More than a dozen malicious packages have been discovered on the npm package repository since the start of August 2023 with capabilities to deploy an open-source information stealer called Luna Token Grabber on systems belonging to Roblox developers.
The ongoing campaign, first detected on August 1 by ReversingLabs, employs modules that masquerade as the legitimate package noblox.js, an API

Software Security / Malware

More than a dozen malicious packages have been discovered on the npm package repository since the start of August 2023 with capabilities to deploy an open-source information stealer called **Luna Token Grabber** on systems belonging to Roblox developers.

The ongoing campaign, first detected on August 1 by ReversingLabs, employs modules that masquerade as the legitimate package noblox.js, an API wrapper that's used to create scripts that interact with the Roblox gaming platform.

The software supply chain security company described the activity as a "replay of an attack uncovered two years ago" in October 2021.

"The malicious packages \[...\] reproduce code from the legitimate noblox.js package but add malicious, information-stealing functions," software threat researcher Lucija Valentić said in a Tuesday analysis.

The packages were cumulatively downloaded 963 times before they were taken down. The names of the rogue packages are as follows -

*   noblox.js-vps (versions 4.14.0 to 4.23.0)
*   noblox.js-ssh (versions 4.2.3 to 4.2.5)
*   noblox.js-secure (versions 4.1.0, 4.2.0 to 4.2.3)

While the broad contours of the latest attack wave remain similar to the previous one, it also exhibits some unique characteristics of its own, notably in the deployment of an executable that delivers Luna Grabber.

The development is one of the rare instances of a multi-stage infection sequence uncovered on npm, ReversingLabs said.

"With malicious campaigns that target the software supply chain, the difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated attacks often comes down to the level of effort the malicious actors make to disguise their attack and make their malicious packages look legitimate," Valentić pointed out.

The modules, in particular, cleverly conceal their malicious functionality in a separate file named postinstall.js that's invoked after installation.

That's because the genuine noblox.js package also employs a file with the same name to display a thank you message to its users alongside links to its documentation and GitHub repository.

The bogus variants, on the other hand, utilize the JavaScript file to verify to see if the package is installed on a Windows machine, and if so, download and execute a second-stage payload hosted on Discord CDN, or alternatively, show an error message.

ReversingLabs said that the second-stage continued to evolve with each iteration, progressively adding more functionality and obfuscation mechanisms to thwart analysis. The primary responsibility of the script is to download Luna Token Grabber, a Python tool that can siphon credentials from web browsers as well as Discord tokens.

However, it appears that the threat actor behind the npm campaign appears to have opted only to harvest system information from victims using a configurable builder made available by the author(s) behind Luna Token Grabber.

This is not the first time Luna Token Grabber has been spotted in the wild. Earlier this June, Trellix disclosed details of a new Go-based information stealer called Skuld that overlaps with the malware strain.

"It highlights yet again the trend of malicious actors using typosquatting as a technique to fool developers into downloading malicious code under the guise of similarly named, legitimate packages," Valentić said.

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Over a Dozen Malicious npm Packages Target Roblox Game Developers


IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7.1 and 23.0.0 through 23.0.1 server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from installation logs.  IBM X-Force Id:  262293.



  

**Summary**

IBM Robotic Process Automation server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from installation logs. Authenticated users are able to view database connection strings in the IBM Robotic Process Automation installation logs.

**Vulnerability Details**

**CVEID:**   CVE-2023-38733  
**DESCRIPTION:**   IBM Robotic Process Automation server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from installation logs.  
CVSS Base score: 4.3  
CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/262293 for the current score.  
CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

**Affected Products and Versions**

Affected Product(s)

Version(s)

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.3, 23.0.0 - 23.0.3

**Remediation/Fixes**

**IBM strongly recommends addressing the vulnerability now.**

**Product(s)**

**Version(s) number and/or range** 

**Remediation/Fix/Instructions**

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.3

Download 21.0.7.4 or higher and follow these instructions.

IBM Robotic Process Automation

23.0.0 - 23.0.3

Download 23.0.4 or higher and follow these instructions.

**Workarounds and Mitigations**

**Workarounds/Mitigation guidance**:

Remove installation logs after installing the IBM Robotic Process Automation Server.

**References**

Off

**Acknowledgement**

Michael Stuy (IBM)

**Change History**

21 Aug 2023: Initial Publication

\*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Security Bulletin.

**Disclaimer**

According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES ""AS IS"" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY. In addition to other efforts to address potential vulnerabilities, IBM periodically updates the record of components contained in our product offerings. As part of that effort, if IBM identifies previously unidentified packages in a product/service inventory, we address relevant vulnerabilities regardless of CVE date. Inclusion of an older CVEID does not demonstrate that the referenced product has been used by IBM since that date, nor that IBM was aware of a vulnerability as of that date. We are making clients aware of relevant vulnerabilities as we become aware of them. "Affected Products and Versions" referenced in IBM Security Bulletins are intended to be only products and versions that are supported by IBM and have not passed their end-of-support or warranty date. Thus, failure to reference unsupported or extended-support products and versions in this Security Bulletin does not constitute a determination by IBM that they are unaffected by the vulnerability. Reference to one or more unsupported versions in this Security Bulletin shall not create an obligation for IBM to provide fixes for any unsupported or extended-support products or versions.

