Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities in the SoftEther VPN solution for individual and enterprise users to force users to drop their connections or execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine.

Wednesday, October 25, 2023 12:10

Cisco Talos has disclosed 17 vulnerabilities over the past two weeks, including nine that exist in a popular VPN software.  

Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities in the SoftEther VPN solution for individual and enterprise users to force users to drop their connections or execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine.  

Talos’ Vulnerability Research team also found a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Peplink Surf series of home and wireless routers that could allow an attacker to manipulate HTML elements into executing arbitrary JavaScript. However, this vulnerability is not considered to be particularly serious, with a CVSS severity score of only 3.4 out of 10. 

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.  

**SoftEther VPN client **

_Discovered by Lilith >\_>._ 

The SoftEther VPN client contains multiple vulnerabilities that could lead to a variety of conditions, including allowing an adversary to cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine. SoftEther is an open-source, cross-platform, multi-protocol VPN managed as part of an academic project at the University of Tsukuba in Japan. 

Four of the vulnerabilities Talos disclosed last week exist when an adversary sends a specific set of packets to the targeted device, and can cause the software to crash entirely, leading to a denial of service: 

*   TALOS-2023-1736 (CVE-2023-22325) 
*   TALOS-2023-1741 (CVE-2023-23581) 
*   TALOS-2023-1737 (CVE-2023-22308) 
*   TALOS-2023-1743 (CVE-2023-25774) 

The most serious of these issues is TALOS-2023-1735 (CVE-2023-27395), a vulnerability in the VPN that could lead to a heap-based buffer overflow, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability is considered critical, with a CVSS score of 9.0 out of 10.  

Two other vulnerabilities — TALOS-2023-1755 (CVE-2023-32634) and TALOS-2023-1754 (CVE-2023-27516) — could allow an adversary to gain unauthorized access to the VPN session by viewing the default RPC server credentials. This opens the door for the attackers to install certificates and carry out man-in-the-middle attacks or dump the VPN’s authentication settings and further compromise the endpoint connected to the VPN session. 

A man-in-the-middle attack could also be used to exploit TALOS-2023-1768 (CVE-2023-31192) and TALOS-2023-1753 (CVE-2023-32275), which leads to the disclosure of sensitive information in certain packets. 

**JustSystems Ichitaro word processor remote code execution vulnerabilities **

_Discovered by a Cisco Talos researcher._ 

Talos researchers recently found four vulnerabilities in the JustSystems Ichitaro word processor that could lead to arbitrary code execution, albeit with varying paths. 

Ichitaro is one of the most popular word processing systems in the Japanese market and utilizes the ATOK input method. An adversary could exploit these vulnerabilities by tricking the targeted user into opening a specially crafted, malicious file in the program. 

The vulnerabilities all exist in various parsers in the software: 

*   TALOS-2023-1758 (CVE-2023-34366) 
*   TALOS-2023-1808 (CVE-2023-38127) 
*   TALOS-2023-1809 (CVE-2023-38128) 
*   TALOS-2023-1825 (CVE-2023-35126) 

**XSS, command injection vulnerabilities in SOHO router **

_Discovered by Matt Wiseman._ 

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the Peplink Surf line of small and home office (SOHO) wireless routers that can lead to the execution of arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser. 

An attacker could trigger TALOS-2023-1781 (CVE-2023-34354) or TALOS-2023-1782 (CVE-2023-35194 and CVE-2023-35193) by making an authenticated HTTP request. 

The Surf routers also contain three vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands in the context of the router’s operating system. To exploit TALOS-2023-1778 (CVE-2023-34356), TALOS-2023-1779 (CVE-2023-28381) and TALOS-2023-1780 (CVE-2023-27380), an attacker first needs to be authenticated on the device and then make a specially crafted HTTP request.

9 vulnerabilities found in VPN software, including 1 critical issue that could lead to remote code execution

Cisco Talos assesses with high confidence that YoroTrooper, an espionage-focused threat actor first active in June 2022, likely consists of individuals from Kazakhstan based on their use of Kazakh currency and fluency in Kazakh and Russian.

Kazakhstan-associated YoroTrooper disguises origin of attacks as Azerbaijan

We observed the BlackByte ransomware group’s new variant, BlackByte NT, for the first time in addition to the previously seen LockBit ransomware, which continues to be the top observed ransomware family in Talos IR engagements.

Tuesday, October 24, 2023 08:10

**Quarterly threat report: Telecommunications and education are most-targeted verticals**

There was a notable increase in threats to web applications, accounting for 30 percent of the engagements Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) responded to in the third quarter of 2023, compared to 8 percent the previous quarter. Exploitation of public-facing applications was the top observed means of gaining initial access, accounting for 30 percent of engagements. The high number of web application attacks likely played a significant role in the increase this quarter.  

However, ever-present ransomware continues to be a threat, accounting for 10 percent of engagements. This quarter, which covers July, August and September, featured the LockBit and BlackByte ransomware families, which Talos IR has observed in previous quarters. But for the very first time, Talos IR observed a new variant of BlackByte ransomware, BlackByte NT. 

 Telecommunications and education were the most targeted verticals, each accounting for 20 percent of engagements. Threat actors and groups with varying motives and sophistication frequently targeted telecommunications organizations, continuing a trend where it was consistently a top-targeted industry vertical in 2022, according to Talos IR.  

Telecommunications companies are attractive targets due to their control over several critical infrastructure assets, serving as a gateway for adversaries to access other businesses, subscribers, or third-party providers. These organizations also have a large amount of customer data that is often targeted by financially motivated cybercriminals such as ransomware groups.   

Educational institutions are continuously targeted by cybercriminals due to vast amounts of personally identifiable student data, including financial and counseling records, as well as research institutes rich in intellectual property. Many education organizations have limited budgets devoted to cybersecurity, hampering defenses.      

**Web application targeting on the rise **

Attacks against web applications — and subsequent post-compromise activity — were the top-observed threat in Q3, accounting for 30 percent of engagements, a significant increase compared to the previous quarter. After gaining initial access, adversaries leveraged techniques such as launching web injection attacks, deploying web shells, and using commercial off-the-shelf frameworks such as Supershell, which deploys web shells to maintain access to a system. Talos IR is seeing a growing trend of adversaries leveraging advanced functionalities of various command and control (C2) frameworks, such as the newly observed Supershell C2 framework, to identify weaknesses in web servers and deploy web shells more easily. 

Supershell is a web-based management platform that allows attackers to remotely execute commands, manage compromised systems, and collaborate with multiple users. Before downloading Supershell, the attackers placed malicious XML inputs containing a reference to an external entity using XML external entity (XXE) injection attacks in hopes the web server had a misconfigured XML parser. Based on our analysis, Supershell appears to be designed for predominantly Chinese-speaking individuals as the tool is written for a Chinese-only web interface console. There is also a clear preference for Chinese in Supershell’s GitHub documentation, although an English-translated option exists.  

