Vulnerability discovered is related to the peer-to-peer (p2p) communications, attackers can craft consensus messages, send it to individual nodes and take them offline. An attacker can crawl the network peers using getaddr message and attack the unpatched nodes.

**Scope of Vulnerability Disclosure Policy**

Halborn’s vulnerability disclosure policy primarily addresses the following three situations:

*   Vulnerabilities discovered by Halborn that affect other entities
    
*   Vulnerabilities reported to Halborn that affect other entities
    
*   Vulnerabilities reported to Halborn that affect Halborn
    

Our CVE assignment scope includes all blockchain and Web3 products that rely on smart contracts written in Rust, Go, and Solidity as well as blockchain associated Web2 and Web3 infrastructure not covered by another CNA.

Halborn’s vulnerability disclosure policy covers all our products that do not meet one of the exclusion criteria below, except when the impact is deemed high enough that our risk-based approach would dictate otherwise.

**Reporting a Vulnerability**

Halborn welcomes reports from independent researchers, industry organizations, vendors, customers, and other sources concerned with product or network security. 

All security issues and questions should be reported via email to the Halborn Security Team at disclosures@halborn.com. Valid submissions will be acknowledged within 24 hours and reporters will receive a more detailed response to the email within 72 hours, indicating perceived severity and the next steps in handling the report.

When we report a security issue, we ask that you provide full details of the security issue including steps to reproduce and the details of the system where the tests were conducted and a clearly defined impact. 

We use CVSS version 3.1 to score vulnerabilities and consider several factors such as active exploitation, customer exposure, and public disclosure timelines while prioritizing response actions for issues.

**Handling & Disclosure Process For Issues Affecting non-Halborn Entities**

When a security issue is identified by Halborn engineers or disclosed via the reporting process, the following steps will be taken by Halborn to notify the respective parties to fix it:

*   Once we have confirmed the vulnerability, we will gather all the necessary information to communicate the details to the affected party.
    
*   Halborn will try to establish initial contact with the affected vendor via email regarding the vulnerability and provide supporting documents.
    
*   If we don’t receive a response from the vendor within seven days of sending the mail, another reminder will be sent. If the vendor did not respond or refuses to acknowledge the vulnerability within 14 days from initial contact, Halborn may publicly disclose the vulnerability.
    
*   If we receive a response from the vendor, we will notify them about the date of the vulnerability disclosure that we have set.
    
*   The vendor will be allowed 90 days to provide a patch or relevant fix for the issue. If provided, then the vulnerability will be disclosed immediately following the vendor’s patch or fix release.
    
*   If a fix is not provided within the 90 day period and no response is received from the vendor, Halborn will disclose the vulnerability on the determined date.
    
*   In the event that the vendor is unable to provide a fix within the deadline, but has communicated to Halborn regarding the same, then the deadline may be adjusted. A maximum of six months of coordination will be given to the vendor for fixing the vulnerabilities. After that the vulnerability may be disclosed regardless of the fix.
    
*   The 90-day deadline mentioned above is not a hard deadline. Halborn can shorten or lengthen the deadline based on criteria like the severity of the vulnerability, ease of exploitation, etc.
    
*   Until the completion of the disclosure process, Halborn will maintain confidentiality of any communication to and from the vendor. However, we will disclose the vulnerability to the public irrespective of the vendor’s support or not.
    
*   All CVEs assigned by Halborn and its vulnerability disclosures can be found in the Halborn Disclosures Page. Only the advisories present in the security advisory will be considered as official documents.
    

**Handling & Disclosure Process For Issues Affecting Halborn**

*   When a security report is received involving Halborn owned or controlled systems or products, it is assigned to an owner who is responsible for evaluating, coordinating remediation, and disclosing the issue as appropriate.
    
*   The evaluation process addresses the validity, impact, and scope of the reported issue and includes a review to identify any similar issues that might be present.
    
*   Fixes are implemented as necessary
    
*   An announcement date is decided for disclosure
    
*   Prior to public announcement, all affected stakeholders are given a period of time to implement any fixes needed
    

**Rewards for submission of security vulnerabilities**

For issues affecting non-Halborn products or systems we will make a good faith effort, to the extent permissible, to award credit to the reporter on our disclosures page.

For issues affecting Halborn a reward may be issued at the discretion of Halborn senior leadership. The reward will be issued primarily based on the severity of the finding, among other considerations.

To be eligible for an acknowledgement or bounty the following conditions must be met:

*   The vulnerability is disclosed to Halborn before it is disclosed publicly, and Halborn or the corresponding vendor are given sufficient time to fix it
    
*   The vulnerability is not disclosed to anyone else besides Halborn before it is fixed
    
*   The vulnerability is not exploited until it is fixed
    

We also require that reporters DO NOT: 

*   Cause potential or actual damage to Halborn, systems, or applications.
    
*   Use an exploit to view unauthorized data or corrupt data. 
    
*   Engage in disruptive testing including but not limited to DoS, fuzzing, automated scanning of cloud services, or any action that could impact the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information and systems.
    
*   Engage in social engineering (e.g. phishing, vishing, smishing) of Halborn or other organizations’ employees or customers.
    

**Vulnerabilities in Halborn’s Scope**

Halborn specifically prohibits any intentional behaviors that are designed to allow unauthorized device or network access, exposure of sensitive device information, or a bypass of security features or restrictions.

Vulnerabilities in Halborn’s scope include any design or implementation issue that substantially affects the confidentiality or integrity of the product and/or impacts user security. Common examples include:

*   Undisclosed device access methods or “backdoors”
    
*   Hardcoded or undocumented account credentials
    
*   Undocumented traffic diversion
    
*   Cross-site scripting
    
*   Cross-site request forgery
    
*   Mixed-content scripts
    
*   Authentication or authorization flaws
    
*   Server-side code execution bugs
    
*   Bypass of security feature (Bypass of AV/IPS engine)
    

Halborn will address any issues of this nature with the highest priority and we encourage all parties to report suspected vulnerabilities for immediate investigation.

The following vulnerability categories are considered out of scope of (unless a proven high impact is demonstrated) and will not be eligible for bounties or credit on our researcher list: 

*   Network-level Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) vulnerabilities.
    
*   Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) with low security impact (logout CSRF, etc.)
    
*   Client-side application/browser autocomplete or saved credentials
    
*   User, account or id enumeration via brute-force
    
*   Any kind of physical intrusion or social engineering attempts.
    
*   Missing Cookie flags or Missing/Enabled HTTP Headers/Methods (unless it leads directly to a security vulnerability)
    
*   Low impact Stack trace disclosures, Information disclosures and banner grabbing issues (Software and Server version disclosure etc.)
    
*   Reports that have not been validated from automated web vulnerability scanners and SSL/TLS scanners or port scanners.
    

*   Any low impact issues related to session management (i.e. concurrent sessions, session expiration, session refresh on password reset/change log out, etc.)
    
*   Vulnerabilities affecting only outdated user agents or application versions
    
*   Verbose error pages without proof of exploitability or obtaining sensitive information
    
*   Lack of SSL/TLS or SSL/TLS best practices that do not contain a fully functional proof of concept.
    