**Document Location**

Worldwide

\[{"Business Unit":{"code":"BU059","label":"IBM Software w\\/o TPS"},"Product":{"code":"SSC50T","label":"IBM Robotic Process Automation"},"Component":"","Platform":\[{"code":"PF033","label":"Windows"},{"code":"PF040","label":"RedHat OpenShift"}\],"Version":"21.0.0 - 21.0.7.3, 23.0.0 - 23.0.3","Edition":"","Line of Business":{"code":"LOB45","label":"Automation"}}\]

CVE-2023-38733: IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to sensitive information disclosure in installation logs (CVE-2023-38733)


IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7.1 runtime is vulnerable to information disclosure of script content if the remote REST request computer policy is enabled.  IBM X-Force ID:  263470.



  

**Summary**

IBM Robotic Process Automation runtime is vulnerable to information disclosure of script content if the remote REST request computer policy is enabled.

**Vulnerability Details**

**CVEID:**   CVE-2023-40370  
**DESCRIPTION:**   IBM Robotic Process Automation runtime is vulnerable to information disclosure of script content if the remote REST request computer policy is enabled.  
CVSS Base score: 3.7  
CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/263470 for the current score.  
CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

**Affected Products and Versions**

Affected Product(s)

Version(s)

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1

IBM Robotic Process Automation for Cloud Pak

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1

**Remediation/Fixes**

**IBM strongly recommends addressing the vulnerability now.**

**Product(s)**

**Version(s) number and/or range** 

**Remediation/Fix/Instructions**

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1

Download 21.0.7.2 or higher and follow these instructions.

IBM Robotic Process Automation for Cloud Pak

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1

Update to 21.0.7.2 or higher using the following instructions. 

**Workarounds and Mitigations**

None.

**References**

Off

**Acknowledgement**

Mariana Penna (IBM)

**Change History**

21 Aug 2023: Initial Publication

\*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Security Bulletin.

**Disclaimer**

According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES ""AS IS"" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY. In addition to other efforts to address potential vulnerabilities, IBM periodically updates the record of components contained in our product offerings. As part of that effort, if IBM identifies previously unidentified packages in a product/service inventory, we address relevant vulnerabilities regardless of CVE date. Inclusion of an older CVEID does not demonstrate that the referenced product has been used by IBM since that date, nor that IBM was aware of a vulnerability as of that date. We are making clients aware of relevant vulnerabilities as we become aware of them. "Affected Products and Versions" referenced in IBM Security Bulletins are intended to be only products and versions that are supported by IBM and have not passed their end-of-support or warranty date. Thus, failure to reference unsupported or extended-support products and versions in this Security Bulletin does not constitute a determination by IBM that they are unaffected by the vulnerability. Reference to one or more unsupported versions in this Security Bulletin shall not create an obligation for IBM to provide fixes for any unsupported or extended-support products or versions.

**Document Location**

Worldwide

\[{"Business Unit":{"code":"BU059","label":"IBM Software w\\/o TPS"},"Product":{"code":"SSC50T","label":"IBM Robotic Process Automation"},"Component":"","Platform":\[{"code":"PF033","label":"Windows"},{"code":"PF040","label":"RedHat OpenShift"}\],"Version":"21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1","Edition":"","Line of Business":{"code":"LOB45","label":"Automation"}}\]

CVE-2023-40370: IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to information disclosure of script content (CVE-2023-40370)


IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7.1 and 23.0.0 through 23.0.1 is vulnerable to incorrect privilege assignment when importing users from an LDAP directory.  IBM X-Force ID:  262481.



  

**Summary**

IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to incorrect privilege assignment when importing user from an LDAP directory (CVE-2023-38734).

**Vulnerability Details**

**CVEID:**   CVE-2023-38734  
**DESCRIPTION:**   IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to incorrect privilege assignment when importing users from an LDAP directory.  
CVSS Base score: 6.6  
CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/262481 for the current score.  
CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

**Affected Products and Versions**

Affected Product(s)

Version(s)

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1, 23.0.0 - 23.0.1

**Remediation/Fixes**

**IBM strongly recommends addressing the vulnerability now.**

**Product(s)**

**Version(s) number and/or range** 

**Remediation/Fix/Instructions**

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1

Download 21.0.7.2 or higher and follow these instructions.

IBM Robotic Process Automation

23.0.0 - 23.0.1

Download 23.0.2 or higher and follow these instructions.

**Workarounds and Mitigations**

None

**References**

Off

**Acknowledgement**

Mariana Penna (IBM)

**Change History**

21 Aug 2023: Initial Publication

\*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Security Bulletin.

