#git

### Summary A SQL injection vulnerability has been discovered in the the "Add News" functionality due to improper escaping of the email address. This allows any authenticated user with the rights to add/edit FAQ news to exploit this vulnerability to exfiltrate data, take over accounts and in some cases, even achieve RCE. ### Details The vulnerable field lies in the `authorEmail` field which uses PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL` filter. This filter is insufficient in protecting against SQL injection attacks and should still be properly escaped. However, in this version of phpMyFAQ (3.2.5), this field is not escaped properly can be used together with other fields to fully exploit the SQL injection vulnerability. ### PoCs 4 PoCs are demonstrated here to illustrate the potential impacts. #### PoC 1 - Postgres Time Based SQLi 1. Login as admin or any user with the rights to view and save news. 2. Navigate to "../phpmyfaq/admin/?action=news", click on "Add news", fill in some data, send and...

### Impact Navigation history, most viewed and favorite navigation items are returned to storefront user in JSON navigation response if ID of storefront user matches ID of back-office user.

### Summary The custom action behind WiX's `RemoveFolderEx` functionality could allow a standard user to delete protected directories. ### Details `RemoveFolderEx` deletes an entire directory tree during installation or uninstallation. It does so by recursing every subdirectory starting at a specified directory and adding each subdirectory to the list of directories Windows Installer should delete. If the setup author instructed `RemoveFolderEx` to delete a per-user folder from a per-machine installer, an attacker could create a directory junction in that per-user folder pointing to a per-machine, protected directory. Windows Installer, when executing the per-machine installer after approval by an administrator, would delete the target of the directory junction.

### Impact WP Crontrol includes a feature that allows administrative users to create events in the WP-Cron system that store and execute PHP code [subject to the restrictive security permissions documented here](https://wp-crontrol.com/docs/php-cron-events/). While there is _no known vulnerability in this feature on its own_, there exists potential for this feature to be vulnerable to RCE if it were specifically targeted via vulnerability chaining that exploited a separate SQLi (or similar) vulnerability. This is exploitable on a site if one of the below preconditions are met: * The site is vulnerable to a writeable SQLi vulnerability in any plugin, theme, or WordPress core * The site's database is compromised at the hosting level * The site is vulnerable to a method of updating arbitrary options in the `wp_options` table * The site is vulnerable to a method of triggering an arbitrary action, filter, or function with control of the parameters ### Patches As a hardening measure, WP...

### Summary The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. I have spotted currently two attack vectors ### Details 1. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. 2. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits ### PoC Here is a Netty branch that provides a fix + tests : https://github.com/vietj/netty/tree/post-request-decoder Here is a reproducer with Vert.x (which uses this decoder) https://gist.github.com/vietj/f558b8ea81ec6505f1e9a6ca283c9ae3 ### Impact Any Netty based HTTP server that uses the `HttpPostRequestDecoder` to decode a form.

### Impact The vulnerability [CVE-2023-49090](https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/security/advisories/GHSA-gxhx-g4fq-49hj) wasn't fully addressed. This vulnerability is caused by the fact that when uploading to object storage, including Amazon S3, it is possible to set a Content-Type value that is interpreted by browsers to be different from what's allowed by `content_type_allowlist`, by providing multiple values separated by commas. This bypassed value can be used to cause XSS. ### Patches Upgrade to [3.0.7](https://rubygems.org/gems/carrierwave/versions/3.0.7) or [2.2.6](https://rubygems.org/gems/carrierwave/versions/2.2.6). ### Workarounds Use the following monkey patch to let CarrierWave parse the Content-type by using `Marcel::MimeType.for`. ```ruby # For CarrierWave 3.x CarrierWave::SanitizedFile.class_eval do def declared_content_type @declared_content_type || if @file.respond_to?(:content_type) && @file.content_type Marcel::MimeType.for(d...

### Impact Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.2 and pre-release alpha and beta versions before 5.0.0-beta.3 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs. When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode [using `encodeurl`](https://github.com/pillarjs/encodeurl) on the contents before passing it to the `location` header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redirect allow list implementations in Express applications, leading to an Open Redirect via bypass of a properly implemented allow list. The main method impacted is `res.location()` but this is also called from within `res.redirect()`. ### Patches https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/0867302ddbde0e9463d0564fea5861feb708c2dd https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/0b746953c4bd8e377123527db11f9cd866e39f94 An initial fix went out with `[email protected]`, we then patched a feature regression in `4.19.1` and added ...

### Impact Logged in user can access page state data of pinned pages of other users by pageId hash. ### Patch ```patch --- src/Oro/Bundle/NavigationBundle/Controller/Api/PagestateController.php +++ src/Oro/Bundle/NavigationBundle/Controller/Api/PagestateController.php @@ -158,6 +158,13 @@ AbstractPageState::generateHash($this->get('request_stack')->getCurrentRequest()->get('pageId')) ); + if ($entity) { + $entity = $this->getEntity($entity->getId()); + } + if (!$entity) { + return $this->handleNotFound(); + } + return $this->handleView($this->view($this->getState($entity), Response::HTTP_OK)); } ```

### Impact KaTeX users who render untrusted mathematical expressions could encounter malicious input using `\includegraphics` that runs arbitrary JavaScript, or generate invalid HTML. ### Patches Upgrade to KaTeX v0.16.10 to remove this vulnerability. ### Workarounds * Avoid use of or turn off the `trust` option, or set it to forbid `\includegraphics` commands. * Forbid inputs containing the substring `"\\includegraphics"`. * Sanitize HTML output from KaTeX. ### Details `\includegraphics` did not properly quote its filename argument, allowing it to generate invalid or malicious HTML that runs scripts. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue or security advisory in the [KaTeX repository](https://github.com/KaTeX/KaTeX/) * Email us at [email protected]

### Impact KaTeX users who render untrusted mathematical expressions could encounter malicious input using `\def` or `\newcommand` that causes a near-infinite loop, despite setting `maxExpand` to avoid such loops. This can be used as an availability attack, where e.g. a client rendering another user's KaTeX input will be unable to use the site due to memory overflow, tying up the main thread, or stack overflow. ### Patches Upgrade to KaTeX v0.16.10 to remove this vulnerability. ### Workarounds Forbid inputs containing any of the characters `₊₋₌₍₎₀₁₂₃₄₅₆₇₈₉ₐₑₕᵢⱼₖₗₘₙₒₚᵣₛₜᵤᵥₓᵦᵧᵨᵩᵪ⁺⁻⁼⁽⁾⁰¹²³⁴⁵⁶⁷⁸⁹ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖʳˢᵗᵘʷˣʸᶻᵛᵝᵞᵟᵠᵡ` before passing them to KaTeX. (There is no easy workaround for the auto-render extension.) ### Details KaTeX supports an option named `maxExpand` which aims to prevent infinitely recursive macros from consuming all available memory and/or triggering a stack overflow error. Unfortunately, [support for "Unicode (sub|super)script characters"](https://github.com/KaTeX/...