Although the development of recent frameworks that make the deployment of web shells easier benefits sophisticated adversaries, these frameworks may also reduce the barrier for entry for less sophisticated attackers. Given the growing trend of commercial off-the-shelf C2 frameworks within the last year, including Alchimist and Manjusaka, it is likely this trend will continue to play out as adversaries increasingly turn to adopt additional capabilities for performing web-based attacks. 

Web shells are malicious scripts that enable threat actors to compromise web-based servers exposed to the internet. Talos IR responded to an engagement where attackers uploaded several PHP web shells to an unpatched web server, demonstrating how threat actors commonly chain together web shells to build a more flexible toolkit. Within this cluster of activity, the attackers could not further carry out any post-compromise objectives due to the presence of a Web Application Firewall (WAF), highlighting the importance of implementing a WAF between public-facing servers and the Internet to help defend against these attacks.   

In several engagements this quarter, we observed adversaries leveraging Structured Query Language injection (SQLi) attacks, a technique in which adversaries enter SQL commands into an input field that does not use validation and sanitization. We increasingly see adversaries continue to use scanning frameworks to launch SQLi attacks. In one cluster of activity, Talos IR identified multiple SQLi attempts and more than 1,000 instances of SQLMap, an open-source utility often used to identify and exploit SQLi vulnerabilities. Adversaries also used a SQL injection module within Nessus, a proprietary vulnerability scanner, highlighting the threat actor’s intent on identifying SQLi vulnerabilities for expanded access.  

**Ransomware remains a threat **

Ransomware activity continued this quarter accounting for 10 percent of total IR engagements in Q3. We observed the BlackByte ransomware group’s new variant, BlackByte NT, for the first time in addition to the previously seen LockBit ransomware, which continues to be the top observed ransomware family in Talos IR engagements. 

LockBit was one of the most prevalent variants seen in Talos IR engagements since September 2022, consistent with a wide body of reporting calling LockBit one of the most active ransomware threats this year.  

Talos IR responded to a LockBit ransomware attack where the adversaries gained an initial foothold into the environment by compromising a valid contractor account. Once inside, attackers began dumping credentials from internal systems and were able to create an administrator account to elevate privileges and remain persistent in the environment. To evade detection, the attackers cleared the Windows event logs and disabled several security tools, including endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus. LockBit established C2 channels via multiple methods, including the adversary simulation tool Cobalt Strike and the legitimate remote access software AnyDesk. The attackers modified domain policies to create a scheduled task that eventually executed the LockBit ransomware binary.  

Talos IR has previously observed BlackByte ransomware, but this quarter was the first time seeing the new variant, BlackByte NT. Unlike the former variants, this new variant (aka BlackByte 2.0) is written entirely in C++ and was discovered in May 2023. 

Talos IR observed the new BlackByte NT ransomware variant where the attackers initially compromised a valid account to gain access. Several accounts with administrator privileges were created in this engagement as well, showing ransomware actors’ reliance on account creation to escalate privileges and enable persistence. Attackers then used a combination of RDP, SSH, and Server Message Block (SMB) for lateral movement. Using the open-source Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) tool WinSCP, adversaries exfiltrated data from the environment. Before encryption, the attackers cleared the Windows event logs to cover their tracks and deleted the shadow volume copies to inhibit system recovery, consistent with ransomware TTPs. Ransomware was propagated across the environment via SMB admin shares, a common distribution method also observed in ransomware attacks.   

**New ShroudedSnooper actor observed using custom backdoors **

This quarter also featured a new advanced persistent threat (APT) ShroudedSnooper targeting telecommunications firms in the Middle East. This activity is a continuation of a trend we have been monitoring over the past several years in which sophisticated actors are frequently targeting telecommunications organizations, a top-targeted industry vertical this quarter and throughout 2022, according to Talos IR. As part of this activity, ShroudedSnooper deployed two novel backdoor implants we dubbed “HTTPSnoop” and “PipeSnoop.” 

These backdoors interface with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen to incoming requests for specific HTTP(S) URLs and execute that content on the infected endpoint. Talos IR observed DLL- and EXE-based versions of the implants that masquerade as legitimate security software components, and specifically extended detection and response (XDR) agents, making detection challenging.  

**Initial vectors **

Exploitation of public-facing applications was the top observed means of gaining initial access, accounting for 30 percent of engagements. The high number of web application attacks likely played a significant role in the increase this quarter.   

**Security weaknesses **

Unpatched or misconfigured applications and a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) were tied to the top security weaknesses, each accounting for 40 percent of engagements. This activity aligns with the top two initial access vectors used by adversaries this quarter, including exploiting public-facing applications and abusing valid accounts. Talos IR frequently observes attacks that could have been prevented if MFA was enabled on critical services, such as RDP. Talos IR recommends expanding MFA for all user accounts, such as employee, contractor and business partner accounts.   

Staying up-to-date with software updates on public-facing applications is a crucial aspect of an organization’s security posture. Attackers often exploit vulnerabilities to achieve post-compromise objectives, such as privilege escalation. While vulnerability and patch management are critical, it is not always possible to immediately apply every security patch due to the complexity of enterprise networks. Talos IR recommends prioritizing critical vulnerabilities that pose the biggest threats to preventing exploitation.   

Misconfigurations can also leave organizations exposed regardless of an adversary’s intention. Talos IR frequently sees actors compromising systems that were misconfigured to be exposed publicly. Attackers often take the path of least resistance by leveraging vulnerabilities and exposures, highlighting that organizations need to be proactive in ensuring both systems and tools are configured properly.    

**Top observed MITRE ATT&CK techniques **

The table below represents the MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed in this quarter’s IR engagements, which includes relevant examples and the volume Talos IR saw in engagements. Given that some techniques can fall under multiple tactics, we grouped them under the most relevant tactic in which they were leveraged. Please note this is not an exhaustive list. 

Key findings from the MITRE ATT&CK framework include: 

*   Exploitation of public-facing applications was the top observed means of gaining initial access this quarter, accounting for 30 percent of total engagements.  
*   Attackers abused remote services, such as RDP, to move laterally in 25 percent of engagements. 
*   AnyDesk was observed in all ransomware and pre-ransomware engagements this quarter, underscoring its role in ransomware affiliates' attack chains.   
*   Indicator removal, such as clearing Windows event logs and file deletion, was the top defense evasion technique observed.   
*   In 25 percent of engagements this quarter, Talos IR observed attackers abusing scheduled tasks for continuous execution of malicious code to maintain persistence on an endpoint.    

Initial Access (TA0001)  

Example  

T1190 Exploit in Public-Facing Application  

Attackers successfully exploited a vulnerable application that was publicly exposed to the Internet    

Execution (TA0002)  

Example  

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell  

Executes PowerShell code to retrieve information about the client’s Active Directory environment  

Persistence (TA0003)  

Example  

T1053.005 Scheduled Task / Job: Scheduled Task  

Scheduled tasks were created on a compromised server  

Defense Evasion (TA0005)  

Example  

T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token  

Attackers created a new process using the command “run as”  

Credential Access (TA0006)  

Example  

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory  

Use “lsass.exe” for stealing password hashes from memory  

Lateral Movement (TA0008)  

Example  

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol  

Adversary made attempts to move laterally using Windows Remote Desktop   

Command and Control (TA0011)  

Example  

T1219 Remote Access Software  

Remote access tools found on the compromised system    

Exfiltration (TA0010)  

Example  

T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol  

Using FTP for file exfiltration  

Impact (TA0040)  

Example  

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact  

Deploy LockBit ransomware and encrypt critical systems

Attacks on web applications spike in third quarter, new Talos IR data shows

Today, Talos is publishing a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we've observed between Oct. 13 and Oct. 20. As with previous roundups, this post isn't meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, this post will summarize the threats we've observed by highlighting key

Threat Roundup for October 13 to October 20

Taking a “Security Action” of any kind — whether it be simply enabling multi-factor authentication for your online banking login or marking that weird email as spam — can go a long way toward you and any organizations you’re a part of be more security resilient.