*   Incomplete or missing SPF/DMARC/DKIM records
    
*   Self-XSS
    
*   Unchained open redirects
    
*   Low impact Content Spoofing issues
    
*   UI and UX bugs (including spelling mistakes)
    

**Contact**

Halborn is always open to feedback and suggestions. If you would like to contact us to learn more about this Policy or to discuss any matter related to it, please feel free to email us at disclosures@halborn.com.

**Legal Notes**

We encourage security researchers to come forward with their findings and report them to us without fear of legal consequences. Halborn does not intend to engage in legal action against any researcher who has performed research according to current best practices for conducting and reporting vulnerability research. Security research must make good faith efforts to avoid violating any law, avoid any action that could negatively impact the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information and systems of either Halborn or its customers.

**Disclaimer**

All aspects of this Halborn Vulnerability Disclosure Policy are subject to change without notice at any time. Response is not guaranteed for any specific issue or class of issues. Your use of the information on the policy or materials linked from the policy is at your own risk.

**Change History**

Published: October 11, 2022.

Have concerns, want to learn more, or have a bug you’d like to disclose? Please reach out to us at disclosures@halborn.com.

Halborn is hiring! If you’re someone who can help make our products and this industry more secure, consider joining our team.

CVE-2023-30769: Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

Focusing on what customers and partners need from a company can help CISOs show the real financial benefits of improving cybersecurity.

Security has historically been seen as a cost center, which has led to it being given as little money as possible. Many CISOs, CSOs, and CROs fed into that image by primarily talking in terms of disaster avoidance, such as data breaches hurting the enterprise and ransomware potentially shutting it down.

But what if security presented itself instead as a way to boost revenue and increase market share? That could easily shift those financial discussions into something much more comfortable.

For example, Apple touted its investments into the secure enclave to claim that it offers users better privacy. Specifically, the company argued that it couldn't reveal information to federal authorities because the enclave was just that secure. Apple turned that into a powerful competitive argument against rival Android creator Google, which makes much of its revenue by monetizing users' data.

In another scenario, bank regulations require financial institutions to reimburse customers who are victimized by fraudsters, but they carve out an exception for wire fraud. Imagine a bank realizes that covering all fraud — even though it is not required to do so — could be a powerful differentiator that would boost its market share by supporting customers better than competitors do. How can the bank afford to do this? It increases security investments to the point where the projected fraud losses are materially less than the projected increase in revenue.

Or look at the case of a cloud provider, which could differentiate itself from most major cloud providers by improving uptime performance by focusing on reducing DDoS attack damage. Even further afield, an agriculture company that invested in better security could improve trust and bring in more partners, thus expanding into lucrative new markets. A wide range of companies can make the case for improving overall business performance by improving cybersecurity.

**Case Study: Brokering Cyber Insurance**

Another example of leveraging security to explicitly boost revenue comes from Marsh McLennan, a $10 billion business that bills itself as the world's largest insurance broker.

One of the biggest recent trends in cybersecurity insurance are insurance companies refusing to insure many enterprises because the enterprise does not have security that meets the strict requirements of that insurer. Although this does limit their potential losses, it also immediately threatens insurance companies' revenue because of the loss of premium income.

To maximize the number of companies that it can deliver to insurance companies, and thereby maintain its own revenue, Marsh evaluates companies. When a company's security profile isn't sufficient, Marsh taps its security company partners to bring that potential client's security profile up to where it qualifies for a policy with the insurance company. That's good for the company because it is able to get insurance and enjoy better security, it's good for the insurance company because it gets the premium revenue, and it's good for Marsh, which makes a proper and successful referral.

"We look at the client relationship as a holistic life cycle. Placing insurance is our bread and butter," says Katherine Keefe, leader of cyber incident management at Marsh. "Our clients need support in readiness: how to prepare, how to develop an incident response plan \[or\] tabletop exercises. We provide them with tools and solutions and support cyber preparation."

**Shifting From Defense to Growth**

Stephen Boyce, a director at Magnet Forensics, argues that when enterprise security executives focus on what prospects care about, and therefore help with revenue and market share, it can be the single most effective way to improve the security posture.

"What it does is create a shift in the relationship dynamic between the CISO and the CFO, and potentially the rest of the C-level team," Boyce says.

This does indeed have the potential to change the relationship dynamic, but SailPoint CISO Rex Booth stresses that such a change can only happen if the enterprise is ready for it. And, he adds, many are not yet.

"For way too long, security has been \[focused\] on conflict, where it should be an enabling function. And that does require a shift in the relationship dynamic of the CISO — a role that has traditionally been seen as purely risk reduction," Booth says. "This needs to happen at the proportion of companies that are mature enough to take their CISO and dual-hat them into not only a security role, but a revenue-generating role. Some are migrating in this direction, but most organizations are not there yet."

**Proving Value by Improving the Business**

Still, Booth says there are pros and cons at play. The argument against such a change — or at least slowing it way down — is that security departments today are severely underbudgeted, which means they are understaffed and find it difficult to properly defend the enterprise. That suggests that attempts to support sales will further dilute their attention and make a bad situation potentially worse.

The counter to that is that underbudgeted security operations are likely to always be underbudgeted. By making periodic moves to help sales — maybe just once or twice a year — it could illustrate to the CFO, the COO, the CEO, and the board the potential for using security to help with the bottom line. And, in theory, that could meaningfully contribute to security being budgeted a little better, which itself could be a huge help in defending the enterprise.

That is even more critical given that the core efforts of security are often difficult to prove from a value ROI perspective.

"If I do everything right from a security perspective, there's no way for me to tell the board, 'I saved you $2 million because of those ransomware events that never happened,'" Booth says.

The goal should go beyond getting prospects to convert to customers and increasing market share and needs to include customer retention, argues Bob Hansmann, cyber-risk and security product marketing leader for Infoblox.

"The enterprise needs to make sure that the services are not just up and available, but that they run smoothly," Hansmann says. "And security is the unit that is best positioned — in terms of experience, talent, and tools — to make that happen."

Security Is a Revenue Booster, Not a Cost Center

Categories: Business
Prevent port scanning attacks with Malwarebytes for Business. 



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The post Port scan attacks: Protecting your business from RDP attacks and Mirai botnets appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Compromised IP addresses and domains—otherwise legitimate sites that are exploited by hackers without the owner's knowledge—are frequently utilized to conduct port scanning attacks.

Port scanning involves systematically scanning a computer network for open ports, which can then be exploited by threat actors to gain unauthorized access or gather information about the system's vulnerabilities.

In this article, we will explain the two biggest threats utilizing port scanning attacks, RDP attacks and Mirai botnets, and how businesses can protect themselves using Malwarebytes for Business.

**Compromised detections: RDP attacks and Mirai botnets**

Cybercriminals typically conduct reconnaissance on the target port before using what are called dictionary attacks, entering and trying out known usernames and passwords to see if any of the combinations grant access.

The two most common detections of compromised IP addresses are systems scanning for open RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) ports and IoT (Internet of Things) botnets, such as Mirai.

