#web

Plus: The Biden administration warns of nationwide attacks on US water systems, a new Russian wiper malware emerges, and China-linked hackers wage a global attack spree.

A malicious ad for the popular admin tool PuTTY leads victims to a fake site that downloads malware.

The nonprofit organization that supports the Firefox web browser said today it is winding down its new partnership with Onerep, an identity protection service recently bundled with Firefox that offers to remove users from hundreds of people-search sites. The move comes just days after a report by KrebsOnSecurity forced Onerep's CEO to admit that he has founded dozens of people-search networks over the years.

Win32.STOP.Ransomware (smokeloader) malware suffers from both local and remote code execution vulnerabilities. The remote code execution can be achieved by leveraging a man-in-the-middle attack.

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5643-1 - Multiple security issues have been found in the Mozilla Firefox web browser, which could potentially result in the execution of arbitrary code or information disclosure, bypass of content security policies or spoofing.

Ubuntu Security Notice 6700-2 - It was discovered that the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol implementation in the Linux kernel contained a race condition when releasing PPPoL2TP sockets in certain conditions, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code. It was discovered that the ext4 file system implementation in the Linux kernel did not properly handle block device modification while it is mounted. A privileged attacker could use this to cause a denial of service or possibly expose sensitive information.

By Waqas Using a Wordpress website? Lookout for Sign1 malware! This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Thousands of WordPress Websites Hacked with New Sign1 Malware

## Description: During some analysis today on npm's `node-tar` package I came across the folder creation process, Basicly if you provide node-tar with a path like this `./a/b/c/foo.txt` it would create every folder and sub-folder here a, b and c until it reaches the last folder to create `foo.txt`, In-this case I noticed that there's no validation at all on the amount of folders being created, that said we're actually able to CPU and memory consume the system running node-tar and even crash the nodejs client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside ## Steps To Reproduce: You can reproduce this issue by downloading the tar file I provided in the resources and using node-tar to extract it, you should get the same behavior as the video ## Proof Of Concept: Here's a [video](https://hackerone-us-west-2-production-attachments.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/3i7uojw8s52psar6pg8zkdo4h9io?response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%3D%22tar-dos-poc....

### Summary Symfony 1 has a gadget chain due to dangerous unserialize in `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` class that would enable an attacker to get remote code execution if a developer unserialize user input in his project. ### Details This vulnerability present no direct threat but is a vector that will enable remote code execution if a developper deserialize user untrusted data. For example: ```php public function executeIndex(sfWebRequest $request) { $a = unserialize($request->getParameter('user')); } ``` We will make the assumption this is the case in the rest of this explanation. Symfony 1 provides the class `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` which implements `Serializable` interface. In particular, when an instance of this class is deserialized, the normal php behavior is hooked by implementing `unserialize()` method: ```php public function unserialize($serialized) { $this->__unserialize(unserialize($serialized)); } ``` Which make an array access on the ...

### Summary Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which allows any authenticated user (editor permissions are sufficient) to execute arbitrary code on the remote server bypassing the existing security sandbox. ### Details The Grav CMS implements a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods "registerUndefinedFunctionCallback()" and "registerUndefinedFilterCallback()", in order to avoid SSTI attacks by denying the calling of dangerous PHP functions into the Twig template directives (such as: "exec()", "passthru()", "system()", etc.). The current defenses are based on a blacklist of prohibited functions (PHP, Twig), checked through the "isDangerousFunction()" method called in the file "system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php": ```php ... $this->twig = new TwigEnvironment($loader_chain, $params); $this->twig->registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) { $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_functions'); if (is_array...