Thursday, October 19, 2023 14:10

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

I continue to be saddened by all the conflict in Israel and Gaza that’s still ongoing. I’ll be back with a “normal” newsletter next week, as unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be a peaceful solution coming any time soon.  

In the meantime, I just wanted to use this space again to provide a roundup of the best resources I found this week for Cybersecurity Awareness Month. Taking a “Security Action” of any kind — whether it be simply enabling multi-factor authentication for your online banking login or marking that weird email as spam — can go a long way toward you and any organizations you’re a part of be more security resilient. 

*   The Annual Cybersecurity Attitudes and Behaviors Report 2023 (National Cybersecurity Alliance) 
*   2023 Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon) 
*   Cisco is continuing to invest in the future of skills certifications. Here’s how the company thinks it’ll help fill the lack of cybersecurity experts (Fortune) 
*   The open nature of XDR and cross-domain telemetry (Cisco Secure livestream) 
*   Federal Cyber Chief Tells Agencies to Tap Brakes on AI (Wall Street Journal) 
*   Former NSA Director: AI is ‘double-edged sword’ for cybersecurity (The Hill) 
*   Small-Business Cybersecurity: 20 Effective Tips From Tech Experts (Forbes) 
*   5 quick tips to strengthen your Android phone security today (ZDNet) 
*   Fact Sheet: Improving Security of Open Source Software in Operational Technology and Industrial Control Systems (CISA) 
*   Cisco 2023 Consumer Privacy Survey 

**The one big thing **

Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown, zero-day vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks. This affects physical and virtual devices running Cisco IOS XE software that also have the HTTP or HTTPS Server feature enabled. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, effectively granting them full control of the compromised device and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity.   

**Why do I care? **

Security researchers have already confirmed that threat actors have installed implants on targeted devices by exploiting this vulnerability. Up to 10,000 devices could already be affected, according to some estimates. In a worst-case scenario, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the targeted devices. 

**So now what? **

Cisco recommends in its security advisory disabling the HTTP server feature on internet-facing systems. This is consistent with, not only best practices, but guidance the U.S. government has provided in the past on mitigating risk from internet-exposed management interfaces. As this is a critical vulnerability, Talos strongly recommends affected entities immediately implement the steps outlined in Cisco’s PSIRT advisory. As soon as a patch is available, Talos and Cisco will be informing users, who should then patch as soon as possible.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Government officials are starting to disclose the true breadth of Russia’s cyber attacks at the outset of its invasion of Ukraine.** The head of the cyber division of Ukraine’s intelligence service said in a recent interview with Recorded Future that Ukraine worked with the U.S. to disrupt multiple attempts at disrupting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure in February 2022, right as Russia was launching a ground invasion of Ukraine. Sandra Joyce, the executive vice president of global intelligence at Mandiant, also said in a separate interview this week that protecting Ukraine in the initial weeks and months of the invasion was like “hand-to-hand combat.” Joyce also said that her company saw more wiper malware deployed against Ukraine in the first few weeks of the invasion than it had all of the past eight years it had partnered with Ukraine. Another top Ukrainian cybersecurity official called these attacks from Russia “nothing but a war crime.” (The Record, Yahoo! News) 

**Internet giant Amazon is slowly rolling out passkeys as a login method for its users.** Amazon quietly added the feature under users’ account management portal to opt into setting up a passkey. This means users can login using biometric authentication on their device, such as their fingerprint or face scan. This conceivably makes it more difficult for bad actors to access their accounts unknowingly, as they’d need physical access to their device. However, this login option still does not work on Amazon’s native apps, like Prime Video or Amazon shopping, on mobile devices. And the passkey login still requires a multi-factor authentication code to be entered, which would conceivably be redundant with a passkey. A spokesperson for Amazon told news outlet TechCrunch that the company is “in the early stages of adding Passkey support for Amazon.com to give customers another secure way to access their accounts. We will have more to share soon.” (TechCrunch, Dark Reading) 

**Threat actors in Vietnam attempted to infiltrate U.S. government officials’ devices with spyware earlier this year,** according to a new report, as well as devices belonging to a high-profile CNN anchor. The spyware was embedded in links placed in messages on the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. While the attempts appear to be unsuccessful, it does highlight the continued threat that spyware poses, specifically the Predator software, which Talos has written about previously. An Italian cybersecurity research group also recently found that bad actors were trying to spread spyware through fake national alerts in Italy. The actors have set up a fake site posing as Italy’s recently released IT Alert program for natural disasters, urging users to download an app to receive critical alerts. (Washington Post, Cyber Security Hub) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos Takes Ep. #158: How to find the right password management solution for you 
*   Why logging is one of the most overlooked aspects of incident response, and how Cisco Talos IR can help 
*   Snapshot fuzzing direct composition with WTF 
*   Ransomware versus data theft 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ATT&CKcon 4.0** **(Oct. 24 - 25)** 

_McLean, Virginia_ 

> _Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland discuss the MIRE ATT&CK framework in “One Leg to Stand on: Adventures in Adversary Tracking with ATT&CK.” Even though ATT&CK has become an industry standard for cyber threat intelligence reporting, all too often, techniques are thrown at the bottoms of reports and blogs without any context never to be seen again after dissemination. This is not useful for intelligence producers or consumers. In this presentation, Nicole and James will show analysts how to use ATT&CK as a guideline for creating a contextual knowledge base for adversary tracking._ 

**misecCON** **(Nov. 17)** 

_Lansing, Michigan_ 

> _Terryn Valikodath from Talos Incident Response will deliver a talk providing advice on the best ways to conduct analysis, learning from his years of experience (and mishaps). He will speak about the everyday tasks he and his Talos IR teammates must go through to properly perform analysis. This talk covers topics such as planning, finding evil, recording findings, correlation and creating your own timelines._ 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256: 744c5a6489370567fd8290f5ece7f2bff018f10d04ccf5b37b070e8ab99b3241**   
**MD5:** a5e26a50bf48f2426b15b38e5894b189   
**Typical Filename:** a5e26a50bf48f2426b15b38e5894b189.vir   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Generic::1201 

**SHA 256:** 85b936960fbe5100c170b777e1647ce9f0f01e3ab9742dfc23f37cb0825b30b5   
**MD5:** 8c80dd97c37525927c1e549cb59bcbf3     
**Typical Filename:** Eternalblue-2.2.0.exe     
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** Win.Exploit.Shadowbrokers::5A5226262.auto.talos 

**SHA 256: 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440**   
**MD5:** ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e   
**Typical Filename:** iizbpyilb.bat   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.Agent.DDOH 

**SHA 256:** 975517668a3fe020f1dbb1caafde7180fd9216dcbf0ea147675ec287287f86aa   
**MD5:** 9403425a34e0c78a919681a09e5c16da   
**Typical Filename:** vincpsarzh.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd 

**SHA 256:** 2ebfc0b6ae3e80ca4e5a3ebfa4d9d7e99818be183d57ce6fbb9705104639bf95   
**MD5:** 2371212b783f959809647de4f476928b   
**Typical Filename:** wzncntdmgkm.bat   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd

More helpful resources for users of all skill levels to help you Take a Security Action

Learn about Talos' research into cracked versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system and applications. Discover why the use of cracktivator software is a growing trend.