Remote Desktop Protocol is exactly what the name implies, a tool for remotely controlling a PC that gives you all the power and control you would have if you were actually sitting behind it—which is what makes it so dangerous in the wrong hands. In fact, **one of the primary attack vectors for ransomware attacks** has been the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).

RDP port scanners, often found in the form of compromised servers, scan the internet for open RDP ports by trying the default port for RDP, **TCP 3389**. The cybercriminals that control the compromised server then try to brute-force their way in, repeatedly entering common username and password combos to find RDP login credentials.

Other than RDP, cybercriminals often perform port scans for various other network protocols, including FTP (20/21), POP3 (110/995), IMAP (143/993), SMTP (25/465/587), and SQL (1433/1434/3306). Gaining access through RDP and other network protocols allows attackers to infiltrate systems and deploy various malware.

Mirai, on the other hand, is a botnet primarily composed of Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as IP cameras, routers, and other internet-connected devices. Mirai actively scans the internet for open telnet servers on **ports 23 or 2323**, and, upon discovering one, attempts authentication using known default credentials. Such credentials are easy to find in many IoT devices—they're often the prepackaged combination of "admin" and "admin" for both username and password whenever customers first purchase a product to set it up. 

If successful in its malicious login attempts, Mirai compromises the device and integrates it into the existing botnet.

In addition to launching DDoS attacks, botnets like Mirai can aid hackers in weakening website security, stealing credit card information, and distributing spam.

**Protecting your business with Malwarebytes for Business**

Malwarebytes for Business offers a comprehensive solution to monitor and manage threats, including detections from compromised IP addresses scanning for and attacking open ports.

For example, Malwarebytes blocks the **IP address 5.39.37.10** as it is associated with the Mirai botnet, and **81.198.240.73** because it has been found to be involved in RDP probes or attacks.

**Brute Force Protection** policies in Nebula, our cloud-hosted security platform, can be configured to specify which protocols to protect, the ports used (default or custom), and create trigger rules. If set to monitor and detect, the policy will not block the ports. However, if set to block, it will utilize the Windows Firewall to block communications based on the configured rules.

When a block is implemented, the offending IP address will be placed in a "jail" for a predetermined duration, such as 30 minutes as shown in the example screenshot above. Blocks last a max of 60 minutes because IP addresses might be reassigned to legitimate users, or an attacker may leverage a legitimate user's IP address. 

There are two kinds of inbound connections that Malwarebytes can detect, Blocked Inbound Connections and Found Inbound Connections.

**Blocked inbound connections**

Detections with the following fields reported typically occur when a port is open and exposed to the internet:

*   **Type**: Inbound Connection
    
*   **Action** Taken: Blocked
    

These detections are prevented by the Web Protection real-time protection layer. When these detections occur, it means the IP address being blocked is scanning or attempting to force its way into the endpoint using different ports.

Malwarebytes blocks IP addresses that have a history of abuse and is correctly preventing malicious connections.

**Found inbound connections**

Detections with the following fields reported are typically a result of having open ports in the router or firewall:

*   **Type**: Inbound Connection
    
*   **Action Taken**: Found
    
*   **Detection Name**: RDP Intrusion Detection
    

These detections occur based on your Brute Force Protection trigger rule settings specified in the Nebula policy.

**Configuring Brute Force Protection in Nebula**

To configure Brute Force Protection in Nebula:

1.  On the left navigation menu, go to **Configure > Policies**.
    
2.  Select a policy, then select the **Brute Force Protection** tab.
    
3.  Select the following protocols for your workstations or servers:
    

*   **Workstation and server protocols**: Check mark the RDP protocol.
    
*   **Server-only protocols**: Check mark the **FTP, IMAP, MSSQL, POP3, SMTP, or SSH** protocols.
    

4.  Configure custom port settings based on your endpoint environment and protocol requirements.
    
5.  Create a Trigger rule based on the number of failed remote login attempts within a certain minute range across all enabled protocols. Choose to either **block** the IP address or **monitor and** **detect** the event when the trigger threshold is reached.
    
6.  Optionally, enable the option to **Prevent private network connections from being blocked.**
    
7.  When enabled, endpoints within private network address ranges will not trigger Brute Force Protection due to failed login attempts. This excludes the following network ranges:
    

*   **10.0.0.0/8** (10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255)
    
*   **172.16.0.0/12** (172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255)
    
*   **192.168.0.0/16** (192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255)
    
*   **127.0.0.0/8** (127.0.0.0-127.255.255.255)
    

8.  Click Save at the top-right of your policy.
    

**Safeguarding your business from compromised threats**

By leveraging Malwarebytes for Business' advanced threat detection and protection capabilities, businesses can effectively protect themselves against attacks that result from compromised IP addresses and domains, including RDP attacks (and attacks against other network protocols) and IoT botnets. Configuring Brute Force Protection in Nebula allows companies to stay one step ahead of cybercriminals and ensure the safety of their networks and data.

Protection from port scanning attacks is only one aspect of Malwarebytes for Business' multi-layered approached to defense, which includes an all-in-one endpoint security portfolio that combines 21 layers of protection.

Request Your Free Malwarebytes Business Trial

Port scan attacks: Protecting your business from RDP attacks and Mirai botnets

By Waqas
Is it a highly dubious claim by the infamous LockBit 3.0 ransomware gang? It looks like it!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: LockBit 3.0 Posts Dubious Claims of Breaching Darktrace Cybersecurity Firm

**Darktrace, a leading cybersecurity firm renowned for its AI-powered threat detection and response solutions, has swiftly dismissed LockBit 3.0’s statements.**

LockBit 3.0, a notorious ransomware gang known for its high-profile and some time making up attacks, has claimed to have successfully hacked, prominent Cambridge, United Kingdom-based Darktrace cybersecurity company.

The gang announced the breach on its dark web portal, where they posted images of Darktrace’s CEO Poppy Gustafsson that are already publicly available. Although LockBit 3.0 claims to have published the alleged stolen data, clicking the download links on the gang’s website only redirects users to Darktrace’s official website.

Screenshot from LockBit 3.0’s website (Credit: Hackread.com)

Darktrace, on the other hand, has issued a statement acknowledging the claims made by LockBit 3.0, but denying any breaches or malicious activity.

> **Our security teams have run a full review of our internal systems and can see no evidence of compromise. None of the LockBit social media posts link to any compromised Darktrace data. We will continue to monitor the situation extremely closely, but based on our current investigations we are confident that our systems remain secure and all customer data is fully protected.**
> 
> Darktrace

LockBit 3.0 has a track record of targeting high-profile organizations, such as a SpaceX contractor, and demanding hefty ransoms for the release of encrypted data. Yet, the group has faced allegations of fabricating claims about compromising new victims. For example, in a similar instance last year, LockBit 3.0 claimed to have breached cybersecurity firm Mandiant, which is owned by Google. However, Mandiant swiftly denied and dismissed the gang’s statements.

There has also been confusion regarding whether LockBit 3.0 initially meant Darktrace or DarkTracer, a Singapore-based threat intelligence and OSINT firm, as their victim. However, it is safe to say that neither Darktrace nor DarkTracer has been targeted or impacted by any breach. Read more about this on Twitter.