**Disclaimer**

According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES ""AS IS"" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY. In addition to other efforts to address potential vulnerabilities, IBM periodically updates the record of components contained in our product offerings. As part of that effort, if IBM identifies previously unidentified packages in a product/service inventory, we address relevant vulnerabilities regardless of CVE date. Inclusion of an older CVEID does not demonstrate that the referenced product has been used by IBM since that date, nor that IBM was aware of a vulnerability as of that date. We are making clients aware of relevant vulnerabilities as we become aware of them. "Affected Products and Versions" referenced in IBM Security Bulletins are intended to be only products and versions that are supported by IBM and have not passed their end-of-support or warranty date. Thus, failure to reference unsupported or extended-support products and versions in this Security Bulletin does not constitute a determination by IBM that they are unaffected by the vulnerability. Reference to one or more unsupported versions in this Security Bulletin shall not create an obligation for IBM to provide fixes for any unsupported or extended-support products or versions.

**Document Location**

Worldwide

\[{"Business Unit":{"code":"BU059","label":"IBM Software w\\/o TPS"},"Product":{"code":"SSC50T","label":"IBM Robotic Process Automation"},"Component":"","Platform":\[{"code":"PF033","label":"Windows"},{"code":"PF040","label":"RedHat OpenShift"}\],"Version":"21.0.0 - 21.0.7.1, 23.0.0 - 23.0.1","Edition":"","Line of Business":{"code":"LOB45","label":"Automation"}}\]

CVE-2023-38734: IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to incorrect privilege assignment when importing user from an LDAP directory (CVE-2023-38734).

Directory Traversal vulnerability in FileMage Gateway Windows Deployments v.1.10.8 and before allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted request to the /mgmt/ component.

**Overview**

Hello all! Long time no see, I recently identified a vulnerability on FileMage Gateway that I applied for my first CVE.

On a recent security assesment, I identified a security vulnerability in FileMage Gateway. It is possible to send an unauthenticated HTTP(s) GET request to retrieve arbitrary files on the host system. This vulnerability is present and identified on the Azure Marketplace product.

**What is Filemage**

FileMage Gateway is an FTP/SFTP server backed by a cloud object storage API. Deployable from your cloud provider marketplace and billed hourly.

**Technical Details**

This section outlines the steps to replicate the exploitation of the identified vulnerability. I deployed an Azure Virtual Machine from the marketplace for the technical analysis. Additional reference material may be requested if needed.

By navigating to the homepage on FileMage Gateway, a path traversal vulnerability is present under the /mgmnt/ directory on the Azure Marketplace Deployment. An unauthenticated HTTPS GET request can be sent using dot-dot slash sequences using URL encoding as observed below.

    URI: /mgmnt/..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5 cwindows%5cwin.ini
    

Deploying a test instance from the Azure Marketplace, process monitoring was leveraged to understand where the sensitive and configuration files are stored in FileMage.

It’s possible for an unauthenticated user to extract sensitive data such as FileMage and PostgresSQL configuration files, SSH keys, and other sensitive files as illustrated in the screenshots below.

This vulnerability was tested on non-azure deployments of FileMage but were found not to be vulnerable to the path traversal. I disclosed this vulnerability with the help of a great friend “Tylous”, thanks! This has since been patched.

**Recommendation**

User-controllable data should be strictly validated before being passed to any filesystem operations. In particular, input containing dot-dot sequences should be blocked. This was disclosed to the vendor

**Patched**

https://www.filemage.io/docs/updates.html - This was updated in 1.10.9 version of FileMage

**Next Steps**

While waiting on the CVE # to publish, I’ll publish the python POC code to exploit this and a nuclei template that I will try to merge with the nuclei-templates repo.

CVE-2023-39026: FileMage Gateway LFI

By Habiba Rashid
The campaign, which began at the start of August 2023, revolves around malicious packages impersonating the legitimate noblox.js,…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Luna Grabber Malware Hits Roblox Devs Through npm Packages

The campaign, which began at the start of August 2023, revolves around malicious packages impersonating the legitimate noblox.js, a popular Node.js Roblox API wrapper.

*   **Roblox developers are being targeted by a new malware called Luna Grabber**

*   **The malware is being distributed through malicious npm packages that impersonate legitimate software.**

*   **Luna Grabber is capable of stealing sensitive data from victims’ web browsers, Discord applications, and local system configurations.**

*   **The malware was downloaded approximately 1000 times, but its impact was relatively low due to the security measures in place to protect developers on the npm repository.**

*   **The incident highlights the growing trend of malicious actors employing typo squatting to exploit developers’ trust in legitimate software packages.**

Cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs has uncovered a sophisticated cyber attack targeting developers on the Roblox gaming platform. Malicious actors have been distributing malicious packages through the npm public repository, attempting to exploit users by mimicking legitimate software while incorporating malicious payloads that steal sensitive information from victims’ systems.

**Malware Campaign Overview**

The campaign, which began at the start of August 2023, revolves around malicious packages impersonating the legitimate noblox.js, a popular Node.js Roblox API wrapper. By infiltrating the npm public repository, attackers capitalized on unsuspecting developers seeking to interact with the Roblox gaming platform using scripts.

ReversingLabs researchers identified several malicious packages during the campaign, including noblox.js-vps, noblox.js-ssh, and noblox.js-secure. These packages were engineered to deliver multi-stage malicious payloads that targeted victims’ local web browsers and Discord applications. The most notable payload identified was Luna Grabber, an open-source malware designed to extract sensitive data.