Wednesday, October 18, 2023 11:10

Cisco Talos coined the term “Cracktivator software” to reference counterfeit or modified software for pirated versions of Windows applications. 

One of our teammates, James Nutland, led the research to look into cracked versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system and other Microsoft applications such as Office.  

Both products use Microsoft key management service (KMS), which typically allows organizations to activate systems on their own network. Cracktivators co-opt this service by altering the system to allow pirated keys. The term could also apply to other applications that have been modified or pirated in some way. 

The use of Cracktivator software is a growing trend around the world. A notable majority of the organizations using cracked software are in Europe, especially Eastern Europe, in a broad range of industries. During Talos’ Ukrainian Task Force’s threat hunting operations, which is focussed on critical infrastructure, we uncovered a substantial number of organizations running this type of illegitimate software.   

According to Talos data, North America also shows a variety in industry types using Cracktivator software, with the highest prevalence being in manufacturing and education, and, to a lesser extent, construction, financial services and retail. In the Asia Pacific region, the industries using Cracktivator software are predominantly within the manufacturing and government sectors.  

However, there seems to be less overall Cracktivator usage in Asia Pacific than in Europe and North America, which is a shift. Asia Pacific used to have a large presence of pirated enterprise software, though we are still unsure as to the exact reason why they’ve moved away from cracked software. 

Regional use of pirated Windows software for more than 30 days. 

**The security risks of using Cracktivator software **

Aside from the fact that using pirated software is illegal, the use of it brings many security risks. These include not having access to critical updates or security patches, which can leave users more open to attacks that target known vulnerabilities within Windows applications. 

During our research, we also found that other threats, such as remote access trojans (RATs) and cryptocurrency mining malware, are also commonly found on systems running Cracktivator software. We’ve detected that adversaries are bundling these types of threats into modified software as a method of initial access. 

In this situation, the user is typically unaware of any built-in malware when they download the cracked software (typically via torrent sites). In fact, Cracktivator software looks and sounds, in most cases, like the real thing. This is largely because threat actors don’t want users to spot anything amiss, so they can carry out whatever malicious intentions they may have (for example, establishing a backdoor to systems).   

**Why do organizations use Cracktivator software? **

This is a complicated question, as there are many reasons as to why organizations choose (or in some cases, turn a blind eye) to using Cracktivator software. Poor security hygiene is one reason. Organization’s may not have the appropriate tools for security training, unable to spread awareness to employees about the risks of using such software. 

Another reason is that certain people or departments may be under a time crunch to deliver a piece of work. Purchasing an illegitimate license may help speed up the completion of these deliverables or be cheaper than buying an actual license. 

Unfortunately, while users are typing away on their Word document to get that board report in on time, there is typically a lot of malicious activity going on in the background. Therefore the short-term gains are never worth the long-term pains. 

**Recommendations on how to address the growing trend of Cracktivator software use **

*   Regularly update all software and systems with legitimate, licensed versions. 
*   Employ robust cybersecurity solutions to detect and mitigate threats, including installing endpoint detection response (EDR) solutions. 
*   Regularly monitor internal systems for any suspicious activity, such as unusual PowerShell and Netsh utility usage. 
*   Conduct cybersecurity awareness and training programs to inform staff about the risks associated with downloading and using cracked software. 
*   Block and/or monitor traffic reaching out to the associated IOCs.   
*   Monitor and prevent unnecessary and/or unauthorized use of system administration tools, such as remote access software.   
*   Ensure sensitive systems are properly segmented and not exposed to the internet to prevent lateral movement from compromised machines.   

Talos’ Head of Strategic Analysis David Liebenberg recently appeared on the CyberWire podcast to talk about Talos’ Cracktivator research. Check out the conversation:

If you’d like to continue to learn more about the basics of the topics we cover on the Talos blog, read the rest of our entries in The Need to Know series.

What is Cracktivator software?

As the adoption of digital technologies increases, the volume of log data grows, which makes it challenging for cybersecurity teams to identify which logs are most valuable when investigating and analyzing threats.

Tuesday, October 17, 2023 12:10

_By Rami Altalhi and David Roman._  

Logs are fundamental to strengthening an organization's digital defenses. Many logs within an organization contain records related to computer security.  

These computer security logs are generated by many sources, including security software, workstations, servers, antivirus software, EDRs, firewalls, and intrusion detection and prevention and networking equipment.   

Many organizations face different challenges in collecting, reviewing and managing logs. As the adoption of digital technologies increases, the volume of log data grows, which makes it challenging for cybersecurity teams to identify which logs are most valuable when investigating and analyzing threats. 

To simplify companies logging challenges, and bolster incident response planning, the Talos IR team will soon offer Log Architecture Assessment, as part of the services available through the Cisco Talos Incident Response Retainer Service. The Log Architecture Assessment can help companies analyze, collect and prepare their logs to be better equipped for any potential threats. On top of things like an incident response plan, having strong log policies and understanding those policies enhances the company’s incident response data points/references to make better-informed decisions on future incidents. 

During a Log Architecture Assessment, Talos IR will look at customers’ environments to determine what, if any, logs are being collected, processed and correlated and how they can be better identified and sorted to spot potentially malicious events. This enables the company to create a timeline of events more easily during any future incidents. 

Customers do not need to come prepared ahead of time with anything for a Log Architecture Assessment — Talos IR will work with the customer to: 

1.  Determine metadata being logged in their environment and any basic configurations in place.  
2.  Run a few scripts to grab important metadata from the logs generated in their environment currently to answer pertinent questions such as: 

*   How long are logs stored?  
*   Are they just in the default configurations?  
*   Do logs roll over after a certain period? 

3.  Provide a detailed report, post-analysis, of the organization’s logging infrastructure inclusive of workstations, servers and network equipment to ensure both thoroughness and efficiency.  

Our goal is to give the customer more visibility over their environment. For example, we can map logs to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework so that, if an incident occurs, it’s easier to identify the lifecycle of the attack or breach.  