> The reliability of the RaaS service operated by LockBit ransomware gang seems to have declined. They appear to have become negligent in managing the service, as fake victims and meaningless data have begun to fill the list, which is being left unattended. pic.twitter.com/mfGhH93oYh
> 
> — Fusion Intelligence Center @ DarkTracer (@darktracer\_int) April 12, 2023

****Ransomware, a growing threat****

In recent years, ransomware attacks have become a major cybersecurity challenge, causing significant financial losses and reputational damage to businesses and organizations worldwide.

These attacks often result in data breaches, operational disruptions, and financial extortion, as victims are left with few options other than paying the ransom or facing severe consequences.

As the cybersecurity landscape continues to evolve, organizations must remain vigilant in their efforts to safeguard their systems and data from cyber threats. This includes implementing robust cybersecurity measures, regularly updating and patching systems, and providing comprehensive employee training on cybersecurity best practices.

1.  Hackers infiltrate Western Digital Internal Systems
2.  New Strain of Rorschach Ransomware Hits US Firms
3.  LockBit blames victim for DDoS attack on its website
4.  UK Criminal Records Office Hit by Ransomware Attack
5.  New Cylance Ransomware Targets Linux and Windows

I am a UK-based cybersecurity journalist with a passion for covering the latest happenings in cyber security and tech world. I am also into gaming, reading and investigative journalism

LockBit 3.0 Posts Dubious Claims of Breaching Darktrace Cybersecurity Firm

An "open" Internet faces challenges from autocratic governance models. Policymakers should instead think about creating an Internet that's equitable, inclusive, and secure.

In policy circles, we often hear about the need for a "free," "open," and "secure" Internet. This was most recently the case with the White House's Declaration for the Future of the Internet. Ideally, users benefit from all three properties. However, fundamental tradeoffs between them force us to look for other goals. These three properties present a "trilemma" — and we must choose _only two_.

As a supposedly "open" Internet faces challenges from autocratic governance models, policymakers should think instead about creating an "equitable, inclusive, and secure" Internet — criteria I believe are actually achievable with policy interventions.

"Free," "open," _and_ "secure"? Those are all slippery notions, but they have traditionally been operationalized by three properties.

"Free" has been understood to mean "permissionlessness" — anyone can send anything to anyone.

"Open" has been understood to mean common carriage. Common carriers (traditionally Internet service providers or ISPs) cannot filter content. This notion has been referred to as "net neutrality" in US policy debates.

"Secure" has been understood to mean reasonable protection against attack: Internet users should enjoy reasonable protection against both unfocused attacks (like distributed denial of service, or DDoS) and targeted ones (like ransomware).

    

Source: Nick Merrill

To understand this trilemma, let's start by understanding how security is achieved on the Internet today. Content distribution networks (CDNs) — like Cloudflare — use AI to defend against both large-scale and targeted threats. Due to their efficacy, CDNs have grown in their importance: Per recent estimates, CDNs now deliver three-quarters of traffic directly to users.

However, CDNs are not common carriage: Algorithms inspect content and make a judgment about whether to allow or block it. Let's call this strategy "secure with AI."

Could we have protection against cyberattacks _and_ common carriage? Yes: We could use cryptographic identities to authenticate traffic. Traffic could then be common carriage, and end users could decide which identities to accept (or reject) traffic from. The problem? In such a world, we lose the "free" or permissionless Internet, creating a scenario I call "secure with ID."

**Toward an Inclusive and Equitable Internet**

Which world do we prefer?

Let's start with the secure with AI world. We sacrifice common carriage: "Stop worrying and love the algorithm." Can AI be made inspectable, regulatable, and directly accountable to policymakers, and also be robust against attacks? These questions would guide us in understanding the workability of this approach.

Now, let's look at the other side: secure with ID. We regain common carriage but open up new avenues for discrimination. A properly engineered system should obfuscate users' exact identity (e.g., one's name), but will reveal which authority granted that identity (e.g., "Is this person American?").

In navigating these two worlds, inclusion and equity must be our north star.

Imagine you live in Ghana. As research on this topic reveals, people from countries like Ghana are regularly prevented from accessing websites, thanks to AI-powered "security" measures from CDNs. How can we make a democratically governed Internet more inclusive while retaining our democratic values?

In the "secure with AI" world, we would need Ghanaians (and others from countries in which connectivity is fast-rising) to sit at the table in which algorithms are governed.

In the "secure with ID" world, we would need to give Ghanaians robust digital identities — not only to hand Ghanaians identities,but to make these identities legible and usable in actual practice, and to give Ghanaians a say in how those identities work.

Which is harder? Which is more inclusive in practice? Which does a better job of assuring a democratic Internet, one subject to the will of the broadest number of people — not in theory, but in practice?

**Looking Over the Horizon**

Artificial intelligence, quantum communication, bioengineered pathogens: Various near-future technologies will require strict governance and sharp policy thinking.

These threats are — and I'll use a technical term here — scary. Here's where I take solace: If we can manage to govern the Internet, we'll find ourselves many steps closer to managing technology broadly.

The Internet governs the way technologies communicate with one another. As we govern transportation by placing roads and skies under publicly accountable institutions, we can govern technology — particularly AI — by placing Internet infrastructure under the right kinds of public accountability.

Democracy can find an answer here, and that answer will propel us closer to a model of democratically accountable technology.

What does that accountability actually look like? Answers to this question will help shape the future. Will our children, and their children, fear technology, or control it? Will they be watched over by technologies — by technocrats — or will they do the watching?

The Internet Reform Trilemma

**MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif., April 11, 2023** – Menlo Security, a leader in browser security, today shared results from the CyberEdge Group’s 10th Annual Cyberthreat Defense Report (CDR). This year’s report, sponsored in part by Menlo Security, highlights the growing importance of browser isolation technologies to combat ransomware and other malicious threats. This continues to be critically important as the research revealed that 78% of ransomware attacks include threats beyond data encryption.

Threat actors know today’s employees spend most of their time working in their web browser, making it both a critical business asset and an attractive attack vector if not properly protected. More than half (51%) of respondents use some form of browser or Internet isolation to protect their organizations, with another 40% planning to deploy this type of technology in the next 12 months. Furthermore, 33% of respondents noted that browser isolation is a key element of their cybersecurity strategy for protecting against sophisticated attacks such as ransomware, phishing and zero-day attacks.

This growing focus on browser security is validated by CDR findings that four in five respondents said that when victimized by ransomware attacks, which are often delivered through the browser, they faced the consequences of multiple threats if they did not pay the ransom. These multi-level attacks included threats to publicly release exfiltrated data (40%), notify customers/media of a data breach (42%) or commit a DDoS attack against the organization (42%).

“Evasive web threats, including Highly Evasive Adaptive Threats (HEAT), often come through the web browser and easily bypass multiple layers of detection in prominent security technology, resulting in malware, compromised credentials, and, many times, ransomware,” said Mark Guntrip, senior director of cybersecurity strategy at Menlo Security. “The CDR shows that the risk of ransomware delivered via a HEAT attack is becoming even more serious, with multiple threats in one payload. Preventing it is critical and browser isolation technologies are a highly effective way to do so.”