**Malware Execution and Strategy**

Attackers meticulously designed the malicious packages to closely resemble the legitimate noblox.js package. By mirroring the original code and adopting similar naming conventions, the attackers aimed to deceive developers into downloading and using the compromised software.

The malicious packages leveraged a variety of techniques to compromise victims’ systems, including the incorporation of a separate file named postinstall.js. This post-installation script triggered the execution of a malicious payload after the package installation was completed. The malware then determined whether the victim was operating a Windows machine and proceeded to download and execute the Luna Grabber malware from Discord’s Content Delivery Network (CDN).

**Luna Grabber: Information Stealing Malware**

The research revealed that the primary payload of the malicious packages was Luna Grabber, a highly customizable malware capable of stealing information from victims’ web browsers, Discord applications, and local system configurations. The malware was also equipped with features that enabled it to detect virtual environments and initiate a self-destruct mechanism if necessary.

Interestingly, the attackers behind the campaign took advantage of the user-friendly nature of Luna Grabber’s builder application, simplifying the process of creating and configuring the malicious executable.

Screenshot shared by ReversingLabs shows Luna Grabber builder

While Luna Grabber’s open-source nature allowed attackers to tailor the malware to their needs, the choice of targeting developers on the Roblox platform suggests a focus on a specific user group.

**Limited Impact and Lessons Learned**

Despite the campaign’s sophistication, its impact remained relatively low. The malicious packages were downloaded approximately 1000 times, signalling that the security measures in place to protect developers on the npm repository were successful in limiting the reach of the attack.

The incident sheds light on the growing trend of malicious actors employing typo squatting to exploit developers’ trust in legitimate software packages. This approach has been previously observed in other campaigns, such as the IconBurst and Brainleeches campaigns.

Fake noblox.js-ssh’s npm website page (ReversingLabs)

While multi-stage malicious packages are common on certain open-source platforms, such as PyPI, their presence on npm—where this campaign took place—represents the ongoing challenge of maintaining secure open-source repositories and the importance of cautiousness in choosing software packages for development purposes.

1.  CISA warns of trojanized JavaScript library’s NPM package
2.  Discord.io Admits Data Breach: Info of 760K Users Sold Online
3.  6 official Python repositories plagued with cryptomining malware

Luna Grabber Malware Hits Roblox Devs Through npm Packages

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 in PluginBMP.cpp in FreeImage 3.18.0 allows remote attackers to run arbitrary code and cause other impacts via crafted image file.

*   Summary
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Milestone: None

Status: pending

Labels: None

Priority: 5

Updated: 2021-04-04

Created: 2019-12-03

Private: No

There is a heap-buffer-overflow in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 of PluginBMP.cpp whick may cause a code execution or denial of service.  
The asan log as below:

\=================================================================
\==28346\==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow on address 0xf4b02ca0 at pc 0x081595db bp 0xff8e4b28 sp 0xff8e4b20
WRITE of size 1 at 0xf4b02ca0 thread T0
    #0 0x81595da in LoadPixelDataRLE8(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, FIBITMAP\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:445:22
    #1 0x8153442 in LoadWindowsBMP(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, unsigned int, int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:555:11
    #2 0x8153442 in Load(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, void\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:1135:12
    #3 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:388:24
    #4 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_Load /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:408:22
    #5 0x811a7a0 in main /home/FreeImage/test.cpp:115:8
    #6 0xf7290fb8 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc\-jYPHgv/glibc\-2.30/csu/../csu/libc\-start.c:308:16
    #7 0x806f8f5 in \_start (/home/FreeImage/test+0x806f8f5)

0xf4b02ca0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 544\-byte region \[0xf4b02a80,0xf4b02ca0)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x80e6675 in malloc (/home/FreeImage/TestAPI/testAPI+0x80e6675)
    #1 0x812aa32 in FreeImage\_Aligned\_Malloc(unsigned int, unsigned int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:183:19
    #2 0x812aa32 in FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(int, unsigned char\*, unsigned int, FREE\_IMAGE\_TYPE, int, int, int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:390:26
    #3 0x812b600 in FreeImage\_AllocateHeader /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:482:9
    #4 0x8152bf1 in LoadWindowsBMP(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, unsigned int, int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:494:11
    #5 0x8152bf1 in Load(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, void\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:1135:12
    #6 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:388:24
    #7 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_Load /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:408:22
    #8 0x811a7a0 in main /home/FreeImage/test.cpp:115:8
    #9 0xf7290fb8 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc\-jYPHgv/glibc\-2.30/csu/../csu/libc\-start.c:308:16

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:445:22 in LoadPixelDataRLE8(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, FIBITMAP\*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x3e960540: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e960550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960570: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
\=>0x3e960590: 00 00 00 00\[fa\]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e9605a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e9605b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
\==28346\==ABORTING

**1 Attachments**

**Discussion**

Log in to post a comment.

CVE-2020-21427: FreeImage / Bugs / #298 heap-buffer-overflow in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 of PluginBMP.cpp


IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7 server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from application logs. IBM X-Force ID: 262289.