As we’ve discussed many times, logging is vital to incident response and proper network hygiene for a variety of reasons: 

*   **Incident detection and response:** Security incidents are bound to happen. When one occurs, logs become invaluable. They offer a detailed trail of events leading up to and following the incident. Having this data can lead to quicker detection and effective incident containment. 
*   **Forensic analysis:** Post-incident logs play a significant role in understanding the nature and impact of a cyber security breach. They help identify vulnerabilities exploited, determine the extent of data exposure and provide insights to prevent future attacks.  
*   **Compliance and audits:** Various regulations such as GDPR, HIPAA and PCI-DSS mandate logging and regular reviews. Logs help demonstrate compliance, protect your organization from potential legal ramifications, and provide auditors with the necessary data.  
*   **Operational insights:** Logs provide insights into the health and performance of systems which offer a clear picture of system behaviors, helping IT teams optimize performance and scalability. 

Please contact your Cisco Account Team representatives or directly email Talos IR if you are interested or have questions regarding the Cisco Talos Incident Response Retainer Service or the availability of the Log Architecture Assessment service component.

Why logging is one of the most overlooked aspects of incident response, and how Cisco Talos IR can help

Although there is public research on Direct Composition, only a few discuss fuzzing this feature, and none, to our knowledge, that covers snapshot fuzzing.

Tuesday, October 17, 2023 08:10

*   Cisco Talos has developed a custom fuzzer using the popular snapshot fuzzer “WTF” which targets Direct Composition in Windows. 
*   Talos’ vulnerability research team used Protocol Buffers developed by Google to serialize and deserialize test cases. 
*   The Bochscpu backend of WTF was patched and other tricks were used to make snapshot fuzzing work correctly 
*   We hope that the release of our snapshot fuzzing implementation details will give new snapshot fuzzing ideas to the readers making direct composition more secure.

Direct Composition is a feature first introduced in Windows 8 that enables high-performance bitmap composition with transformations, effects and animations that are abstracted as kernel objects. These kernel objects are later serialized and sent to DWM (Desktop Window Manager) to be rendered on screen. 

The fact that kernel objects can be created and manipulated directly using system calls made it an attractive attack surface. Researchers have demonstrated how adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities in Direct Composition, such as in competitions like Pwn2Ownimplement.  

Although there is public research on Direct Composition, only a few discuss fuzzing this feature, and none, to our knowledge, that covers snapshot fuzzing.  Therefore, we wanted to research how to apply snapshot fuzzing to Direct Composition and implement a fuzzer using the publicly available WTF snapshot fuzzer. 

**Past work on fuzzing Direct Composition **

Security researchers Peng Qiu and SheFang Zhong of the Qihoo 360 Vulcan Team first published research on vulnerabilities in Direct Composition in the conference talk “Win32k Dark Composition: Attacking the Shadow Part of Graphic Subsystem.” This research showed how to trigger and eventually fuzz Direct Composition-related code. By fuzzing the exposed code, security researchers could uncover potential vulnerabilities in Direct Composition, a feature that had never been publicly dissected for finding vulnerabilities 

More recently at HITB conference in 2023, researchers from Hillstone Networks presented a talk about using a modified version of the fuzzing framework syzkaller to fuzz Direct Composition. First, they fuzzed the kernel component with code coverage. With the generated corpus, at the end of each test case they added a call to NtDCompositionCommitChannel which triggers userland DWM to process the data. They fuzzed again with the modified corpus, and as a result, found vulnerabilities in DWM. Although syzkaller runs with full system virtualization, it is not a snapshot fuzzer and their approach did not collect coverage on DWM. 

**“What The Fuzz,” snapshot-based fuzzer **

Wtf (“what the fuzz”) is a snapshot-based fuzzer for Windows targets developed by a researcher named Axel Souchet. After it was first released, researchers quickly started using it to fuzz various targets. It supports several backends to execute the snapshot, such Bochscpu, Windows Hypervisor Framework and KVM. Wtf also supports mutators such as hongfuzz and libfuzzer mutators by default. 

To get fuzzing working, researchers must create a memory snapshot and create a customized fuzzer that mutates the test case, copies it into the loaded snapshot’s guest memory space and installs breakpoints strategically to detect crashes, context switches, or restore snapshots. Then, wtf handles the rest. 

We were also interested in using wtf to fuzz potentially high-severity targets. Naturally, we investigated using it to fuzz Direct Composition to try and build off the previous research into Direct Composition. 

**Challenges in fuzzing Direct Composition **

Direct Composition consists of a kernel component and a userland component. A user can execute system calls to interface with the kernel component. When targeting the kernel, it can be fuzzed using a traditional Windows system call fuzzing with tailored grammar, which was the case the 360 Vulcan Team’s research. 

However, fuzzing the userland component is a bit tricky. Direct Composition-related internal kernel objects, which are created by system calls, are serialized and sent to the userland DWM for processing when the NtDCompositionCommitChannel system call is executed. The fuzzer needs to detect if dwm.exe has crashed while processing the data sent from the kernel. This can be tricky in the perspective of snapshot fuzzing because the fuzzing harness that is executed inside the guest lives in a different address space than that of dwm.exe process. Therefore, wtf can only catch the guest fuzzing harness itself crashing (which is a bug in the fuzzer itself) but not the dwm.exe process. Workaround can be making the guest fuzzing harness monitor the status of dwm.exe after each test case execution (e.g., PID change) and crash itself to notify wtf. However, this is very inefficient, especially when using a slow backend like Bochscpu. 

Another issue is that the context switch happens between the execution of the kernel and userland component, so fuzzing must continue until dwm.exe processes data ignoring context switches that happen. The Bochscpu backend, for example, checks whether the CR3 value has changed and automatically restores the snapshot if it did, ending the test case execution. 

**Our fuzzing approach **

We developed a custom fuzzer for Direct Composition using wtf while adding some tricks to overcome the challenges of fuzzing Direct Composition with snapshots. The following diagram explains how our fuzzing approach works using wtf.   

Each stage of our custom fuzzer is explained in detail in the following sections. All the components described in the diagram are part of wtf. 

**Test case generation and mutation **

Dcgen (Direct Composition generator) implements various code generators that each generate an instruction for our interpreter called dcpreter (Direct Composition interpreter) which maps to a related Direct Composition system call. When wtf requests a new test case, it randomly selects a series of code generators and, as a result, it will have a test case. The test case is interpreted by dcpreter, which is executed inside the guest. 

While executing a code generator, newly generated instruction is interpreted with an abstract interpreter which understands side effects such as a new resource being generated with a handle (should be saved for further reference and must not be reused for creation). This information is saved and later used by code generators to make decisions. The following code is an example of a simple code generator for generating instructions that correlate to NtDCompositionCreateChannel system call. 

First, it adds a new instruction to the current test case and sets the opcode of the instruction as OP_CREATE_CHANNEL (opcode defined in Protocol Buffers file explained in next section) which when interpreted NtDCompositionCreateChannel is called by dcpreter. 

Here is a bit more complex one. 

Generating an instruction for setting integer property on resource marshaler.

This code generator generates an instruction that sets a value to an integer property type randomly chosen that the specific resource marshaler supports. First, it randomly selects a resource handle that should be available when the test case is executed sequentially in the snapshot and gets a pointer to CMarshaler object which stores information about the specific resource type the handle represents. Using this object dcgen knows what integer property types are valid and chooses one. 