This year’s CDR notes browser isolation as an up-and-coming technology that allows employees to perform activities such as accessing websites, opening emails and downloading documents in an isolated environment in the cloud. Because the browser session is isolated, any malware, ransomware or other threats are unable to reach corporate systems, negating the effectiveness of even sophisticated attacks.

“It’s exciting to see browser isolation technologies embraced by CDR respondents, in part because they’re designed to improve security without affecting the end user’s experience at all,” said Steve Piper, founder and CEO of CyberEdge Group. “We think that we’ll all be hearing more about the importance of this type of technology in the future.”

**About the CDR**

In November 2022, 1,200 IT security decision makers and practitioners completed a 27-question online survey. Each participant was employed by a commercial or government entity with a minimum of 500 employees. Participants came from six geographic regions: North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The CDR gauges perceptions about cyberthreats and ascertains future plans for improving security and reducing risk. It empowers IT security professionals to benchmark their company’s security posture, operating budget, product investments, and best practices against peers in their industry and geographic region.

**About CyberEdge Group**

CyberEdge Group is an award-winning research and marketing consulting firm serving the diverse needs of information security vendors and service providers. Headquartered in Annapolis, Maryland, with 60+ consultants based across North America, CyberEdge works with approximately one in every six IT security vendors. The company’s annual Cyberthreat Defense Report provides information security decision makers and practitioners with practical, unbiased insight into how enterprises and government agencies defend their networks in today’s complex cyberthreat landscape. For more information, visit www.cyber-edge.com. The CyberEdge Group name and logo are trademarks of CyberEdge Group, LLC in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks and service marks are the property of their respective owners.

**About Menlo Security**

Menlo Security protects organizations from cyberattacks by eliminating the threat of malware from the web, documents, and email. Menlo Security’s patented Isolation-powered cloud security platform scales to provide comprehensive protection across enterprises of any size, without requiring endpoint software or impacting the end user-experience. Menlo Security is trusted by major global businesses, including Fortune 500 companies, eight of the ten largest global financial services institutions, and large governmental institutions. The company is backed by Vista Equity Partners, Neuberger Berman, General Catalyst, American Express Ventures, Ericsson Ventures, HSBC, and JP Morgan Chase. Menlo Security is headquartered in Mountain View, California. For more information, please visit www.menlosecurity.com.

Menlo Security Illustrates Importance of Browser Security as 4 in 5 Ransomware Attacks Include Threats Beyond Data Encryption

On affected platforms running Arista CloudEOS an issue in the Software Forwarding Engine (Sfe) can lead to a potential denial of service attack by sending malformed packets to the switch. This causes a leak of packet buffers and if enough malformed packets are received, the switch may eventually stop forwarding traffic.

**Date: April 11, 2023**

Revision

Date

Changes

1.0

April 11, 2023

Initial release

This advisory consists of two CVEs which affect the Arista CloudEOS product.

CVE-ID: CVE-2023-24545  
CVSSv3.1 Base Score: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)  
Common Weakness Enumeration: CWE-400- Uncontrolled Resource Consumption  
This vulnerability is being tracked by BUG 743423

CVE-ID: CVE-2023-24513  
CVSSv3.1 Base Score: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L)  
Common Weakness Enumeration: CWE-126 - Buffer Over-read  
This vulnerability is being tracked by BUG 764777

**Description**

This advisory details the impact of two issues discovered on Arista CloudEOS;

**CVE-2023-24545**: On affected platforms running Arista CloudEOS an issue in the Software Forwarding Engine (Sfe) can lead to a potential denial of service attack by sending malformed packets to the switch. This causes a leak of packet buffers and if enough malformed packets are received, the switch may eventually stop forwarding traffic.

**CVE-2023-24513**: On affected platforms running Arista CloudEOS a size check bypass issue in the Software Forwarding Engine (Sfe) may allow buffer over reads in later code. Additionally, depending on configured options this may cause a recomputation of the TCP checksum which could be leveraged in DDoS attacks.

These issues were discovered internally and Arista is not aware of any malicious uses of these issues in customer networks.

**Vulnerability Assessment****Affected Software****CVE-2023-24545******CloudEOS Versions****

*   4.29.1F and below releases in the 4.29.x train
*   4.28.4M and below releases in the 4.28.x train
*   4.27.7M and below releases in the 4.27.x train
*   4.26.8M and below releases in the 4.26.x train

**CVE-2023-24513******CloudEOS Versions****

*   4.29.1F and below releases in the 4.29.x train
*   4.28.5M and below releases in the 4.28.x train
*   4.27.8M and below releases in the 4.27.x train
*   4.26.9M and below releases in the 4.26.x train

**Affected Platforms****CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513**

The following products are affected by CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513:

*   All CloudEOS software forwarding instances, including:  
    *   All supported hypervisor deployments
    *   DCA-200-VEOS appliances
    *   AWS Marketplace
    *   Azure Marketplace
    *   Google Cloud Platform marketplace
    *   Equinix Network Edge

The following product versions and platforms are not affected by this vulnerability:

*   Arista EOS-based Hardware products:  
    *   720D Series
    *   720XP/722XPM Series
    *   750X Series
    *   7010 Series
    *   7010X Series
    *   7020R Series
    *   7130 Series running EOS
    *   7150 Series
    *   7160 Series
    *   7170 Series
    *   7050X/X2/X3/X4 Series
    *   7060X/X2/X4/X5 Series
    *   7250X Series
    *   7260X/X3 Series
    *   7280E/R/R2/R3 Series
    *   7300X/X3 Series
    *   7320X Series
    *   7358X4 Series
    *   7368X4 Series
    *   7388X5 Series
    *   7500E/R/R2/R3 Series
    *   7800R3 Series
*   cEOS-lab
*   vEOS-lab
*   Arista Wireless Access Points
*   CloudVision WiFi, virtual appliance or physical appliance
*   CloudVision WiFi cloud service delivery
*   CloudVision eXchange, virtual or physical appliance
*   CloudVision Portal, virtual appliance or physical appliance
*   CloudVision as-a-Service
*   Arista 7130 Systems running MOS
*   Arista Converged Cloud Fabric and DANZ Monitoring Fabric (Formerly Big Switch Nodes for BCF and BMF)
*   Arista Network Detection and Response (NDR) Security Platform (Formerly Awake NDR)
*   Arista Edge Threat Management - Formerly Untangle (Formerly Arista NG Firewall and Arista Micro Edge)
*   Arista Unified Cloud Fabrics - (Formerly Pluribus Netvisor One)

**Required Configuration for Exploitation****CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513**

In order to be vulnerable to CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513, the switch must be configured to run the Software Forwarding Engine (Sfe). Sfe is the default configuration on CloudEOS platforms.

switch(config#show agent Sfe uptime
Agent Name       Restarts       Uptime
---------------- -------------- -------
Sfe              1              0:29:49

**Indicators of Compromise ****CVE-2023-24545**

The following two indicators in combination might indicate system compromise for CVE-2023-24545:

#1 - The Sfe agent log will print warning messages once the number of packet buffers is reaching low levels (< 25% Buffers free).  The command show agent Sfe logs will include lines such as below:

I0719 13:58:07.860103  2994 Management.cpp:681\] Possible Packet Leak: <25% Buffers free(1273/131072)

#2 - Additionally, the command show platform sfe counters | nz | grep -i frag can be used to see if the platform is receiving fragmented packets.  In particular, look for large values in the counter:

ForUsClassifyIpv4-frag\_recv\_pkts          ForUsClassifyIpv4       module       packets 353771

**CVE-2023-24513**

No indications of compromise exists.

