of Compromise **

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here

SneakyChef espionage group targets government agencies with SugarGh0st and more infection techniques

A malvertising campaign is leveraging trojanized installers for popular software such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Teams to drop a backdoor called Oyster (aka Broomstick and CleanUpLoader).
That's according to findings from Rapid7, which identified lookalike websites hosting the malicious payloads that users are redirected to after searching for them on search engines like Google and Bing.
The

A malvertising campaign is leveraging trojanized installers for popular software such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Teams to drop a backdoor called Oyster (aka Broomstick and CleanUpLoader).

That's according to findings from Rapid7, which identified lookalike websites hosting the malicious payloads that users are redirected to after searching for them on search engines like Google and Bing.

The threat actors are luring unsuspecting users to fake websites purporting to contain legitimate software. But attempting to download the setup binary launches a malware infection chain instead.

Specifically, the executable serves as a pathway for a backdoor called Oyster, which is capable of gathering information about the compromised host, communicating with a hard-coded command-and-control (C2) address, and supporting remote code execution.

While Oyster has been observed in the past being delivered by means of a dedicated loader component known as Broomstick Loader (aka Oyster Installer), the latest attack chains entail the direct deployment of the backdoor. The malware is said to be associated with ITG23, a Russia-linked group behind the TrickBot malware.

The execution of the malware is followed by the installation of the legitimate Microsoft Teams software in an attempt to keep up the ruse and avoid raising red flags. Rapid7 said it also observed the malware being used to spawn a PowerShell script responsible for setting up persistence on the system.

The disclosure comes as a cybercrime group known as Rogue Raticate (aka RATicate) has been attributed as behind an email phishing campaign that employs PDF decoys to entice users into clicking on a malicious URL and deliver NetSupport RAT.

"If a user is successfully tricked into clicking on the URL, they will be led via a Traffic Distribution System (TDS) into the rest of the chain and in the end, have the NetSupport Remote Access Tool deployed on their machine," Symantec said.

It also coincides with the emergence of a new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform called the ONNX Store that allows customers to orchestrate phishing campaigns using embedded QR codes in PDF attachments that lead victims to credential harvesting pages.

ONNX Store, which also offers Bulletproof hosting and RDP services via a Telegram bot, is believed to be a rebranded version of the Caffeine phishing kit, which was first documented by Google-owned Mandiant in October 2022, with the service maintained by an Arabic-speaking threat actor named MRxC0DER.

Besides using Cloudflare's anti-bot mechanisms to evade detection by phishing website scanners, the URLs distributed via the quishing campaigns come embedded with encrypted JavaScript that's decoded during page load in order to collect victims' network metadata and relay 2FA tokens.

"ONNX Store has a two-factor authentication (2FA) bypass mechanism that intercepts \[two-factor authentication\] requests from victims," EclecticIQ researcher Arda Büyükkaya said. "The phishing pages look like real Microsoft 365 login interfaces, tricking targets into entering their authentication details."

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Oyster Backdoor Spreading via Trojanized Popular Software Downloads

A recently patched high-severity flaw impacting SolarWinds Serv-U file transfer software is being actively exploited by malicious actors in the wild.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-28995 (CVSS score: 8.6), concerns a directory transversal bug that could allow attackers to read sensitive files on the host machine.
Affecting all versions of the software prior to and including Serv-U 15.4.2

Vulnerability / Data Protection

A recently patched high-severity flaw impacting SolarWinds Serv-U file transfer software is being actively exploited by malicious actors in the wild.

The vulnerability, tracked as **CVE-2024-28995** (CVSS score: 8.6), concerns a directory transversal bug that could allow attackers to read sensitive files on the host machine.

Affecting all versions of the software prior to and including Serv-U 15.4.2 HF 1, it was addressed by the company in version Serv-U 15.4.2 HF 2 (15.4.2.157) released earlier this month.

The list of products susceptible to CVE-2024-28995 is below -

*   Serv-U FTP Server 15.4
*   Serv-U Gateway 15.4
*   Serv-U MFT Server 15.4, and
*   Serv-U File Server 15.4

Security researcher Hussein Daher of Web Immunify has been credited with discovering and reporting the flaw. Following the public disclosure, additional technical details and a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit have since been made available.