Mutation is remarkably like generation. Dcmutate (Direct Composition mutator), instead of generating instructions, first abstract interprets instructions inside the test case sequentially. But in the middle of this process, mutator randomly decides if it mutates the current instruction, it is processing. If it decides to do so, it will mutate that instruction and abstract interpret the mutated instruction instead and continue processing the remaining instructions in the test case. This could include changing the operands of the instruction (arguments to the system call) or replacing the instruction with a completely different type of instruction. 

Mutating an instruction that sets an integer property. 

It retrieves a pointer to an object which represents part of the mutated instruction. By changing the fields referenced from this object, dcmutate mutates the operands in the instruction. In this case, it randomly chooses between three cases where it changes the integer property type and/or the assigning value. 

**Serialization and deserialization of test cases **

To pass the test case to the guest, we used Protocol Buffers to serialize and deserialize the test case and defined an “inst.proto” file that models each Direct Composition system call with interpreter instructions. Message formats defined in the file with Protocol Bufferswere used when generating and mutating instructions inside the test case. 

Proto file for defining dcpreter instructions. 

As explained previously, dcpreter runs inside the guest and deserializes the test case using the Protocol Buffers library and starts interpretation. 

Main interpretation loop. 

This big switch statement shows how each instruction is interpreted. For OP\_CREATE\_CHANNEL, you can see that NtDCompositionCreateChannel is actually called here and saves the handle for the created channel. 

**Patching Bochscpu Backend **

When you call NtDCompositionCommitChannel, serialized kernel data structures will be sent to userland DWM for further processing. In the process, context switching can occur, which will stop Bochscpu emulation and restore the snapshot as mentioned in the previous section. If you intend to only fuzz the kernel component of the Direct Composition it is acceptable, but if you want to fuzz the dwm.exe, it is a problem. 

To avoid this, you can change the code in the Bochscpu backend that detects CR3 change and stops the emulation. For our purpose, the current CR3 value must be tracked to know when Bochscpu has switched to the original process context. 

Ignoring CR3 changes. 

In TlbControlHook, instead of restoring the snapshot if the initial CR3 value and new CR3 do not match, we save the new CR3 value and continue with the emulation.  

Ignoring breakpoints when CR3 doesn’t match. 

BeforeExecutionHook checks whether the breakpoint is set on the current instruction pointer and dispatches the breakpoint handler accordingly. Since breakpoints are saved as a virtual address when it has an initial CR3 value, saved breakpoint addresses will be invalid if bochscpu is executing in a different context. Therefore, a check is added to do nothing if the current CR3 doesn’t match the initial CR3 value. 

To reduce edge coverage tracking overhead, if the current CR3 doesn’t match that of when the snapshot was generated, we made a patch to not log the edge coverage to avoid tracking code that is not directly related to fuzzing. 

Ignoring edge recording. 

Finally, when restoring the snapshot, the variable that stores the current CR3 value must be restored to the initial CR3. 

Restoring the CR3. 

**Injecting dcpreter to dwm.exe **

To catch any user process crashes, breakpoints should be installed on user mode crash handlers. However, if the dcpreter.exe is executed as a separate process and a snapshot is created in that process context, how will wtf catch dwm.exe crashing? 

To solve this problem, dcpreter must be executed in the same process context as dwm.exe. To achieve this, dcpreter is implemented as a DLL and injected into dwm.exe with an injector. Before dcpreter starts to deserialize the test case from memory, a snapshot must be created, and breakpoints need to be installed on user mode crash handlers in the dwm.exe context. Then, breakpoints will be triggered while fuzzing if dwm.exe crashes. 

However, there were additional implementation issues that needed to be solved. Libprotobuf, which is statically linked to dcpreter, uses thread local storage (TLS) internally which makes dcpreter crash when it is injected to dwm.exe. You can define the specific macro GOOGLE\_PROTOBUF\_NO\_THREADLOCAL to disable the use of TLS, but it falls back to using pthread instead, which is not available on Windows. This can be solved by compiling with the Windows port of pthread library called pthread-win32. 

**Installing breakpoints **

Wtf has a function named SetupUsermodeCrashDetectionHooks() which will install breakpoints that will be triggered when a userland crash happens. Calling this function at the initialization stage of our custom fuzzer will allow us to detect dwm.exe crashes and immediately restore the snapshot and continue fuzzing after saving the test case. 

Furthermore, you need to make sure that an appropriate breakpoint is installed which marks the end of a single test case execution. If not, the test case always times out, slowing down the overall fuzzing speed. This should be a location inside dwmcore.dll where it finished processing data from the kernel. By looking at call stack of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, we decided to test the withsetting breakpoint at the end of dwmcore!CKernelTransport::DispatchBatches. 

**Miscellaneous **

While testing our fuzzing setup, we noticed that it always crashes at the function named D3D10Warp!ProcessorThreadSpecificData::ExecuteProgram_JIT when it is executed inside the snapshot. We used wtf’s backend SimulateReturnFromFunction() to return from this function without actually doing anything which made it no longer crash in the snapshot. 

**Results **

We have fuzzed Direct Composition with our custom fuzzer and successfully caught dwm.exe crashes using generated test cases. 

The size of each test case greatly affects the execution speed, as it relates to the number of system calls executed. The system call requires emulating a large number of machine instructions by Bochscpu that are not directly related to fuzzing Direct Composition. This should be reduced for better performance. There are some unpatched denial-of-service kernel bugs that exist, which are triggered using a small combination of system calls. Therefore, a large test case has a higher probability of terminating the test case early. Although our fuzzer works as intended, there is still a lot of room for improvement. 

**Future Research ****Batch processing **

There are some features inside Direct Composition that can only be executed by the so-called “batch command,” such as setting a property value in a kernel object. Batch commands are handled by calling NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer. Multiple batch commands can be executed with a single system call which reduces the bottleneck of switching between kernel and userland. For the ease of fuzzer implementation however, only a single batch command is included in every batch processing system call. Supporting multiple batch commands in a single NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer call test case generation and mutation will significantly increase the fuzzing speed. 

**Targeting race condition **

Since mapped shared memory used in Direct Composition can be manipulated from the kernel and userland, Direct Composition can be vulnerable to race conditions, which was the case with some of the vulnerabilities found by Hillstone Networks researchers. Although our fuzzer can generate such test cases, it will be interesting to aid the fuzzer in generating a test case that specifically targets race conditions. 

**Faster and better mutation **

Although basic mutation is already available, it can be improved. For example, some resource types take structured data as property value and how it is generated and mutated affects the quality of fuzzing. Because there are so many resource types, there is more work to be done to improve the correctness. Furthermore, the mutation itself is quite heavy since each instruction in the test case is abstractly interpreted again. Reducing the need for abstract interpreting every single instruction will also greatly improve overall performance. 

**Maintenance **

When a new Windows build is released, there is a chance that the Direct Composition component will be updated. It is a tedious job to check which resource type was removed or added etc. Automatic extraction of available resource types and their properties can greatly help maintain our fuzzer. There are currently more than 200 types of resource marshalers and manual maintenance requires a lot of work. Using scripting on popular disassemblers may help with this research.