**Mitigation****CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513**

There is no mitigation / workaround for these issues.

**Resolution**

The recommended resolution is to upgrade to a remediated software version at your earliest convenience. Arista recommends customers move to the latest version of each release that contains all the fixes listed below.

**CVE-2023-24545**

CVE-2023-24545 has been fixed in the following releases:

*   4.29.2F and later releases in the 4.29.x train
*   4.28.5M and later releases in the 4.28.x train
*   4.27.8M and later releases in the 4.27.x train
*   4.26.9M and later releases in the 4.26.x train

**CVE-2023-24513**

CVE-2023-24513 has been fixed in the following releases:

*   4.29.2F and later releases in the 4.29.x train
*   4.28.6M and later releases in the 4.28.x train
*   4.27.9M and later releases in the 4.27.x train
*   4.26.10M and later releases in the 4.26.x train

**Hotfix**

The following hotfixes can be applied to remediate both CVE-2023-24545 and CVE-2023-24513. Due to the size of the hotfixes, there are multiple files. Each hotfix applies to a specific set of release trains:

Note: Installing/uninstalling the SWIX will cause Sfe agent to restart and stop forwarding traffic for up to 10 seconds.

**4.29.1F and below releases in the 4.29.x Train:**

**URL:** **SecurityAdvisory85\_4.29\_Hotfix.swix**  
**SWIX Hash:**  
SHA512

(SHA-512)c965e149cbbaa8698648af9290c5a728e9fe635186eee7629b789502ef37db4a94beea5ecd20e1dc8a19c2cc8988052b625cfccf764c28b8b0e9e4eef8e79bb4

**4.28.5M and below releases in the 4.28.x train:**

**URL:** **SecurityAdvisory85\_4.28\_Hotfix.swix**  
**SWIX Hash:**

(SHA-512)522d51c6548111d9819ef8b1523b8798ac6847012955e3f885c6f466c81468960fbd4497b45289c8f77297263111340fbdbd7003a30b64e3ef9a270ace62c079

**4.27.8M and below releases in the 4.27.x train:**

**URL:** **SecurityAdvisory85\_4.27\_Hotfix.swix**  
**SWIX Hash:**

(SHA-512)5ce5479c11abf185f50d484204555b2dfb9b1c93e8f475d027082ca0951cbfca0f331960a1dd111b8c079264b1dab31b0a62c8daf011afb27b1283c2382747a2

**4.26.9M and below releases in the 4.26.x train:**

**URL:** **SecurityAdvisory85\_4.26\_Hotfix.swix**  
**SWIX Hash:**

(SHA-512)9386f12a24f35679bdeb08d506bf0bddb9703d1ef3043de2c06d09ff47f2dd0d1bd7aca0748febb5b04fbdeaed7c4ae2922086fb638c754c3a9a5384306396d2

**For More Information**

If you require further assistance, or if you have any further questions regarding this security notice, please contact the Arista Networks Technical Assistance Center (TAC) by one of the following methods:

**Open a Service Request**

By email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.  
By telephone: 408-547-5502 ; 866-476-0000  
Contact information needed to open a new service request may be found at: https://www.arista.com/en/support/customer-support

CVE-2023-24513: Security Advisory 0085 - Arista

By Waqas
DDoS attacks have surged by 47% in Q1 2023, according to a StormWall report.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: US, India and China Most Targeted in DDoS Attacks, StormWall Q1 2023 Report

**StormWall projects a 170% increase in DDoS Attacks by the end of 2023 and urges businesses to implement mitigation strategies.**

Leading cybersecurity provider, StormWall, has released a comprehensive report on the state of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS attacks) in Q1 2023. The report, based on an analysis of attacks on StormWall’s clients across various sectors, reveals a significant increase of 47% in DDoS attacks compared to the same period last year.

The findings, shared with Hackread.com, highlight a worrisome trend of botnet usage and a growing practice of smokescreening to conceal multi-vector attacks.

The study reveals that attackers are increasingly targeting critical infrastructure and services, including logistical services, payment processing hubs, and banking systems, in an attempt to impact a larger number of users. The average attack strength reached a peak of 1.4 Tbps, and the longest attack lasted for 4 days.

Among the sectors targeted, the financial industry experienced the highest number of attacks, accounting for 34% of the total and witnessing a staggering 68% increase compared to Q1 2022. E-commerce also faced significant challenges, enduring 22% of the attacks and experiencing a 51% increase from the previous year. Telecommunications remained a popular target, with 16% of the attacks and a 47% year-over-year increase.

The use of botnets in DDoS attacks continues to gain traction, with over 38% of attacks leveraging networks of compromised devices. Additionally, the practice of smokescreening, where DDoS attacks are used as decoys in multi-vector assaults, increased by 28% compared to the previous year.

The report also reveals that more destructive HTTP attacks are becoming increasingly accessible to run. As a result, 82.3% of DDoS attacks targeted the application layer (L7), while 11.7% were directed at the transport (L4) and network (L3) layers of the OSI model. DNS was targeted in 2.3% of the attacks, and the remaining 3.7% were aimed at other targets.

Geographically, the United States (17.6% attack share), India (14.2%), and China (11.7%) remain the most targeted countries. However, the United Arab Emirates saw a notable surge in attacks, with the proportion nearly doubling from 3.8% in Q1 2022 to 6.4% in the current year. Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand, experienced a decline in DDoS activity as hacktivism subsided.

Targeted industries and countries

StormWall’s report emphasizes the escalating threat of DDoS attacks, as evidenced by the significant rise in attack volume, strength, and duration. With threat actors constantly adapting their tactics and integrating DDoS attacks within multi-vector incidents, organizations need to address not only outages from overburdened servers but also data breaches, ransomware, and other associated threats.

Based on data analysis from client-targeted attacks, StormWall projects a further 170% increase in DDoS attacks by the end of 2023. In light of these alarming findings, the company strongly recommends that all businesses seek professional DDoS protection to safeguard their online assets in the upcoming year.

1.  Significant increase in demand for stolen YouTube credentials
2.  DDoS attacks hitting BLM movement see widespread increase
3.  Vulnerable phones, IoT Devices: 400% increase in infection rate
4.  400% increase in cryptomining malware attacks against iPhones
5.  Israel Faces Fresh Wave of Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure

I am a UK-based cybersecurity journalist with a passion for covering the latest happenings in cyber security and tech world. I am also into gaming, reading and investigative journalism

US, India and China Most Targeted in DDoS Attacks, StormWall Q1 2023 Report

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Digital Assets Manager module of DNN Corp DotNetNuke v7.0.0 to v9.10.2 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted SVG file.

