Tag
#nginx
By Deeba Ahmed According to Microsoft, the new campaign is ongoing and uses a backdoor to install a patched version of OpenSSH to hijack targeted devices. This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Patched OpenSSH Exploited for IoT, Linux Cryptomining
SRS is a real-time video server supporting RTMP, WebRTC, HLS, HTTP-FLV, SRT, MPEG-DASH, and GB28181. Prior to versions 5.0.157, 5.0-b1, and 6.0.48, SRS's `api-server` server is vulnerable to a drive-by command injection. An attacker may send a request to the `/api/v1/snapshots` endpoint containing any commands to be executed as part of the body of the POST request. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Versions 5.0.157, 5.0-b1, and 6.0.48 contain a fix.
In Percona Monitoring and Management (PMM) server 2.x before 2.37.1, the authenticate function in auth_server.go does not properly formalize and sanitize URL paths to reject path traversal attempts. This allows an unauthenticated remote user, when a crafted POST request is made against unauthenticated API routes, to access otherwise protected API routes leading to escalation of privileges and information disclosure.
Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system for both manual and automated testing. Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks. The upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we've discovered that Nginx's `proxy_pass` directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy. This issue has been addressed in version 12.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade who are serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy should make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren't red...
### Impact Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks. The upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we've discovered that Nginx's `proxy_pass` directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy. ### Patches - Improved file upload validation code - Updated Nginx reverse proxy configuration for ***.tenant.kiwitcms.org** ### Workarounds If serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren't redefine them inside the proxy configuration. S...
Serenity and StartSharp Software versions prior to 6.7.1 suffer from file upload to cross site scripting, user enumeration, and reusable password reset token vulnerabilities.
Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system for both manual and automated testing. Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded. The upload validation checks were not robust enough which left the possibility of an attacker to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file. Exploiting this flaw, a combination of files could be uploaded so that they work together to circumvent the existing Content-Security-Policy and allow execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. This issue has been patched in version 12.3.
A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where a user that can create or update ingress objects can use a newline character to bypass the sanitization of the `spec.rules[].http.paths[].path` field of an Ingress object (in the `networking.k8s.io` or `extensions` API group) to obtain the credentials of the ingress-nginx controller. In the default configuration, that credential has access to all secrets in the cluster.
A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where a user that can create or update ingress objects can use a newline character to bypass the sanitization of the `spec.rules[].http.paths[].path` field of an Ingress object (in the `networking.k8s.io` or `extensions` API group) to obtain the credentials of the ingress-nginx controller. In the default configuration, that credential has access to all secrets in the cluster.
### Impact Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded, see [GHSA-fwcf-753v-fgcj](https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-fwcf-753v-fgcj) and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks, see [GHSA-2wcr-87wf-cf9j](https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-2wcr-87wf-cf9j). The upload validation checks were not robust enough which left the possibility of an attacker to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file. Exploting this flaw a combination of files could be uploaded so that they work together to circumvent the existing Content-Security-Policy and allow execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. ### Patches - File upload validation code has been improved - Kiwi TCMS will now force `Content-Type: text/plain` when serving uploaded files ...