Snapshot fuzzing direct composition with WTF

Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks.

Monday, October 16, 2023 11:10

**Overview **

*   Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks. This affects both physical and virtual devices running Cisco IOS XE software that also have the HTTP or HTTPS Server feature enabled.  
*   Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, effectively granting them full control of the compromised device and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity.  
*   The recommendation that Cisco has provided in its security advisory to disable the HTTP server feature on internet-facing systems is consistent with not only best practices but also guidance the U.S. government has provided in the past on mitigating risk from internet-exposed management interfaces.  
*   Cisco support centers collaborated with the security team after using methods and procedures to correlate similar indicators in a very small number of cases out of our normal substantial daily case volume.  
*   This is a **critical vulnerability**, and we strongly recommend affected entities immediately implement the steps outlined in Cisco’s PSIRT advisory. 

**Cisco identifies suspicious activity **

We discovered early evidence of potentially malicious activity on September 28, 2023, when a case was opened with Cisco's Technical Assistance Center (TAC) that identified unusual behavior on a customer device. Upon further investigation, we observed what we have determined to be related activity as early as September 18. The activity included an authorized user creating a local user account under the username “cisco\_tac\_admin” from a suspicious IP address (5.149.249\[.\]74). Instances of this activity ended on October 1, and we did not observe any other associated behavior at that time other than the suspicious account creation.  

On October 12, Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) and TAC detected what we later determined to be an additional cluster of related activity that began on that same day. In this cluster, an unauthorized user was observed creating a local user account under the name “cisco\_support” from a second suspicious IP address (154.53.56\[.\]231). Unlike the September case, this October activity included several subsequent actions, including the deployment of an implant consisting of a configuration file (“cisco\_service.conf”). The configuration file defines the new web server endpoint (URI path) used to interact with the implant. That endpoint receives certain parameters, described in more detail below, that allows the actor to execute arbitrary commands at the system level or IOS level. For the implant to become active, the web server must be restarted; in at least one observed case the server was not restarted so the implant never became active despite being installed. 

The implant is saved under the file path “/usr/binos/conf/nginx-conf/cisco\_service.conf” that contains two variable strings made up of hexadecimal characters. The implant is not persistent—meaning a device reboot will remove it—but the newly created local user accounts remain active even after system reboots. The new user accounts have level 15 privileges, meaning they have full administrator access to the device. This privileged access to the devices and subsequent creation of new users is tracked as CVE-2023-20198. 

We assess that these clusters of activity were likely carried out by the same actor. Both clusters appeared close together, with the October activity appearing to build off the September activity. The first cluster was possibly the actor’s initial attempt and testing their code, while the October activity seems to show the actor expanding their operation to include establishing persistent access via deployment of the implant. 

**Initial access **

The new CVE-2023-20198 vulnerability received the highest Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score (10/critical). Successful exploitation would grant an attacker full administrator privileges, allowing them to effectively take full control of the affected router and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity. 

**Implant delivery **

Leveraging existing detections, we observed the actor exploiting CVE-2021-1435, for which Cisco provided a patch in 2021, to install the implant after gaining access to the device. We have also seen devices fully patched against CVE-2021-1435 getting the implant successfully installed through an as of yet undetermined mechanism. 

**Implant analysis **

The implant is based on the Lua programming language and consists of 29 lines of code that facilitates the arbitrary command execution. The attacker must create an HTTP POST request to the device, which delivers the following three functions (Figure 1): 

1.  The first function is dictated by the “menu” parameter, which must exist and must be non-empty. This returns a string of numbers surrounded by forward-slashes, which we suspect might represent the implant’s version or installation date. 

2.  The second function is dictated by the “logon\_hash” parameter, which must be set to “1”. This returns an 18-character hexadecimal string that is hardcoded into the implant. 

3.  The third function is also dictated by the “logon\_hash” parameter, which checks to see if the parameter matches a 40-character hexadecimal string that is hardcoded into the implant. A second parameter used here is “common\_type”, which must be non-empty, and whose value determines whether the code is executed at the system level or IOS level. If the code is executed at the system level, this parameter must be set to “subsystem”, and if it is executed at the IOS level, the parameter must be “iox”. The IOX commands are executed at privilege level 15.  

Figure 1: Implant code 

In most instances we have observed of this implant being installed, both the 18-character hexadecimal string in the second function and the 40-character hexadecimal string in the third function are unique, although in some cases, these strings were the same across different devices. This suggests there is a way for the actor to compute the value used in the third function from the value returned by the second function, acting as a form of authentication required for the arbitrary command execution provided in the third function. 

**Guidance and mitigation **

We strongly recommend organizations that may be affected by this activity immediately implement the guidance outlined in Cisco’s Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) advisory. 

Organizations should look for unexplained or newly created users on devices as evidence of potentially malicious activity relating to this threat. One method to identify if the implant is present is to run the following command against the device, where the "DEVICEIP” portion is a placeholder for the IP address of the device to check:  

curl -k -X POST "https\[:\]//DEVICEIP/webui/logoutconfirm.html?logon\_hash=1" 

Note: The above check should use the HTTP scheme if the device is only configured for an insecure web interface. 

This will execute a request to the device’s Web UI to see if the implant is present. If the request returns a hexadecimal string, similar to what was outlined in the third function above, the implant is present. We note this will only work as an indication of compromise if the web server was restarted by the actor after the implant was installed.  

We also have the following Snort coverage to address this threat. The first Snort ID is an older rule that covers CVE-2021-1435, and the last three alert if interaction with the implant occurs:  

*   **3:50118:2**  
*   **3:62527:1** 
*   **3:62528:1** 
*   **3:62529:1**  

The recommendation that Cisco has provided in its security advisory to disable the HTTP/S server feature on internet-facing systems is consistent with best practices and also guidance the U.S. government has provided in the past on mitigating risk from internet-exposed management interfaces. This is also in line with Cisco’s ongoing work with industry partners as part of the Network Resilience Coalition. 

Cisco support centers collaborated with the security team after using methods and procedures to correlate similar indicators in a very small number of cases out of our normal substantial daily case volume. 

**IOCs **

5.149.249\[.\]74 

154.53.56\[.\]231 

**Usernames:** 

cisco\_tac\_admin 

cisco\_support 

In addition to the curl command referenced above, perform the following checks to determine whether a device may have been compromised: 

1.  Check the system logs for the presence of any of the following log messages where “user” could be “cisco\_tac\_admin”, “cisco\_support” or any configured, local user that is unknown to the network administrator: 

%SYS-5-CONFIG\_P: Configured programmatically by process SEP\_webui\_wsma\_http from console as user on line

%SEC\_LOGIN-5-WEBLOGIN\_SUCCESS: Login Success \[user: user\] \[Source: source\_IP\_address\] at 03:42:13 UTC Wed Oct 11 2023

Note: The %SYS-5-CONFIG\_P message will be present for each instance that a user has accessed the web UI. The indicator to look for is new or unknown usernames present in the message. 