DNN Platform Version:

2022-01 (Critical) Moment.js Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-02 (Critical) CKEditor Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-03 (Medium) Stored XSS Injection Vulnerability Published: 9/28/2022

2022-04 (Medium) XSS in Digital Asset Manager Published: 9/28/2022

2022-05 (Medium) jQuery and jQuery UI Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-06 (Low) Unrestricted Website Redirect in Plugin Published: 9/28/2022

2022-07 (Medium) Knockout.js Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-08 (Medium) Secure Credential Disclosure Published: 9/28/2022

2022-09 (Critical) Newtonsoft JSON Security Updates Published: 9/28/2022

2022-10 (Critical) Sharp Zip Lib Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-11 (Medium) Log4Net Security Enhancements Published: 9/28/2022

2022-12 (Medium) Remote File Download and Path Traversal Published: 9/28/2022

2022-13 (Medium) Authentication Provider Bypass Published: 9/28/2022

2021-01 (Critical) Optional Telerik Removal Suggested Published: 8/24/2021

2021-02 (Critical) Anonymous User File Download Published: 8/24/2021

2020-07 (Low) jQuery Security Issue Published: 5/14/2020

2020-01 (Low) Interaction with “soft-deleted” modules Published: 5/7/2020

2020-02 (Critical) Telerik CVE-2019-19790 (Path Traversal) Published: 5/7/2020

2020-03 (Medium) Javascript Library Vulnerabilities Published: 5/7/2020

2020-04 (Medium) XSS Scripting Risk Published: 5/7/2020

2020-05 (Critical) Path Traversal & Manipulation (ZipSlip) Published: 5/7/2020

2020-06 (Low) Access Control Bypass - Private Message Attachment Published: 5/7/2020

2019-04 (Critical) Possible Unauthorized File Access Published: 11/22/2019

2019-05 (Medium) Possible User Information Discovery Published: 11/22/2019

2019-06 (Low) Possible Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Execution Published: 11/22/2019

2019-07 (Medium) Possibility of Uploading Malicious Files Published: 11/22/2019

2019-01 (Low) Possible Denial of Service (DDos) or XSS Issue Published: 4/16/2019

2019-02 (Medium) Possible Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Execution Published: 4/16/2019

2019-03 (Medium) Possible Leaked Cryptographic Information Published: 4/16/2019

2018-13 (Critical) Possible Leaked Cryptographic Information Published: 10/1/2018

2018-14 (Low) Possible Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability Published: 10/1/2018

2018-11 (Low) Possibility for Denial of Service (DOS) Published: 3/29/2018

2018-12 (Low) Possibility to Upload Images as Anonymous User Published: 3/29/2018

2018-01 (Low) Active Directory module is subject to blind LDAP injection Published: 3/29/2018

2018-02 (Low) Return URL open to phishing attacks Published: 3/29/2018

2018-03 (Low) Potential XSS issue in user profile Published: 3/29/2018

2018-04 (Low) WEB API allowing file path traversal Published: 3/29/2018

2018-05 (Low) Possible XML External Entity (XXE) Processing Published: 3/29/2018

2018-06 (Low) Activity Stream file sharing API can share other user's files Published: 3/29/2018

2018-07 (Low) SVG XSS Vulnerability Published: 3/29/2018

2018-08 (Low) Admin Security Settings Vulnerability Published: 3/29/2018

2018-09 (Low) Possible Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / CVE-2017-0929 Published: 3/29/2018

2017-06 (Low) Vulnerable ASP.NET MVC library (assembly) in Platform 8.0.0 and Evoq 8.3.0 Published: 7/5/2017

2017-07 (Low) SWF files can be vulnerable to XSS attacks Published: 7/5/2017

2017-08 (Critical) Possible remote code execution on DNN sites Published: 7/5/2017

2017-09 (Low) HTML5: overly permissive message posting policy on DNN sites Published: 7/5/2017

2017-11 (Low) Possibility of URL redirection abuse in DNN sites Published: 7/5/2017

2017-10 (Critical) Possibility of uploading malicious files to DNN sites Published: 7/5/2017

2017-05 (Critical) Revealing of Profile Properties Published: 2/17/2017

2017-01 (Medium) Antiforgery checks on Web APIs can be ignored in certain situations Published: 1/26/2017

2017-02 (Low) Authorization can be bypassed for few Web APIs Published: 1/26/2017

2017-03 (Low) Socially engineered link can trick users into some unwanted actions Published: 1/26/2017

2017-04 (Low) Unauthorized file-copies can cause disk space issues Published: 1/26/2017

2016-08 (Low) Certain keywords in Search may give an error page Published: 8/20/2016

2016-09 (Medium) Non-Admin users with Edit permissions may change site containers Published: 8/20/2016

2016-10 (Low) Registration link may be used to redirect users to external links Published: 8/20/2016

2016-07 (Low) Image files may be copied from DNN's folder to anywhere on Server Published: 8/20/2016

2016-06 (Critical) Unauthorized users may create new SuperUser accounts Published: 5/26/2016

2016-05 (Critical) Potential file upload by unauthenticated users Published: 4/21/2016

2016-01 (Low) Potential open-redirect and XSS issue on the query string parameter - returnurl Published: 3/16/2016

2016-02 (Low) Potential XSS issue when enable SSL Client Redirect Published: 3/16/2016

2016-03 (Low) Potential XSS issue on user's profile Published: 3/16/2016

2016-04 (Critical) Potential CSRF issue on WebAPI POST requests Published: 3/16/2016

2015-06 (Low) Potential XSS issue when using tabs dialog Published: 10/6/2015

2015-07 (Medium) Users are getting registered even though User Registration is set to None Published: 10/6/2015

2015-02 (Low) ability to confirm file existance Published: 5/26/2015

2015-03 (Low) Version information leakage Published: 5/26/2015

2015-04 (Low) Server-Side Request Forgery in File Upload Published: 5/26/2015

2015-05 (Critical) unauthorized users may create new host accounts Published: 5/26/2015

2015-01 (Low) potential persistent cross-site scripting issue Published: 2/4/2015

2014-03 (Medium) Failure to validate user messaging permissions Published: 10/1/2014

2014-02 (Critical) improve captcha logic & mitigate against automated registration attacks Published: 8/13/2014

2014-01 (Low) potential persistent cross-site scripting issue Published: 3/19/2014

2013-10 (Low) potential reflective xss issue Published: 12/4/2013

2013-07 (Low) potential reflective xss issue Published: 8/13/2013

2013-08 (Low) malformed html may allow XSS issue Published: 8/13/2013

2013-09 (Low) fix issue that could lead to redirect 'Phishing' attack Published: 8/13/2013

2013-04 (Medium) Failure to reapply folder permissions check Published: 4/3/2013

2013-05 (Low) Potential XSS in language skin object Published: 4/3/2013

2013-06 (Low) Non-compliant HTML tag can cause site redirects Published: 4/3/2013

2013-01 (Low) Added defensive code to protect against denial of service Published: 1/7/2013

2013-02 (Critical) Protect against member directory filtering issue Published: 1/7/2013