  

**Summary**

IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to exposure of sensitive information in application logs. In specific error conditions, a login id may be logged to the application log un-obfuscated. (CVE-2023-38732)

**Vulnerability Details**

**CVEID:**   CVE-2023-38732  
**DESCRIPTION:**   IBM Robotic Process Automation server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from application logs.  
CVSS Base score: 4.3  
CVSS Temporal Score: See: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/262289 for the current score.  
CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

**Affected Products and Versions**

Affected Product(s)

Version(s)

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7

IBM Robotic Process Automation for Cloud Pak

21.0.0 - 21.0.7

**Remediation/Fixes**

**IBM strongly recommends addressing the vulnerability now.**

**Product(s)**

**Version(s) number and/or range** 

**Remediation/Fix/Instructions**

IBM Robotic Process Automation

21.0.0 - 21.0.7

Download 21.0.7.1 or higher and follow these instructions.

IBM Robotic Process Automation for Cloud Pak

21.0.0 - 21.0.7

Update to 21.0.7.1 or higher using the following instructions. 

**Workarounds and Mitigations**

**Workarounds/Mitigation guidance**:

Remove older application logs that were created in versions 21.0.0 - 21.0.7.

**References**

Off

**Acknowledgement**

Mariana Penna (IBM)

**Change History**

21 Aug 2023: Initial Publication

\*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Security Bulletin.

**Disclaimer**

According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES ""AS IS"" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY. In addition to other efforts to address potential vulnerabilities, IBM periodically updates the record of components contained in our product offerings. As part of that effort, if IBM identifies previously unidentified packages in a product/service inventory, we address relevant vulnerabilities regardless of CVE date. Inclusion of an older CVEID does not demonstrate that the referenced product has been used by IBM since that date, nor that IBM was aware of a vulnerability as of that date. We are making clients aware of relevant vulnerabilities as we become aware of them. "Affected Products and Versions" referenced in IBM Security Bulletins are intended to be only products and versions that are supported by IBM and have not passed their end-of-support or warranty date. Thus, failure to reference unsupported or extended-support products and versions in this Security Bulletin does not constitute a determination by IBM that they are unaffected by the vulnerability. Reference to one or more unsupported versions in this Security Bulletin shall not create an obligation for IBM to provide fixes for any unsupported or extended-support products or versions.

**Document Location**

Worldwide

\[{"Business Unit":{"code":"BU059","label":"IBM Software w\\/o TPS"},"Product":{"code":"SSC50T","label":"IBM Robotic Process Automation"},"Component":"","Platform":\[{"code":"PF033","label":"Windows"},{"code":"PF040","label":"RedHat OpenShift"}\],"Version":"21.0.0 - 21.0.7","Edition":"","Line of Business":{"code":"LOB45","label":"Automation"}}\]

CVE-2023-38732: IBM Robotic Process Automation is vulnerable to exposure of sensitive information in application logs (CVE-2023-38732)

A stack exhaustion issue was discovered in FreeImage before 1.18.0 via the Validate function in PluginRAW.cpp.

> tl;dr:  
> When Load RIFF format files, "size" is read from file. FreeImage seek file pos by "size", and function Validate will call LibRaw::open\_datastream with LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream, it will call to LibRaw::parse\_riff. If "size" is a negative number(>0x7ffffffff), FreeImage will call LibRaw::parse\_riff function by itself, it eventually causing the stack to be filled.

When the program reads a RIFF format file, it will call to the Validate function of the 'PluginRAW.cpp' file , to validata format.

In Validate function, it will use LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream to call LibRaw::open\_datastream

static BOOL DLL\_CALLCONV
Validate(FreeImageIO \*io, fi\_handle handle) {           //<---- io is LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream
......
    // no magic signature : we need to open the file (it will take more time to identify it)
    // do not declare RawProcessor on the stack as it may be huge (300 KB)
    {
        LibRaw \*RawProcessor \= new(std::nothrow) LibRaw;

        if(RawProcessor) {
            BOOL bSuccess \= TRUE;

            // wrap the input datastream
            LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream datastream(io, handle);

            // open the datastream
            if(RawProcessor->open\_datastream(&datastream) != LIBRAW\_SUCCESS) {     //<---- call LibRaw::open\_datastream
                bSuccess \= FALSE;   // LibRaw : failed to open input stream (unknown format)
            }

            // clean-up internal memory allocations
            RawProcessor-\>recycle();
            delete RawProcessor;

            return bSuccess;
        }
    }

    return FALSE;
}

And will call to LibRaw::parse\_riff function if file start with "RIFF".