2.  Check the system logs for the following message where **filename** is an unknown filename that does not correlate with an expected file installation action:  

%WEBUI-6-INSTALL\_OPERATION\_INFO: User: username, Install Operation: ADD filename

Active exploitation of Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface vulnerability

Plus, many of the world’s largest cloud providers are warning of a vulnerability that attackers exploited in August to launch the largest distributed denial-of-service attack on record.

Thursday, October 12, 2023 14:10

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

I didn’t feel like I wanted to write anything special or witty this week given the current events in Israel and the Gaza Strip, but I will certainly advocate for any assistance readers would like to provide to the various organizations and helpers who are trying to do some good for Israeli and Palestinian civilians right now.  

And since it’s still Cybersecurity Awareness Month, I also wanted to provide some links to various resources, blog posts and podcasts that I’ve found particularly helpful this month and I think you will, too. 

*   Countering the Rise of Ransomware (Cisco YouTube) 
*   Talos APJC Threat Update: How attackers are using AI 
*   The New Normal: How XDR is Tackling Social Engineering in Today’s World (Cisco Secure blog) 
*   CISA’s Secure Our World initiative 
*   Allied Against Hate: CISA resources for faith and community leaders 
*   Fact sheet: Improving Security of Open Source Software in Operational Technology and Industrial Control Systems 

**The one big thing **

Many of the world’s largest cloud providers are warning of a vulnerability that attackers exploited in August to launch the largest distributed denial-of-service attack on record. CVE-2023-44487, a vulnerability in the HTTP/2 protocol, was recently used to launch intensive DDoS attacks against several targets. The problem lies in the way that HTTP/2 protocol handles request cancellations or resets. When a client issues a reset for an HTTP/2 request, this consumes resources on the server as it cancels the corresponding stream. However, after issuing a reset, the client can instantly open a new stream. 

**Why do I care? **

Google said the attack in August was the heaviest DDoS assault it ever recorded at over 398 million requests per second, which the company said is more than seven times larger than any other its ever recorded. So, the sheer scale is certainly notable. If this type of attack was launched with a much larger botnet, the traffic volume could be orders of magnitude greater and have a much larger potential impact. As such, organizations are urged to patch or mitigate as quickly as possible. 

**So now what? **

Users of any products using the vulnerable protocol — individual companies like F5 and Microsoft have released individual advisories about anything that was affected — should make sure patches are implemented immediately. However, this issue is largely about appropriate DDoS mitigation techniques on your environment. A newly released Snort rule, SID 62519, can detect activity associated with this vulnerability.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Attackers have published the personal information of almost one million people who have Ashkenazi Jew heritage** after the adversaries breached genetic testing service 23AndMe. The list allegedly includes full names, sex and 23AndMe’s data on where their ancestry stems from. As of Wednesday morning, the company was still investigating the attackers’ claims but assumed it was authentic. Customers can learn more about their family’s heritage by providing identification data, health information, phenotype, photos and more to 23AndMe. A security researcher said the information looked authentic, and that it’s a sign that a data breach can be dangerous, even if attackers don’t end up manually breaking into a deeper layer of the network. (The Record by Recorded Future 23andMe scraping incident leaked data on 1.3 million users of Ashkenazi and Chinese descent)  

**Microsoft patched more than 100 vulnerabilities in its range of products as part of its monthly security update.** This batch included two zero-day vulnerabilities that had already been exploited in the wild and nine critical issues in the Layer 2 tunneling protocol. Meanwhile, Apple also released a security update Tuesday to fix two critical vulnerabilities in its iOS mobile operating system that were also being exploited in the wild. CVE-2023-42724 in iOS and iPadOS, has been exploited by attackers to elevate their access on a local device. Back on the Microsoft side, the company also used Patch Tuesday as an opportunity to fix security holes in their products related to the high-profile HTTP/2 protocol used to launch massive, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks earlier this year. (Talos, Krebs on Security) 

The International Committee of the Red Cross published new guidelines this week, **hoping hacktivist groups will follow during wartime to avoid affecting critical infrastructure and everyday civilians.** An increasing number of civilian hackers have become involved in international conflicts hoping to make a difference, especially in the Russia-Ukraine war and now again in Israel. The Red Cross’ new guidelines urge these groups and individuals to obey national laws, if appropriate, and follow the same set of rules for kinetic warfare that international humanitarian law (IHL) provides, and which are aimed at safeguarding “civilians, and soldiers who are no longer able to fight, from some of the horrors of war.” Some of the objectives put forth include not targeting civilian objectives, deploying any malware that may target military and civilian targets indiscriminately and adhering to these rules even if the enemy does not. (Washington Post, SecurityWeek). 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos Takes Ep. #157: Cybersecurity Awareness Month: The best practices for implementing multi-factor authentication 
*   Qakbot hackers now pushing Cyclops/Ransom Knight ransomware, Cisco says 
*   Qakbot hackers are still spamming victims despite FBI takedown 
*   Qakbot Attackers Remain Alive and Quacking, Researchers Find 
*   Researcher Spotlight: How looking at decades of spam led Jaeson Schultz from Y2K to the metaverse and cryptocurrency 
*   Vulnerability Roundup: 10 zero-day vulnerabilities in industrial cell router could lead to code execution, buffer overflow 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ATT&CKcon 4.0** **(Oct. 24 - 25)** 

_McLean, Virginia_ 

> Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland discuss the MIRE ATT&CK framework in “One Leg to Stand on: Adventures in Adversary Tracking with ATT&CK.” Even though ATT&CK has become an industry standard for cyber threat intelligence reporting, all too often, techniques are thrown at the bottoms of reports and blogs without any context never to be seen again after dissemination. This is not useful for intelligence producers or consumers. In this presentation, Nicole and James will show analysts how to use ATT&CK as a guideline for creating a contextual knowledge base for adversary tracking. 

**misecCON** **(Nov. 17)** 

_Lansing, Michigan_ 

> Terryn Valikodath from Talos Incident Response will deliver a talk providing advice on the best ways to conduct analysis, learning from his years of experience (and mishaps). He will speak about the everyday tasks he and his Talos IR teammates must go through to properly perform analysis. This talk covers topics such as planning, finding evil, recording findings, correlation and creating your own timelines. 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91**  
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991

**SHA 256: d5219579eec1819d52761730a72ce7a95ee3f598fcfd9a4b86d1010ea103e827**  
**MD5:** bf357485cf123a72a46cc896a5c4b62d  
**Typical Filename:** bf357485cf123a72a46cc896a5c4b62d.virus  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** W32.Auto:d5219579ee.in03.Talos

**SHA 256: 975517668a3fe020f1dbb1caafde7180fd9216dcbf0ea147675ec287287f86aa**   
**MD5:** 9403425a34e0c78a919681a09e5c16da   
**Typical Filename:** vincpsarzh.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd 

**SHA 256:** 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440   
**MD5:** ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e   
**Typical Filename:** iizbpyilb.bat   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.Agent.DDOH 

**SHA 256:** 7f66d4580871e3ee6a35c8fef6da7ab26a93ba36b80279625328aaf184435efa   
**MD5:** e9a6b1346d1a2447cabb980f3cc5dd27   
**Typical Filename:** профиль 10 класс.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Application\_Blocker