2013-03 (Low) Filter out unrequired tag Published: 1/7/2013

2012-9 (Low) Failure to encode module title Published: 11/15/2012

2012-10 (Low) List function contains a cross-site scripting issue Published: 11/15/2012

2012-11 (Low) Member directory results fail to apply extended visibility correctly Published: 11/15/2012

2012-12 (Critical) Member directory results fail to apply extended visibility correctly Published: 11/15/2012

2012-5 (Low) Deny folder permissions were not respected when generating folder lists Published: 7/2/2012

2012-6 (Medium) Module Permission Inheritance Published: 7/2/2012

2012-7 (Low) Cross-site scripting issue with list function Published: 7/2/2012

2012-8 (Low) Journal image paths can contain javascript Published: 7/2/2012

2012-4 (Medium) Filemanager function fails to check for valid file extensions Published: 3/7/2012

2012-1 (Low) Potential XSS issue via modal popups Published: 1/2/2012

2012-2 (Critical) Non-approved users can access user and role functions Published: 1/2/2012

2012-3 (Low) Radeditor provider function could confirm the existence of a file Published: 1/2/2012

2011-16 (Low) Cached failed passwords could theoretically be retrieved from browser cache Published: 12/14/2011

2011-17 (Low) invalid install permissions can lead to unauthorized access error which echoes path Published: 12/14/2011

2011-14 (Low) able autoremember during registration Published: 11/1/2011

2011-15 (Medium) failure to sanitize certain xss strings Published: 11/1/2011

2011-13 (Low) incorrect logic in module administration check Published: 8/24/2011

2011-8 (Low) ability to reactivate user profiles of soft-deleted users Published: 6/6/2011

2011-9 (Critical) User management mechanisms can be executed by invalid users Published: 6/6/2011

2011-10 (Low) Cached failed passwords could theoretically be retrieved from browser cache Published: 6/6/2011

2011-11 (Medium) remove support for legacy skin/container upload from filemanager Published: 6/6/2011

2011-12 (Medium) Module Permissions Editable by anyone with the URL Published: 6/6/2011

2011-1 (Critical) Edit Level Users have Admin rights to modules Published: 1/19/2011

2011-2 (Critical) Unauthenticated user can install/uninstall modules Published: 1/19/2011

2011-3 (Low) Failure to filter viewstate exception details can lead to reflective xss issue Published: 1/19/2011

2011-4 (Low) Remove OS identification code Published: 1/19/2011

2011-5 (Low) Add additional checks to core input filter Published: 1/19/2011

2011-6 (Low) Change localized text to stop user enumeration Published: 1/19/2011

2011-7 (Low) Ensure that profile properties are correctly filtered Published: 1/19/2011

2010-12 (Medium) Potential resource exhaustion Published: 8/17/2010

2010-06 (Low) Logfiles contents after exception may lead to information leakage Published: 6/17/2010

2010-07 (Medium) Cross-site request forgery possible against other users of a site Published: 6/14/2010

2010-08 (Low) update inputfilter blacklist for invalid tag that could allow XSS attack Published: 6/14/2010

2010-09 (Low) Mail function can result in unauthorized email access Published: 6/14/2010

2010-10 (Low) Member only profile properties could be exposed under certain conditions Published: 6/14/2010

2010-11 (Low) Profile properties not htmlencoding data Published: 6/14/2010

2010-05 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability in User messaging Published: 5/19/2010

2010-04 (Low) Install Wizard information leakage Published: 5/18/2010

2010-03 (Critical) System mails stored in cleartext in User messaging Published: 4/20/2010

2010-02 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 3/17/2010

2010-01 (Low) User account escalation Vulnerability Published: 2/17/2010

2009-06 (Low) 2009-06 Published: 11/26/2009

2009-07 (Low) 2009-07 Published: 11/26/2009

2009-04 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability when working with multiple languages Published: 9/2/2009

2009-05 (Medium) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability in ClientAPI Published: 5/20/2009

2009-02 (Low) Errorpage information leakage Published: 5/19/2009

2009-03 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 5/19/2009

2009-01 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 4/7/2009

2008-14 (Critical) User can gain access to additional roles Published: 12/24/2008

2008-12 (Low) Install wizard information leakage Published: 9/10/2008

2008-13 (Critical) Failure to validate when loading skins Published: 9/10/2008

2008-11 (Critical) Authentication blindspot in User functions Published: 9/9/2008

2008-4 (Low) Version information leakage Published: 5/27/2008

2008-5 (Low) Denial of Service attack Published: 5/27/2008

2008-6 (Critical) Force existing database scripts to re-run Published: 5/27/2008

2008-7 (Critical) Failure to revalidate file and folder permissions correctly for uploads Published: 5/27/2008

2008-8 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 5/11/2008

2008-9 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 5/11/2008

2008-10 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability when operating with multiple languages Published: 5/11/2008

2018-10 (Low) Custom 404 Error Page Vulnerability Published: 3/29/2008

2008-1 (Critical) Administrator account permission escalation Published: 3/19/2008

2008-2 (Critical) Validationkey can be a known value Published: 3/19/2008

2008-3 (Critical) Ability to create dynamic scripts on server Published: 3/19/2008

2007-3 (Low) HTML/Script Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 11/6/2007

2007-4 (Critical) HTML/Text module authentication blindspot Published: 11/6/2007

2007-2 (Low) Phishing risk in login redirect code Published: 7/20/2007

2007-1 (Medium) Phishing risk in link code Published: 4/5/2007

2006-6 (Medium) Anonymous access to vendor details Published: 11/30/2006

2006-4 (Critical) Cross site scripting permission escalation Published: 11/16/2006

2006-5 (Low) Information Leakage Published: 11/16/2006

2006-3 (Low) HTML Code Injection Vulnerability Published: 9/17/2006

2006-1 (Medium) Vulnerability in DotNetNuke could allow restricted file types to be uploaded Published: 8/2/2006

2006-2 (Critical) Vulnerability in DotNetNuke could allow access to user profile details Published: 8/2/2006

CVE-2022-47053: DNN Security Updates | DNN (DotNetNuke)

An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command vulnerability [CWE-78] in FortiADC 5.x all versions, 6.0 all versions, 6.1 all versions, 6.2.0 through 6.2.4, 7.0.0 through 7.0.3, 7.1.0; FortiDDoS 4.x all versions, 5.0 all versions, 5.1 all versions, 5.2 all versions, 5.3 all versions, 5.4 all versions, 5.5 all versions, 5.6 all versions and FortiDDoS-F 6.4.0, 6.3.0 through 6.3.3, 6.2.0 through 6.2.2, 6.1.0 through 6.1.4 may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via specifically crafted arguments to existing commands.

**Outbreak Alerts**

What you need to know about the latest cybersecurity attacks - VM2 Sandbox Escape Vulnerability

**Threat Signal Report**

Patch Released for Critical vm2 Sandbox Escape Vulnerability (CVE-2023-29017 and CVE-2023-29199) - Apr 12, 2023

**Research Center**

\[Insomni'hack 2023\] Hacking your Jump Rope or your Coffee Machine - Mar 24, 2023

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#ddos