FreeImaged.dll!LibRaw::parse\_riff()
FreeImaged.dll!LibRaw::identify()
FreeImaged.dll!LibRaw::open\_datastream(LibRaw\_abstract\_datastream \* stream)
FreeImaged.dll!Validate(FreeImageIO \* io, void \* handle)
FreeImaged.dll!FreeImage\_ValidateFIF(FREE\_IMAGE\_FORMAT fif, FreeImageIO \* io, void \* handle)
FreeImaged.dll!FreeImage\_GetFileTypeFromHandle(FreeImageIO \* io, void \* handle, int size)
FreeImaged.dll!FreeImage\_GetFileType(const char \* filename, int size)

In LibRaw::parse\_riff function, it call itslef by variable "tag". And the "tag" is read from file.

void LibRaw::parse\_riff()
{
  unsigned i, size, end;
  char tag\[4\], date\[64\], month\[64\];
  static const char mon\[12\]\[4\] \= {"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
                                  "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"};
  struct tm t;

  order \= 0x4949;
  fread(tag, 4, 1, ifp);
  size \= get4();                                //<---- size read from file
  end \= ftell(ifp) + size;
  if (!memcmp(tag, "RIFF", 4) || !memcmp(tag, "LIST", 4))
  {
    int maxloop \= 1000;
    get4();
    while (ftell(ifp) + 7 < end && !feof(ifp) && maxloop\--)
      parse\_riff();                             //<---- call itself
  }
.......
  }
  else
    fseek(ifp, size, SEEK\_CUR);                 //<---- seek pos by size
}

function get4() just read four bytes.

unsigned LibRaw::get4()
{
  uchar str\[4\] \= {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
  fread(str, 1, 4, ifp);
  return sget4(str);
}

\_\_int64 is file default variable type at LibRaw\_bigfile\_buffered\_datastream in "libraw\_datastream.h"

class DllDef LibRaw\_bigfile\_buffered\_datastream : public LibRaw\_abstract\_datastream
{
public:
......
    virtual INT64 tell();
    virtual INT64 size() { return \_fsize; }
......
protected:
    INT64   readAt(void \*ptr, size\_t size, INT64 off);
......
    INT64 \_fsize;
    INT64 \_fpos; /\* current file position; current buffer start position \*/
......
};

But long is file default variable type at "LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream" in FreeImageIO.cpp

unsigned DLL\_CALLCONV 
\_ReadProc(void \*buffer, unsigned size, unsigned count, fi\_handle handle) {
    return (unsigned)fread(buffer, size, count, (FILE \*)handle);
}

unsigned DLL\_CALLCONV 
\_WriteProc(void \*buffer, unsigned size, unsigned count, fi\_handle handle) {
    return (unsigned)fwrite(buffer, size, count, (FILE \*)handle);
}

int DLL\_CALLCONV
\_SeekProc(fi\_handle handle, long offset, int origin) {
    return fseek((FILE \*)handle, offset, origin);
}

long DLL\_CALLCONV
\_TellProc(fi\_handle handle) {
    return ftell((FILE \*)handle);
}

So if we let "size" to a negative number, the the file cursor pos could go back to begining of function.  
LibRaw::parse\_riff will call function by itself, it eventually causing the stack to be filled. An attacker can reach a remote denial of service attack by sending a specially constructed file.

windbg:

ModLoad: 00000001\`80000000 00000001\`80a65000   D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Dist\\x64\\FreeImaged.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffa\`f4430000 00007ffa\`f44bd000   C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\MSVCP140.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffb\`5eda0000 00007ffb\`5edac000   C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\VCRUNTIME140\_1.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffb\`7de50000 00007ffb\`7debb000   C:\\Windows\\System32\\WS2\_32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffb\`69a60000 00007ffb\`69a7b000   C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\VCRUNTIME140.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffb\`39170000 00007ffb\`391a7000   C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\VCOMP140D.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffb\`7dd20000 00007ffb\`7de4a000   C:\\Windows\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll
(4460.8c84): Break instruction exception \- code 80000003 (first chance)
ntdll!LdrpDoDebuggerBreak+0x30:
00007ffb\`7ed80770 cc              int     3
0:000\> g
(4460.8c84): Stack overflow \- code c00000fd (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
FreeImaged!\_\_crt\_stdio\_stream::has\_any\_buffer+0x13:
00000001\`8058e103 e808000000      call    FreeImaged!\_\_crt\_stdio\_stream::has\_any\_of (00000001\`8058e110)
0:000\> k
 # Child\-SP          RetAddr               Call Site
00 000000a9\`09a03ff0 00000001\`805a2947     FreeImaged!\_\_crt\_stdio\_stream::has\_any\_buffer+0x13 \[minkernel\\crts\\ucrt\\inc\\corecrt\_internal\_stdio.h @ 221\] 
01 000000a9\`09a04020 00000001\`805a31c0     FreeImaged!\_fread\_nolock\_s+0x2b7 \[minkernel\\crts\\ucrt\\src\\appcrt\\stdio\\fread.cpp @ 93\] 
02 000000a9\`09a04100 00000001\`805a307d     FreeImaged!fread\_s+0x130 \[minkernel\\crts\\ucrt\\src\\appcrt\\stdio\\fread.cpp @ 56\] 
03 000000a9\`09a04150 00000001\`8000f564     FreeImaged!fread+0x3d \[minkernel\\crts\\ucrt\\src\\appcrt\\stdio\\fread.cpp @ 240\] 
04 000000a9\`09a04190 00000001\`8005192b     FreeImaged!\_ReadProc+0x34 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\FreeImage\\FreeImageIO.cpp @ 33\] 
05 000000a9\`09a041c0 00000001\`802f1bf1     FreeImaged!LibRaw\_freeimage\_datastream::read+0x3b \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\FreeImage\\PluginRAW.cpp @ 67\] 
06 000000a9\`09a041f0 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x81 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 256\] 
07 000000a9\`09a043b0 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 
08 000000a9\`09a04570 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 
09 000000a9\`09a04730 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 
0a 000000a9\`09a048f0 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 
0b 000000a9\`09a04ab0 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 
0c 000000a9\`09a04c70 00000001\`802f1d11     FreeImaged!LibRaw::parse\_riff+0x1a1 \[D:\\coding\\FreeImage\\freeimage\-svn\-r1889\\FreeImage\\trunk\\Source\\LibRawLite\\src\\metadata\\misc\_parsers.cpp @ 263\] 

