Headline
CVE-2022-27185: TALOS-2022-1505 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
A denial of service vulnerability exists in the confctl_set_master_wlan functionality of TCL LinkHub Mesh Wifi MS1G_00_01.00_14. A specially-crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send packets to trigger this vulnerability.
SUMMARY
A denial of service vulnerability exists in the confctl_set_master_wlan functionality of TCL LinkHub Mesh Wifi MS1G_00_01.00_14. A specially-crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send packets to trigger this vulnerability.
CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS
The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.
TCL LinkHub Mesh Wifi MS1G_00_01.00_14
PRODUCT URLS
LinkHub Mesh Wifi - https://www.tcl.com/us/en/products/connected-home/linkhub/linkhub-mesh-wifi-system-3-pack
CVSSv3 SCORE
9.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
DETAILS
The LinkHub Mesh Wi-Fi system is a node-based mesh system designed for Wi-Fi deployments across large homes. These nodes include most features standard in current Wi-Fi solutions and allow for easy expansion of the system by adding nodes. The mesh is managed solely by a phone application, and the routers have no web-based management console.
The LinkHub Mesh system uses protobuffers to communicate both internally on the device as well as externally with the controlling phone application. These protobuffers can be sent to port 9003 while on the Wi-Fi, or wired network, provided by the LinkHub Mesh in order to issue commands, much like the phone application would. Once the protobuffer is received, it is routed internally starting from the ucloud binary and is dispatched to the appropriate handler.
In this case, the handler is confsrv, which handles many message types. In this case we are interested in WlanCfgAll
enum MESH_WIFI_TYPE {
MESH_WIFI_2G = 0;
MESH_WIFI_5G = 1;
MESH_WIFI_MAX = 2;
}
message WlanTimeChoice {
repeated int32 option = 1;
}
message WlanSecChoice {
repeated string option = 1;
}
message WlanLimitChoice {
repeated int32 option = 1;
}
message WlanCfg {
required MESH_WIFI_TYPE band = 1;
required string ssid = 2; [2]
required string passwd = 3; [3]
optional string sec = 4;
optional int32 left = 5;
optional int32 limite = 6;
optional int32 timeout = 7;
optional bool enable = 8;
}
message WlanCfgAll {
repeated WlanCfg wlan = 1; [1]
optional WlanTimeChoice timeout = 2;
optional WlanSecChoice security = 3;
optional WlanLimitChoice limits = 4;
optional uint64 timestamp = 5;
optional bool enable = 6;
optional bool from_app = 7;
}
Using [1], direct control over SSID ([2]) and passwd ([3]) can be obtained, and both WlanCfgAll and WlanCfg are parsed within confctrl_set_master_wlan.
00455938 int32_t confctl_set_master_wlan(int32_t arg1, int32_t arg2, int32_t arg3)
...
00455a54 int32_t var_1d0_1 = 0
00455a74 struct WlanCfgAll* pkt = wlan_cfg_all__unpack(0, arg3, arg2)
00455a88 if (pkt == 0) {
00455aa0 puts(" wlan_cfg_all__unpack error…")
00455aac $v0_1 = 0xffffffff
00455aac } else {
004560d4 for (int32_t var_1bc_1 = 0; var_1bc_1 u< pkt->wlan_count; var_1bc_1 = var_1bc_1 + 1) {
00455adc int32_t $v0_9 = *(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0xc)
00455ae0 if ($v0_9 == 0) {
00455b18 if (*(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x10) == 0) {
00455ba8 printf("[%s][%d][Arainc] 2g ssid is null…", "confctl_set_master_wlan", 0x17a)
00455b9c } else {
00455b58 int32_t $v0_21 = set_if_changed("wl2g.ssid0.ssid", *(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x10), &var_114) [4]
00455b68 int32_t $v0_22 = var_1c8
00455b78 if ($v0_21 s>= $v0_22) {
00455b78 $v0_22 = $v0_21
00455b78 }
00455b7c var_1c8 = $v0_22
00455b7c }
00455bd0 if (*(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14) == 0) {
00455dc8 printf("[%s][%d][Arainc] 2g passwd is nu…", "confctl_set_master_wlan", 0x19d)
00455dbc } else {
00455bf0 memset(&var_94, 0, 0x80)
00455c1c if (sx.d(**(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14)) != 0) {
00455d1c SetValue(name: "wl2g.ssid0.security", input_buffer: "wpapsk")
00455d60 int32_t $v0_50 = set_if_changed("wl2g.ssid0.wpapsk_psk", *(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14), &var_114) [5]
00455d70 int32_t $v0_51 = var_1c8
00455d80 if ($v0_50 s>= $v0_51) {
00455d80 $v0_51 = $v0_50
00455d80 }
....
004560b4 } else {
00455df8 if (*(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x10) == 0) {
00455e88 printf("[%s][%d][Arainc] 5g ssid is null…", "confctl_set_master_wlan", 0x1aa)
00455e7c } else {
00455e38 int32_t $v0_64 = set_if_changed("wl5g.ssid0.ssid", *(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x10), &var_114) [6]
00455e48 int32_t $v0_65 = var_1c8
00455e58 if ($v0_64 s>= $v0_65) {
00455e58 $v0_65 = $v0_64
00455e58 }
00455e5c var_1c8 = $v0_65
00455e5c }
00455eb0 if (*(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14) == 0) {
00456070 printf("[%s][%d][Arainc] 5g passwd is nu…", "confctl_set_master_wlan", 0x1ca)
00456064 } else if (sx.d(**(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14)) != 0) {
00455fdc SetValue(name: "wl5g.ssid0.security", input_buffer: "wpapsk")
00456020 int32_t $v0_92 = set_if_changed("wl5g.ssid0.wpapsk_psk", *(*(pkt->wlan + (var_1bc_1 << 2)) + 0x14), &var_114) [7]
00456030 int32_t $v0_93 = var_1c8
00456040 if ($v0_92 s>= $v0_93) {
00456040 $v0_93 = $v0_92
00456040 }
00456044 var_1c8 = $v0_93
....
At [4], the ssid from the provided protobuf is used directly into the new SSID of the device. Similarly at [5] the passwd provided is used as the new password for the 2G wireless network. Likewise, [6] and [7] can be used to change the SSID and password associated with the 5G wireless network. While this change is the most basic example, any of the fields in the defined protobuffers can be changed using this method without authentication.
TIMELINE
2022-03-29 - Vendor Disclosure
2022-08-01 - Public Release
Discovered by Carl Hurd of Cisco Talos.
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