Cybersecurity firm Rapid7 described the vulnerability as trivial to exploit and that it allows external unauthenticated attackers to read any arbitrary file on disk, including binary files, assuming they know the path to that file and it's not locked.

"High-severity information disclosure issues like CVE-2024-28995 can be used in smash-and-grab attacks where adversaries gain access to and attempt to quickly exfiltrate data from file transfer solutions with the goal of extorting victims," it said.

"File transfer products have been targeted by a wide range of adversaries the past several years, including ransomware groups."

Indeed, according to threat intelligence firm GreyNoise, threat actors have already begun to conduct opportunistic attacks weaponizing the flaw against its honeypot servers to access sensitive files like /etc/passwd, with attempts also recorded from China.

With previous flaws in Serv-U software exploited by threat actors, it's imperative that users apply the updates as soon as possible to mitigate potential threats.

"The fact that attackers are using publicly available PoCs means the barrier to entry for malicious actors is incredibly low," Naomi Buckwalter, director of product security at Contrast Security, said in a statement shared with The Hacker News.

"Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could be a stepping stone for attackers. By gaining access to sensitive information like credentials and system files, attackers can use that information to launch further attacks, a technique called 'chaining.' This can lead to a more widespread compromise, potentially impacting other systems and applications."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

SolarWinds Serv-U Vulnerability Under Active Attack - Patch Immediately

IntelBroker is offering source code from major companies for sale. Are they demonstrating the value of a zero-day they are also selling?

A moderator of the notorious data breach trading platform BreachForums is offering data for sale they claim comes from a data breach at T-Mobile.

The moderator, going by the name of IntelBroker, describes the data as containing source code, SQL files, images, Terraform data, t-mobile.com certifications, and “Siloprograms.” (We’ve not heard of siloprograms, and can’t find a reference to them anywhere, so perhaps it’s a mistranslation or typo.)

Post offereing data for sale supposedly from a T-Mobile internal breach

To prove they had the data, IntelBroker posted several screenshots showing access with administrative privileges to a Confluence server and T-Mobile’s internal Slack channels for developers.

But according to sources known to BleepingComputer, the data shared by IntelBroker actually consists of older screenshots. These screenshots show T-Mobile’s infrastructure, posted at a known—yet unnamed—third-party vendor’s servers, from where they were stolen.

When we looked at the screenshots IntelBroker attached to their post, we spotted something interesting in one of them.

Found CVE-2024-1597

This screenshot shows a search query for a critical vulnerability in Jira, a project management tool used by teams to plan, track, release and support software. It’s typically a place where you could find the source code of works in progress.

The search returns the result CVE-2024-1597, a SQL injection vulnerability. SQL injection happens when a cybercriminal injects malicious SQL code into a form on a website, such as a login page, instead of the data the form is asking for. The vulnerability affects Confluence Data Center and Server according to Atlassian’s May security bulletin.

For a better understanding, it’s important to note that Jira and Confluence are both products created by Atlassian, where Jira is the project management and issue tracking tool and Confluence is the collaboration and documentation tool. They are often used together.

If IntelBroker has a working exploit for the SQL injection vulnerability, this could also explain their claim that they have the source code of three internal tools used at Apple, including a single sign-on authentication system known as AppleConnect.

This theory is supported by the fact that IntelBroker is also offering a Jira zero-day for sale.

IntelBroker selling zero-day for JIra

> “I’m selling a zero-day RCE for Atlassian’s Jira.
> 
> Works for the latest version of the desktop app, as well as Jira with confluence.
> 
> No login is required for this, and works with Okta SSO.”

If this is true then this exploit, or its fruits, might be used for data breaches that involve personal data.

Meanwhile, T-Mobile has denied it has suffered a breach, saying it is investigating whether there has been a breach at a third-party provider.

> “We have no indication that T-Mobile customer data or source code was included and can confirm that the bad actor’s claim that T-Mobile’s infrastructure was accessed is false.”

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