TestFile:

\==

CVE-2021-40262: FreeImage / Bugs / #338 A stack buff overflower in function Validate() located in PluginRAW.cpp

An issue discovered in XZ 5.2.5 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via decompression of crafted file.

XZ Utils is free general-purpose data compression software with a high compression ratio. XZ Utils were written for POSIX-like systems, but also work on some not-so-POSIX systems. XZ Utils are the successor to LZMA Utils.

The core of the XZ Utils compression code is based on LZMA SDK, but it has been modified quite a lot to be suitable for XZ Utils. The primary compression algorithm is currently LZMA2, which is used inside the .xz container format. With typical files, XZ Utils create 30 % smaller output than gzip and 15 % smaller output than bzip2.

XZ Utils consist of several components:

*   liblzma is a compression library with an API similar to that of zlib.
*   xz is a command line tool with syntax similar to that of gzip.
*   xzdec is a decompression-only tool smaller than the full-featured xz tool.
*   A set of shell scripts (xzgrep, xzdiff, etc.) have been adapted from gzip to ease viewing, grepping, and comparing compressed files.
*   Emulation of command line tools of LZMA Utils eases transition from LZMA Utils to XZ Utils.

While liblzma has a zlib-like API, liblzma doesn't include any file I/O functions. A separate I/O library is planned, which would abstract handling of .gz, .bz2, and .xz files with an easy to use API.

**Documentation**

Man page with a keyword index: xz(1)

Doxygen-generated liblzma API documentation is also included in the source packages since XZ Utils 5.4.2.

**Source code**

Versions 5.2.12, 5.4.3, and later have been signed with Jia Tan's OpenPGP key. The older files have been signed with Lasse Collin's OpenPGP key.

See the NEWS file for a summary of changes between versions.

**Stable**

5.4.4 was released on 2023-08-02. A minor bug fix release 5.2.12 to the old stable branch was made on 2023-05-04. This is probably the last release in the 5.2.x series.

XZ Utils releases are hosted on GitHub and thus some of the links below redirect to the XZ Utils release section on GitHub. Release files are also available in the XZ Utils files section on Sourceforge.

xz-5.4.4.tar.gz (2808 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.bz2 (2116 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.zst (1680 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.xz (1623 KiB) signature

Probably the last release of the old stable branch:

xz-5.2.12.tar.gz (2140 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.bz2 (1593 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.zst (1317 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.xz (1275 KiB) signature

**Development**

The new APIs, command line options etc. in development releases should be considered unstable. Incompatible changes to unstable features may be done before they get included in a stable release.

There currently are no development releases.

**Old versions**

Source and binary packages of old XZ Utils releases are available on a separate page.

**Git repository**

The primary repository is on GitHub:

git clone https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz

It is mirrored with some delay to git.tukaani.org:

git clone https://git.tukaani.org/xz.git

Gitweb

Branches:

*   **master**: the latest development code
*   **v5.4**: fixes for the next 5.4.x release
*   **v5.2**: fixes for the next 5.2.x release
*   **v5.0**: fixes for the next 5.0.x release (unmaintained)

Building the code from the git repository requires GNU Autotools. Here are the _minimum_ versions that should work with XZ Utils; using the latest versions is strongly recommended:

*   Autoconf 2.69
*   Automake 1.12
*   gettext 0.19.6 (Note: autopoint depends on cvs!)
*   Libtool 2.4

The following are optional dependencies. The autogen.sh script will fail if they are missing but autogen.sh takes command line arguments to disable these dependencies.

*   po4a is needed for translated documentation (man pages). To build without po4a, use --no-po4a with autogen.sh.
*   Doxygen is needed to generate liblzma API documentation. To build without Doxygen, use --no-doxygen with autogen.sh.

**Security issues****xzgrep CVE-2022-1271, ZDI-CAN-16587**

A patch to fix a security vulnerability in xzgrep (CVE-2022-1271, ZDI-CAN-16587) was made public on 2022-04-07. The patch applies to 4.999.9beta to 5.2.5, 5.3.1alpha, and 5.3.2alpha. Newer XZ Utils releases include an improved fix for the problem.

It is a severe issue if an attacker can control the filenames that are given on the xzgrep command line. The vulnerability was discovered by cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative. For more information, see the detailed description in the patch file linked below.

xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch  
xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch.sig

**Bindings****Python**

Python 3.3 includes bindings for liblzma. A backport of these bindings are available for Python 2 in the backports.lzma package.

lzmaffi is another Python binding which adds random-access decompression support.

The original Python 2 binding for liblzma is PylibLZMA.

**Perl**

Perl bindings for liblzma: IO-Compress-Lzma and Compress-Raw-Lzma.

**Haskell**

Haskell bindings.

**Delphi and Free Pascal**

Bindings and example programs for Delphi and Free Pascal are available here.

**Pre-built binaries**

Many free software operating systems already provide easy-to-install XZ Utils binaries. It doesn't make sense to provide links to all those here. Instead, binaries or links to websites providing binaries are listed here only for operating systems that don't have well-known repositories where users would get software like this.

If you have a website that provides up-to-date XZ Utils binaries for an operating system that meets the the criteria above, let me know and I will include a link here. Note that I won't host the binaries themselves without a good reason.

**Windows**

The Windows version of XZ Utils includes binaries for 32-bit and 64-bit x86. The binaries only depend on msvcrt.dll, which is available on Windows 98 and later out of the box.

*   Command line tools: xz, xzdec, lzmadec, lzmainfo
*   Shared (DLL) and static liblzma, required C header files, and liblzma.def to create import libraries for non-GNU toolchains (no import library is needed with GNU toolchain)
*   Documentation is in plain text (UTF-8) format. The man pages of the command line tools are included also as PDF.

5.2.10, 5.2.11, or 5.2.12 do not have anything significant for Windows so only 5.2.9 is here. 5.4.x builds are not provided for now.

xz-5.2.9-windows.zip (1473 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.9-windows.7z (708 KiB) signature

**DOS**

The DOS version of XZ Utils includes only the xz command line tool and some documentation. The xz tool should work e.g. on FreeDOS (also in DOSEMU), MS-DOS, and Windows 95/98/98SE/ME. This doesn't necessarily work in DOSBox at all, and at least some problems are expected under Windows XP Command Prompt (signal handling doesn't work).

Since the DOS version is naturally going to get very little testing, it is recommended to use the Windows version instead of the DOS version if you need xz under Windows 98 or later. It is likely that that the DOS version will be updated only occasionally.

5.2.0 and later have experimental support for 8.3 filenames. See xz-dos.txt in the binary package or dos/README.txt in the source package for details.

xz-5.4.0-dos.zip (277 KiB) signature

The package includes some copylefted code from DJGPP and CWSDPMI. The relevant source code is available from their home pages, and copies are also available below.

djlsr205.zip (2000 KiB)  
djtst205.zip (1061 KiB)  
csdpmi7s.zip (88 KiB)

Juan Manuel Guerrero has made a more complete port of XZ Utils to DOS. It also has support for short file names (8.3), but the naming method is different from the one found in 5.2.0 and later. It is available from DJGPP mirrors under /current/v2apps (e.g. xz-500b.zip for 5.0.0 binaries).

**Supported platforms**

Below is an incomplete and somewhat vague (version numbers mostly missing) list of operating systems on which XZ Utils should work. The compiler(s) or toolchains are mentioned in parenthesis. GCC refers to GCC 3 or later. If you have additions or corrections, please email them to me.

*   GNU/Linux (GCC, Clang, ICC, IBM XL C)
*   GNU/HURD (GCC)
*   DragonflyBSD (GCC)
*   FreeBSD (GCC, Clang)
*   MirBSD (GCC)
*   NetBSD (GCC)
*   OpenBSD (Clang, GCC)
*   MINIX 3 (GCC) \[1\]
*   Haiku (GCC4)
*   Mac OS X (GCC)
*   Solaris 8, 9, 10, 11 (GCC, Sun Studio) \[3\]
*   Solaris 2.6, 7 (GCC)
*   HP-UX (GCC, HP ANSI C) \[2\]
*   Tru64 (GCC, Compaq C compiler) \[1\]
*   IRIX (MIPSpro) \[1\]
*   AIX (GCC, IBM XL C)
*   z/OS (IBM XL C)
*   QNX (compilers?)
*   OpenVMS (HP C compiler) \[1\]
*   OpenVOS 17 (GCC)
*   SCO OpenServer 5.0.7 (GCC 3.4.6, 4.2.4) \[4\]
*   Windows 95 and later (GCC/MinGW, GCC/MinGW-w64, GCC/Cygwin, GCC/Interix, Visual Studio (VS can only build liblzma)) \[1\]
*   OS/2, eComStation (GCC)
*   DOS e.g. FreeDOS and MS-DOS (GCC/DJGPP) \[1\]

\[1\] See also the platform-specific notes in the INSTALL file.

\[2\] 2010-09-22: HP ANSI C compiler crashes when compiling XZ Utils on PA-RISC. On Itanium there are no problems.

\[3\] On Solaris 8 and 9 one may need to pass ac\_cv\_prog\_cc\_c99= to configure if using Sun Studio.

\[4\] Use --disable-threads when running configure.

**Licensing**

The most interesting parts of XZ Utils (e.g. liblzma) are in the public domain. You can do whatever you want with the public domain parts.

Some parts of XZ Utils (e.g. build system and some utilities) are under different free software licenses such as GNU LGPLv2.1, GNU GPLv2, or GNU GPLv3.

See the file COPYING for more details.

Tag

#windows